Partai Islam Se-Malaysia
Partai Islam Se-Malaysia. See Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
Partai Komunis Indonesia
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (Indonesia Communist Party). Founded in May 1920 to succeed the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV). Its leaders, Semaun and Darsono, argued that capitalist imperialism had proletarianized Indonesian society and that the national and proletarian struggles thus coincided. They pioneered the “bloc within” strategy as members of the nationalist party the Sarekat Islam (SI). Expelled from SI in 1921, the PKI won wide support in Java and Sumatra, attracting the attention of the Dutch police. To maintain its elan and forestall repression, the party launched uprisings in Banten (1926) and West Sumatra (1927). Supported by Musso and Alimin but opposed by Tan Malaka, these uprisings were abortive and led the Dutch to suppress the party and exile many cadres to West New Guinea.
In 1935, Musso established the illegal PKI, which followed an anti-fascist line and remained underground until 1948. An above-ground party was established in 1945 and briefly led by Muhammad Jusuf, later by Alimin and Sardjono. It was subordinate to the underground party, and party members were active in several parties within the ruling Sayap Kiri (“left wing”). The PKI supported negotiations with the Dutch to ensure the Indonesian Republic’s survival, but after the fall of Amir Sjarifuddin’s cabinet in January 1948 it increasingly favored armed struggle by workers and peasants. In August 1948, the PKI emerged openly as leader of the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s Democratic Front) under Musso and Sjarifuddin but was suppressed militarily for its involvement in the Madiun Affair (September 1948).
After Madiun, the PKI, under Tan Ling Djie, resumed the strategy of working through front parties. This policy, however, was discarded in 1951 by the new-generation leadership -- D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman, Nyoto, and Sudisman -- who rehabilitated the party politically by stressing its nationalist commitment and renouncing armed revolution. The party survived repression by the Sukiman government and expanded its membership by broadening its base to include the peasantry, especially through one of its affiliates, the Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants’ Front). It won 16.4 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections and later claimed three million members.
Although it obtained political protection from Sukarno by backing his program of Guided Democracy and emphasized that its primary enemy was Dutch and American capital, the PKI drew the hostility of many intellectuals for its insistence on ideological correctness. The PKI also angered civilian and military officials as a result of its attacks on corruption and privilege and alienated the rural elite (often associated with Muslim parties) because of its support of peasant interests, especially its unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) in 1964 to carry out an as yet unimplemented land reform law in Central and East Java.
After the 1965 Gestapu Affair, army units and Muslim youth conducted a pogrom in which perhaps 400,000 PKI members and supporters died and 100,000 were jailed. The party was banned in March 1966 but briefly conducted guerrilla operations near Blitar, East Java, and in West Kalimantan. PKI exiles in Beijing, led by Jusuf Ajitoropo, later publicized a self-criticism (otokritik) condemning the Aidit leadership for alleged revisionism and announcing a new Maoist program advocating armed revolution.
In spite of initial sporadic resistance, PKI stood paralysed after the 1965-1966 killings. In September 1966 the remnants of the party politburo issued a statement of self-criticism, criticizing the previous cooperation with the Sukarno regime.
After the killings of Aidit and Njoto, Sudisman took over party leadership. In 1967 he was sentenced to death.
Some cadres of PKI had taken refuge in Blitar, Eastern Java, following the crackdown on the party. Amongst the leaders present were the youth leader Sukatno, the deputy chairman of SOBSI, Ruslan Widjayasastra and Professor Iskandar Subekti, assistant to Aidit. Blitar was an underdeveloped area were PKI had strong support amongst the peasantry. The military was unaware that PKI had been able to consolidate itself there. But in March 1968 violence erupted in Blitar, as local peasants attacked leaders and cadres of Nahdatul Ulama, as a revenge for the role it had played in anti-communist persecutions. Around 60 NU cadres were killed. It is, however, unlikely that the killings of NU cadres in Blitar had been conducted on the orders of PKI. The military became aware of the PKI enclave and crushed it. Sukatno, Ruslan and Iskandar Subekti were captured and sentenced to death.
Some party cadres were temporarily outside Indonesia at the time of the September 30 events. Notably a sizeable delegation had travelled to the People's Republic of China to participate in the anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Revolution. Others had left Indonesia to pursue studies in Eastern Europe. In exile, a party apparatus continued to function. It was, however, largely isolated from political developments inside Indonesia. In Java, some villages that were known to be refuges for members or suspected sympathizers were identified by authorities and were kept under careful watch for a considerable time.
As of 2004, former PKI members remain blacklisted from many occupations including government jobs. During his presidency Abdurrahman Wahid invited former PKI exiles to return to Indonesia in 1999, and proposed removing restrictions on open discussion of the communist ideology. In arguing for the removal of the ban, Wahid cited Indonesia's original 1945 constitution, which did not prohibit or even specifically mention communism. Wahid's proposal was vigorously opposed by some sectors of Indonesian society, especially conservative Islamic groups. In an April 2000 protest, a group called the Indonesian Islamic Front rallied ten thousand people in Jakarta against Wahid's proposal. The Army did not immediately reject the proposal, but promised a "comprehensive and meticulous study" of the idea
PKI see Partai Komunis Indonesia
Indonesia Communist Party see Partai Komunis Indonesia
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (Indonesia Communist Party). Founded in May 1920 to succeed the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV). Its leaders, Semaun and Darsono, argued that capitalist imperialism had proletarianized Indonesian society and that the national and proletarian struggles thus coincided. They pioneered the “bloc within” strategy as members of the nationalist party the Sarekat Islam (SI). Expelled from SI in 1921, the PKI won wide support in Java and Sumatra, attracting the attention of the Dutch police. To maintain its elan and forestall repression, the party launched uprisings in Banten (1926) and West Sumatra (1927). Supported by Musso and Alimin but opposed by Tan Malaka, these uprisings were abortive and led the Dutch to suppress the party and exile many cadres to West New Guinea.
In 1935, Musso established the illegal PKI, which followed an anti-fascist line and remained underground until 1948. An above-ground party was established in 1945 and briefly led by Muhammad Jusuf, later by Alimin and Sardjono. It was subordinate to the underground party, and party members were active in several parties within the ruling Sayap Kiri (“left wing”). The PKI supported negotiations with the Dutch to ensure the Indonesian Republic’s survival, but after the fall of Amir Sjarifuddin’s cabinet in January 1948 it increasingly favored armed struggle by workers and peasants. In August 1948, the PKI emerged openly as leader of the Front Demokrasi Rakyat (People’s Democratic Front) under Musso and Sjarifuddin but was suppressed militarily for its involvement in the Madiun Affair (September 1948).
After Madiun, the PKI, under Tan Ling Djie, resumed the strategy of working through front parties. This policy, however, was discarded in 1951 by the new-generation leadership -- D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman, Nyoto, and Sudisman -- who rehabilitated the party politically by stressing its nationalist commitment and renouncing armed revolution. The party survived repression by the Sukiman government and expanded its membership by broadening its base to include the peasantry, especially through one of its affiliates, the Barisan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants’ Front). It won 16.4 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections and later claimed three million members.
Although it obtained political protection from Sukarno by backing his program of Guided Democracy and emphasized that its primary enemy was Dutch and American capital, the PKI drew the hostility of many intellectuals for its insistence on ideological correctness. The PKI also angered civilian and military officials as a result of its attacks on corruption and privilege and alienated the rural elite (often associated with Muslim parties) because of its support of peasant interests, especially its unilateral actions (aksi sepihak) in 1964 to carry out an as yet unimplemented land reform law in Central and East Java.
After the 1965 Gestapu Affair, army units and Muslim youth conducted a pogrom in which perhaps 400,000 PKI members and supporters died and 100,000 were jailed. The party was banned in March 1966 but briefly conducted guerrilla operations near Blitar, East Java, and in West Kalimantan. PKI exiles in Beijing, led by Jusuf Ajitoropo, later publicized a self-criticism (otokritik) condemning the Aidit leadership for alleged revisionism and announcing a new Maoist program advocating armed revolution.
In spite of initial sporadic resistance, PKI stood paralysed after the 1965-1966 killings. In September 1966 the remnants of the party politburo issued a statement of self-criticism, criticizing the previous cooperation with the Sukarno regime.
After the killings of Aidit and Njoto, Sudisman took over party leadership. In 1967 he was sentenced to death.
Some cadres of PKI had taken refuge in Blitar, Eastern Java, following the crackdown on the party. Amongst the leaders present were the youth leader Sukatno, the deputy chairman of SOBSI, Ruslan Widjayasastra and Professor Iskandar Subekti, assistant to Aidit. Blitar was an underdeveloped area were PKI had strong support amongst the peasantry. The military was unaware that PKI had been able to consolidate itself there. But in March 1968 violence erupted in Blitar, as local peasants attacked leaders and cadres of Nahdatul Ulama, as a revenge for the role it had played in anti-communist persecutions. Around 60 NU cadres were killed. It is, however, unlikely that the killings of NU cadres in Blitar had been conducted on the orders of PKI. The military became aware of the PKI enclave and crushed it. Sukatno, Ruslan and Iskandar Subekti were captured and sentenced to death.
Some party cadres were temporarily outside Indonesia at the time of the September 30 events. Notably a sizeable delegation had travelled to the People's Republic of China to participate in the anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Revolution. Others had left Indonesia to pursue studies in Eastern Europe. In exile, a party apparatus continued to function. It was, however, largely isolated from political developments inside Indonesia. In Java, some villages that were known to be refuges for members or suspected sympathizers were identified by authorities and were kept under careful watch for a considerable time.
As of 2004, former PKI members remain blacklisted from many occupations including government jobs. During his presidency Abdurrahman Wahid invited former PKI exiles to return to Indonesia in 1999, and proposed removing restrictions on open discussion of the communist ideology. In arguing for the removal of the ban, Wahid cited Indonesia's original 1945 constitution, which did not prohibit or even specifically mention communism. Wahid's proposal was vigorously opposed by some sectors of Indonesian society, especially conservative Islamic groups. In an April 2000 protest, a group called the Indonesian Islamic Front rallied ten thousand people in Jakarta against Wahid's proposal. The Army did not immediately reject the proposal, but promised a "comprehensive and meticulous study" of the idea
PKI see Partai Komunis Indonesia
Indonesia Communist Party see Partai Komunis Indonesia
Partai Murba
Partai Murba (Murba Party) (Proletarian Party). Indonesian left-wing nationalist party founded in October 1948 by Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka and led after his death by Sukarno. It gathered together leftists who were unhappy with the Indonesian Communist Party’s (PKI’s) alleged accommodation with the West during the revolution and its emphasis on class struggle within Indonesia thereafter. Murba was ideologically close to Sukarno, arguing for an all-encompassing national front or state party, but it was unable to deliver significant popular support for him. Under PKI pressure, it was declared inactive in January 1965 and was formally banned in September. Restored to legality for the 1971 elections, it polled poorly and in 1973 was incorporated into the Partai Deomkrasi Indonesia (PDI).
Murba Party (Indonesian: Partai Murba) was a 'national Communist' political party in Indonesia. The party was founded by Tan Malaka's followers in 1948. The history of the party was largely intertwined with that of the powerful Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Initially relations between PKI and the Murba Party were fluid, but gradually the two parties developed into each others' arch-enemies. The Murba Party continued to exist under the New Order, but was merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1973.
The 1948 Madiun Affair resulted in a severe backlash for the PKI. Across Java (except in Bantam), a political vacuum emerged on the political left. The followers of Tan Malaka sought to capitalize on this, and on October 3, 1948, the three main constituents of the Tan Malaka-led Revolutionary People's Movement (GRR); the People's Party, Poor People's Party and the Independent Labour Party of Indonesia, declared that they would merge to form the unitary Murba Party. The merger was to be completed on November 7, 1948, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The constitution of the party was declared on November 12, 1948. At the time of its foundation, the new party had around 80,000 members. The GRR continued to exist separately though, with the Murba Party as one of its affiliates.
Whilst Tan Malaka was highly influential in the party, he wasn't formally the leader of the party. At the time of the merger a leadership was formed consisting of Sukarni (president), Sjamsu Harja Udaja (general secretary), Maruto Nitimihardjo (vice president), Sutan Dewanis (second vice president) and Pandu Karta Wiguna (secretary). The Murba Party published two official newspapers, Murba and Massa. Furthermore there were guerrilla units linked to the party, which played an important role in the struggle against Dutch rule in West and Central Java.
Although far smaller than the PKI, the Murba Party constituted an important rival to it. The leadership of the Murba Party was largely made up by leaders of mass movements. The young men who led Murba had often been leaders of guerrillas or mass struggles against the Japanese occupation. The party appealed to ex-guerrillas and workers, who were dissatisfied with post-independence developments.
The Murba Party was secular, and wary of the possibility of increased Islamic influence in government.
In March 1951 the party joined the Consultative Body of Political Parties, a broad coalition initiated by PKI that soon became non-functional. During the following year, PKI-Murba relations improved significantly. At the time, Murba guerrilla units still roamed in West Java and held some territories under their control.
In February 1952, the party supported a parliamentary motion calling for the opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
The Murba Party suffered a stark set-back in the 1955 legislative election. The party obtained 199,588 votes (0.53% of the national vote), and won two seats from Java in the People's Representative Council (down from four seats prior to the elections). After the election, the Murba Party MPs joined the National Progressive Fraction, a body of ten MPs from Java. In the 1955 Constituent Assembly election, the party obtained 248,633 votes (0.66%) and four seats in the assembly.
When President Sukarno introduced Guided Democracy in 1957, the Murba Party was the first to declare its outright support of the plan. The Murba Party became one of ten parties that were legal under the Guided Democracy. The Murba Party were highly supportive of President Sukarno during this period, and repeatedly sought to gain Sukarno's confidence and convince him to turn against the PKI. The Murba Party politician and Minister of Education Priyono, became the head of the Guided Democracy Committee.
During the 1958 Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion, Murba Party cadres were seized by PRRI rebels and held at the Muara Labuh detention camp in West Sumatra.
Adam Malik, one of the founding leaders of the Murba Party, was named as the Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union and Poland. In 1960 Chaerul Saleh of the Murba Party became chairman of the National Council. He also came to serve as chairman of the National Front.
During the November 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Murba Party voiced its support for Cuba and declared that the party was willing to send volunteers to help the Cubans.
In 1959, the Murba Party declared that China was the state in the Socialist Bloc with whom it felt closest affinity but with the PKI-Soviet alliance in 1963, the Murba Party re-oriented itself towards building relations with the Soviet Union instead. Once it was clear that PKI had sided with the Communist Party of China in the Sino-Soviet split, one sector of the Murba Party began to negotiate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding the possibility that the Murba-led mass organizations could replace PKI mass organizations in pro-Soviet international communist structures. The Murba Party, on its behalf, began calling for the inclusion of the Soviet Union into the Afro-Asian fraternity. These contacts were aided by the fact that the Murba leader Adam Malik had been stationed as ambassador in Moscow. In 1963, Adam Malik returned to Indonesia, and became Minister of Trade.
In April 1964, the Murba Party proposed that a single-party system be introduced in Indonesia, seeking support from President Sukarno for the idea. The underlying purpose of the plan was to eliminate PKI as an independent political force. Parties like the Indonesian National Party and Nahdatul Ulama protested against the proposal, and in the end the Murba Party failed to convince Sukarno to endorse the proposal. However, the proposal did gain some quiet support from sectors of the army. Later the same year, when President Sukarno expressed his willingness to include PKI in the government, the Murba Party was one of the parties which voiced its opposition.
During this period, the Murba Party was publicly targeted by the PKI. In its anti-price hike mass campaigns the PKI singled out the Murba Party ministers Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh as responsibles. Issues that had aroused the fury of the PKI were the alliances of the Murba Party with anti-Communist sectors and anti-Sukarno army officers, the support of the Murba Party for United States film imports and the covert Soviet-Murba contacts.
On January 6, 1965, the government declared that the activities of the Murba Party had been 'frozen'. Murba Party leaders were arrested. The 'freezing' of the Murba Party followed the ban by Sukarno on the 'Body to Promote Sukarnoism' (BPS, in which prominent Murba Party figures had played leading roles). Through its activities in BPS (directed towards the breaking of the political influence of PKI), the Murba Party had moved outside the political boundaries of the Nasakom concept of Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Sukarno believed that the BPS campaign had been manipulated by the CIA.
Following the 'freezing' of the Murba Party, PKI continued ferocious attacks on the party. PKI declared that the Murba Party was a party of 'Trotskyites' and 'imperialist agents'. Demands were raised that the Murba Party ministers be expelled from the government, pro-Murba newspapers be closed and that Murba Party members be expelled from the journalists' union and other semi-official structures.
After the 1965-1966 coup d'état the Murba Party continued its activities. It was able to retain small pockets of influence. In March 1966, Adam Malik became foreign minister and deputy prime minister under Suharto.
Under Suharto's rule, the surviving political parties of the 'Old Order' were pressured to consolidate themselves into two political blocs, one Islamic and one 'secular'. The Murba Party was included in the latter category and in March 1970 the Democratic Development Group (Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan) was formed, consisting of the Murba Party, Indonesian National Party (PNI), the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), the Catholic Party and the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo).
The Murba Party took part in the 1971 parliamentary election. The party got 48,126 votes nationwide (0.1%), and failed to win any seats.
On January 10, 1973 the Murba Party and the other members of the Democratic Development Group merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party.
Proletarian Party see Partai Murba
Murba Party see Partai Murba
Partai Murba (Murba Party) (Proletarian Party). Indonesian left-wing nationalist party founded in October 1948 by Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka and led after his death by Sukarno. It gathered together leftists who were unhappy with the Indonesian Communist Party’s (PKI’s) alleged accommodation with the West during the revolution and its emphasis on class struggle within Indonesia thereafter. Murba was ideologically close to Sukarno, arguing for an all-encompassing national front or state party, but it was unable to deliver significant popular support for him. Under PKI pressure, it was declared inactive in January 1965 and was formally banned in September. Restored to legality for the 1971 elections, it polled poorly and in 1973 was incorporated into the Partai Deomkrasi Indonesia (PDI).
Murba Party (Indonesian: Partai Murba) was a 'national Communist' political party in Indonesia. The party was founded by Tan Malaka's followers in 1948. The history of the party was largely intertwined with that of the powerful Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Initially relations between PKI and the Murba Party were fluid, but gradually the two parties developed into each others' arch-enemies. The Murba Party continued to exist under the New Order, but was merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party in 1973.
The 1948 Madiun Affair resulted in a severe backlash for the PKI. Across Java (except in Bantam), a political vacuum emerged on the political left. The followers of Tan Malaka sought to capitalize on this, and on October 3, 1948, the three main constituents of the Tan Malaka-led Revolutionary People's Movement (GRR); the People's Party, Poor People's Party and the Independent Labour Party of Indonesia, declared that they would merge to form the unitary Murba Party. The merger was to be completed on November 7, 1948, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The constitution of the party was declared on November 12, 1948. At the time of its foundation, the new party had around 80,000 members. The GRR continued to exist separately though, with the Murba Party as one of its affiliates.
Whilst Tan Malaka was highly influential in the party, he wasn't formally the leader of the party. At the time of the merger a leadership was formed consisting of Sukarni (president), Sjamsu Harja Udaja (general secretary), Maruto Nitimihardjo (vice president), Sutan Dewanis (second vice president) and Pandu Karta Wiguna (secretary). The Murba Party published two official newspapers, Murba and Massa. Furthermore there were guerrilla units linked to the party, which played an important role in the struggle against Dutch rule in West and Central Java.
Although far smaller than the PKI, the Murba Party constituted an important rival to it. The leadership of the Murba Party was largely made up by leaders of mass movements. The young men who led Murba had often been leaders of guerrillas or mass struggles against the Japanese occupation. The party appealed to ex-guerrillas and workers, who were dissatisfied with post-independence developments.
The Murba Party was secular, and wary of the possibility of increased Islamic influence in government.
In March 1951 the party joined the Consultative Body of Political Parties, a broad coalition initiated by PKI that soon became non-functional. During the following year, PKI-Murba relations improved significantly. At the time, Murba guerrilla units still roamed in West Java and held some territories under their control.
In February 1952, the party supported a parliamentary motion calling for the opening of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
The Murba Party suffered a stark set-back in the 1955 legislative election. The party obtained 199,588 votes (0.53% of the national vote), and won two seats from Java in the People's Representative Council (down from four seats prior to the elections). After the election, the Murba Party MPs joined the National Progressive Fraction, a body of ten MPs from Java. In the 1955 Constituent Assembly election, the party obtained 248,633 votes (0.66%) and four seats in the assembly.
When President Sukarno introduced Guided Democracy in 1957, the Murba Party was the first to declare its outright support of the plan. The Murba Party became one of ten parties that were legal under the Guided Democracy. The Murba Party were highly supportive of President Sukarno during this period, and repeatedly sought to gain Sukarno's confidence and convince him to turn against the PKI. The Murba Party politician and Minister of Education Priyono, became the head of the Guided Democracy Committee.
During the 1958 Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) rebellion, Murba Party cadres were seized by PRRI rebels and held at the Muara Labuh detention camp in West Sumatra.
Adam Malik, one of the founding leaders of the Murba Party, was named as the Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union and Poland. In 1960 Chaerul Saleh of the Murba Party became chairman of the National Council. He also came to serve as chairman of the National Front.
During the November 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Murba Party voiced its support for Cuba and declared that the party was willing to send volunteers to help the Cubans.
In 1959, the Murba Party declared that China was the state in the Socialist Bloc with whom it felt closest affinity but with the PKI-Soviet alliance in 1963, the Murba Party re-oriented itself towards building relations with the Soviet Union instead. Once it was clear that PKI had sided with the Communist Party of China in the Sino-Soviet split, one sector of the Murba Party began to negotiate with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding the possibility that the Murba-led mass organizations could replace PKI mass organizations in pro-Soviet international communist structures. The Murba Party, on its behalf, began calling for the inclusion of the Soviet Union into the Afro-Asian fraternity. These contacts were aided by the fact that the Murba leader Adam Malik had been stationed as ambassador in Moscow. In 1963, Adam Malik returned to Indonesia, and became Minister of Trade.
In April 1964, the Murba Party proposed that a single-party system be introduced in Indonesia, seeking support from President Sukarno for the idea. The underlying purpose of the plan was to eliminate PKI as an independent political force. Parties like the Indonesian National Party and Nahdatul Ulama protested against the proposal, and in the end the Murba Party failed to convince Sukarno to endorse the proposal. However, the proposal did gain some quiet support from sectors of the army. Later the same year, when President Sukarno expressed his willingness to include PKI in the government, the Murba Party was one of the parties which voiced its opposition.
During this period, the Murba Party was publicly targeted by the PKI. In its anti-price hike mass campaigns the PKI singled out the Murba Party ministers Adam Malik and Chaerul Saleh as responsibles. Issues that had aroused the fury of the PKI were the alliances of the Murba Party with anti-Communist sectors and anti-Sukarno army officers, the support of the Murba Party for United States film imports and the covert Soviet-Murba contacts.
On January 6, 1965, the government declared that the activities of the Murba Party had been 'frozen'. Murba Party leaders were arrested. The 'freezing' of the Murba Party followed the ban by Sukarno on the 'Body to Promote Sukarnoism' (BPS, in which prominent Murba Party figures had played leading roles). Through its activities in BPS (directed towards the breaking of the political influence of PKI), the Murba Party had moved outside the political boundaries of the Nasakom concept of Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Sukarno believed that the BPS campaign had been manipulated by the CIA.
Following the 'freezing' of the Murba Party, PKI continued ferocious attacks on the party. PKI declared that the Murba Party was a party of 'Trotskyites' and 'imperialist agents'. Demands were raised that the Murba Party ministers be expelled from the government, pro-Murba newspapers be closed and that Murba Party members be expelled from the journalists' union and other semi-official structures.
After the 1965-1966 coup d'état the Murba Party continued its activities. It was able to retain small pockets of influence. In March 1966, Adam Malik became foreign minister and deputy prime minister under Suharto.
Under Suharto's rule, the surviving political parties of the 'Old Order' were pressured to consolidate themselves into two political blocs, one Islamic and one 'secular'. The Murba Party was included in the latter category and in March 1970 the Democratic Development Group (Kelompok Persatuan Pembangunan) was formed, consisting of the Murba Party, Indonesian National Party (PNI), the League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence (IPKI), the Catholic Party and the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo).
The Murba Party took part in the 1971 parliamentary election. The party got 48,126 votes nationwide (0.1%), and failed to win any seats.
On January 10, 1973 the Murba Party and the other members of the Democratic Development Group merged into the Indonesian Democratic Party.
Proletarian Party see Partai Murba
Murba Party see Partai Murba
Partai Nasional Indonesia
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (Indonesian Nationalist Party). Formed in 1927 by Sukarno and other nationalist leaders, some of them recently returned from study in the Netherlands. It quickly became the main voice of Indonesian nationalism. Under Sukarno’s chairmanship the party aimed at a mass membership, sought the union of all nationalist organizations in the pursuit of independence, and practiced non-cooperation with the colonial regime. Within two years, it claimed a membership of approximately ten thousand.
After Sukarno’s arrest, trial, and conviction in 1930, the PNI dissolved itself and formed the Partindo (Indonesian Party), also to be deprived of its leaders and effectively immobilized two years later.
The PNI was reformed after the Proclamation of Independence in 1945. Although in theory it was a new party, its leadership and its ideas came primarily from the original PNI. After 1950, it became one of the main elements in the domestic political balance. It saw itself as the party of radical nationalism, seeking indonesianization of the economy and an independent foreign policy. The PNI participated in the Masjumi-led Sukiman government (1951-1952) and was the main partner in the Wilopo government (1952-1953) and the Ali Sastroamidjojo governments (1953-1955 and 1955-1956). The 1955 elections confirmed it as one of the big four parties (the others were Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI). In 1957, the PNI supported Sukarno’s Guided Democracy plans, although their effect, in the end, was to undermine party activity. It continued to support Sukarno after 1959.
The 1971 elections under President Suharto saw all remaining parties overwhelmed by Golkar, the government sponsored organization. In 1973, an enforced rationalization of parties led to the amalgamation of the PNI and other non-Muslim parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia).
After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the part was revived and contested the 1999 legislative election as the Indonesian National Party Marhaenism.
PNI see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian Nationalist Party see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian National Party Marhaenism see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (Indonesian Nationalist Party). Formed in 1927 by Sukarno and other nationalist leaders, some of them recently returned from study in the Netherlands. It quickly became the main voice of Indonesian nationalism. Under Sukarno’s chairmanship the party aimed at a mass membership, sought the union of all nationalist organizations in the pursuit of independence, and practiced non-cooperation with the colonial regime. Within two years, it claimed a membership of approximately ten thousand.
After Sukarno’s arrest, trial, and conviction in 1930, the PNI dissolved itself and formed the Partindo (Indonesian Party), also to be deprived of its leaders and effectively immobilized two years later.
The PNI was reformed after the Proclamation of Independence in 1945. Although in theory it was a new party, its leadership and its ideas came primarily from the original PNI. After 1950, it became one of the main elements in the domestic political balance. It saw itself as the party of radical nationalism, seeking indonesianization of the economy and an independent foreign policy. The PNI participated in the Masjumi-led Sukiman government (1951-1952) and was the main partner in the Wilopo government (1952-1953) and the Ali Sastroamidjojo governments (1953-1955 and 1955-1956). The 1955 elections confirmed it as one of the big four parties (the others were Masjumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI). In 1957, the PNI supported Sukarno’s Guided Democracy plans, although their effect, in the end, was to undermine party activity. It continued to support Sukarno after 1959.
The 1971 elections under President Suharto saw all remaining parties overwhelmed by Golkar, the government sponsored organization. In 1973, an enforced rationalization of parties led to the amalgamation of the PNI and other non-Muslim parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia).
After the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the part was revived and contested the 1999 legislative election as the Indonesian National Party Marhaenism.
PNI see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian Nationalist Party see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Indonesian National Party Marhaenism see Partai Nasional Indonesia
Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (PPP) (P3) (Development Unity Party). The only Islamic political party in Indonesia today is the Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (Development Unity Party, abbreviated as Partai Persatuan, PPP, or P3), formed in 1973 through the fusion of the four pre-existing Islamic parties: the traditionalist Partai NU (Nahdatul Ulama Party), the modernist Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party), and tow other minor parties, the PSII and Perti. The fusion was imposed by the New Order government under General Suharto, who placed utmost priority on economic development, political stability, and national integration. The PPP was prohibited from pursuing an Islamic state as its goal and from using “Islam” or “Muslim” in its name. The government, to secure loyalty, also intervened in the formation of the PPP leadership.
In spite of these constraints, the PPP became increasingly militant and confrontational vis-a-vis the government during the 1970s. The government had to withdraw its secular version of the Marriage Law bill in the face of Muslim criticism in 1973. Strong Islamic sentiments were mobilized in the 1977 general elections campaign for the PPP, who used the Ka‘ba as their party symbol. A number of charismatic ‘ulama’ openly criticized the secularization, corruption, and inequality that the New Order had brought and urged Muslim voting for the PPP as religious obligation. The PPP received 29 percent of the national vote, obtaining the leading position in the capital city of Jakarta. The PPP staged a walkout from the parliament in 1978 in protest of the government promotion of Javanese mysticism over Islam. They maintained almost the same level of popular support (28 percent) in the 1982 general elections.
Alarmed by rising Islamic radicalism, the government instituted a law requiring all social and political organization to stipulate the state philosophy of Pancasila (Five Pillars) as the sole foundation of their constitutions. The NU complied with this in 1983, followed by the PPP and others. The NU was, however, dissatisfied with the PPP leadership over the allocation of parliamentary seats and decided to withdraw its support from the PPP. In the 1987 general elections, the NU actively engaged in a “deflation campaign” against the PPP; the results showed a drastic reduction in votes for the PPP, which received only 16 percent of the total. The replacement of the Ka‘bah with a star as the party symbol also contributed to this demise, symbolizing the fact that its constitution and statutes had become less explicitly Islamic. It received seventeen precent of the total votes in the 1992 general election.
The decline of the PPP’s strength has not, however, meant the departure of Islam from public life. Since the late 1980s, islamization of the bureaucracy has been visible. Now that all Muslim organizations have accepted the Pancasila as their sole foundation, the intensification of religious activities in government offices is no longer under scrutiny. Suharto himself contributed to this trend by promoting the establishment of mosques all over the country and performing the hajj in 1991. The government party Golkar has also become manifestly Islamic in its orientation. A mainstreaming of Islam is under way. A number of goals previously pursued by the Islamic parties have been achieved without arousing political controversies. This new situation is blurring the distinctiveness of the PPP as an Islamic party, and its raison d’etre is in question.
PPP see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
P3 see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
Development Unity Party see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (PPP) (P3) (Development Unity Party). The only Islamic political party in Indonesia today is the Partai Persatuan Pembanguan (Development Unity Party, abbreviated as Partai Persatuan, PPP, or P3), formed in 1973 through the fusion of the four pre-existing Islamic parties: the traditionalist Partai NU (Nahdatul Ulama Party), the modernist Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party), and tow other minor parties, the PSII and Perti. The fusion was imposed by the New Order government under General Suharto, who placed utmost priority on economic development, political stability, and national integration. The PPP was prohibited from pursuing an Islamic state as its goal and from using “Islam” or “Muslim” in its name. The government, to secure loyalty, also intervened in the formation of the PPP leadership.
In spite of these constraints, the PPP became increasingly militant and confrontational vis-a-vis the government during the 1970s. The government had to withdraw its secular version of the Marriage Law bill in the face of Muslim criticism in 1973. Strong Islamic sentiments were mobilized in the 1977 general elections campaign for the PPP, who used the Ka‘ba as their party symbol. A number of charismatic ‘ulama’ openly criticized the secularization, corruption, and inequality that the New Order had brought and urged Muslim voting for the PPP as religious obligation. The PPP received 29 percent of the national vote, obtaining the leading position in the capital city of Jakarta. The PPP staged a walkout from the parliament in 1978 in protest of the government promotion of Javanese mysticism over Islam. They maintained almost the same level of popular support (28 percent) in the 1982 general elections.
Alarmed by rising Islamic radicalism, the government instituted a law requiring all social and political organization to stipulate the state philosophy of Pancasila (Five Pillars) as the sole foundation of their constitutions. The NU complied with this in 1983, followed by the PPP and others. The NU was, however, dissatisfied with the PPP leadership over the allocation of parliamentary seats and decided to withdraw its support from the PPP. In the 1987 general elections, the NU actively engaged in a “deflation campaign” against the PPP; the results showed a drastic reduction in votes for the PPP, which received only 16 percent of the total. The replacement of the Ka‘bah with a star as the party symbol also contributed to this demise, symbolizing the fact that its constitution and statutes had become less explicitly Islamic. It received seventeen precent of the total votes in the 1992 general election.
The decline of the PPP’s strength has not, however, meant the departure of Islam from public life. Since the late 1980s, islamization of the bureaucracy has been visible. Now that all Muslim organizations have accepted the Pancasila as their sole foundation, the intensification of religious activities in government offices is no longer under scrutiny. Suharto himself contributed to this trend by promoting the establishment of mosques all over the country and performing the hajj in 1991. The government party Golkar has also become manifestly Islamic in its orientation. A mainstreaming of Islam is under way. A number of goals previously pursued by the Islamic parties have been achieved without arousing political controversies. This new situation is blurring the distinctiveness of the PPP as an Islamic party, and its raison d’etre is in question.
PPP see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
P3 see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
Development Unity Party see Partai Persatuan Pembanguan
Partai Sosialis Indonesia
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) (Indonesian Socialist Party). Formed in February of 1948 by Sutan Sjahrir’s followers. It was the ideological descendant of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, formed by Hatta and Sjahrir in 1931 to train a socialist leadership for the Indonesian nationalist movement. After Indonesia became independent, the PSI was influential in Parliament and the civil service. It was seen as the party of the intellectuals and was noted for a pragmatic and rational approach to political issues. It lacked electoral support, however, and was virtually eliminated in the 1955 elections. Some of its members were implicated in the 1958 rebellion, and in 1960 Sukarno banned the party.
The Socialist Party of Indonesia (Indonesian: Partai Sosialis Indonesia) was a political party in Indonesia from 1948 until 1960, when it was banned by President Sukarno.
In December 1945 Amir Sjarifoeddin's Socialist Party of Indonesia (Parsi) and Sutan Sjahrir's Socialist People's Party (Parsas), both of which had only recently been established, merged to form the Socialist Party. Sjahrir became leader of the combined party. It was popular among young intellectuals and students as well as members of the underground movements led by the two men during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. At the end of 1945 the Socialist Party gained five of the 25 seats on the working committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee, the de facto legislature. Both Sutan and Amir served terms as prime minister, while other Socialist Party members held senior cabinet posts.
From 1947, divisions appeared between Sutan and Amir as Amir and his communist allies gained more and more influence over the party. In June 1947 Amir ousted Sutan. The second party called the Socialist Party of Indonesia was founded on February 13, 1948, by Sutan Sjahrir after his departure from the Socialist Party.
Following the dissolution of the United States of Indonesia and the reestablishment of the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950, the PSI was awarded 17 of the 232 seats in the new legislature, the People's Representative Council (DPR), a total in proportion to the estimated strength of the party
The PSI held its first party congress in 1952.
In the 1955 legislative election the PSI won only 2% of the vote, resulting in 5 seats in the legislature. This was a far smaller share of the vote than had been expected.
The second party congress was held in June 1955.
After the 1955 elections, a clear political division between Java and the outer islands opened up. This was followed by a military crisis brought about by army chief-of-staff General Nasution's plan to implement widespread transfers of officers, many of whom had built up private business interests in the regions. On July 20, 1956, the most prominent non-Javanese politician, Vice-president Hatta, resigned effective December 1, 1956. Tired of the political infighting, on October 28, President Sukarno called for an end to political parties. This would lead to his 1957 conception of “guided democracy”, which the PSI opposed.
In December 1956, several army commanders in Sumatra announced they had taken over civil government. This crisis spread and in March 1957, the military commander of East Indonesia imposed martial law over his command area. On March 1957, the cabinet resigned and Sukarno proclaimed martial law nationwide. In May 1957, PSI economist Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo left Jakarta for Sumatra, followed by other political figures. In January 1958, the PSI demanded a new cabinet, and the following month dissidents in Padang, West Sumatra, issued an ultimatum demanding the dissolution of the cabinet within five days. Despite efforts by the PSI in Jakarta to forestall a rebellion, on February 15, a rebel government was proclaimed in Bukitinggi called the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). It was headed by Amir Sjarifoeddin as Prime Minister and included Burhanuddin Harahap from the Masyumi Party and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Hatta and PSI leaders in Jakarta called for a negotiated settlement, but the government decided on a military solution, which defeated the rebellion by mid-1958.
Sukarno implemented his plan for guided democracy by issuing a decree restoring the 1945 Constitution. The PSI was not represented in either the new cabinet, the Supreme Advisory Council nor the National Planning Council established under the new system. Finally, in August 1960, President Sukarno formally banned the PSI and the Masyumi Party for their opposition to Guided Democracy and their alleged support of the PRRI rebellion.
The party's philosophy was based on Fabianism with elements of Marxist social analysis. There was a distinct Indonesian character to the party's brand of socialism. It stressed the need for modernization, economic development and rational planning and organization, while opposing extreme nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment. It accepted the need for foreign capital, but party leaders criticized what they saw as the Hatta cabinet's overcautious foreign policy and the strong influence of the United States over it. They strongly opposed the party siding with either the United States or the Soviet Union.
Rather than building support among the masses, the party aimed to develop a well-trained core of members. It had considerable influence among high-level bureaucrats and the leadership of the army. Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX and Nasution did not belong to the PSI, but they had strong informal links with it.
PSI see Partai Sosialis Indonesia
Indonesian Socialist Party see Partai Sosialis Indonesia
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) (Indonesian Socialist Party). Formed in February of 1948 by Sutan Sjahrir’s followers. It was the ideological descendant of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, formed by Hatta and Sjahrir in 1931 to train a socialist leadership for the Indonesian nationalist movement. After Indonesia became independent, the PSI was influential in Parliament and the civil service. It was seen as the party of the intellectuals and was noted for a pragmatic and rational approach to political issues. It lacked electoral support, however, and was virtually eliminated in the 1955 elections. Some of its members were implicated in the 1958 rebellion, and in 1960 Sukarno banned the party.
The Socialist Party of Indonesia (Indonesian: Partai Sosialis Indonesia) was a political party in Indonesia from 1948 until 1960, when it was banned by President Sukarno.
In December 1945 Amir Sjarifoeddin's Socialist Party of Indonesia (Parsi) and Sutan Sjahrir's Socialist People's Party (Parsas), both of which had only recently been established, merged to form the Socialist Party. Sjahrir became leader of the combined party. It was popular among young intellectuals and students as well as members of the underground movements led by the two men during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. At the end of 1945 the Socialist Party gained five of the 25 seats on the working committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee, the de facto legislature. Both Sutan and Amir served terms as prime minister, while other Socialist Party members held senior cabinet posts.
From 1947, divisions appeared between Sutan and Amir as Amir and his communist allies gained more and more influence over the party. In June 1947 Amir ousted Sutan. The second party called the Socialist Party of Indonesia was founded on February 13, 1948, by Sutan Sjahrir after his departure from the Socialist Party.
Following the dissolution of the United States of Indonesia and the reestablishment of the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950, the PSI was awarded 17 of the 232 seats in the new legislature, the People's Representative Council (DPR), a total in proportion to the estimated strength of the party
The PSI held its first party congress in 1952.
In the 1955 legislative election the PSI won only 2% of the vote, resulting in 5 seats in the legislature. This was a far smaller share of the vote than had been expected.
The second party congress was held in June 1955.
After the 1955 elections, a clear political division between Java and the outer islands opened up. This was followed by a military crisis brought about by army chief-of-staff General Nasution's plan to implement widespread transfers of officers, many of whom had built up private business interests in the regions. On July 20, 1956, the most prominent non-Javanese politician, Vice-president Hatta, resigned effective December 1, 1956. Tired of the political infighting, on October 28, President Sukarno called for an end to political parties. This would lead to his 1957 conception of “guided democracy”, which the PSI opposed.
In December 1956, several army commanders in Sumatra announced they had taken over civil government. This crisis spread and in March 1957, the military commander of East Indonesia imposed martial law over his command area. On March 1957, the cabinet resigned and Sukarno proclaimed martial law nationwide. In May 1957, PSI economist Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo left Jakarta for Sumatra, followed by other political figures. In January 1958, the PSI demanded a new cabinet, and the following month dissidents in Padang, West Sumatra, issued an ultimatum demanding the dissolution of the cabinet within five days. Despite efforts by the PSI in Jakarta to forestall a rebellion, on February 15, a rebel government was proclaimed in Bukitinggi called the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). It was headed by Amir Sjarifoeddin as Prime Minister and included Burhanuddin Harahap from the Masyumi Party and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. Hatta and PSI leaders in Jakarta called for a negotiated settlement, but the government decided on a military solution, which defeated the rebellion by mid-1958.
Sukarno implemented his plan for guided democracy by issuing a decree restoring the 1945 Constitution. The PSI was not represented in either the new cabinet, the Supreme Advisory Council nor the National Planning Council established under the new system. Finally, in August 1960, President Sukarno formally banned the PSI and the Masyumi Party for their opposition to Guided Democracy and their alleged support of the PRRI rebellion.
The party's philosophy was based on Fabianism with elements of Marxist social analysis. There was a distinct Indonesian character to the party's brand of socialism. It stressed the need for modernization, economic development and rational planning and organization, while opposing extreme nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment. It accepted the need for foreign capital, but party leaders criticized what they saw as the Hatta cabinet's overcautious foreign policy and the strong influence of the United States over it. They strongly opposed the party siding with either the United States or the Soviet Union.
Rather than building support among the masses, the party aimed to develop a well-trained core of members. It had considerable influence among high-level bureaucrats and the leadership of the army. Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX and Nasution did not belong to the PSI, but they had strong informal links with it.
PSI see Partai Sosialis Indonesia
Indonesian Socialist Party see Partai Sosialis Indonesia
Pasha
Pasha (Pacha) (Paşa) . Turkish term for the highest official title of honor in the Ottoman Empire and in modern Turkey until 1934. It survived even longer in some former Ottoman provinces like Egypt and Iraq. It always followed the proper name. Military rather than feudal in character, it was however also given to certain high civil officials, but not to religious people. It was not hereditary, did not give any rank to wives, and was not attached to territorial possession.
Pasha is the highest title for a person or an office in the Ottoman Empire. The title, when used for a person, was always together with his proper name. The title was used for military officers and officials in the administration, but never for any of the religiously learned. The title was not hereditary, except in Egypt in the 19th century. In some rare cases, the title was even used for women.
The title first occurred among the Seljuks and was used early on by the Ottomans. The brother and son of the first bey (later sultan) Orhan, were called pasha.
The use of the title “pasha” continued for some time even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but was abandoned in 1934. In Egypt, it survived until 1952.
In everyday conversation, Turks today use the title to mark their respect for a person they consider of very high status in the society.
Pasha was a high rank in the Ottoman Empire political system, typically granted to governors, generals and dignitaries. As an honorary title, Pasha, in one of its various ranks, is equivalent to the British title of Lord, and was also one of the highest titles in pre-republic Egypt.
The word pasha entered English from Turkish paşa. Etymologists variously derive the word paşa from the Turkish baş or baş ağa, "head, chief", or from Persian pādshāh. Old Turkish had no fixed distinction between /b/ and /p/, and the word was spelled başa still in the 15th century. As first used in western Europe, the title appeared in writing with the initial "b". The English forms bashaw, bassaw, bucha etc., general in the 16th and 17th century, derive through the medieval Latin and Italian word bassa. Due to the Ottoman presence in the Arab World, the title became used frequently in Arabic, though pronounced as basha due to the absence of the letter "p" in Arabic. Alternatively, the word could derive from Persian "pa", meaning foot, and "shah", meaning king, making the title "the foot of the king".
The Ottoman Sultan and his nominal vassal the Khedive of Egypt had the right to bestow the title of Pasha. The title appears, originally, to have applied exclusively to military commanders, but subsequently it could distinguish any high official, and also unofficial persons whom the court desired to honor.
Pashas ranked above Beys and Aghas, but below Khedives and Viziers.
Three grades of Pasha existed, distinguished by the number of yak- or horse-tails (three, two and one respectively; a symbol of Turco-Mongol tradition) or peacock tails, which the bearers were entitled to display on their standard as a symbol of military authority when on campaign. Only the Sultan himself was entitled to four tails, as sovereign commander in chief.
The following military ranks entitled the holder to the style Pasha (lower ranks were styled Bey or merely Effendi):
* The Vizier-i-Azam (Grand Vizier, the prime minister, but also often taking the field as Generalissimo instead of the Sultan)
* Mushir (Field marshal)
* Ferik (army lieutenant-general or navy vice-admiral)
* Liva (major general or Rear-admiral)
* The Kizlar Agha (chief black eunuch, the highest officer in the Topkapı Palace; three tails, as commander of the baltacı corps of the halberdiers in the imperial army
* Istanbul's Shaikh ul-Islam, the highest Muslim clergyman, of cabinet rank.
If a Pasha governed a provincial territory, it could be called a pashaluk after his military title, besides the administrative term for the type of jurisdiction, e.g. eyalet, vilayet/walayah. Both Beylerbeys (governors-general) and valis/wālis (the most common type of Governor) were entitled to the style of Pasha (typically with two tails). The word pashalik designated any province or other jurisdiction of a Pasha.
Ottoman and Egyptian authorities conferred the title upon both Muslims and Christians without distinction. They also frequently gave it to foreigners in the service of the Ottoman Empire or of the Egyptian Khedivate (later Sultanate, and Kingdom in turn), e.g. Hobart Pasha.
In usage, the title followed the given name. Although the word serves as a non-hereditary title, English speakers have commonly used the word pasha as if it formed part of a personal name, as for instance in Ibrahim Pasha or Emin Pasha, similar to the practice of referring to a British Peer as Lord X, since in both cases it substitutes for a more precise rank title.
The sons of a Pasha were styled Pashazada or Pasha-zade, which means just that.
In modern Egyptian and (to a lesser extent) Levantine Arabic, it is used as an honorific closer to "Sir" than "Lord," especially by older people.
The following is a list of notable pashas:
* Abaza Family - Egyptian Pashas and Beys
* Abbas I of Egypt
* Abbas II of Egypt
* Ahmed Pasha (Claude Alexandre de Bonneval)
* Ali Pasha — statesman
* Barbarossa Khair ad-Din Pasha
* Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha
* Emin Pasha
* Enver Pasha
* Essad Pasha
* Fakhri Pasha
* Fuad Pasha
* Glubb Pasha (John Bagot Glubb)
* Gordon Pasha
* Hagop Kazazian Pasha
* Hobart Pasha
* Hussein Refki Pasha
* Ibrahim Pasha
* İsmet Pasha (İsmet İnönü)
* Jafar al-Askari
* Jamal Pasha
* Judar Pasha - Moroccan general
* Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Kazazian Pasha
* Kilic Ali Pasha
* Multiple members of the Köprülü family, especially Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Liman von Sanders Pasha
* Mahmud Dramali Pasha — Ottoman general
* Mehmed Pasha Sokolović
* Melling Pasha
* Midhat Pasha
* Müezzinzade Ali Pasha — Ottoman admiral
* Muhammad Ali Pasha — viceroy of Egypt
* Mustafa Kemal Pasha, subsequently known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the post-Ottoman Turkish republic
* Mustafa Reshid Pasha
* Nubar Pasha
* Osman Pasha
* Piyale Pasha
* Riyad Pasha — Egyptian statesman
* Said Pasha
* Sinan Pasha
* Stone Pasha
* Sulejman Pasha
* Sultan al-Atrash
* Talat Pasha
* Tewfik Pasha
* Turhan Pasha Përmeti
* Tusun Pasha
* Urabi Pasha
* Valentine Baker
* Wehib Pasha
* Woods Pasha
* Youssef Wahba Pasha — Egyptian Prime Minister
* Yusuf Karamanli Pasha of Tripoli
Pacha see Pasha
Pasa see Pasha
Pasha (Pacha) (Paşa) . Turkish term for the highest official title of honor in the Ottoman Empire and in modern Turkey until 1934. It survived even longer in some former Ottoman provinces like Egypt and Iraq. It always followed the proper name. Military rather than feudal in character, it was however also given to certain high civil officials, but not to religious people. It was not hereditary, did not give any rank to wives, and was not attached to territorial possession.
Pasha is the highest title for a person or an office in the Ottoman Empire. The title, when used for a person, was always together with his proper name. The title was used for military officers and officials in the administration, but never for any of the religiously learned. The title was not hereditary, except in Egypt in the 19th century. In some rare cases, the title was even used for women.
The title first occurred among the Seljuks and was used early on by the Ottomans. The brother and son of the first bey (later sultan) Orhan, were called pasha.
The use of the title “pasha” continued for some time even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but was abandoned in 1934. In Egypt, it survived until 1952.
In everyday conversation, Turks today use the title to mark their respect for a person they consider of very high status in the society.
Pasha was a high rank in the Ottoman Empire political system, typically granted to governors, generals and dignitaries. As an honorary title, Pasha, in one of its various ranks, is equivalent to the British title of Lord, and was also one of the highest titles in pre-republic Egypt.
The word pasha entered English from Turkish paşa. Etymologists variously derive the word paşa from the Turkish baş or baş ağa, "head, chief", or from Persian pādshāh. Old Turkish had no fixed distinction between /b/ and /p/, and the word was spelled başa still in the 15th century. As first used in western Europe, the title appeared in writing with the initial "b". The English forms bashaw, bassaw, bucha etc., general in the 16th and 17th century, derive through the medieval Latin and Italian word bassa. Due to the Ottoman presence in the Arab World, the title became used frequently in Arabic, though pronounced as basha due to the absence of the letter "p" in Arabic. Alternatively, the word could derive from Persian "pa", meaning foot, and "shah", meaning king, making the title "the foot of the king".
The Ottoman Sultan and his nominal vassal the Khedive of Egypt had the right to bestow the title of Pasha. The title appears, originally, to have applied exclusively to military commanders, but subsequently it could distinguish any high official, and also unofficial persons whom the court desired to honor.
Pashas ranked above Beys and Aghas, but below Khedives and Viziers.
Three grades of Pasha existed, distinguished by the number of yak- or horse-tails (three, two and one respectively; a symbol of Turco-Mongol tradition) or peacock tails, which the bearers were entitled to display on their standard as a symbol of military authority when on campaign. Only the Sultan himself was entitled to four tails, as sovereign commander in chief.
The following military ranks entitled the holder to the style Pasha (lower ranks were styled Bey or merely Effendi):
* The Vizier-i-Azam (Grand Vizier, the prime minister, but also often taking the field as Generalissimo instead of the Sultan)
* Mushir (Field marshal)
* Ferik (army lieutenant-general or navy vice-admiral)
* Liva (major general or Rear-admiral)
* The Kizlar Agha (chief black eunuch, the highest officer in the Topkapı Palace; three tails, as commander of the baltacı corps of the halberdiers in the imperial army
* Istanbul's Shaikh ul-Islam, the highest Muslim clergyman, of cabinet rank.
If a Pasha governed a provincial territory, it could be called a pashaluk after his military title, besides the administrative term for the type of jurisdiction, e.g. eyalet, vilayet/walayah. Both Beylerbeys (governors-general) and valis/wālis (the most common type of Governor) were entitled to the style of Pasha (typically with two tails). The word pashalik designated any province or other jurisdiction of a Pasha.
Ottoman and Egyptian authorities conferred the title upon both Muslims and Christians without distinction. They also frequently gave it to foreigners in the service of the Ottoman Empire or of the Egyptian Khedivate (later Sultanate, and Kingdom in turn), e.g. Hobart Pasha.
In usage, the title followed the given name. Although the word serves as a non-hereditary title, English speakers have commonly used the word pasha as if it formed part of a personal name, as for instance in Ibrahim Pasha or Emin Pasha, similar to the practice of referring to a British Peer as Lord X, since in both cases it substitutes for a more precise rank title.
The sons of a Pasha were styled Pashazada or Pasha-zade, which means just that.
In modern Egyptian and (to a lesser extent) Levantine Arabic, it is used as an honorific closer to "Sir" than "Lord," especially by older people.
The following is a list of notable pashas:
* Abaza Family - Egyptian Pashas and Beys
* Abbas I of Egypt
* Abbas II of Egypt
* Ahmed Pasha (Claude Alexandre de Bonneval)
* Ali Pasha — statesman
* Barbarossa Khair ad-Din Pasha
* Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha
* Emin Pasha
* Enver Pasha
* Essad Pasha
* Fakhri Pasha
* Fuad Pasha
* Glubb Pasha (John Bagot Glubb)
* Gordon Pasha
* Hagop Kazazian Pasha
* Hobart Pasha
* Hussein Refki Pasha
* Ibrahim Pasha
* İsmet Pasha (İsmet İnönü)
* Jafar al-Askari
* Jamal Pasha
* Judar Pasha - Moroccan general
* Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Kazazian Pasha
* Kilic Ali Pasha
* Multiple members of the Köprülü family, especially Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha
* Liman von Sanders Pasha
* Mahmud Dramali Pasha — Ottoman general
* Mehmed Pasha Sokolović
* Melling Pasha
* Midhat Pasha
* Müezzinzade Ali Pasha — Ottoman admiral
* Muhammad Ali Pasha — viceroy of Egypt
* Mustafa Kemal Pasha, subsequently known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the post-Ottoman Turkish republic
* Mustafa Reshid Pasha
* Nubar Pasha
* Osman Pasha
* Piyale Pasha
* Riyad Pasha — Egyptian statesman
* Said Pasha
* Sinan Pasha
* Stone Pasha
* Sulejman Pasha
* Sultan al-Atrash
* Talat Pasha
* Tewfik Pasha
* Turhan Pasha Përmeti
* Tusun Pasha
* Urabi Pasha
* Valentine Baker
* Wehib Pasha
* Woods Pasha
* Youssef Wahba Pasha — Egyptian Prime Minister
* Yusuf Karamanli Pasha of Tripoli
Pacha see Pasha
Pasa see Pasha
Pashai
Pashai. Although Afghanistan is no longer quite the “ethnic mystery” some have called it, there are still segments of its population for which there is little reliable information. Of these, the people who speak what linguists call Pashai particularly stand out. No mention is made of the Pashai speakers in many general works on Afghanistan, and one will look in vain for some indication they exist on most maps which purport to show the distribution of ethnic groups.
There are conflicting positions among specialists regarding the history of the Pashai. Scholars argue that the progenitors of the present day Pashai were expelled from their original homes in the lowlands of classic Gandhara culture by the invasion of Pashto-speaking Afghans from the Suleiman Mountains. They found refuge in the high mountain valleys of the Hindu Kush, where their descendants live today. These descendants, the contemporary Pashai mountain people, ware thus seen as relics of a once higher civilization.
Although historical records indicate that the population of the Pashai area converted to Islam fairly recently, some scholars believe that this is no way means that the Pashai religion of the immediate pre-Islamic period was similar to that found among the pagans of what is now Nuristan. This latter religious system was comprised of symbols, rituals and beliefs strikingly similar to those found in ancient Indo-Iranian religions. According to some scholars, the paganism of the Pashai was rather a debased form of Hindu-Buddhism.
In contrast, there are those who argue that the Pashai are probably not the descendants of lowland refugees but are more likely a popuation that has inhabited their high mountain valleys from a time before the rise of Gandharan civilization. This argument is based mainly on evidence gathered in the course of field research among the Pashai speakers of the Darra-i Nur Valley.
The Pashai are Sunni Muslims who in terms of formal religion are no different from their Nuristani and Pushtun neighbors. There are shrines of famous saints in the area, and it is not unknown for Pashai men to leave their home communities and become followers of well-known Pakistani or Afghan holy men. However, in the remote villages, saints do not play a particularly important role in local politics.
Pashai. Although Afghanistan is no longer quite the “ethnic mystery” some have called it, there are still segments of its population for which there is little reliable information. Of these, the people who speak what linguists call Pashai particularly stand out. No mention is made of the Pashai speakers in many general works on Afghanistan, and one will look in vain for some indication they exist on most maps which purport to show the distribution of ethnic groups.
There are conflicting positions among specialists regarding the history of the Pashai. Scholars argue that the progenitors of the present day Pashai were expelled from their original homes in the lowlands of classic Gandhara culture by the invasion of Pashto-speaking Afghans from the Suleiman Mountains. They found refuge in the high mountain valleys of the Hindu Kush, where their descendants live today. These descendants, the contemporary Pashai mountain people, ware thus seen as relics of a once higher civilization.
Although historical records indicate that the population of the Pashai area converted to Islam fairly recently, some scholars believe that this is no way means that the Pashai religion of the immediate pre-Islamic period was similar to that found among the pagans of what is now Nuristan. This latter religious system was comprised of symbols, rituals and beliefs strikingly similar to those found in ancient Indo-Iranian religions. According to some scholars, the paganism of the Pashai was rather a debased form of Hindu-Buddhism.
In contrast, there are those who argue that the Pashai are probably not the descendants of lowland refugees but are more likely a popuation that has inhabited their high mountain valleys from a time before the rise of Gandharan civilization. This argument is based mainly on evidence gathered in the course of field research among the Pashai speakers of the Darra-i Nur Valley.
The Pashai are Sunni Muslims who in terms of formal religion are no different from their Nuristani and Pushtun neighbors. There are shrines of famous saints in the area, and it is not unknown for Pashai men to leave their home communities and become followers of well-known Pakistani or Afghan holy men. However, in the remote villages, saints do not play a particularly important role in local politics.
Patani United Liberation Organization
Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO). Muslim separatist organization in Thailand. The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was established in 1968 by Tenku Bira Kotanila, who claimed to speak of Malay Muslims liing in the four southern Thai provinces of Pattani (spelled Patani in Malay), Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun. Its goal is to detach these provinces from Thailand and combine them into an independent state based on Islamic principles. The creation of such a state is considered essential in order to preserve the “Malayness” and Islamic way of life of the local Malay Muslims, which are preceived to be threatened by the assimilationist policies of successive Thai governments. PULO also considers Thailand to be an occupying power from whom independence can be wrested only through the use of armed force.
PULO’s emphasis on protecting the Malay and Islamic character of these Malay Muslims through achieving independence for the area serves as the basis for its political mobilization efforts, since the wide appeal of the agenda cuts across social classes and secular and religious boundaries. It has proved particularly attractive to younger, more militant Malay Muslims. It has also attracted moral, financial, and other support from Malaysian individuals and organizations associated either directly or indirectly with the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), which draws most of its political support from Muslims in Malaysian states bordering Thailand. Another source of external support is the Middle East, where financial contributions are made to PULO, usually in the name of charity, by some governments, by organizations such as the Islamic Call Society in Libya, and by a few wealthy individuals. Furthermore, one faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization has provided training in Syria for small groups of PULO guerrillas.
PULO has a fairly sophisticated organizational structure with a central committee, headed by a chairman, at the top. Under the central committee is a secretariat with political, economic, military, and foreign sections. Policy making headquarters are in Mecca, and operational headquarters are in Kelantan, Malaysia. Within Thailand, PULO guerrillas conduct both military and political activities.
In 1981, PULO claimed twenty thousand members, a figure that probably was exaggerated. Independent estimates of PULO guerrillas operating in three of the provinces (no separatist guerrilla activity has been noted in Satun) have previously ranged from aroung two hundred to six hundred. In the early 1990s, however, PULO’s membership was smaller than before, and the number of guerrillas was thought to be fewer than a hundred. This is largely owing to the fact that in the mid-1980s Saudi authorities became disturbed by PULO activities such as openly issuing citizen identification
cards, in the name of the Patani Republic, to Malay Muslim workers from Thailand in Saudi Arabia. PULO headquarters in Mecca were raided, some of the staff were arrested, about seven hundred PULO members were deported, and Tenku Bira Kotanila was replaced as chairman by Dr. Ar-rong Moorang. Therse developments left the organization in disarray, and it is still trying to regroup.
The Patani United Liberation Organization (also spelled Pattani United Liberation Organisation) or PULO is one of the active separatist movements calling for a free and independent Patani. This group, along with others, is currently fighting for the independence of Thailand's predominantly Malay Muslim south.
PULO was founded in 1968 reportedly around the leadership of Kabir Abdul Rahman (Bira Kotanila), a Patani Malay scholar, who has been serving as its chairman until his death in 2008. By late 1992, the organization had split into three factions. The first faction was headed by Dr. Arong Muleng while the second one was lead by Haji Hadi Bin Ghazali. The first faction set up the PULO Leadership Council with a symbol of a dagger crossing with a sword as its logo. The name of its armed unit is called "Kasdan Army." The second faction, also headed by Haji Sama-ae Thanam, set up the PULO Army Command Council to give support to Kabir Abdul Rahman, the founder of PULO. The third faction headed by Abu Yasir Fikri has the largest ground support and leading the only group with diplomatic credibility, political influence and popular support to be able to officially negotiate and represent PULO at OIC.
In 1995, rifts emerged among the core leaders of the new PULO movement. As a result, Dr. Arong Muleng decided to split his group from the movement to set up a new organization called "PULO 88", while the other group led by Haji Abdul Rahman named its armed unit as "Pulo Keris" (Dagger Pulo).
Currently, PULO has a policy of targeting those whom it views as collaborators and associates of the Thai government, such as civil servants, soldiers and policemen.
The organization carries out car bombs, road side bombs and drive-by shootings targeting Thai military and police which they see as legitimate targets.
PULO considers itself to be continuing the independence struggle of the Malay Sultanates after the area declared its independence following the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. The Islamic state proposed by PULO would cover the areas they say were historically ruled by the Sultanate of Pattani - consisting of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla and Satun provinces in present-day Thailand. However, Songkla Province is only about 30% Muslim and mainly Thai speaking, while Satun actually was part of Kedah and has shown virtually no support for separation from Thailand.
Four star PULO is considered to be the most respected and popular separatist group in Patani with the most political clout and a large presence in the area although little is known about the group as they prefer to stay out of media and is working under a silence policy. During recent years, this group has become increasingly visible and been able to show their influence by gathering active separatists and organizing them under their political wing and being recognized internationally as representatives of the Patani People.
They are currently the political representatives by popular consent of GMIP and active military fractions of BRN, RKK and other groups. The four star became increasingly powerful steadily gaining support and loyalty from separatist groups forcing different fractions to join their ranks.
On July 26, 2009, Abu Yasir Fikri, the President of PULO and the Emir of the Movement of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Cikgume Kuteh, made an official agreement to join forces. The agreement includes giving Abu Yasir Fikri mandate to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. Further on, the agreement included a section in which the movements agreed to build one military force, the Patani Liberation Army, the PLA, to be led by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).
PULO see Patani United Liberation Organization
The Patani United Liberation Organization (also spelled Pattani United Liberation Organisation) or PULO is one of the active separatist movements calling for a free and independent Patani. This group, along with others, is currently fighting for the independence of Thailand's predominantly Malay Muslim south.
PULO was founded in 1968 reportedly around the leadership of Kabir Abdul Rahman (Bira Kotanila), a Patani Malay scholar, who has been serving as its chairman until his death in 2008. By late 1992, the organization had split into three factions. The first faction was headed by Dr. Arong Muleng while the second one was lead by Haji Hadi Bin Ghazali. The first faction set up the PULO Leadership Council with a symbol of a dagger crossing with a sword as its logo. The name of its armed unit is called "Kasdan Army." The second faction, also headed by Haji Sama-ae Thanam, set up the PULO Army Command Council to give support to Kabir Abdul Rahman, the founder of PULO. The third faction headed by Abu Yasir Fikri has the largest ground support and leading the only group with diplomatic credibility, political influence and popular support to be able to officially negotiate and represent PULO at OIC.
In 1995, rifts emerged among the core leaders of the new PULO movement. As a result, Dr. Arong Muleng decided to split his group from the movement to set up a new organization called "PULO 88", while the other group led by Haji Abdul Rahman named its armed unit as "Pulo Keris" (Dagger Pulo).
Currently, PULO has a policy of targeting those whom it views as collaborators and associates of the Thai government, such as civil servants, soldiers and policemen.
The organization carries out car bombs, road side bombs and drive-by shootings targeting Thai military and police which they see as legitimate targets.
PULO considers itself to be continuing the independence struggle of the Malay Sultanates after the area declared its independence following the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. The Islamic state proposed by PULO would cover the areas they say were historically ruled by the Sultanate of Pattani - consisting of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla and Satun provinces in present-day Thailand. However, Songkla Province is only about 30% Muslim and mainly Thai speaking, while Satun actually was part of Kedah and has shown virtually no support for separation from Thailand.
Four star PULO is considered to be the most respected and popular separatist group in Patani with the most political clout and a large presence in the area although little is known about the group as they prefer to stay out of media and is working under a silence policy. During recent years, this group has become increasingly visible and been able to show their influence by gathering active separatists and organizing them under their political wing and being recognized internationally as representatives of the Patani People.
They are currently the political representatives by popular consent of GMIP and active military fractions of BRN, RKK and other groups. The four star became increasingly powerful steadily gaining support and loyalty from separatist groups forcing different fractions to join their ranks.
On July 26, 2009, Abu Yasir Fikri, the President of PULO and the Emir of the Movement of Mujahidin Islam Patani (GMIP), Cikgume Kuteh, made an official agreement to join forces. The agreement includes giving Abu Yasir Fikri mandate to speak on behalf of the GMIP on all political issues. Further on, the agreement included a section in which the movements agreed to build one military force, the Patani Liberation Army, the PLA, to be led by the First Deputy Military Commander of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO).
PULO see Patani United Liberation Organization
