Thursday, March 21, 2013

Hizb al-Nahdah - Husayn, Taha

Hizb al-Nahdah
Hizb al-Nahdah.  Formerly called al-Ittijah al-Islami (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique [MTI]), a political movement that, in 1988, adopted the name Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party).  Hizb al-Nahdah was the principal representative of Islamist thought and political expression in contemporary Tunisia.  The movement’s relations with the government have from the outset been contentious, but it has survived successive waves of repression.  It is thought to have the diffuse support of as much as one-third of the Tunisian population.

The contemporary Islamist movement traces its roots to the Qur’anic Preservation Society (QPS), a cultural association founded in 1970 in reaction to modernist reforms promulgated in the 1960s, and to the Pakistan based Da‘wah (The Call), which spread across the Maghrib in the early 1970s “calling” Muslims to return to the faith.  Out of this group emerged a nexus of activists who were satisfied with neither the cultural critique of the QPS nor the more personal approach of the Da‘wah, but who focused rather on the role of Islam in society and openly preached reform (tajdid).  As these sentiments sorted themselves out in the 1970s, young men with beards and women in the chador-like hijab (veil) became a common sight in Tunis and other cities.  By 1979, one group identifying itself as “progressive Islamists” and concentrating on the renewal of Islamic thought (ijtihad) had split off to pursue essentially intellectual matters.  The energies of those who sought political action coalesced around Rashid Ghannoushi (Rashid al-Ghannushi) and Abdelfatah Mourou.  Ghannoushi had recently returned from Syria, and Mourou, a jurist, had been studying at the Zaytunah Mosque in Tunis.  At a press conference in 1981, they announced the formation of the MTI, which officially called for the reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single party politics, and a return to the “fundamental principles of Islam” through a purging of what was viewed as well-entrenched “social decadence.”  Further, MTI representatives announced that they were seeking recognition as a political party according to guidelines established by the government in the preceding autumn.  That request was denied, and less than two months later most of the MTI’s leaders were imprisoned.

Despite this repression – or perhaps because of it – the MTI survived and even gained strength in the early 1980s.  The MTI found allies in other Tunisian opposition forces, including the Movement of Democratic Socialists and the new Tunisian League of Human Rights, and its discourse took on egalitarian and republican overtones.  Under pressure, the Tunisian government released MTI leadrs in 1984, and, in a symbolic gesture, the government outlawed the hijab.  As the MTI’s condemnatory rhetoric once again gathered steam, in spring 1987 the government intensified its efforts to eradicate the movement, arresting more than three thousand of its alleged supporters.  The party’s leaders were tried en masse before the State Security Court in August for ill-defined capital crimes, and several were sentenced to death in absentia.

The specter of politically motivated executions and uncontrollable social response created a backdrop for the coup instigated by Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali a few months later.  Islamists were the primary beneficiaries of the liberalizing policies introduced by the new regime.  Prisons were emptied, a multi-party system was embraced, and the franchise was restored to those who had previously been imprisoned.  The atmosphere of détente raised hopes among Islamists that they would be allowed to participate in the political system.  To comply with new rules prohibiting parties from capitalizing on religious sentiments, the MTI changed its name.

The renamed Hizb al-Nahdah reached a turning point in relations with the new regime in April 1989.  Without legal recognition, Islamists were prevented from participating openly in Tunisia’s first contested legislative elections, but the independent slates they fielded nevertheless garnered fourteen percent of the popular vote (thirty percent in certain Tunis suburbs) and sent shock waves through the government.  Al-Nahbah’s pending request for recognition was denied, educational reforms aimed at curtailing Islamist influence were implemented, and the movement’s leaders were taken in for questioning.  Tensions were exacerbated by the Gulf War, which fanned flames of anti-Western sentiment.  The death of one Islamist student, shot by government militia during a demonstration, sparked protests that inspired a new wave of arrests and further restrictions.  An assault by Islamists on an office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in February 1991, which killed one guard and injured another, heightened the political confrontation.  Al-Nahdah’s formal responsibility for that attack was never made clear, but together with the discovery in subsequent months of two alleged plots to overthrow the government, the event fueled a campaign of repression that resulted in more than eight thousand arrests.  In 1992, 279 al-Nahdah members were tried before military tribunals; leaders in the government’s custody were sentenced to life in prison.

It is unclear how much al-Nahdah was affected by the far-reaching efforts to stifle it.  However, its leadership did change.  In 1993, Rashid Ghannoushi was still formally recognized as the head of al-Nahdah (although since 1989 he had been in self-imposed exile), but Mourou formally dissociated himself from the unauthorized party in 1991 following the attack on the RCD office.  A new cadre of leaders emerged, and the government claimed to have uncovered a covert military wing.  Meanwhile, El fajr, the al-Nahdah publication that was to have illuminated its thought, was silenced.

Concerted pressures in the early 1990s made al-Nahdah less visible.  In particular, many young women ceased to wear the symbolic hijab.  There was evidence that the Islamist movement continued to enjoy popular support – perhaps more than ever in the wake of disappointment with the Ben Ali government.  A membership once described as young and chiefly comprised of students became aged, without obvious attrition.  Students, particularly those in religious and technical institutes, continue to supply recruits, but the Islamist message of social and political resistance and reform resonated in the humanities and social sciences.  The movement held particular appeal for sectors of society that have felt relatively disenfranchised by the modernist regime, and economic pressures only increased those sentiments.  Parents and others of an older generation were commonly identified as sympathizers, and the movement was supported from abroad by a broad network of Tunisian students.  It remained the most significant opposition group in contemporary Tunisia.  {See also Ben Ali and Ghannushi, Rashid al-.}

Renaissance Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Nahda, also Hizb Ennahda; French: Parti de la Renaissance) is an un-authorized Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia.

Originally known as Islamic Action, the party changed its name to Movement of the Islamic Tendency, and then in 1989 Hizb al-Nahda.[1] Although traditionally shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, starting in the 1980s they began to be described as moderate Islamist. They advocated democracy and a "Tunisian" form of Islamism which recognized political pluralism. They also discussed a "dialogue" with the West. These statements should not be misconstrued as they reject Western notions of liberal democracy and believe in an essentially Islamic constitution. Critics charge that one of their main leaders, named Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had a history of violence yet in courts he was accused by the ruling party of organizing a non authorized political party. Others say he supports any form multi-party democracy that offers a minimum of freedom for his party and followers.

Al Nahda a party published the banned newspaper Al-Fajr. The editor of Al Fajr, Hamadi Jebali, was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment in 1992 for membership of the un-authorized organisation and for "aggression with the intention of changing the nature of the state". Al Nahda members were allowed to stand in the 1989 elections but the movement was banned in 1991. The Arabic language television station El Zeitouna is believed to be connected with Al Nahda.
[edit] References
Renaissance Party see Hizb al-Nahdah.

Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.  Established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an al-Azhar graduate and religious school teacher and judge from Ijzim in northern Palestine, and a group of colleagues who had separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) declared itself to be a political party with Islam as its ideology and the revival of the Islamic nation – purged of the vestiges of colonialism and restored to an Islamic way of life – as its goal.  The party sought to achieve this goal by creating a single Islamic state, erected on the ruins of existing regimes, which would implement Islam and export it throughout the world.  Although the party never obtained official sanction, it enjoyed modest successes in Jordan and the West Bank until the suppression of the opposition in 1957.  It indoctrinated recruits; disseminated its ideas through leaflets, lectures, and sermons; and contested parliamentary elections.  The party early established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq.  Although the ascendancy of Nasserism hindered its effort to gain popular support, the early 1960s witnessed its growing confidence, which culminated in two attempts at a coup d’etat in Amman in 1968 and 1969.  Each of these coup attempts was coordinated with simultaneous arrangements in Damascus and Baghdad.  Other such plots emerged in Baghdad (1972), Cairo (1974), and Damascus (1976).

The party construed the Islamic resurgence as evidence of society’s reception of its ideas.  After the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, its optimism grew, based on the belief that the insincerity of political movements and regimes in the region had been exposed and that public opinion had appreciated the correctness of the party’s understanding of Islam and its radical approach to change.  Rigid adherence to its ideology made it unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic groups, and its confrontational approach brought it universal proscription.  In spite of the isolation and marginalization consequent upon this, its members were active in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa (especially Tunisia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,  Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and parts of Europe, including Britain, France, Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia.

Activities were coordinated and prioritized throughout the Arab-Islamic region, reflecting the party’s well-organized, highly-disciplined, and overwhelmingly centralized structure.  Membership was typical of modern mass parties, but the Hizb al-Tahrir exhibited totalitarian features, including a preoccupation with maintaining ideological homogeneity:  To this end the leadership adopted ideological material, which became binding on members.  Secondary school and university students and recent graduates constitute a significant proportion of new members.  Conceptions of authority and leadership within the party derived from the Islamic tradition:  executive power and authority were vested in a specific individual at each level of organization, but consultation (shura) also operated.  In addition, the influence of quasi-fascist ideas was discernible.

Alongside its avowedly political nature, the party was distinguished by a consistent system of thought and a coherent political program.  Central to the former was an attempt to construe Islam as an ideology superior to socialism and capitalism.  This ideology was comprised of two parts:  a rational doctrine that shapes Muslim thought and conduct and a system for ordering all aspects of Muslim life.  The latter, which issued from the doctrine, is the shari‘a.  The party urges Muslims to practice ijtihad in its ongoing elaboration.  It excludes all forms of consensus (ijma‘), except that of the Prophet’s companions, as a source of jurisprudence and rejects the rational effective cause (‘illah) as a basis for analogical deduction.  It also rejects the principles of general interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah), applying discretion in deriving legal rules (al-istihsan) and in acquiring good and repelling evil (jalb al-masalih; dar‘ al-mafasid).   This stance effectively minimizes the role of reason in juridic elaboration and suspends mechanisms designed to serve the community’s immediate interests and to take account of its changing circumstances.

The party considers the implementation of the shari‘a as the lynchpin in the restoration of an Islamic way of life and the state as a sine qua non for achieving this aim.  It upholds the classical model of the caliphate as the only authentic form of Islamic government, which it seeks to restore with its traditional accompanying institutions.  To this end, it has drafted a constitution detailing the political, economic, and social systems of the proposed state.  This document vests executive and legislative powers in an elected caliph, in whom most functions of state are centralized.  Citizens are encouraged to exercise their right to call the state to account through a political opposition based on the Islamic ideology and expressed through a system of party plurality.  Although involvement in politics is construed as a collective religious duty (fard al-kifayah), shura is not held to be a pillar of Islamic government.  The party emphasizes the distinction between shura and democracy and holds that democracy is not compatible with Islam.  It also denounces nationalism as a creation of unbelief.

The party’s program evidences an attempt to employ the constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize adopting modes of political organization and mobilization characteristic of the emergent modern, secular political parties contemporary with it in the Arab East.  The heart of this program is the endeavor to replace erroneous concepts, prevalent in Muslim societies due to both their decline and the legacies of colonialism, with the party ideology.  The objective is to create an extensive fifth column that will support the revolutionary state, which is to be established through a coup d’etat executed by the party and selected power groups that have been won over to its cause.  It also aims to politicize the Islamic ummah, and to expose conspiracies hatched against it by the West.  Its perceived role is confined to political and intellectual spheres:  it expressly refuses to involve itself in social, religious, or educational projects.

The party’s major publications include Al-takattul al-hizbi (The Party Formation), Al-shakhsiyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Way of Life), Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic Order), Mafahim hizb al-tahrir (Concepts of the Islamic Liberation Party), Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam (The System of Government in Islam), Nazarat siyasiyah li-Hizb al-Tahrir (Political Reflections of the Islamic Liberation Party), and Kayfa hudimat al-khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed). 
Islamic Liberation Party see Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.

Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan.  Name shared by two political parties that from 1978 until 1992 fought against the Marxist government of Afghanistan.  The better known and more influential of these parties was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the other by Maulavi Yunus Khales.  Both leaders were Pushtuns (Hekmatyar from northern Kunduz Province, and Khales from eastern Ningrahar Province), and their parties had their strongest bases of support in Pushtun regions of the country.

The origins of Hizb-I Islami can be traced to the efforts of a group of students at Kabul University who formed the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulmun) in 1969.  Initially an informal study group that was introduced to modern Islamic political ideology (particularly that of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, (or Muslim Brotherhood) by professors who had studied in Egypt, the Muslim Youth began active political organizing and recruitment in response to the increasingly strident efforts of Marxist parties to expand their base within the student population during the early 1970s.  The Muslim Youth was also concerned with the rapid secularization of Afghan society and the pro-Soviet direction of government policy, and its leaders railed against perceived corruption within the royal family and the traditional ‘ulama’.  In its first years, the Muslim Youth Organization was primarily involved in campus politics, but a series of violent confrontations between Muslim and Marxist students led to the first arrests of Muslim Youth leaders in 1972.

In response to the July 1973 coup d’etat of Muhammad Da’u, an avowed leftist, the Muslim Youth joined forces with other covert Muslim political parties to overthrow the new government.  These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and led to further arrests and the flight of many of the top Muslim Youth leaders to Pakistan, where they continued their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government.  In July 1975, guerrillas associated with the Organization of Muslim Youth initiated an operation intended to combine a military coup d’etat in Kabul with rural insurrections in various provinces.  The military coup never materialized, however, and the uprisings were unsuccessful, in large part because of the absence of popular support. 

Hizbu’llah.  Indonesian Islamic guerrilla organization that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1950.  Hizbu’llah along with Sabili’llah  formed part of Masjumi, an Islamic party.  Hizbu’llah (“Allah’s forces”), founded in December 1944, was intended to become a reserve corps in the war against the Allies and was open to youths between seventeen and twenty-five years of age.  Its first chairman was Zainul Arifin and its first vice-chairman Moh Roemn.  In August 1945, it had about five hundred trained members.  Only after the declaration of Indonesian indepedence did the Hizbu’llah become one of Indonesia’s largest irregular guerrilla organizations. 

Hmad u-Musa
Hmad u-Musa (Sidi Hmad u-Musa) (c. 1460-1563).  Great saint of southern Morocco and a patron saint of Sus. His tomb in Tazerwalt is an object of veneration.
Sidi Hmad u-Musa see Hmad u-Musa

Hostages (raha'in).  Seizing, detaining, and threatening to injure a person in order to secure compliance with a condition or demand from a third party is the act of hostage taking.  Before the advent of the modern regime of international law, belligerents often took hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransoms, bills, or treaties.  The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Hague Protocols I and II prohibited the taking of hostages in international and internal armed conflicts.  The 1979 United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages imposed a duty to either prosecute or extradite hostage takers, but this convention has been ratified by only a few nations.  Nevertheless, in contemporary times, hostage taking probably violates customary international law.

The Arabic term for hostages, raha’in, means persons held as security.  Like most medieval legal systems, classical Islamic law permitted the exchange of hostages to ensure compliance with a treaty.  However, Islamic law considered such hostages inviolable and prohibited killing them even if the enemy violated the treaty or killed their Muslim hostages.  On the outbreak of hostilities Muslim forces were commanded to safely return the hostages to their country.  Furthermore, Islamic law prohibited Muslim forces from using enemy personnel or civilians as human shields in an armed conflict.  Muslim jurists disagreed, however, on whether Muslim forces should attack if the enemy uses Muslim prisoners.

There is some obscurity as to the distinction between prisoners of war and hostages.  In classical Islamic law, muqallah (combatants) could be prisoners of war.  Muslim jurists disagreed on whether a prisoner of war could be ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, killed, or freed.  Other than combatants, any non-Muslim who does not have aman (safe conduct) or who is a national of a territory without a peace treaty with Muslims could be placed into captivity.  In the opinion of most jurists aman can be granted by any Muslim.  Additionally, if the non-Muslim wrongly, but reasonably, believes that he or she enjoys safe conduct, then he or she cannot be made a captive.  Under no circumstances could a captive be used to make demands on a third party, hence, no captive could be used as a hostage.

Classical Islamic law was developed over a long span of time, primarily from the eighth to twelfth centuries, in response to specific historical circumstances.  Additionally, classical Islamic law is represented by a variety of Sunni and Shi‘a schools of thought that often reached different conclusions on many issues.  Consequently, Islamic law leaves a rich and diverse legacy to its modern adherents.  From this complex legacy an argument for or against hostage taking can be constructed, since both positions are supported by certain historical practices.

Since independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of most Muslim states have ratified the Geneva Conventions and have observed the prohibition against the taking of hostages.  Only a few Muslim states, however, have ratified the Hostages Convention.  Hostage taking has continued to be an issue in the Middle East because of the fact that guerrilla groups or national liberation movements, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, have used the taking of hostages as a means to secure compliance with their political demands.  Typically, these groups have claimed that their captives are prisoners of war, but international law does not permit the endangering of the life of a captive in order to make demands on a third party.

In the 1980s, the taking of hostages became a subject of debate among Shi‘a scholars when several pro-Iranian groups seized hostages in Lebanon.  Some Shi‘a leaders, such as Husayn al-Musawi, justified the taking of hostages in 1987 as a practical necessity.  Interestingly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) used the same logic in 1986 to defend the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979 and in Lebanon.  Others, such as the Lebanese Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council, and Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a senior Lebanese Shi‘a cleric, have condemned hostage taking as un-Islamic and illegal.  In 1992-1993 the Western hostages held in Lebanon were released, and the issue, for the time being, has fallen out of public discourse.  Significantly, whether among proponents or opponents, serious discussions of the legality of hostage taking under Islamic law are very rare.  Ultimately, hostage taking in the Middle East is motivated by political consideration and has little to do with any set of religious or legal injunctions. 
raha’in see Hostages

Houris (in Arabic, in singular form, hur; in plural form, huriyah). The term is used in the Qur’an for the virgins of Paradise promised to the Believers.  In Islam, a houri is one of the beautiful maidens who dwell in Paradise and reward true believers with the sensual pleasure of their companionship after death. The houris are perennially young and pure, although they have the power to conceive and bear children at the will of the faithful.  Muslim theologians of modern times, offended by the unabashedly sensual picture of Paradise that the concept of the houris affords, have endeavored to place an allegorical interpretation upon them.
hur see Houris
huriyah see Houris

Hrawi (Elias Hrawi) (September 4, 1926 - July 7, 2006). President of Lebanon (r.1989-1998).  Hrawi was born into a landowning Maronite Christian family in Hawch Al-Umara, near the Zahle region.  He was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, from which he graduated with a commerce degree.  A successful farmer and businessman, he started a vegetable export business, dealing with major Swiss companies.  He also headed the Beqaa sugarbeet cooperative.  When his export business was destroyed by the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990, he switched his line of business to oil importing.

In 1972, Hrawi followed his brothers George and Joseph and became a parliamentary deputy, and in 1980, he was appointed Minister for Public Works.  From 1980 to 1982, he served in the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works under President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan.  He concentrated on building bridges and highways to link all parts of the country.

On November 24, 1989 Hrawi was elected president  of Lebanon with ninety percent of the votes from the parliament.  A native of the Beqaa valley, Hrawi was ther first president to come from outside of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon.  He was elected two days after the assassination of Rene Moawad, who had held office for just seventeen days. 

His first challenge was to face Michel Aoun, the “temporary” prime minister, who would not bow to his presidency.  He also started working for closer ties between Syria and Lebanon. 

In August 1990, Hrawi was central in securing support for the forthcoming negotiations for the National Reconciliation Charter to be held in At Ta’if, as well as fighting Aoun.  This campaign proved successful, as Aoun’s territory was reduced to one-third.  Hrawi signed into law amendments to the Constitution that formalized the Taif Agreement reforms, giving a greater measure of power and influence to Lebanon's Muslim community.  In October of 1990, together with his Syrian allies, Hrawi was able to defeat Aoun for good.  This victory, on October 13, forced Aoun to surrender and marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War.  This allowed Hrawi to create Greater Beirut, which was to be totally under government control.

On May 22, 1991, Hrawi signed the Treaty of fraternity, co-ordination and co-operation with Syria, in which Lebanon promised not to allow its territory to be used against Syria's interests. In 1992, in the general elections, Hrawi’s supporters gained more seats, making his power more effective. 

In 1995, Hrawi had his presidency prolonged for an additional three years following a change in the constitution by the National Assembly.

In 1998, Hrawi stepped down as president, and was succeeded by Emile Lahoud. 

As Hrawi’s Zahle region was under Syrian control through most of the civil war, he developed good relations with Damascus.  This came to be central both to his rise to success, which was aided by Syria, and the direction of his politics through his nine years of presidency.  Hrawi was the man in the driver seat when Lebanon achieved peace.  However, his pro-Syrian politics did  provoke many Lebanese nationalists.

The Lebanese people were divided in their opinion of Hrawi.  Many appreciated his decisiveness in acting against the feuding militias and ending the civil war that had been tearing the country apart for fifteen years.  He was also respected for his long-held conviction that national loyalty should take precedence over sectarian interests, and for promoting peaceful coexistence among Lebanon's religious factions.  Some tried to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize.  Others, however, accused him of inconsistency for disarming all Christian and most Muslim militias -- but not Hezbollah, a Shi'a fundamentalist militia.  His critics also point out that he was very supportive of Syrian interests and charge that the cooperation treaty that he signed effectively turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony.  He was also criticized by some for having the Constitution amended to extend his term of office by three years.

With his wife, Mouna Jammal, Hrawi had three sons and two daughters.  He died of cancer at the American University Hospital in Beirut on July 7, 2006. 
Elias Hrawi see Hrawi

Hubaysh ( Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi) (al-A‘sam).  Ninth century ranslator of Greek medicinal writings.  With the exception of the Hippocratic oath and the herb-book of Dioscurides, he translated 35 of Galen’s works from Arabic into Syriac, and three from Syriac into Arabic.  He also wrote additions to a work of his uncle Hunayn ibn Ishaq, which won extremely wide diffusion.
Hubaysh ibn al-Hasan al-Dimashqi see Hubaysh
al-A‘sam see Hubaysh

Hud.  Name of the earliest of the five “Arab” prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, the others being Salih, Ibrahim, Shu‘ayb, and the Prophet himself. Hud is the name of a prophet of Islam, the prophet The eleventh sura of the Qur'an, Hud, is named after him, though the narrative of Hud comprises only a small portion of the sura, 11:50–60. Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T.

The Qur'an states that Hud was sent as a warning to the people of 'Ad. The recently discovered city of Ubar, mentioned in the Qur'an as Iram, is believed to have been the capital of 'Ad, which might connect it to the biblical character Aram, son of Shem. Ad was the name given to Hud's tribe because Ad was the name of Aram's granson

Although there is no mention of the amount of time elapsed after Noah in the Qur'an, according to Islamic secular tradition of history (but not from the Qur'an or Hadith), Hud was born eight generations after Nuh. In that time, his people had completely forgotten about The Flood that had struck generations past and had begun worshipping idols made of stone. Despite Hud's warnings and admonitions the people persisted in their idolatry (shirk). To punish them, Allah sent a drought. Even after the drought, the people would not relent, so they were destroyed in a large storm from which only Hud and a few believers emerged.

Some Muslims believe that Hud lived for about 150 years and received revelations and prophethood sometime around 2400 B.C.T. The Qur'an and Muhammad say nothing about the exact amount of years of Hud's lifespan or when exactly he was sent (it specified only that it was after Noah). Thus, on the secular level, this debate is subject to academic discussion.

Several sites are revered as his tomb, the most noted of which is located in the deserted Yemen village of the Wadi Hadhramaut.

Hudids (Banu Hud).  Muslim Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa kingdom of Saragossa (Zaragoza) in Spain from 1039 until 1146 during the period of the Muluk al-Tawa’if.  The Hudids were of the Banu Hud and were an Hispano-Arabic dynasty.  Its leader, Sulaiman ibn Muhammad (r. 1039-1046) took over Zaragoza from the Banu Tujib.  His successors, Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (r. 1046-1081) and Ahmad II al-Mustain (r. 1085-1110), were keen patrons of the arts, initiating an active building program (Aljaferia), and led Spanish resistance to the Almoravids.  When the latter conquered Zaragoza in 1110, Abd al-Malik (r. 1110-1136) was able to escape to Rueda, where the last of the Hudids held out until 1146.  The last ruler, Abu Ja’far Ahmad III al-Mustansir bi-‘llah, was killed in a battle with the Christians.

The Banu Hud were an Arab dynasty that ruled the taifa of Zaragoza from 1039-1110. In 1039, under the leadership of Al-Mustain I, Sulayman ibn Hud al-Judhami (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad), the Bani Hud seized control of Zaragoza from a rival clan, the Banu Tujibi. His heirs, particularly Ahmad I al-Muqtadir (1046-1081), Yusuf al-Mutamin (1081-1085), and Al-Mustain II, Ahmad ibn Yusuf (1085-1110), were patrons of culture and the arts.  The Aljafería, the royal residence erected by Ahmad I, is practically the only palace from that period to have survived almost in its entirety.

Despite their independence, the Banu Hud were forced to recognize the superiority of the Kingdom of Castile and pay parias to it as early as 1055. In 1086, they led the smaller kingdoms in their resistance to the Almoravids, who did not succeed in conquering Zaragoza until May 1110. The conquest represented the end of the dynasty. The last of the Banu Hud, Imad al-Dawl abd al-malik al Hud, the last king of Zaragoza, forced to abandon his capital, allied himself with the Christian Aragonese under Alfonso el Batallador, who in 1118 reconquered the city for the Christians and made it the capital of the Kingdom of Aragon.

Banu Hud see Hudids

Hui.  The Hui (pronounced “whey”) are the most widely distributed and the second largest of all ethnic minorities in China.  They are Muslims, or atheists of Muslim parentage, who speak Chinese as their native language and who trace their descent to Arabs and Persians who began settling in China during the seventh century of the Christian calendar.  Among China’s ten Muslim minorities, the Hui are the most numerous, having the longest history in China, and are the most acculturated to the Han Chinese majority.  They are the only Muslims in China who speak Chinese as a mother tongue and live dispersed through all provinces of the country.

In Chinese, Hui are known as Huihui, Huihui minzu (“Huihui people” or “Huihui nationality”) and Huizu (a contraction of Huihui minzu).  Traditionally they have also called themselves Huijiaoren (“Hui-religion -- Islam – people”), Mumin (from the Arabic mu’min) and Jiaomen (a term meaning something like “people of the Teachings”).  In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government promoted the use of “Muslim” (“Muslim”) to denote Hui (and others) who actively believe in Islam as distinct from Hui in general, a portion of whom no longer practice the religion.  In other countries, Hui are called by such names as Panthay and Dungan.  In English, the Hui have often been referred to simply as Chinese Muslims, a term that has caused much confusion because it also rightly includes the nine other Muslim ethnic groups in China.  

Islam was introduced to China during the flourishing Tang dynasty (618-906).  Arab and Persian merchants and mariners sailed to and settled in Canton and other southeastern Chinese port cities, bringing the religion just after it was founded.  Muslim soldiers, brought across Central Asia to help China’s emperor quell a rebellion in 757, introduced Islam to the interior.  Many of these Arabs, Persians, and Central Asians, nearly all men, married local Han Chinese women and remained in China, speaking Persian and Arabic as their lingua francas.  They lived in special districts (called “barbarian settlements”), where they were held responsible for maintaining law and order according to the customs of their homelands.  The Muslims increased in numbers as the children of mixed Muslim and Han marriages were raised as Muslims and as foreign Muslims continued to settle in China for several more centuries.  Another major Muslim influx came with the Mongols, who conquered China in the thirteenth century and imported thousands of Central and West Asian artisans, scholars and administrators to help them rule China.  Muslims directed the financial administration of the empire and were appointed to other high positions in the central and provincial governments.

While the Muslims remained a distinctly foreign minority during their first seven centuries in China, during the next five centuries they had relatively little contact with the rest of the Muslim world.  When the Han Chinese overthrew the Mongols in 1368, they sought to wipe out the much resented foreign influence and thus prohibited the use of foreign languages, foreign names and foreign clothing and restricted foreign travel.  European capture of the Asian sea trade from the Arabs also contributed to halting Muslim migration to China.  It was during this period (the Ming dynasty, 1368-1644) that the Muslims in China became sinicized, acculturating to Han Chinese ways through the adoption of Han surnames, clothing and food habits and through speaking Chinese as their everyday language.  The continued in-marriage of Han women, as well as the adoption of Han children and occasional conversion of Han adults, further contributed to the increase in the number of Muslims and, at the same time, to their becoming increasingly similar, physically as well as culturally, to the Han.  Muslims ceased being referred to as Arabs, barbarians and foreigners and came to be known instead by a new name, Huihui.

The next phase of Muslim history in China was one of violent ethnic conflict between the Han and the Hui.  From the sixteenth to early twentieth century, Muslims of northwest China (Hui, Salars and others) and Hui in Yunnan in southwest China rose against both local Han and the government in a series of rebellions said to have claimed as many as ten million lives.  Exacerbating the ethnic conflict were intense factional cleavages within the Muslim communities themselves, notably that between the so-called New Teaching adherents inspired by Naqshbandi fundamentalism and ideas of reform and Old Teaching adherents who clung to established practices of Chinese Islam. 

With the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, the Hui were formerly recognized as one of China’s “five great peoples” (usually translated as  “races” in English), part of the new Western inspired government’s attempt to win over the independent minded minorities who dominated more than half of China’s territory.  Many Hui, following trends among the Han, became actively engaged in reform movements.  During the civil war between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, both sides actively sought to win Hui loyalties.  After the Communist victory and establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, several thousand Hui fled with the Nationalists to Taiwan, while the majority remained on the mainland.  There the Communist leaders developed a Soviet-inspired minority policy that formally identified major ethnic groups as “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) and promised them rights of autonomy and self-government in exchange for their support.  The Communist Party has now recognized 55 ethnic groups as minority nationalities and established 107 so-called autonomous governments at three levels -- 5 at the provincial level, 30 at a middle (prefecture) level and 72 at the county level.  Twelve of these bear the name “Hui.”

The Communist government extended special considerations to Islam, all the while taking measures to ensure that all Islamic activity was consistent with official policies and under the control of the Muslim leaders loyal to the government.  The Chinese Islamic Association, founded in Beijing in 1953 and reporting to the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, was central in this regard.   Mosques were exempt from property and housing taxes, and government funds were provided for renovation of several famous old mosques.  Government funds are also provided for the official pilgrimage delegation sent each year to Mecca with goodwill stops in other Muslim countries.

The greatest resentment expressed by Hui today is over incidents during the Cultural Revolution, when Red Guards in many parts of China forced Muslims to eat pork and cremate their dead, defiled their mosques and humiliated ahongs (for example, by forcing them to tend pigs or parade down the street wearing a pig part).  Yet Muslims survived the Cultural Revolution better than other religious groups, and at almost all times some mosques remained open where at least foreign Muslims were permitted to observe Friday prayer and the major festivals.

Hui spokesmen were quite positive about the more liberal religious policies that were adopted after 1979.  Many Muslim leaders resumed leadership roles, and a few even traveled abroad to participate in international conferences.  In 1980, the Chinese Islamic Association convened a national conference, its first in 17 years, and several regional and provincial Islamic associations began to meet annually.  Government supported training of new ahongs also began. 

Taiwan twice provided a new home for Chinese emigrating from the mainland.  Both times Hui were among them.  The first migration, during the mid-seventeenth century, was from the southeast coastal province of Fujian.  With few exceptions, Hui descended from this migration have now been assimilated by their Han neighbors.  The second migration occurred when Chinese loyal to the Nationalists fled the Communists in 1949.  Muslims among them are usually said to have numbered 20,000.  Nearly all are Hui and nearly all are city dwellers.

Hui people commonly believe that their surnames originated as "Sinified" forms of their foreign Muslim ancestors some time during the Yuan or Ming eras. These are some common surnames used by the Hui ethnic group:

    * Ma for Muhammad
    * Mu for Muhammad
    * Han for Muhammad
    * Ha for Hasan
    * Hu for Hussein
    * Sai for Said
    * Sha for Shah
    * Zheng for Shams
    * Koay for Kamaruddin
    * Chuah for Osman

A legend in Ningxia states that four Hui surnames common in the region - Na, Su, La, and Ding - originate with the descendants of one Nasruddin, a son of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, who "divided" the ancestor's name (Nasulading, in Chinese) among themselves.
Huihui see Hui.
Huihui minzu see Hui.
“Huihui people” see Hui.
“Huihui nationality” see Hui.
Huizu  see

Huijiaoren  see Hui.

Hujjatiyah (Hojjatieh) (Hojjatieh Society).  Conservative religio-political school of thought within Shiism, the Hujjatiyah was founded in the early 1950s.  The Hujjati founder, Shaykh Mahmud Halabi, was rarely seen in public, and devotees of this school constituted the most conservative, ultra-traditionalist clergy and laypersons.  Originally founded as the Hujjatiyah Society in Mashhad, Iran, the group was known for having organized several anti-Baha’i campaigns.

Hujjatiyah derives from the word hujjah, meaning both proof and the presentation of proof.  In Shiism, the term has had three meanings or applications.  It has been used to refer to a person through whom the “inaccessible God becomes accessible” or to “a particular function within the process of revelation”.  The term has also been used to refer to “any figure in a religious hierarchy through whom an inaccessible higher figure became accessible to those below.”  In this connection, Shi‘a doctrine holds that the Imams are the proofs of Allah.

During the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1941-1979), the shah frequently gave the clergy permission to mount missionary campaigns against the Baha’is, who were perceived by the religious hierarchy as heretics.  Shaykh Halabi emerged as a figure whose fiery anti-Baha’i sermons sent throngs of clergymen to various cities to lecture on the dangers of Baha’ism.  Characteristics of their missionary behavior included spreading the works of, or news about, those Baha’is who had repented their presumed sins.

These activities led to intimidation of Baha’is in the cities of Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, and Kashan.  Moreover, Hujjatiyah supporters pressured the government to cut off work permits, licenses, documentations of property ownership, and so forth to the Baha’is.  There is no evidence that Shaykh Halabi met Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) during these campaigns or that the grand ayatollahs in Qom supported Halabi’s actions.  Whatever the situation, Halabi created a nationwide organization with a single objective: to seek out and eradicate all remnants of the Baha’i creed.

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Hujjatiyah were accused by various fundamentalist clerics as oppositionists to the concept of vilayat-i faqih (rule of the jurisconsult), a constitutional power given to Khomeini.  It was claimed that the Hujjatiyah took a passive stand on the return of the Hidden Imam (Mahdi) and hence were opposed to those who want to actively promote the necessary conditions for his return.  In this fashion, Khomeini’s revolutionary stand, as well as demands for unquestioned loyalty to the faqih, was portrayed as anathema to Hujjati ideology.  Furthermore, the label of Hujjatiyah in the post-revolutionary factional struggle was given to those who argued that the clergy must be less directly involved in the governing appraratus and who emphasized an islamization of all aspects of life.  Also, those bazaari merchants who were keen to protect their trade from government taxes or other encroachments were easily labeled, Hujjati.

In the summer of 1983, the Islamic regime mounted a public campaign against Hujjatiyah sympathizers.  Khomeini alluded to the existence of iqtishash (commotion), “internal rift,” and “the dangerous elements” that undermine the Islamic Revolution.  He specifically alluded to the Hujjatiyah group when he said that some groups wanted “to force the return of the Hidden Imam,” meaning, to oppose the faqih.

After Khomeini’s remarks, the two major dailies, Kayhan and Ittila‘at, launched a series of attacks on the Hujjatiyah.  Kayhan published extracts from a Hujjati pamphlet in which the authors stated that they understood Khomeini’s remarks to be directed at them and, having failed to gain an appointment with him, they consulted with Shaykh Halabi.  The pamphlet stated that because of the “current atmosphere,” the Hujjatiyah could no longer continue its activities.  They announced a suspension of the society.  However, in conclusion, they directed an implicit criticism at Khomeini by stating, “Allah and the Hidden Imam would appreciate what the movement [Hujjatiyah] had done for the Islamic cause.”  This gave the impression that Khomeini lacked this appreciation and therefore was out of line with God and the Hidden Imam.

After the summer of 1983, the regime practically ignored the existence of the Hujjatiyah.  No one knew the whereabouts of Halabi or the extent of support for his group in Iran.  On August 29, 1983, the chief revolutionary prosecutor, Husayn Musavi Tabrizi, was asked about his views on the Hujjatiyah Society and whether they were still continuing their activities.  He replied, “They have said they have renounced their activities, they should get permission from the Ministry of Interior.”  Musavi Tabrizi ignored the fact that the charter of the Hujjatiyah Society states specifically that it will not dissolve itself or end its activities until the appearance of the Hidden Imam.

Hojjatieh see Hujjatiyah
Hojjatieh Society see Hujjatiyah

Hujr ibn ‘Adi al-Kindi
Hujr ibn ‘Adi al-Kindi.  Shi‘a agitator in early Islam.  He was put to death by the Umayyad Caliph al-Mu‘awiya I.

Hulegu (Hulagu) (Hulagu Khan) (c.1217 - February 8, 1265).  Founder of the Mongol Ilkhanid dynasty of Iran.  During his rule, from 1256 to 1265, Hulegu established the boundaries and basic policies of Ilkhanid rule.  His successors ruled Iran for approximately one hundred years. Hulegu was Genghis Khan’s grandson and the brother of Mongke Khan, who in 1251 sent Hulegu to extend and consolidate Mongol rule in the Middle East.  Hulegu conquered Iran, Mesopotamia, and Syria, the last of which, however, he soon lost.  In the course of his campaigns, Hulegu suppressed the Isma’ili sect (known as the Assassins) and from 1256 to 1257 destroyed their strongholds.  In 1258, Hulegu sacked Baghdad and killed the Abbasid caliph.  Hulegu conquered Alamut in 1256, took Baghdad in 1258 and Aleppo and Damascus in 1260, but returned to Persia at the news of the death of the Great Khan.  The army Hulegu left behind was destroyed by the Mamelukes at ‘Ayn Jalut in 1260.  Hulegu was Buddhist but also favored Christians, and formed an alliance with the pope and European kings against the Arab Mamelukes.  He likewise promoted Islamic culture, patronizing the Persian historian Juwaini and the Shi’ite scholar Nasir al-Din Tusi, for whom he built an observatory. 

Hulagu Khan was a Mongol ruler who conquered much of Southwest Asia. Son of Tolui and the Kerait princess Sorghaghtani Beki, he was a grandson of Genghis Khan, and the brother of Arik Boke, Möngke Khan and Kublai Khan. Hulagu's army greatly expanded the southwestern portion of the Mongol Empire, founding the Ilkhanate of Persia, a precursor to the eventual Safavid dynasty, and then the modern state of Iran. Under Hulagu's leadership, the Mongols destroyed the greatest center of Islamic power, Baghdad, and also weakened Damascus, causing a shift of Islamic influence to the Mamelukes in Cairo. It was also in Hulagu's reign that historians switched from writing in Arabic to writing in Persian.

Hulagu was born to Tolui, one of Genghis Khan's sons, and Sorghaghtani Beki, an influential Kerait princess. Sorghaghtani successfully navigated Mongol politics, arranging for all of her sons to become Mongol leaders. Hulagu was friendly to Christianity, as his mother was a Nestorian Christian. Hulagu's favorite wife, Dokuz Khatun, was also a Christian, as was Hulagu's closest friend and general, Kitbuqa. Hulagu told the Armenian historian Vardan Arewelc'i in 1264 that he had been a Christian since birth. It is recorded however that he was a Buddhist. as he neared his death, against the will of his Christian wife Dokuz Khatun.

Hulagu had at least three children: Abaqa, second Ilkhan of Persia from 1265–1282, Taraqai, whose son Baydu became Ilkhan in 1295, and Teguder Ahmad, third Ilkhan from 1282-1284.

Hulagu see Hulegu
Hulagu Khan see Hulegu

Humai (Ume). First ruler of the Kanuri empire of Kanem (in Chad, Niger, and Nigeria) to accept Islam (r.1085-1097).  He was probably converted through the influence of Muslim traders who lived in colonies in the larger towns.
Ume see Humai

Humayun (Nasir al-Din Humayun) (Nasir ud-din Muhammad Humayun) (March 17, 1508– March 4, 1556) (OS March 7, 1508-OS February 22, 1556). Son of Babur and the second Mughal ruler of Hindustan and Kabul (r.1530-1540 and 1555-1556).  His first period of rule was a long struggle against his family, most of all his half-brother Kamran, and against the Afghan chief Shir Shah Suri (Sher Khan), who took over Bengal and used it as a base from which to expel Humayun from India. 
Humayun was the second Mughal Emperor who ruled present day Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of northern India from 1530–1540 and again from 1555–1556. Like his father, Babur, he lost his kingdom early, but with Persian aid, he eventually regained an even larger one. On the eve of his death in 1556, the Mughal empire spanned almost one million square kilometers.

He succeeded his father in India in 1530, while his half-brother Kamran Mirza, who was to become a rather bitter rival, obtained the sovereignty of Kabul and Lahore, the more northern parts of their father's empire. He originally ascended the throne at the age of 22 and was somewhat inexperienced when he came to power.

Humayun lost his Indian territories to the Pashtun (Afghan) noble, Sher Shah Suri, and, with Persian aid, regained them fifteen years later. Humayun's return from Persia, accompanied by a large retinue of Persian noblemen, signaled an important change in Mughal court culture, as the Central Asian origins of the dynasty were largely overshadowed by the influences of Persian art, architecture, language and literature.

Subsequently, in a very short time, Humayun was able to expand the Empire further, leaving a substantial legacy for his son, Akbar.

Humayun, upon his accession, inherited troublesome brothers and a shaky empire surrounded by hostile regional powers.  The most determined hostile element, however, lay within the empire, toward the east.  The Afghans, from whom Babur had snatched the throne at Panipat, still commanded considerable strength, and an ambitious and competent leader was preparing them for the final trial with the Mughals.  In 1540, the Afghan Sher Shah retrieved the imperial throne, which he held for five years.  During this period, Humayun wandered about in western India (Sind) and Persia.  In 1543, Humayun was obliged to seek the hospitality of Shah Tahmasp I of Persia, who forced Humayun to sign papers professing Shi 'ism.  In 1545, aided by the Iranian shah, Humayun wrested Afghanistan from his brother Kamran and, in 1555, Humayun recaptured Delhi and Agra from Sher Khan's warring descendants.  Thus, the second Afghan attempt at empire building in India lasted a mere fifteen years.  Internal Afghan dissension facilitated Humayun’s return.

Humayun was a keen patron of mathematics and astronomy, wrote Persian verse, and carried books on his travels.

He died of an accident (from a fall), leaving the empire to his son, Akbar.

Nasir al-Din Humayun see Humayun
Nasir ud-din Muhammad Humayun see Humayun

Hunayn ibn Ishaq al-‘Ibadi
Hunayn ibn Ishaq al-‘Ibadi (Hunayn ibn Ishaq) ('Abu Zayd Hunayn ibn 'Ishaq al-'Ibadi) (Hunain ibn Ishaq)   (808-873).  Scientist and translator.  He was the most important mediator of ancient Greek science to the Arabs.  He is credited with an immense number of translations from Greek into Syriac and Arabic, among them those of Hippocrates and Galen.  He also composed numerous original works, mainly on medical subjects, and had a special interest in ophthalmology.

Hunayn ibn Ishaq was a famous and influential Assyrian Nestorian Christian scholar, physician, and scientist, known for his work in translating scientific and medical works in Greek into Arabic and Syriac during the glory years of the Abbasid Caliphate. Ḥunayn ibn Isḥaq was the most productive translator of Greek medical and scientific treatises. He was originally from southern Iraq but he spent his working life in Baghdad, the center of the great ninth-century Greek-into-Arabic/Syriac translation movement. Impressively, Hunayn's translations did not require corrections at all. This perfection possibly came about because he mastered four languages: Arabic, Syriac, Greek and Persian. He studied Greek and became known among the Arabs as the "Sheikh of the translators." Hunayn’s method was widely followed by later translators.

Hurmuzan, al-
Hurmuzan, al- (d. 644).  Persian ruler and general.  He was killed at Medina by ‘Ubayd Allah ibn ‘Umar under the suspicion of being involved in Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab’s murder by the Persian slave Abu Lu’lu’a.

Hurrem Sultana
Hurrem Sultana (Sultana Roxalena) (d. 1558).  First woman to formally marry a sultan.

As with most of the women who passed through the harems of the Ottoman Sultans, Roxalena’s origins are shrouded in mystery.  Presumably she was a Russian slave from the Ukraine.  Such an origin might explain the name “Roxalena” or “Russalena.”  Roxalena was purchased at the open air market by Suleyman’s best friend, the grand vizier, Ibrahim.

The portraits of Roxalena suggest a mosaic refinement, with classical features and blazing red hair.  There is depth and intelligence in her eyes.  An extraordinary strategist and a true political artist, Roxalena planned her moves as if she were playing chess.

At the beginning, Suleyman was attracted to Roxalena by her silent charm.  Lured by her beauty and intelligence, Suleyman made Roxalena his favorite.  Soon she bore him a son and this birth elevated her to third kadin -- the third most powerful woman in the hierarchy of the harem.

Despite her lofty status, Roxalena knew all too well that, according to the Code of Laws established by Muhammad the Conqueror, the throne passed to the oldest male child of the Sultan and that once the oldest male child ascended to the throne, all of his brothers were subject to being put to death.  As such, Roxalena realized from the beginning that the ascension of the eldest son of Suleyman, Prince Mustafa, meant the death warrant for her own male children.

In 1526, a vicious quarrel erupted between Roxalena, and Gulbahar Sultana, the first kadin and the mother of Prince Mustafa.  During the quarrel, Gulbahar pulled Roxalena’s hair and badly scratched Roxalena’s face.  Wounded, Roxalena confined herself to her apartments.  Using her disfigurement as an excuse, Roxalena refused to appear before the Sultan.  She continued to withhold favors from Suleyman, and began to demand that he legally marry her and consent to share not only pleasure but also power with her. 

Roxalena’s bold obstinacy could well have cost her her life.  However, Suleyman was intrigued and impressed by Roxalena’s sharp mind and her seeming fearlessness.  In partial concession to her demand, Suleyman appointed Prince Mustafa to be governor of Manisa, a province far from the seat of power.  Mustafa’s mother, Gulbahar, in accordance with protocol, was dispatched along with Mustafa.  To further cement his fidelity to Roxalena, Suleyman slowly released his other concubines, marrying off many of the most beautiful women to his pashas. 

Ultimately, Suleyman acceded to Roxalena’s every demand, including marriage.  In triumph, Roxalena became the first woman to officially marry a sultan.

"This week there has occurred in this city a most extraordinary event, one absolutely unprecedented in the history of the sultans.  The Grand Signor Suleiman has taken to himself as his Empress a slave woman from Russia, called Roxalena, and there has been great feasting.  The ceremony took place in the Seraglio, and the festivities have been beyond all record.  There was a public procession of the presents.  At night the principal streets were gaily illuminated and there is much music and feasting.  The Houses are festooned with garlands and there are everywhere swings in which the people swing by the hour with great enjoyment.  In the old Hippodrome, a great tribune is set up, the place reserved for the Empress and her ladies screened with gilt lattice.  Here Roxalena and the court attended a great tournament in which both Christian and Moslem Knights were engaged, and tumblers and jugglers and a procession of wild beasts, and giraffes with necks so long they, as it were, touched the sky. ... There is a great deal of talk about the marriage and none can say what it means."  England’s Sir George Young (1530)

In Roxalena, Suleyman found his soul mate.  They became devoted to each other.  Suleyman was a poet.  He loved the language of poetry, and within Roxalena was the blood of a poet as well.  They courted each other through verse, her voice carrying through the fields of battle, muting the sounds of cannon and slashing swords.  Suleyman had found a woman who not only fulfilled him in bed but also became his companion in affairs of state and in a shared appreciation of the arts.

"He bears her such love and keeps such faith to her that all of his subjects marvel and say that she has bewitched him, and they call her the ziadi [jadi], or the witch.  On this account the army and the court hate her and her children, but because he loves her, no one dares to protest:  For myself I have always heard every one speak ill of her and of her children, and well of the first-born and his mother."  Da Zara

Under Roxalena, the harem became a place of beauty and enlightenment.  Indeed, for Suleyman, Roxalena became synonymous with lightness and, accordingly, he named Roxalena “Hurrem” – “the laughing one” -- because of her crystalline laughter and freedom from inhibition.

However, despite these displays of lightness, Roxalena also had her dark side. 

Having vanquished her chief female rivals,  Roxalena soon focused her attention on another rival for Suleyman’s favors.  Roxalena soon focused her attention on the man who had originally owned her -- Ibrahim, the grand vizier.

Ibrahim was the inseparable friend and companion of Suleyman.  Ibrahim shared Suleyman’s tent and his dreams.  Ibrahim had been promoted from the status of royal falconer to Lord of Rumelia and, later, grand vizier.  Ibrahim had also been chosen to marry the sultan’s own sister, Hatice Sultana, and had been the recipient of great wealth and honor.

Grown resentful of his influence and jealous of Suleyman’s affection of him, Roxalena set out to orchestrate Ibrahim’s death.  Roxalena took advantage of every bit of gossip and information to inflame Suleyman’s mind against his friend.  One night, when Ibrahim was in the harem as a privileged friend of the sultan, the deaf-mute guards strangled him in his sleep.  It is believed that the person responsible for this assassination was none other than Roxalena.

In 1541, when the Old Palace, which housed the sultan’s harem, partially burned down, Roxalena, with her entourage of odalisques and eunuchs, moved to the Grand Seraglio, where she could be closer to Suleyman and the seat of power.  This move marked the beginning of the Grand Harem and the period of Ottoman history known as “The Reign of Women.” 

Some time after Ibrahim’s death, Suleyman declared to Roxalena that he wanted to build her a new palace.  Roxalena feared that this declaration was an attempt by Suleyman to distance himself from her.  As a diversionary countermeasure, Roxalena came up with a more challenging project for her “beloved” sultan.  She suggested to Suleyman that he instead construct a mosque utilizing the services of the greatest architect of the time, Sinan.  The mosque was to be named after Suleyman and was to be the grandest mosque ever constructed. 

Suleyman fell for the ploy.  Construction on the mosque -- the Suleymaniye -- began in 1549 and would not be finished until 1556, two years before Roxalena’s death.

As Roxalena’s sons grew older, the heir to the Ottoman throne, Prince Mustafa, loomed as a greater and greater threat.  Mustafa was an able and intelligent prince.  He was much admired by the people and the army.  He was also Suleyman’s favorite son.  However, these were merely obstacles for the devious Roxalena to overcome.

Somehow a forged letter supposedly written by Mustafa to the shah of Persia declaring that Mustafa wanted to dethrone Suleyman and asking for the shah’s assistance wound up in Suleyman’s hands.  This forgery turned Suleyman against Mustafa and provoked a battle between the two on the plains of Eregli.  It is said that several times both Suleyman and Mustafa turned back as they rode to the battlefield, both reluctant to face their loved one in battle.  But fate (or perhaps the force of Roxalena’s will) urged them forward.  Their history had already been written by kismet.

Mustafa ran to his father, alone, unarmed, to redeem himself.  He reached the sultan’s tent, going through four partitions.  When he came to the fifth, his cries echoed through the plains.  It is said that Suleyman shed tears for the son he had killed as well as for himself -- the woeful father who had wrongly killed his own glorious son.

As for Roxalena, she had triumphed.  The line of succession now clearly ran through her. Roxalena had four sons, Muhammad (Mehmed), Cihangir, Bayazid (Beyazit), and Selim. Of Roxalena’s four sons, Muhammad died young of natural causes; Cihangir, although possessed of a brilliant mind, was deformed and epileptic; and Bayazid was able but cruel.  That left Selim as Roxalena’s choice as heir.  Roxalena, preferred Selim, in part, because she was convinced that Selim’s soft nature would not allow him to murder his brothers.  Roxalena also knew that Selim drank to dull his prophetic awareness of his own impending death. 

Roxalena wanting to preserve all her sons encouraged Selim’s weakness.  Against the wishes of Suleyman, Roxalena supplied Selim with the wine that he needed to ease his pain.  Selim became an alcoholic.  He became known as “Selim the Sot.”

Although Roxalena had set the stage for the succession of her son, she did not get to see the play.  Roxalena died in 1558, eight years before Selim assumed the throne. 

However, her legacy was not simply through the sultancy.  Her promotion of the weak Selim would lead to the dominance of the sultancy by women, namely Roxalena’s own daughter, Mihrimah, and her granddaughter, Aisha Humashah.  The “Reign of Women” had begun.

Hurrem Sultana was born in 1506. She was the wife of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent and she played an important role in the Ottoman history as being the favourite wife of the Sultan. Hurrem Sultana was Russian originated and her real name was Roxelanne. As a child, she was presented to the Ottoman palace by the Khan of The Crimea because of her beauty. She had a special education in the palace. She attracted the interest of Sultan Suleyman, by using her femininity, intelligence and talents. She became very influential for the women of Harem and for the other people of the palace. She won the love and reliance of Sultan Suleyman in a short time and became the legal wife of him. She acted very well planned and her intrigues very negatively effected the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century. Prince Mustafa was the eldest son of Sultan Suleyman, born from Gulbahar Hatun. Hurrem Sultan had ordered firstly to strangle her most dangerous rival Gulbahar Hatun and next 40 years old prince Mustafa. Hurrem Sultan became very influential in the governmental administrations and she supported the war with Persia and she restored the peace with Russia and Poland. She died before seeing, one of her sons on the throne. She was 52 years old when she died.  
Sultana Roxalena see Hurrem Sultana
Roxalena see Hurrem Sultana
Russalena see Hurrem Sultana
"The Laughing One" see Hurrem Sultana
"Laughing One" see Hurrem Sultana

Hurriyyet we I’tilaf Firqasi
Hurriyyet we I’tilaf Firqasi (“Freedom and Accord Party”).  Liberal political party in Turkey, formed in November 1911.  The Liberals assumed power in 1912 but were overthrown by the Unionists in 1913.  A second party of the same name was formed in 1919 but was rejected in the elections of that year.
"Freedom and Accord Party" see Hurriyyet we I’tilaf Firqasi

Hurufiyya. Unorthodox Muslim sect of gnostic-cabalistic tendencies founded by Fadl Alah Hurufi (1340-1394) of Astarabad in Persia.

Hurufism (Arabic‎: hurufiyya) was a mystical kabbalistic Sufi doctrine, which spread in areas of western Persia, Anatolia and Azerbaijan in later 14th - early 15th century. The Arabic word hurūf literally means "letters" (of the alphabet).

The creator and spiritual head of the Hurufi movement was Fazlallah Astarabadi also called Naimi (1340-1394). Born in Astrabad, Iran, he was strongly drawn to Sufism and the teachings of Al-Hallaj and Rumi at an early age. In the mid-1370s, young Naimi started to propagate his teachings all over Persia and Azerbaijan. While living in Tabriz Fadlullah gained an elite following in the Jalayirid court, where the writing of his main work — Jawidan-Al-Kabir — allegedly took place. At that time he was still in the mainstream of Sufi tradition. Later, he moved towards more esoteric spirituality, and, failing to convert Timur, was executed in 1394 near Alinjak castle in Nakhichevan by the ruler's son Miranshah. The uprising of Hurufis, who had gathered a large following, was crushed in Azerbaijan, but the popular movement survived for another decade or so in different guises.

According to Fadlullah, the key to open the seventh sealed book, the Qur'an, is a kabbalistic system of letters that is expounded by later Hurufis in the Hidayat-nama, Jawidan and in the Mahram-Nama. The Universe is eternal and moves by rotation. God's visage is imperishable and is manifest in Man, the best of forms — zuhur kibriya. God is incarnated in every atom. Hurufis considered Fadlullah a manifestation of God's force after Adam, Moses and Muhammad. God is also embodied in words and 28 letters of Arabic alphabet and 32 letters of Persian which are the basis for love and beauty in the world. Seven is a key number corresponding to noble parts of the face, the verses of fatiha and verbal confession of faith. Man is a supreme copy of the divine and the key to Haqiqa.

Hurufism was an expression of Ismailism in its mystical identification of human figure, but differed in recognition in the substance of letters rather than in the person of the Imam.

After his death Naimi's ideas were developed and propagated by Nasimi and Ali-ul A'la in Azerbaijan and Seyid Ishag in Turkey. Poet Imadeddin Nasimi (?-1417) and other Hurufis, make kabbalistic tendencies subordinate to mystic concepts of Sufism, and specifically those of Hallaj, who was another great influence on Nasimi.

Through Nasimi's poetry, Hurufi ideas influenced, in different degrees, people like Niyaz-i Misri, Fuzuli, Habibi, Khatai (Ismail I), and Rushani. The Bektashi sect in Turkey and the Ahl-e Haqq in Iran owe a lot of their theological vocabulary to Hurufism.

The Bektashi order in the Balkans (Albania) have preserved the legacy of Fadlullah's teachings the longest and still continue to this day. Gül Baba provided an extensive compendium of Hurufi ideas: The Key to the Unseen .

The Shattari tariqah is a contemporary repository of Hurf-e-Muqattiyat (secrets of the alphabets).

Husain ibn 'Ali
Husain ibn 'Ali (Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-) (3rd Sha‘bān 4 AH - 10th Muharram 61 AH; January 8, 626 - October10, 680).  Grandson of Muhammad and the second son of Fatima and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib.  Encouraged to raise the claims of his family against the Umayyads and motivated by a personal vision of an ideal Islam, Husain went into battle and met a tragic end at Karbala in Iraq.  The date, 10 Muharram 61 A.H. (October 10, 680), is commemorated as Ashura throughout the Shi‘ite world with an annual ritual lamentation and pilgrimage to the Shi‘ite shrines, especially Karbala.  The figure of Husain gave rise to many legends, while the events surrounding his death are the subject of popular drama in Iran and elsewhere.

Husayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was the son of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (the final Rashidun Caliph and the first Shī‘a Imām) and Fātimah Zahrā (daughter of Muhammad). Husayn is an important figure in Islām as he is a member of the Ahl al-Bayt (the household of Muhammad) and Ahl al-Kisā, as well as being a Shī‘a Imām, and one of The Fourteen Infallibles of the Shī'a Twelvers.

Husayn ibn ‘Alī is revered by all Shi'a as a martyr who fought tyranny, as he refused to pledge allegiance to Yazīd I, the Umayyad caliph. He rose up to create a regime that would reinstate a "true" Islāmic polity as opposed to what he considered the unjust rule of the Umayyads. As a consequence, Husayn was killed and beheaded in the Battle of Karbalā in 680 (61AH) by Shimr Ibn Thil-Jawshan. The anniversary of his Shahid ("martydom") is called ‘Āshūrā ("tenth" day of Muharram) and is a day of mourning for Shia Muslims. Revenge for Husayn's death was turned into a rallying cry that helped undermine the Umayyad caliphate, and gave impetus to the rise of a powerful Shī‘a movement.

According to most reports, Imam Husayn ibn Ali was born on January 10, 626.

Imam Husayn and his brother Imam Hassan were the only descendants of Muhammad who remained alive. There are many of the accounts of Muhammad's great love for his grandsons, and refer to them together, and at times confuse them. Muhammad is reported to have said that "whoever loves them [his grandsons] loves me and whoever hates them hates me." Muhammad also said that "al-Hasan and al-Husayn are the sayyids of the youth of Paradise". This quote has been particularly important for Shias who have used it in support of the right of Muhammad's descendants to the imamate. Muhammad, according to other traditions, is depicted with his grandsons on his knees, on his shoulders, or even on his back during the prayer at the moment of prostrating himself. According to Madelung, Muhammad loved them and declared them as his Ahl al-Bayt frequently. The Quran has accorded the Ahl al-Bayt of the Prophet an elevated position above the rest of the faithful.

In addition to these traditions, a number of traditions also involve the presence of angels. From a Muslim point of view, these traditions do not create any problem but to non-Muslims they appear as legends created under the Shi'a influence.

Shi'as proclaimed that Ali's eldest son, Hassan, who was the successor to Ali's Imamate, should be the caliph and that the Islamic tradition should not be discarded again. Muawiyah had fought Ali for the leadership of the empire and now prepared to fight Hassan. After a few inconclusive skirmishes between the armies of Hassan and Muawiyah, Hassan reminded his followers of Ali's position that the Imamate is sufficient for successorship of Muhammad and that leading the Muslim state was not a criterion. Thus, to avoid the agonies of another civil war, he signed a treaty with Muawiyah and relinquished the control of what had turned into an Arabian kingdom. Hassan did indeed pledge his to Muawiyah. After making this treaty Hassan was poisoned by an unknown person. This left Husayn as the head of the Alids and the successor to Hassan's Imamate.

At the time of the siege of the caliph Uthman's residence in Medina, by rebels from Basrah and Egypt (led by Ibn Saba), when Uthman asked Ali to join the defender of his house, Ali sent Hassan and Husayn. While Hassan and Husayn guarded the gates of the Caliph's residence, the rebels entered from the back door and killed Uthman.

During Ali's caliphate, the brothers Hassan, Husayn, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah, and their cousin 'Abd Allah ibn J'afar appear as his closest assistants within his household.

When Imam Hassan ibn Ali agreed to a peace treaty with Muawiyah I, the first Umayyad caliph, he left Kufa and went to Medina with his brother Imam Husayn.

According to Shi'a belief, he lived under the most difficult outward conditions of suppression and persecution. This was due to the fact that, first of all, religious laws and regulations had lost much of their weight and credit, and the edicts of the Umayyad government had gained complete authority and power. Secondly, Mu'awiyah and his aides made use of every possible means to put aside past disputes and move out of the way the Household of Muhammad and the lovers of Imam Ali and his sons and thus obliterate the name of Ali and his family.

Muawiyah I ordered public curses of 'Ali and his major supporters including Imam Husayn and his brother.

According to Shi'a belief Imam Husayn became the third Imam for a period of ten years after death of his brother Imam Hassan in 669. All of this time but the last six months coinciding with the caliphate of Mu'awiyah.

Muawiyah designated his son, Yazid I, as his successor before his death in 680.

When Yazid I became caliph he forced Husayn ibn Ali and Abd Allah ibn Zubayr to pledge alliance with him, but they refused and migrated from Medina to Mecca in that year.

Husayn left Medina with his sisters, daughters, sons, brothers, and the sons of Hasan. He took a side road to Mecca to avoid being pursued, and once in Mecca Husayn stayed in the house of `Abbas ibn `Abd al-Muttalib and remained there for four months.

Husayn opposed Yazid I and declared that Umayyad rule was not only oppressive, but also religiously misguided. In his view the integrity and survival of the Islamic community depended on the re-establishment of the correct guidance. Husayn also believed that the succession of Yazid I was an attempt to establish an illegitimate hereditary dynasty.

The religious attitudes of the Umayyad also inspired people who believed that leadership of the Muslim community rightly belonged to the descendants of Ali, so they urged Husayn to join them and come to Kufa to establish his caliphate since they had no imam. They told him that they did not attend the Friday prayer with the governor of Kufa, No'man ibn Bashir, and would drive him out of the town as soon as Husayn agreed to come to them.

To convince Husayn to come they sent him seven messengers with bags of letters of support by Kufan warriors and tribal leaders. Husayn wrote the Kufans and told them that he understood from their letters that they had no imam and they wished him to come to unite them by the correct guidance. He informed them that he was sending his cousin Moslem ibn Aqil to report to him on the situation. If he found them united as their letters indicated he would quickly join them, for it was the duty of the imam to act in accordance with the Quran and to uphold justice, proclaim the truth, and to dedicate himself to the cause of God. The mission of Moslem was initially successful. The Kufan Shi'as visited him freely, and 18,000 men are said to have enlisted with him in support of Husayn. Moslem wrote to Husayn, encouraging him to come quickly to Kufa.

Husayn was also visited by a Shi'a supporter with two of his sons from Basra, where Shi'a sentiment was limited. He then sent identical letters to the chiefs of the five divisions into which the Basran tribes were divided. He wrote them that Muhammad's family were his family and were the rightful heirs of his position, and that others had illegitimately claimed the right which belonged exclusively to Muhammad's family. The family had initially consented to the actions of the first caliphs for the sake of the unity of the Ummah. He said that the caliphs who had seized the right of Muhammad's family had done many good things, and had sought the truth. The letter closely reflected the guidelines set by Ali, who had strongly upheld the sole right of the family of Muhammad to leadership of the Muslim community but had also praised the conduct of the first caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar. While most of the recipients of the letter kept it secret, one of them suspected that it was a ploy of the governor Ubayd-Allah ibn Ziad to test their loyalty and turned it over to him. Ubayd-Allah seized and beheaded Husayn's messenger and addressed a stern warning to the people of Basra.

In Kufa the situation changed radically when Yazid replaced Noman ibn Bashir with Ubayd-Allah ibn Ziad, ordering the latter to deal severely with Husayn's cousin, Moslem ibn Aqil. Ubayd-Allah succeeded in intimidating the tribal chiefs, and a revolt collapsed when the rebels failed to capture the governor's palace. Moslem was found and delivered to Ubayd-Allah, who had him beheaded on the top of the palace and his body thrown down to the crowd. Yazid wrote to Ubayd-Allah, commending him highly for his decisive action and ordering him to set up watches for Husayn and his supporters and to arrest them but to kill only those who would fight him.

Yazid perceived Husayn's refusal to pledge allegiance as a danger to his throne because he was Muhammad's family, so he plotted to kill the grandson of Muhammad during the Hajj, in the precincts of the Holy Kaaba, thus defiling and desecrating it (killing a person in Mecca is prohibited in Islam). In order to avoid this sacrilege, Husayn took along his wives, children, a few friends and relatives and headed towards Kufa to fulfill the responsibility of the bearer of the Imamate and to fulfill his destiny as was prophesied by his grandfather, Muhammad.

On his way, he was offered military support by the tribe of Banu Tayy as well as sanctuary in their hills from where he could (if he wanted to) safely lead a revolt and overthrow Yazid. But Husayn refused the offer and continued his journey with his few companions.

Husayn in his path toward Kufa encountered the army of Ubayd-Allah ibn Ziyad, the governor of Kufa, led by al-Hurr al-Riyahi (a top commander in the Umayyad army who later changed sides).

On October 10, 680 (Muharram 10, 61 AH), Husayn and his small group of followers and family members, fought a large army of under the command of Umar ibn Sa'ad, son of the founder of Kufah. Husayn and all of his men were killed and beheaded. The bodies were left for three days without burial and survivors from Husayn's family were taken as prisoners to al-Sham (Syria and Lebanon today) to Yazid.

Today, the death of Husayn ibn Ali is commemorated during every Muharram by Shiite Muslims, with the most important of these days being its tenth day, Ashura. Ashura is also commemorated by Sunni Muslims, but not like Shi'a.

Husayn's body is buried in Karbala, near the site of his death. His head is said to have been returned from Damascus and interred with his body.

Husayn's grave became the most visited place for Shi'as. The Imam Husayn Shrine was later built over his grave. In 850 Abbasid caliph, al-Mutawakkil, destroyed his shrine in order to stop Shi'a pilgrimages. However, pilgrimages continued. It is now a holy site of pilgrimage for Shi'a Muslims.

The Day of Ashura is commemorated by the Shi‘a as a day of mourning for the death of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Islamic prophet Muhammad at the Battle of Karbala. In some countries and regions such as Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Bahrain, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica Commemoration of Husayn ibn Ali has become a national holiday and all ethnic and religious communities participate in it.

Husayn ibn 'Ali
see Husain ibn 'Ali Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al- see Husain ibn 'Ali

Husainids.  See Husaynids.
Husaynids see Husainids.

Husain Shahi
Husain Shahi (Hussain Shahi).  Bengali dynasty whose name derives from Alauddin Husain Shah, ruler of Bengal (r.1494 to 1519).  His successors were Nusrat Shah (r. 1519-1532), Firuz Shah (r. 1532-1533), and Mahmud Shah (r. 1533-1538).  The Husain Shahis patronized the cultural life of Bengal -- most prominently through architecture and literature.  Husain Shah made Ekdala his capital and established a progressive administration.  He extended his kingdom to the borders of Orissa, occupied northern Bihar, invaded the Ahom kingdom of Assam, and recovered Chittagong from Arakanese occupation.  His son, Nusrat Shah, annexed Tirhut and entered into conflict with Babur, but was forced to sue for peace.  During this period two famous mosques -- Bara Sona Masjid ("Great Golden Mosque") and Qadam-i Rasul ("Foot Impression of the Prophet") -- were constructed at Gaur, and the Hindu epic Mahabharata was translated into Bengali.  Assassinated by his eunuchs in 1532, Nusrat was succeeded by his son Alauddin Firuz Shah, who in turn was killed by his uncle Ghiyas ud-Din Mahmud Shah.  Ghiyas, the last king of the dynasty, was expelled from Bengal by Sher Khan Suri.

The Husain Shahi (Hussain Shahi) dynasty ruled from 1494-1538. Alauddin Hussain Shah was considered the greatest of all the sultans of Bengal for bringing cultural renaissance during his reign. He conquered Kamarupa, Kamata, Jajnagar, Orissa and extended the sultanate all the way to the port of Chittagong, which witnessed the arrival of the first Portuguese merchants. Nasiruddin Nasrat Shah gave refuge to the Afghan lords during the invasion of Babur though he remained neutral. However, Nusrat Shah made a treaty with Babur and saved Bengal from a Mughal invasion. The last Sultan of the dynasty, who continued to rule from Gaur, had to contend with rising Afghan activity on his northwestern border. Eventually, the Afghans broke through and sacked the capital in 1538 where they remained for several decades until the arrival of the Mughals.

The Husain Shahi rulers were:

   1. Alauddin Hussain Shah (1494-1519)
   2. Nasiruddin Nasrat Shah (1519-1533)
   3. Alauddin Firuz Shah (1533)
   4. Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Shah (1533-1538)

Hussain Shahi see Husain Shahi

Husain, Zakir
Husain, Zakir (Zakir Husain) (Zakir Hussain) (February 8, 1897 - May 3, 1969).  Indian educator and politician.  Although his family’s roots were in the Farrukhabad district of Uttar Pradesh, Zakir Husain was born in Hyderabad (Deccan), where his father had gone to practice law in the courts of the nizam.  Returning to the North for his education, Husain graduated from Aligarh Muslim University.  During the Khilafat and Non-cooperation movements, he joined other Aligarh “old boys” in rejecting their old school as a government pawn.  He was instrumental in the founding of a Muslim “National” University, the Jamia Millia, located in New Delhi.  He left India in 1923 to study economics in Berlin, receiving a doctorate there in 1926.  On his return to India, Husain involved himself in the politics of the Congress Party, becoming its educational expert.  He served in a number of prestigious posts, including vice-chancellor of Aligarh Muslim University (1948), representative to UNESCO (1956), and governor of Bihar (1957).  He became the third president of India in 1967, but died while in office.

Zakir Hussain was the third President of India from May 13, 1967 until his death on May 3, 1969. He was the first elected Muslim president of India.

Hussain was born in Etawah, India (India). His family had migrated to Hyderabad from Kaimganj, district Farrukhabad in Uttar Pradesh. He was educated at Islamia High School, Etawah and at the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University, where he was a prominent student leader). He was known, even in those days for his love of knowledge, his wit and eloquence and his readiness to help his fellow students. His father, Fida Hussain Khan, went to Hyderabad, studied Law and had a most successful career. Unfortunately, he died when Zakir was only ten years old.

Hussain, then only 23, was among the small group of students and teachers who founded a National Muslim University near Delhi and named it Jamia Millia Islamia. He subsequently went to Germany to obtain a doctorate degree from the University of Berlin in Economics. While in Germany, Hussain was instrumental in bringing out the anthology of arguably the greatest Urdu poet Mirza Assadullah Khan "Ghalib" (1797-1868).

He returned to India to head the Jamia Millia Islamia which was facing closure in 1927. He continued in that position for the next twenty-one years providing academic and managerial leadership to an institution that was intimately involved with India's struggle for freedom from the British Rule and experimented with value base education on the lines advocated by Mahatma Gandhi. During this period he continued to engage himself with movements for educational reforms in India and was particularly active in the affairs of his old alma mater the MAO College, now the Aligarh Muslim University. During this period Hussain emerged as one of the most prominent educational thinkers and practitioners of modern India. His personal sacrifice and untiring efforts to keep the Jamia afloat in very adverse circumstances won him appreciation of even his arch political rivals like Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Soon after India attained independence, Hussain agreed to be the Vice chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University which was facing trying times in post partition India because of the active involvement of a segment of its teachers and students in the movement for the creation of Pakistan, where incidentally Hussain's relatives, brother Dr. Mahmood Hussain and nephew General Rahimuddin Khan would migrate to and achieve eminence. Hussain, again, provided leadership during a critical phase of the history of the University at Aligarh from 1948-1956. Soon after completing his term as Vice Chancellor he was nominated as a member of the Upper House of Indian Parliament in 1956, a position he vacated in 1957 to become Governor of the State of Bihar.

After serving as the Governor of Bihar from 1957 to 1962, and as the second Vice President of India from 1962 to 1967, Hussain was elected President of India on May 13, 1967. In his inaugural speech he said that the whole of India was his home and all its people were his family.

Hussain was awarded the highest Indian national honor, the Bharat Ratna, in 1963.

Hussain died on May 3, 1969, the first Indian President to die in office. He is buried on the campus of the Jamia Millia Islamia (or Central University) in New Delhi.
Zakir Husain see Husain, Zakir Zakir Hussain see Husain, Zakir Hussain, Zakir see Husain, Zakir

Husayn I ibn Shah Sulayman I
Husayn I ibn Shah Sulayman I (1668-1726).  Safavid monarch (r.1694-1722).  During his reign, Persia was attacked by Mahmud of Qandahar and by Turkey and Russia.  The Shah was deposed in 1722.

Husayn ibn al-Dahhaq, al-
Husayn ibn al-Dahhaq, al- (al-Khali’) (d. 864).  Poet from Basra at the ‘Abbasid court.  He can be regarded as the ideal type of court poet, at least at a court dominated by the taste for pleasure.
Khali', al- see Husayn ibn al-Dahhaq, al-

Husayn ibn al-Husayn
Husayn ibn al-Husayn (d. 1838).  Last dey of Algiers (r.1818- 1830).  In 1830, he set his seal upon the capitulation proposals formulated by the French government.

Husayn ibn ‘Ali
Husayn ibn ‘Ali (Hussein bin Ali) (1854 — June 4, 1931).  Amir and sharif of Mecca and the Hijaz (1908-1916), and king of the Hijaz (1916-1924).  Appointed by the Ottoman sultan, he at first showed loyalty to the sultan, but prevented the extension of the Hijaz Railway southward from Medina.  In 1916, he proclaimed the Arab revolt and expelled the Turks from Mecca, but the Allied military occupation of Syria and Iraq precluded effective Arab rule.  In 1924, he adopted the title of caliph, but did not find support for his assumption of the caliphate.  ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa‘ud forced him to abdicate in the same year.

Husayn, of the ‘Awn branch of the Hashemite family, was appointed to the emirate by Sultan ‘Abdulhamid II in 1908.  Husayn and his son, ‘Abd Allah (Abdullah), engineered the appointment, portraying the former as loyal to the sultan and opposed to the Committee for Union and Progress, which had proposed ‘Ali Haydar of the Zayd branch of the Hashemites as its candidate.

Husayn supported the Ottomans when he attacked ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Al Sa‘ud of Najd (1910) and the Idrisi of ‘Asir (1911), but such operations dovetailed with his efforts to prevent those leaders from encroaching on tribes whose loyalty he claimed.  However, attempts by the vali (in Arabic, wali – Ottoman governor) to extend his control over the vilayet (in Arabic, wilayah – Ottoman administrative district) of Hejaz ( the district containing Mecca) and the threatened extension of the Hejaz railway from Medina to Mecca, moved Husayn to seek help.  In 1914, ‘Abd Allah met Lord Kitchener in Cairo, asking for British support should the Ottomans attempt to remove Husayn.  Kitchener demurred, since the Ottomans had yet to enter World War I.  Husayn had coveted the emirate of Hejaz for himself and his progeny, but when the Ottomans entered the war in October, Britain sought Hashemite assistance by enticing Husayn with promises of future glory.  Kitchener cabled ‘Abd Allah: “It may be that an Arab of true race will assume the Khalifate at Mecca or Medina, and so good may come by the help of God out of all the evil that is now occurring.”  These comments, although ambiguous, were heady words for Husayn, and he must have swelled with expectation.  In subsequent negotiations with Britain, London tried unsuccessfully to downplay the caliphal notion.  Nevertheless, Britain let him believe that he would obtain large areas of Arab territory, including Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, to rule.  It was on this basis, along with substantial financial assistance, that Husayn loosed the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in June 1916.

Husayn presented the revolt as more Islamic than Arab, and demonstrated this by the application of shari‘a (the divine law) in Hejaz.  But he contended that, although the revolt was inspired by Islam, the Arabs were best qualified to lead it.

Husayn never received the support he hoped for from the Arab and Muslim world.  Many Arabs later saw in him an accessory to British and French imperialism.  Indian Muslims never forgave him for revolting against the caliph, and they castigated him for his abuse of pilgrims.

Husayn’s rule in Hejaz lasted until the fall of Mecca to Ibn Sa‘ud in 1924, and it was plagued by financial problems exacerbated by the reduction and eventual suppression of his British subsidy.  Husayn’s preoccupation with what he saw as British perfidy in Syria, Iraq, and Palestine, his inability to form the tribal confederacy necessary to confront Ibn Sa‘ud, his cruel method of government, and his alienation of the Hejazi merchant class led to his downfall.  Proclaiming himself caliph in March 1924 earned him only ridicule.  As Ibn Sa‘ud bore down on Hejaz, the British left Husayn without much support. Neither of his sons, who ruled in Transjordan and Iraq, gave him shelter, and he died a broken man in Amman in 1931, after spending most of his exile in the distinctly non-Arab country of Cyprus.

Hussein bin Ali  see Husayn ibn ‘Ali

Husayn ibn ‘Ali, al-
Husayn ibn ‘Ali, al-.  Bey of Tunis (1705-1735).  Recognized by the Ottoman sultan, he was the founder of the Husaynid dynasty, which reigned over Tunisia from 1705 until the establishment of the Republic of Tunisia in 1957.

Al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, an Ottoman officer, was proclaimed bey in 1705 after the Algerians captured the former ruler of Tunis. He received legal recognition by the Ottoman sultan as governor (beylerbeyi) of the province and assured the survival of his line by promulgating a law of succession in 1710. Al-Ḥusayn conducted his affairs without Ottoman interference and with a measure of independence that allowed him to maintain separate treaties with France (1710; 1728), Great Britain (1716), Spain (1720), Austria (1725), and Holland (1728).

Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-
Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al- (Husain ibn 'Ali) (625 [626?]-680). Grandson of the Prophet and the second son of ‘Ali and Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad.  Husayn was born in Medina.  The fame of Husayn is based on his martyrdom at Karbala on the tenth day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year (October 10, 680 C.C.). 

Though pressed by the Shi‘is, Husayn actually did not resist the Umayyad Caliph Mu‘awiya I after his father’s death in 661.  ‘Ali, Husayn’s father, was assassinated in 661 after a short and turbulent caliphate and was succeeded by his elder son, Hasan.  However, Hasan soon abdicated as he realized the disunity and fickleness of his followers and the superiority of Mu‘awiyah’s well-organized forces.

Husayn reluctantly accepted his brother’s compromise although he refused to pay allegiance to Mu‘awiyah.  However, during Mu‘awiyah’s long reign (661-680), Husayn honored his brother’s agreement with the Umayyad caliph.  Among the stipulations of this agreement was that after Mu‘awiyah’s death his successor would be either chosen through shura (consultation) or that – according to Shi‘a reports – the caliphate would revert to one of the two sons of ‘Ali.

Hasan died in 671 and Mu‘awiyah appointed his own son Yazid as his successor.  Yazid is reputed to have been a lewd character given to drinking and other illicit pleasures.  Many, particularly in the Hejaz and Iraq, opposed Yazid’s appointment, and a small number of notables, including Husayn, withheld their allegiance.  Wishing to assert his authority and quell opposition at any cost, Yazid in 680 ordered his governor in Medina to take everyone’s oath of allegiance and execute anyone who refused. 

Husayn left Medina (Madinah) secretly and sought protection in the sanctuary of Mecca (Makkah).  There, he received numerous letters from the Shi‘ah of Kufa inviting him to lead them in an insurrection against Yazid.  Husayn sent his cousin Muslim ibn ‘Aqil to Kufa to investigate the situation.  Muslim sent word that support for Husayn was strong and that he should hasten to Kufa without delay.

Apprised of these developments, Yazid dismissed the governor of Kufa and extended the authority of ‘Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad, the governor of Basra, to include Kufa.  'Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad was a shrewd and ruthless politician.  By means of threats and bribes he quickly contained the uprising and sent a small detachment to prevent Husayn from reaching Kufa.  He captured Muslim and had him executed with some of his close supporters.

Husayn now set out for Iraq with his women and children and a small band of followers.  Learning of Muslim’s fate along the way, he released his relatives and followers from all obligations and advised them to go.  Many did, and he was left with a small group of loyal supporters and family members.  He was intercepted by a small detachment and diverted away from Kufa to a spot called Karbala on the banks of the Euphrates.

An army of about four thousand men was then assembled to confront Husayn and his band of seventy-odd followers.  The army was headed by ‘Umar ibn Sa‘d ibn Abi Waqqas, the son of a respected companion of the Prophet.  Ibn Ziyad also made sure that some of Husayn’s Kufic supporters were conscripted. 

Husayn arrived at Karbala on the second of Muharram.  After a week of fruitless negotiations between Husayn and ‘Umar ibn Sa‘d, Ibn Ziyad sent an alternative leader, Shamir ibn Dhi al-Jawshan, with instructions to execute the reluctant ‘Umar ibn Sa‘d should he refuse to carry out his orders.  Husayn, Ibn Ziyad ordered, should either surrender and be brought to him as a war-captive or be killed in battle.  For some days, Husayn and his followers were denied water from the Euphrates in order to force them to surrender.

On the morning of 10 Muharram (in 680 of the Christian calendar), the battle began.  Greatly outnumbered, Husayn and his followers were annihilated by the early afternoon.  One by one, Husayn witnessed his own children and other relatives fall.  Even an infant whom he held in his arms was slain.  Finally, after a brave fight, Husayn himself fell.  On orders from Ibn Ziyad, Husayn’s corpse was trampled by horses and his head and those of his followers were paraded in Kufa as a warning to others.

Few personalities in Muslim history have exerted as great and enduring an influence on Islamic thought and piety as Imam Husayn.  For Sunni, and particularly Sufi piety, Husayn is the revered grandson of the Prophet and member of his household (ahl al-bayt).  Husayn’s shrine-mosque in Cairo is a living symbol of Sunni devotion to the martyred imam.

Husayn’s revolt against Umayyad rule inspired not only religious Muslims, but also secular socialists.  A powerful portrayal of Husayn the revolutionary was made by the socialist Egyptian writer ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi in his two-part play, “Husayn the Revolutionary” and “Husayn the Martyr.”

Although these ideas are also shared by many educated Shi‘is, Husayn occupies a central place in Twelver Shi‘a faith and piety.  Pilgrimage (ziyarah), actual or ritualistic, to his tomb is second in importance to the hajj pilgrimage.  Moreover, the ‘Ashura’ and other ta‘ziyah (passion play) celebrations have given the Shi‘a community an ethos of suffering and martyrdom distinguishing it sharply from the rest of the Muslim community. 

The meaning and significance of the revolution, struggle and martyrdom of Imam Husayn continues to grow with changing times and political circumstances of Muslim society.  He has become a symbol of political resistance for many Muslims, regardless of their ideological persuasion or walk of life.  For Shi‘a Muslims Husayn is also a symbol of eschatological hope, as the expected Mahdi (messiah) will finally avenge his blood and vindicate him and all those who have suffered wrong at the hands of tyrannical rulers.

Since the middle ages special mosque annexes appropriately called husayniyahs have served as centers for the memorial observances of the sufferings and martyrdom of Husayn and his family and the social and political lessons that can be learned from this tragedy.  It was in such centers in Beirut and south Lebanon that the first Shi‘a resistance movements were born.  It was also in the Husayniyah-yi Irshad that the ideas of ‘Ali Shari‘ati kindled the final spark of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.  Indications are that the example of Husayn will continue to inspire Muslim resistance and religious fervor for a long time to come.

Only one of Husayn’s sons survived.  A young boy who lay sick at the time of the battle was the only surviving son.  From him all the numerous line of Husayn’s offspring are descended.

In both Sunnite and Shi‘ite traditions Husayn has been regarded as a man of piety, idealism, nobility of character, and ascetic detachment.  He upheld an ideal of Islamic social and political life which he saw violated in Umayyad rule.  The drama of Karbala has had a remarkable history in the folklore, literature, art, and piety of the Shi‘ite community, and is commemorated annually.  As for Husayn, legend speaks of the marvels connected with his birth and childhood, his death, his severed head, the punishment of those who had insulted and wounded him and of his supernatural attributes which caused other wonders and miracles.   In this respect, the story of Husayn may have been influenced by Christian texts since Husayn’s story bears resemblance to the passion story of Christ.  According to Islamic folklore, after death, Husayn was given a key to Paradise.   On Judgment Day, Husayn shall use this key to allow believers to enter, but only if they have mourned over Husayn’s death during the ceremonies of Muharram. 
Husain ibn 'Ali see Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-

Husayn ibn ‘Ali, Sahib Fakhkh, al-
Husayn ibn ‘Ali, Sahib Fakhkh, al- (Sahib Fakhkh al-Husayn ibn ‘Ali) (d. 786).  ‘Alid who led a revolt at Medina during the caliphate of the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq and was killed at Fakhkh.

Sahib Fakhkh al-Husayn ibn 'Ali see Husayn ibn ‘Ali, Sahib Fakhkh, al-

Husaynids (Husainids).  Last dynasty of the Beys of Tunisia (r.1705-1957).  Their main capital was Tunis (Bardo). It was founded by the Turkish cavalry commander Husain ibn Ali (r. 1705-1735), who in the confusion that followed the removal of the Muradids seized power in Tunisia and gained large scale independence from the Ottomans.  Family strife under Husain’s nephew Ali Pasha (r. 1735-1756) led to the plundering of Tunis in 1756 and Algeria’s hegemony in the region.  There followed a period of reconstruction and economic prosperity with the restoration of full sovereignty (in 1807) under Ali Bey (r. 1759-1782) and Hammuda Bey (r. 1782-1814 – “The Golden Age”), as well as cultural arabization of the country and creation of a national state.  Facing increased economic pressure from Europe following the French occupation of Algeria (in 1830), Ahmed Bey (r. 1837-1855) and Muhammad al-Sadiq (r. 1859-1882) carried out reforms based on the European model.  In 1869, there was an international financial inspectorate overseeing Tunisia and national reforms were prevented.  In 1881, Tunisia became a French protectorate (via the Bardo Convention).  The rule of subsequent beys stood between French tutelage and the support of national endeavors to gain independence (by the Destour Party).  In 1943, the French deposed the nationalist bey Muhammad al-Munsif.   In 1957, the last Husainid, Muhammad al-Amin, known as Bey Lamine (r. 1943-1957), was ousted when the Republic was proclaimed by Habib Bourguiba.

Civil wars that provoked Algerian intervention plagued the early years of the dynasty and persuaded the Husaynid beys, who were part of an Ottoman ruling elite only loosely integrated into Tunisian society, of the need to develop a broad base of support in the country.  The beys began to integrate tribal warriors into their army and to elevate members of the urban bourgeoisie, especially the ‘ulama’, to positions of responsibility in the government.

A dramatic upturn in the economy owing to the revival of corsair activity during the Napoleonic Wars solidified the relationship between the beys and their subjects, but the absence of effective Husaynid leadership following the death of Hamudah Bey (r. 1782-1814) in 1814 left the country weak and vulnerable.  A series of disastrous harvests and a widespread commercial slump in the following years gave European merchants an opportunity to insinuate themselves into the center of the Tunisian economy by lending money to Tunisians on the verge of financial ruin.  The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 heightened the dangers of this European economic penetration by placing a major creditor on Tunisia’s borders.  An Ottoman effort to re-assert direct control over Tripolitania in 1835 similarly jeopardized the bey’s autonomy. 

Determined to avert both French and Ottoman encroachment, Ahmad Bey (r. 1837-1855) launched a campaign to strengthen the central government and make the country more self-sufficient, but the tax increases needed to implement these policies further undermined the economy.  More important, Ahmad’s unchecked spending left his successors with no choice but to borrow money abroad.  The highly unfavorable terms of these loans set off a spiral of indebtedness that placed Tunisia firmly in the grasp of its European creditors.

An intense competition between France and Great Britain for the economic and political domination of the country marked the quarter century between Ahmad’s death and the imposition of the French protectorate, with the Husaynids trying in vain to maintain their autonomy.  The eagerness of many Tunisian officials to enrich themselves by collaborating with foreign governments and business interests produced a debilitating atmosphere of graft and corruption.  In the hope of appeasing the powers, the Husaynids consented to demands for such “reforms” as the ‘ahd al-aman and the constitution of 1861, but this agenda served primarily the Europeans’ purposes and failed to promote either political or economic stability.  When the European powers reached an agreement on the disposition of Tunisia at the Congress of Berlin (1878), a French occupation became inevitable.

The Bardo Treaty, signed after France invaded Tunisia in 1881, left Muhammad al-Sadiq (r. 1859-1882) on the throne, but without real authority.   For the next seventy-five years, the Husaynids reigned but did not rule, their powers circumscribed by the protectorate bureaucracy.  This long period of political impotence, the lack of interest in, or sympathy for, the nationalist movement on the part of the beys (with the possible exception of Munsif [r. 1942-1943]), and the enormous popularity of the nationalist leader, Habib Bourguiba, all contributed to the ease with which al-Amin Bey (r. 1943-1957) was deposed and the monarchy abolished in 1957

The Husainid Dynasty is the former ruling dynasty of Tunisia originally of Cretan origin. They came to power under Al-Husayn I ibn Ali at-Turki in 1705 replacing the Muradid Dynasty. After taking power the Husainids ruled as Beys with succession to the throne determined by age with the oldest member of the dynasty becoming Bey. The heir apparent to the Bey held the title Bey al-Mahalla. The Husainid's originally ruled under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. In 1881 Tunisia came under the control of France as a protectorate. Following independence from France on March 20, 1956 the Bey Muhammad VIII al-Amin assumed the title of King and reigned as such until the prime minister Habib Bourguiba deposed the dynasty and declared Tunisia a republic on July 25, 1957.

Since October 2006 the current head of the dynasty is Prince Muhammad Bey (born 1928) who is a grandson of Muhammad V an-Nasir.

The ruling heads of the Husainid dynasty were:

    * Al-Husayn I ibn Ali at-Turki (15 July 1705 - 7 September 1735)
    * 'Abu'l Hasan 'Ali I (7 September 1735 - 22 September 1756)
    * Muhammad I ar-Rashid (22 September 1756 - 11 February 1759)
    * Ali II ibn Hussein (11 February 1759 - 26 May 1782)
    * Hammuda ibn Ali (26 May 1782 - 15 September 1814)
    * Uthman ibn Ali (15 September - 21 November 1814)
    * Mahmud ibn Muhammad (21 November 1814 - 28 March 1824)
    * Al-Husayn II ibn Mahmud (28 March 1824 - 20 May 1835)
    * Al-Mustafa ibn Mahmud (20 May 1835 - 10 October 1837)
    * Ahmad I ibn Mustafa (10 October 1837 - 30 May 1855)
    * Muhammad II ibn al-Husayn (30 May 1855 - 22 September 1859)
    * Muhammad III as-Sadiq (22 September 1859 - 27 October 1882)
    * Ali III Muddat ibn al-Husayn (28 October 1882 - 11 June 1902)
    * Muhammad IV al-Hadi (11 June 1902 - 11 May 1906)
    * Muhammad V an-Nasir (11 May 1906 - 10 July 1922)
    * Muhammad VI al-Habib (10 July 1922 - 11 February 1929)
    * Ahmad II ibn Ali (11 February 1929 - 19 June 1942)
    * Muhammad VII al-Munsif (19 June 1942 - 15 May 1943)
    * Muhammad VIII al-Amin (15 May 1943 - 25 July 1957)

The non-ruling heads of the Husainid dynasty

    * Muhammad al-Amin (1957 - 30 September 1962)
    * Crown Prince Husain Bey (30 September 1962 - 9 April 1969)
    * Prince Mustafa Bey (9 April 1969 - 1974)
    * Prince Muhammad al-Taib Bey (1974 - 29 April 1989)
    * Prince Sulaiman Bey (29 April 1989 - 1992)
    * Prince 'Allalah Bey (1992 - 2001)
    * Prince Shazli Bey (2001 - 2 July 2004)
    * Prince Muhi ud-din Bey (2 July 2004 - 2006)
    * Prince Muhammad Bey (2006 - )

Husainids see Husaynids

Husayni, Hajj Amin al-
Husayni, Hajj Amin al- (Hajj Amin al-Husayni) (Mohammad Amin al-Husayni) (Muhammad Amin al-Husseini) (1895 - July 4, 1974).  Mufti of Jerusalem and a Palestinian Arab nationalist leader in the 1930s and 1940s.  Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni came from an aristocratic landowning family that traced its lineage to the prophet Muhammad.  His grandfather, father, and half-brother served as muftis of Jerusalem.  Husayni studied briefly at al-Azhar University in Cairo (1912-1913) and, after serving in the Ottoman army, became an active Arab nationalist.  From 1918 to 1920, he supported the unification of Palestine with Syria, as a step toward a Pan-Arab state, and protested the British Balfour Declaration (November 1917) that promised to establish a national home in Palestine for the Jewish people.  He fled to Damascus after participating in violent anti-Zionist protests in Jerusalem in April 1920.

Husayni emerged as a powerful figure when the British not only pardoned him but appointed him mufti of Jerusalem (May 1921) and president of the Supreme Muslim Council (January 1922).  He pledged to maintain order and the British hoped the move would pacify the Palestinian elite.  As president, he gained control over the Muslim religious schools, courts, orphanages, mosques, and awqaf (religious endowments) throughout the country.

Husayni’s effort to maintain calm while pressing for substantive political concessions from the British became more difficult to sustain in the wake of the Wailing Wall crisis (1928-1929) and soaring Jewish immigration in the early 1930s.  He headed a delegation to London (January 1930) that sought a national government with an Arab majority.  He also organized the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem (December 1931) to galvanize support in the Muslim world.  The failure of these initiatives to alter the Palestinians’ situation encouraged anti-British radicals to challenge Husayni’s influence.  They later criticized his efforts, as president of the Arab Higher Committee, to limit the scope of the general strike that began in April 1936.

Husayni only broke decisively with the British when the Peel Commission called for the territorial partition of Palestine in July 1937.  The nationalist cause appeared lost and British support for the Zionist movement irresistible.  At this point he escaped to Lebanon (October 1937) and became a bitter enemy of the British.  He supported the violent Palestinian revolt against the British (1938-1939), encouraged anti-British political forces in Iraq (October 1939 to May 1941), and fled through Iran to Italy and Germany.  Husayni tried to persuade Hitler to pledge support for Arab independence, and appealed over the radio for Arabs and Muslims to revolt against the Allies.  At the end of the war, he escaped to France (May 1945) and then to Cairo (May 1946), where he resumed his political activities.  Discredited by his support for Hitler and unable to prevent the establishment of Israel in 1948, he lived in exile in Egypt until 1959 and then in Beirut.  Husayni’s importance lies in his dual role as a religious and political leader.  His religious stature enhanced his political leadership and he activated support for the Palestinian nationalist cause both inside Palestine and abroad.

Hajj Amin al-Husayni see Husayni, Hajj Amin al- Mohammad Amin al-Husayni see Husayni, Hajj Amin al- Muhammad Amin al-Husseini see Husayni, Hajj Amin al- Husseini, Muhammad Amin al- see Husayni, Hajj Amin al-

Husayn Jahid
Husayn Jahid (Huseyin Cahit Yalcin) (December 7, 1875 - October 18, 1957). Turkish writer, journalist and politician.  In 1930, in the presence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, he publicly opposed a government sponsored language reform.

Huseyin Cahit Yalcin see Husayn Jahid Yalcin, Huseyin Cahit see Husayn Jahid Jahid, Husayn see Husayn Jahid

Husayn Kamil
Husayn Kamil (Hussein Kamel) (November 21, 1853 - October 9, 1917).  Sultan of Egypt (r.1914-1917).  Hussein Kamel was the Sultan of Egypt and Sudan from December 19, 1914 - October 9, 1917, during the British occupation which lasted from 1882-1922.

Hussein was the son of Khedive Isma'il Pasha, who was ruler of Egypt and Sudan from 1863 until 1879. He became Sultan of Egypt and Sudan after the deposition of his nephew, Khedive Abbas II by the British. Egypt was declared a British protectorate in 1914 at the beginning of World War I. This brought an end to the legal fiction of Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt, which had been largely nominal since Muhammad Ali's seizure of power in 1805.

Upon his death, Hussein Kamel's only son, Prince Kamal al-Din Husayn, declined the succession, and Hussein Kamel's brother Ahmed Fuad ascended the throne as Fuad I. At the beginning of Naguib Mahfouz's novel Palace Walk, Ahmad Abd al-Jawwad says "What a fine man Prince Kamal al-Din Husayn is! Do you know what he did? He refused to ascend the throne of his late father so long as the British are in charge."

In his lifetime, Hussein Kamel received the following honors:

    * Imperial Order of the Osmans, 1st Class of Turkey
    * Order of Nobility, 1st Class of Turkey
    * Knight of the Order of Franz Joseph, 1st Class of Austria-1869
    * Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword of Sweden-1891
    * Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (GCB)-1914
    * Grand Cross of the Legion d'Honneur of France-1916
    * Grand Cross of the Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus of Italy-1916
    * Grand Cross of the Order of the Redeemer of Greece-1916
    * Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown of Romania-1916
    * Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold II of Belgium-1917

Kamil, Husayn see Husayn Kamil Hussein Kamel see Husayn Kamil Kamel, Hussein see Husayn Kamil

Husayn Nizam Shah I
Husayn Nizam Shah I.  Ruler of the Nizam Shahi sultanate of Ahmadnagar, western India (r.1554-1565).  His reign was spent in almost continual warfare, mostly with Bijapur.

Husayn Pasha
Husayn Pasha (Kucuk Huseyin Pasha) (Tayazade Groom) (1757 - December 7 1803).  Ottoman Grand Admiral.  He is deemed to be the founder of the modern Ottoman navy.

Kucuk Huseyin Pasha see Husayn Pasha Huseyin, Kucuk see Husayn Pasha Tavazade Groom see Husayn Pasha Groom, Tavazade see Husayn Pasha

Husayn Pasha, Aga
Husayn Pasha, Aga (Aga Husayn Pasha) (1776-1849).  Ottoman vizier.  He is known for having suppressed the Janissaries in 1826.
Aga Husayn Pasha see Husayn Pasha, Aga

Husayn Pasha, Hajji
Husayn Pasha, Hajji (Hajji Husayn Pasha) (Mezzomorto) (Hassan Mezzo Morto) (Hadji Hussein Mezzo Morto) (d.1700).  Algerian corsair and Ottoman general.  He owes his Italian nickname, Mezzomorto -- “half dead” -- to the fact that as a young man he had been wounded, apparently fatally, in a sea-fight with the Spaniards.

Hassan Mezzo Morto or Hadji Hussein Mezzo Morto (?–1700) was an Turkish corsair, then Dey and finally Ottoman admiral.

In 1682, he was at Algiers when it was bombarded by the French under Admiral Abraham Duquesne.

In 1683, he was the commander of the Algerian corsair fleet. After another French bombardment of Algiers in that year, he was offered by the Dey (de facto autonomous Ottoman governor), Baba Hassan, to the French as one of several hostages as a guarantee. Disagreeing with this, he killed the Dey and named himself Dey of Algiers.

In 1684, he signed a "100 year" treaty with Duquesne.

In 1688, he was named Turkish Kaptan Pasha (Ottoman admiral in chief).

He later fought a series of fairly successful actions against the Venetian fleet: circa 1687 (probably in 1688), 1690, 1695 and 1696.

He died in 1700.
Hajji Husayn Pasha see Husayn Pasha, Hajji Mezzomorto  see Husayn Pasha, Hajji "Half Dead" see Husayn Pasha, Hajji Hassan Mezzo Morto see Husayn Pasha, Hajji Hadji Hussein Mezzo Morto see Husayn Pasha, Hajji Morto, Hadji Hussein Mezzo see Husayn Pasha, Hajji

Husayn Rahmi
Husayn Rahmi (Huseyin Rahmi Gurpinar) (August 17, 1864 - March 8, 1944).  Turkish novelist and short story writer.  He wrote about the everyday life of families and individuals and their development within the disintegrating Ottoman society.

Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar was a Turkish writer and politician.

Gürpınar was born in Istanbul, the son of a family close to the Ottoman court. Having lost his mother at an early age, he was sent to Crete where his father was an Ottoman civil servant.  However, he was soon sent back to Istanbul, where he was brought up by his aunts and grandmothers in Istanbul.

Gürpınar started writing fiction at an early age. He became a civil servant, then a writer and journalist. He later served as a member of parliament in the early years of the Turkish Republic between 1935 and 1943.

Gurpinar's published books include:

    * "Şık" (1889)
    * "İffet" (1896)
    * "Metres" (1900)
    * "Tesadüf" (1900)
    * "Şıpsevdi" (1911)
    * "Nimetşinas" (1911)
    * "Kuyruklu Yıldız Altında Bir İzdivaç" (1912)
    * "Gulyabani" (1913)
    * "Hakka Sığındık" (1919)
    * "Efsuncu Baba" (1924)
    * "Evlere Şenlik, Kaynanam Nasıl Kudurdu" (1927)
    * "Namusla Açlık Meselesi" (1933)
    * "Utanmaz Adam" (1934)
    * "İki Hödüğün Seyahati" (1934)
    * "Gönül Ticareti" (1939)
    * "Melek Sanmıştım Şeytanı" (1943)
    * "Dirilen İskelet" (1946)
    * "Deli Filozof" (1964)
    * "Kaderin Cilvesi" (1964)
    * "Namuslu Kokotlar" (1973)
    * "Shikure Babezu" (1974)

Rahmi, Husayn see Husayn Rahmi Huseyin Rahmi Gurpinar see Husayn Rahmi Gurpinar, Huseyin Rahmi see Husayn Rahmi

Husayn, Saddam
Husayn, Saddam.  See Hussein, Saddam.
Hussein, Saddam see Husayn, Saddam.
Saddam Hussein  see Husayn, Saddam.
Saddam Husayn see Husayn, Saddam.

Husayn Shah, al-Makki
Husayn Shah, al-Makki (al-Makki Husayn Shah) (d. 1519).  Founder of the Husayn-Shah dynasty of Bengal.  He claimed descent from the Sharifs of Mecca.
Makki Husayn Shah, al- see Husayn Shah, al-Makki Shah, al-Makki Husayn see Husayn Shah, al-Makki

Husayn Shah Arghun
Husayn Shah Arghun (b. 1490).  Founder of the Arghun dynasty of Sind (r.1521-1555).

The Arghun Dynasty was a dynasty of either Mongol, Turkish or Turko-Mongol ethnicity that ruled parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, as well as the region of Sindh for most of the 16th century. The Arghuns can be divided into two branches: the Arghun branch of Dhu'l-Nun Beg Arghun that ruled until 1554, and the Tarkhan branch of Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan that ruled until 1591.

In the late 15th century the Timurid sultan of Herat, Husayn Bayqarah, appointed Dhu'l-Nun Beg Arghun as governor of Kandahar. Dhu'l-Nun Beg soon began to ignore the authority of the central government in Herat and in around 1479 he began expanding in the direction of Baluchistan, taking over Pishin, Shal and Mustang. In 1485, his sons Shah Beg and Muhammad Mukim Khan also seized Sibi from the Samma Dynasty of Sindh, although this gain was only temporary.

In 1497, Dhu'l-Nun Beg threw his support behind the revolt of Husayn Bayqarah's son Badi' al-Zaman against his father. Dhu'l-Nun Beg, who married off his daughter to Badi' al-Zaman, subsequently gained a prominent position in the latter's government when the Timurid succeeded Husayn Bayqarah in Herat in 1506. Unfortunately for them, the Uzbeks under Muhammad Shaybani invaded Khorasan shortly after Badi' al-Zaman's ascension. In 1507, Dhu'l-Nun Beg was killed in battle against the Uzbeks and succeeded by his sons Shah Beg and Mukim.

The Arghuns ultimately lost control of their portion of Afghanistan to the Timurid prince Babur, who had been expelled from Transoxiana by the Uzbeks and had made his way south to Husayn Bayqarah's kingdom. In 1501/1502 Mukim had peacefully gained the submission of Kabul, which was in chaos after the death of its ruler Ulugh Beg ibn Abu Sa'id. This was contested by Babur, who besieged and took the city in 1504. Mukim fell back to Kandahar.

After Dhu'l-Nun Beg's death, Babur decided that as long as Shah Beg and Mukim remained in Kandahar they would remain a threat to them. In 1507 or 1508 he attacked them, but the brothers saved their position by agreeing to submit to the Uzbek Muhammad Shaybani. In the following years, Babur spent his time fighting against the Uzbeks in an attempt to regain Samarkand, giving Shah Beg and Mukim a degree of respite.

Shah Beg, however, seems to have realized that in the long term it would be impossible to hold Kandahar against Babur. In 1520, in the hopes of establishing a new power base, he invaded Sindh, where the Samma dynasty was struggling under Djam Firuz. Shah Beg defeated Jam Firuz's army and proceeded to sack Thatta. The two sides agreed to a peace, where Shah Beg gained the upper half of Sindh while the Sammas retained the lower half. Jam Firuz almost immediately broke this agreement, but was defeated by Shah Beg and forced to flee to Gujarat. This marked the end of Samma rule in Sindh, as Shah Beg gained control of the whole region.

In 1522, Babur took Kandahar after a drawn out siege and annexed it. Following this, Shah Beg made Bhakkar his official capital. He died in 1524 and his son Shah Husayn succeeded him. Shah Husayn had the khutba read in Babur's name and attacked Multan, probably at Babur's insistence. Multan, which was ruled by the Langah, fell in 1528 after an extended siege and Shah Husayn was appointed a governor of the city. Shortly after, Shah Husayn departed Multan for Thatta. However, the governor was thrown out of the city. The rebels administered Multan for a time independently, but soon afterwards submitted to the Mughal Empire, which had been founded by Babur after his capture of Delhi in 1526.

In 1540, Shah Husayn had to deal with the arrival of Babur's successor Humayun, who had been expelled from Hindustan by Sher Shah Suri. Humayun implored Shah Husayn to provide assistance in fighting against Sher Shah, but was unable to convince him to do so. Some time after this Humayun later attempted to wrest Sindh from Shah Husayn, but the latter was able to force a stalemate. The Mughal Emperor eventually agreed to leave Sindh and made his way to Kandahar in 1543.

Shah Husayn became increasingly incapable of ruling as he approached the end of his life. Because of this, the nobles of Sindh decided to elect Mirza Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan, who was a member of a senior branch of the Arghuns, as their ruler in 1554. Shah Husayn was set aside and died childless in 1556.

During the civil war between Shah Husayn and Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan, the latter had sent a request for help to the Portuguese at Bassein. A 700 man force under the command of Pedro Barreto Rolim sailed up to Thatta in 1555 only to find that Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan had already won the conflict and there was no need for their assistance. Furious at the governor of Thatta's refusal to pay them, the Portuguese sacked the defenseless city and killed several thousand people.

Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan was soon forced to deal with a rival claimant, Sultan Mahmud Gokaldash. He was eventually compelled to make peace with Sultan Mahmud. The two agreed that Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan would keep lower Sindh, with his capital at Thatta, while Sultan Mahmud would rule upper Sindh from Bakhar. In 1567, Muhammad 'Isa Tarkhan died and was succeeded by his son Muhammad Baki. During the latter's reign upper Sindh was annexed by the Mughal Emperor Akbar in 1573.

Muhammad Baki committed suicide in 1585, and was succeeded by his son Jani Beg. In 1591, Akbar sent an army to conquer lower Sindh. Jani Beg put up a resistance but was defeated by the,Mughal forces and his principality was annexed. In 1599. he died of delirium tremens.
Arghun, Husayn Shah see Husayn Shah Arghun

Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah Sharqi
Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah Sharqi (Hussain Shah Sharki) (1458-1493/1494).  Son of Sultan Mahmud Shah Sharki (1440-1458) and last of the line of the Sharqi sultans of Jawnpur (r.1458-1479).  He was a great musician.

Sharqi, Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah see Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah Sharqi Hussain Shah Sharki  see Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah Sharqi Sharki, Hussain Shah see Husayn Shah ibn Mahmud Shah Sharqi

Husayn Shah Langah I
Husayn Shah Langah I.  Founder of the Langah dynasty of Multan, western India (r.1469-1502).

Langah, Husayn Shah see Husayn Shah Langah I.
Langah, Husayn Shah I see Husayn Shah Langah I.

Husayn Shah Langah II
Husayn Shah Langah II.  Son of Mahmud Langah (r. 1498-1524) and the last ruler of the Langah dynasty of Multan (r. 1524-1526).  In 1526, Multan became a dependency of the Mughal Empire.

Langah, Husayn Shah II see Husayn Shah Langah II.

Husayn, Taha
Husayn, Taha  (Taha Husayn) (Taha Hussein) (November 14, 1889—October 28, 1973) One of the most influential 20th century Egyptian writers and intellectuals, and a figurehead for the modernist movement in Egypt.  His two Arabic nicknames summarize this famed writer’s life.  One, ‘Amid al-Adab al-‘Arabi (Dean of Arabic literature), signals his pivotal role as one of the towering figures of Arabic letters in the twentieth century.  The other, Qahir al-Zalam (Conqueror of Darkness), alludes to his blindness, a handicap that gives his story a heroic cast.

Taha Husayn was born in ‘Izbat al-Kilu, a small village in Upper Egypt, to a large family.  At a young age, he contracted ophthalmia, and the village barber’s treatment caused the young boy to lose his sight.  The handicap strengthened Taha’s resolve.  He broke barrier after barrier in his rise to a position of leadership in Egyptian society and letters.

Taha Husayn’s education began in the village kuttab (Qur’anic school).  In 1902, he went to Cairo, pursuing his schooling at al-Azhar, the most prestigious place for traditional Muslim education.  But secularism attracted him more than traditionalism, and he began studies at the newly founded university in Cairo, from which he received a doctorate in 1914.  Like many other Arab intellectuals, he was drawn to Europe and studied in Montpellier and then Paris, where he received his second doctorate in 1919.

In France, Taha Husayn met and married a Frenchwoman, Suzanne Taha Husayn, who maintained the practice of her own religion, Catholicism.  That, combined with much travel and residence abroad, meant that Taha was immersed in two cultures.  However, his impact was greatest on Egyptian society and contemporary Arab culture.  In his roles as adviser to Egypt’s Ministry of Education and then as minister from 1950 to 1952, he saw to the implementation of educational reforms that ensured the expansion of the state school system.

It is for his writings, however, that Taha Husayn is best known in the Arab world today.  Novels, short stories, historical and critical studies, and political articles sit side by side with his translations of Western classics into Arabic.  He took the controversial critical position that the famous pre-Islamic odes were inauthentic.  His criticism also includes impassioned writings on the blind ‘Abbasid poet Abu al-‘Ala’ al-Ma‘arri (d. 1058).  In his cultural manifesto The Future of Culture in Egypt, he predicates his positions on intimate connections between Egypt and the West.  Of all his works, it is Taha Husayn’s autobiography Al-ayyam (The Days) that has earned him a position in world literature.  The three-volume masterpiece was published over forty years, a period critical in the development of Arabic literature.  Its third person narrator exposes, among other things, the weaknesses of the traditional educational system.

More than a century after his birth, the figure of Taha Husayn still towers over the Arab cultural scene.  As the Conqueror of Darkness, in a movie of the same title, he became familiar to millions of Arab cinema viewers.  He stirred controversy during his lifetime with his ideas on pre-Islamic poetry and on Egypt and the West, and with his attitudes toward traditional learning.  After his death, he was treated in many quarters as a virtual secular saint.  With the rise of the Islamists in the Middle East, the figure of Taha Husayn has been drawn into the fray once again, this time as the object of attack by conservative religious thinkers.  The arguments of his anti-secular opponents would not have surprised him.  The question of the future of culture no longer applies only to Egypt, but to the whole of the Middle East and North Africa.  Decades after his death, Taha Husayn continued to serve a role in the cultural game in which he was such an active player.

The works of Taha Husayn include:

    * The Memory of Abu El Alaa 1915
    * Selected Poetical Texts of the Greek Drama 1924
    * Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy 1925
    * Dramas by a Group of the Most Famous French Writers 1924
    * Pioneers of Thoughts 1925
    * Wednesday Talk 1925
    * Pre-Islamic Poetry 1926
    * In the Summer 1933
    * The Days "3 Volumes" 1933
    * Hafez and Shawki 1933
    * The Prophet's Life "Ala Hamesh El Sira" 1933
    * Curlew's Prayers 1934
    * From a Distance 1935
    * Adeeb 1935
    * The Literary Life in the Arabian Peninsula 1935
    * Together with Abi El Alaa in his Prison 1935
    * Poetry and Prose 1936
    * Bewitched Palace 1937
    * Together with El Motanabi 1937
    * The Future of Culture in Egypt 1938
    * Moments 1942
    * The Voice of Paris 1943
    * Sheherzad's Dreams 1943
    * Tree of Misery 1944
    * Paradise of Thorn 1945
    * Chapters on Literature and Criticism 1945
    * The Voice of Abu El Alaa 1945
    * Osman "The first Part of the Greater Sedition
    * "El Fitna Al Kubra" 1947
    * Spring Journey 1948
    * The Tortured of Modern Conscience 1949
    * The Divine Promise "El Wa'd El Haq" 1950
    * The Paradise of Animals 1950
    * The Lost Love 1951
    * From There 1952
    * Varieties 1952
    * In The Midst 1952
    * Ali and His Sons (The 2nd Part of the Greater Sedition" 1953
    * (Sharh Lozoum Mala Yalzm, Abu El Alaa) 1955
    * (Anatagonism and Reform 1955
    * Criticism and Reform 1956
    * Our Contemporary Literature 1958
    * Mirror of Islam 1959
    * Summer Nonsense 1959
    * On the Western Drama 1959
    * Talks 1959
    * Al-Shaikhan (Abi Bakr and Omar Ibn El Khatab) 1960
    * From Summer Nonsense to Winter Seriousness 1961
    * Reflections 1965
    * Beyond the River 1975
    * Words 1976
    * Tradition and Renovation 1978
    * Books and Author 1980
    * From the Other Shore 1990


    * Jules Simon's The Duty 1920-1921
    * Athenians System (Nezam Al-Ethnien) 1921
    * The Spirit of Pedagogy 1921
    * Dramatic Tales 1924
    * Andromaque (Racine) 1935
    * From the Greek Dramatic Literature (Sophocle) 1939
    * Voltaire's Zadig or (The Fate) 1947
    * André Gide: From Greek
    * Legends' Heroes
    * Sophocle-Oedipe 1947
Taha Husayn see Husayn, Taha 'Amid al-Adab al-'Arabi see Husayn, Taha "Dean of Arabic Literature" see Husayn, Taha Qahir al-Zalam  see Husayn, Taha "Conquerorof Darkness" see Husayn, Taha Hussein, Taha see Husayn, Taha

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