Moghols
Moghols. An ethnic and, until recently, linguistic group originally concentrated in west-central Afghanistan, in the modern province of Ghorat. Now, however, groups of them have become dispersed throughout northern and central Afghanistan. They number at most 10,000 individuals.
Two elements distinguish the Moghols of Afghanistan. They no longer speak their original Mongol language, and within a generation or two they will have lost their ethnic identity. Demographically unimportant -- they number no more than 10,000, dispersed in fewer than 50 villages -- they once played a major role in the history of Afghanistan. Their language fascinates linguists, who now study the development and change of a language separated by thousands of miles for over half a millennium from the main body of Mongol speakers.
The forefathers of the Afghan Moghols were once the military and political leaders of a thirteenth century multi-ethnic coalition known as Nikudari or Qarawunas. Nikudar Oghlan was a Chagatai. general of Hulagu, founder of the Mongol II Kahn dynasty, who came to Persia in 1256. Marco Polo mentioned him as “king of the Qarawunas.” Nikudar planned to defect, was imprisoned and died in Mesopotamia. Many of his troops aligned themselves with the Kurt dynasty of Herat in their successful struggles for independence from Il Khan rule. This union lasted for a century until Timur (Tamerlane) captured Herat in 1380.
The Nikudari soon disappeared from historical records, to be mentioned only once again, in 1562, by Babur, founder of the Moghul dynasty in India, who referred to them as “inhabitants of Ghor.” It was in this mountainous tract of west central Afghanistan that the Afghan Moghols lived until around 1900.
It was while they were allied with the Kurt rulers in Herat that the Nikudari or Moghols established themselves in Afghanistan. An unruly group of princes, the Kurts were often attacked by Il Khanid troops and on these occasions retreated to their castle, the “stronghold of Qaisar,” in southern Ghor. The ruins of this castle and a number of nearby Moghol villages remain to this day. In 1886, British intelligence reported 18 Moghol villages with a population of some 5,000 still living in the area. The publication of a vocabulary of their Moghol language in 1838 caused a sensation among linguists of the time. They were forgotten again until 1955, when a team of United States and Japanese linguists discovered what has been called the “Zimi Manuscript,” which prompted renewed interest. Further linguistic research has been carried out be a German team.
The Kurts disappeared from history after Timur captured Herat in 1380. Under Timurid and Arghunid rule, the Moghols of Ghor exerted political power in the mountain region of west central Afghanistan. Then, in 1650, a Pushtun immigrant from Baluchistan named Taiman shaped a coalition of peoples in southern Ghor that has become known as the Taimani tribe of the Char Aimaq. Taiman and his successors seem to have gotten along well with the Moghols until around 1900, when a quarrel about marriage contracts arose that started a blood feud. The ensuing fight caused the diaspora of the majority of the Moghols from Ghor. That case was not settled until 1930 through an exchange of wives in marriage between the Taimani chiefs of Nili and the leading family of the Moghols in neighboring Zirni. By then only eight villages with Moghol populations had survived in Ghor near Qaisar; the rest of the population had emigrated to Obeh and Herat oases on the Heri-rud River and at least five villages in northern and northeastern Afghanistan.
Two elements distinguish the Moghols of Afghanistan. They no longer speak their original Mongol language, and within a generation or two they will have lost their ethnic identity. Demographically unimportant -- they number no more than 10,000, dispersed in fewer than 50 villages -- they once played a major role in the history of Afghanistan. Their language fascinates linguists, who now study the development and change of a language separated by thousands of miles for over half a millennium from the main body of Mongol speakers.
The forefathers of the Afghan Moghols were once the military and political leaders of a thirteenth century multi-ethnic coalition known as Nikudari or Qarawunas. Nikudar Oghlan was a Chagatai. general of Hulagu, founder of the Mongol II Kahn dynasty, who came to Persia in 1256. Marco Polo mentioned him as “king of the Qarawunas.” Nikudar planned to defect, was imprisoned and died in Mesopotamia. Many of his troops aligned themselves with the Kurt dynasty of Herat in their successful struggles for independence from Il Khan rule. This union lasted for a century until Timur (Tamerlane) captured Herat in 1380.
The Nikudari soon disappeared from historical records, to be mentioned only once again, in 1562, by Babur, founder of the Moghul dynasty in India, who referred to them as “inhabitants of Ghor.” It was in this mountainous tract of west central Afghanistan that the Afghan Moghols lived until around 1900.
It was while they were allied with the Kurt rulers in Herat that the Nikudari or Moghols established themselves in Afghanistan. An unruly group of princes, the Kurts were often attacked by Il Khanid troops and on these occasions retreated to their castle, the “stronghold of Qaisar,” in southern Ghor. The ruins of this castle and a number of nearby Moghol villages remain to this day. In 1886, British intelligence reported 18 Moghol villages with a population of some 5,000 still living in the area. The publication of a vocabulary of their Moghol language in 1838 caused a sensation among linguists of the time. They were forgotten again until 1955, when a team of United States and Japanese linguists discovered what has been called the “Zimi Manuscript,” which prompted renewed interest. Further linguistic research has been carried out be a German team.
The Kurts disappeared from history after Timur captured Herat in 1380. Under Timurid and Arghunid rule, the Moghols of Ghor exerted political power in the mountain region of west central Afghanistan. Then, in 1650, a Pushtun immigrant from Baluchistan named Taiman shaped a coalition of peoples in southern Ghor that has become known as the Taimani tribe of the Char Aimaq. Taiman and his successors seem to have gotten along well with the Moghols until around 1900, when a quarrel about marriage contracts arose that started a blood feud. The ensuing fight caused the diaspora of the majority of the Moghols from Ghor. That case was not settled until 1930 through an exchange of wives in marriage between the Taimani chiefs of Nili and the leading family of the Moghols in neighboring Zirni. By then only eight villages with Moghol populations had survived in Ghor near Qaisar; the rest of the population had emigrated to Obeh and Herat oases on the Heri-rud River and at least five villages in northern and northeastern Afghanistan.
Mohamed 'Ali
Mohamed 'Ali (Muhammad Ali) (Maulana Mohammad Ali Jouhar) (Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar) (10 December 1878 – 4 January 1931). Key figure in Indian politics during the first two decades of the twentieth century. He was editor of the Comrade and the Hamdard, two of northern India’s most influential newspapers; the chief spokesman of Muslim interests; and the architect of the Khilafat campaign, which dominated Indian politics from 1919 to 1923.
Born in Rampur, Mohamed Ali was educated at Aligarh and Oxford. He returned to India in 1902 and found employment first in Rampur and later at Baroda. Toward the end of 1910 he decided on a career of journalism; the Comrade, launched on January 14, 1911, was his first venture. Soon afterward, he acquired the Urdu-language Hamdard. These journalistic ventures received unprecedented popularity and provided a framework for the uneasiness and dissatisfaction of important Muslim groups, molding their attitudes toward government. Above all, the newspapers focused on the disturbing news from the Balkan front, which gave evidence of successive military reverses suffered by the Turkish armies and raised the specter of European forces advancing into the heartlands of the Islamic world.
For his views and involvement in the pan-Islamic upsurge, Mohamed Ali was sent to jail, first on May 15, 1915, later in November 1922. During his famous Karachi trial in October 1922, Mohamed Ali said, “The trial is not Mohamed Ali and six others versus the Crown, but God versus man.”
During the Khilafat movement Mohamed Ali was a close ally of Gandhi and a staunch supporter of the Indian National Congress. But when Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements, Mohamed Ali became disillusioned with the Congress as well as with Gandhi.
The gulf that separated Gandhi and Mohamed Ali was confirmed by Mohamed Ali’s open condemnation in April 1930 of the civil disobedience movement launched by the Mahatma. Mohamed Ali urged Muslims not to join it because its goal was the establishment of a Hindu raj.
Mohammad Ali opposed the Nehru Report's rejection of separate electorates for Muslims, and supported the Fourteen Points of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the League. He became a critic of Gandhi, breaking with fellow Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, who continued to support Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. Mohammad Ali said: "Even the most degraded Muhammadan was better than Mahatma Gandhi."
Ali attended the Round Table Conference to show that only the Muslim League spoke for India's Muslims. He died soon after the conference in London, on January 4, 1931 and was buried in Jerusalem according to his own wish.
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar is remembered as a fiery leader of many of India's Muslims. He is celebrated as a hero by the Muslims of Pakistan, who claim he inspired the Pakistan movement. But in India, he is remembered for his leadership during Khilafat Movement and the Non-Cooperation Movement (1919-1922) and his leadership in Muslim education.
The famous Muhammad Ali Road in south Bombay, India's largest city, is named after him. The Gulistan-e-Jauhar neighborhood of Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan's largest city, is also named for him. Additionally, the Mohammad Ali Co-operative Housing Society (M.A.C.H.S.) in Karachi is named in honor of Maulana Mohammad Ali Johar. Johar Town, Lahore, Punjab is also named after him.
'Alli Mohamed see Mohamed 'Ali
Muhammad Ali see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar see Mohamed 'Ali
Jouhar, Maulana Muhammad Ali see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Mohammad Ali Johar see Mohamed 'Ali
Mohamed 'Ali (Muhammad Ali) (Maulana Mohammad Ali Jouhar) (Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar) (10 December 1878 – 4 January 1931). Key figure in Indian politics during the first two decades of the twentieth century. He was editor of the Comrade and the Hamdard, two of northern India’s most influential newspapers; the chief spokesman of Muslim interests; and the architect of the Khilafat campaign, which dominated Indian politics from 1919 to 1923.
Born in Rampur, Mohamed Ali was educated at Aligarh and Oxford. He returned to India in 1902 and found employment first in Rampur and later at Baroda. Toward the end of 1910 he decided on a career of journalism; the Comrade, launched on January 14, 1911, was his first venture. Soon afterward, he acquired the Urdu-language Hamdard. These journalistic ventures received unprecedented popularity and provided a framework for the uneasiness and dissatisfaction of important Muslim groups, molding their attitudes toward government. Above all, the newspapers focused on the disturbing news from the Balkan front, which gave evidence of successive military reverses suffered by the Turkish armies and raised the specter of European forces advancing into the heartlands of the Islamic world.
For his views and involvement in the pan-Islamic upsurge, Mohamed Ali was sent to jail, first on May 15, 1915, later in November 1922. During his famous Karachi trial in October 1922, Mohamed Ali said, “The trial is not Mohamed Ali and six others versus the Crown, but God versus man.”
During the Khilafat movement Mohamed Ali was a close ally of Gandhi and a staunch supporter of the Indian National Congress. But when Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorated in the aftermath of the Khilafat and non-cooperation movements, Mohamed Ali became disillusioned with the Congress as well as with Gandhi.
The gulf that separated Gandhi and Mohamed Ali was confirmed by Mohamed Ali’s open condemnation in April 1930 of the civil disobedience movement launched by the Mahatma. Mohamed Ali urged Muslims not to join it because its goal was the establishment of a Hindu raj.
Mohammad Ali opposed the Nehru Report's rejection of separate electorates for Muslims, and supported the Fourteen Points of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the League. He became a critic of Gandhi, breaking with fellow Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad, Hakim Ajmal Khan and Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, who continued to support Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. Mohammad Ali said: "Even the most degraded Muhammadan was better than Mahatma Gandhi."
Ali attended the Round Table Conference to show that only the Muslim League spoke for India's Muslims. He died soon after the conference in London, on January 4, 1931 and was buried in Jerusalem according to his own wish.
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar is remembered as a fiery leader of many of India's Muslims. He is celebrated as a hero by the Muslims of Pakistan, who claim he inspired the Pakistan movement. But in India, he is remembered for his leadership during Khilafat Movement and the Non-Cooperation Movement (1919-1922) and his leadership in Muslim education.
The famous Muhammad Ali Road in south Bombay, India's largest city, is named after him. The Gulistan-e-Jauhar neighborhood of Karachi, Sindh, Pakistan's largest city, is also named for him. Additionally, the Mohammad Ali Co-operative Housing Society (M.A.C.H.S.) in Karachi is named in honor of Maulana Mohammad Ali Johar. Johar Town, Lahore, Punjab is also named after him.
'Alli Mohamed see Mohamed 'Ali
Muhammad Ali see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar see Mohamed 'Ali
Jouhar, Maulana Muhammad Ali see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar see Mohamed 'Ali
Maulana Mohammad Ali Johar see Mohamed 'Ali
Mohammadi, Narges
Narges Mohammadi (b. April 21, 1972, Zanjan, Iran). An Iranian human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate. She was the vice president of the Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), headed by fellow Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi. She was a vocal proponent of mass feminist civil disobedience against hijab in Iran and a vocal critic of the hijab and chastity program of 2023. In May 2016, she was sentenced in Tehran to 16 years' imprisonment for establishing and running a human rights movement that campaigns for the abolition of the death penalty." She was released in 2020 but sent back to prison in 2021, where she has since given reports of the abuse and solitary confinement of detained women.
In October 2023, while in prison, she was awarded the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize for her fight against the oppression of women in Iran and her fight to promote human rights and freedom for all." The Foreign Ministry of Iran condemned the decision to award Mohammadi.
Mohammadi was born on April 21, 1972, in Zanjan, Iran, and grew up in Qorveh, Karaj, and Oshnaviyeh. She attended Qazvin International University receiving a degree in physics and became a professional engineer. During her university career, she wrote articles supporting women's rights in the student newspaper and was arrested at two meetings of the political student group Tashakkol Daaneshjuyi Roshangaraan ("Enlightened Student Group"). She was also active in a mountain climbing group but was later banned from joining climbs due to her political activities.
Mohammadi went on to work as a journalist for several reformist newspapers and published a book of political essays titled The reforms, the Strategy and the Tactics. In 2003, she joined the Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC), headed by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi. She later became the organization's vice president.
In 1999, Mohammadi married fellow pro-reform journalist Taghi Rahmani, who was soon arrested for the first time. Rahmani moved to France in 2012 after serving 14 years of prison sentences, while Mohammadi remained to continue her human rights work. Mohammadi and Rahmani have twin children.
Mohammadi was first arrested in 1998 for her criticisms of the Iranian government and spent a year in prison. In April 2010, she was summoned to the Islamic Revolutionary Court for her membership in the DHRC. She was briefly released on a US$50,000 bail but re-arrested several days later and detained at Evin Prison. Mohammadi's health declined while in custody, and she developed an epilepsy-like disease, causing her to periodically lose muscle control. After a month, she was released and allowed to seek medical treatment.
In July 2011, Mohammadi was prosecuted again and found guilty of acting against the national security, membership of the DHRC and propaganda against the regime. In September 2011, she was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. Mohammadi stated that she had learned of the verdict only through her lawyers and had been given an unprecedented 23-page judgment issued by the court in which they repeatedly likened my human rights activities to attempts to topple the regime. In March 2012, the sentence was upheld by an appeals court, though it was reduced to six years. On April 26, she was arrested to begin her sentence.
The sentence was protested by the British Foreign Office, which called it another sad example of the Iranian authorities' attempts to silence brave human rights defenders. Amnesty International designated Mohammadi a prisoner of conscience and called for her immediate release. Reporters Without Borders issued an appeal on Mohammadi's behalf on the ninth anniversary of photographer Zahra Kazemi's death in Evin Prison, stating that Mohammadi was a prisoner whose life was "in particular danger." In July 2012, an international group of lawmakers called for her release. On July 31, 2012, Mohammadi was released from prison.
On October 31, 2014, Mohammadi made a speech at the gravesite of Sattar Beheshti, stating, "How is it that the Parliament Members are suggesting a Plan for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, but nobody spoke up two years ago when an innocent human being by the name of Sattar Beheshti died under torture in the hands of his interrogator?" The video of her speech quickly went viral on social media networks, resulting in Evin Prison court summoning her.
On May 5, 2015, Mohammadi was once again arrested on the basis of new charges. Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court sentenced her to ten years' imprisonment on the charge of "founding an illegal group" in reference to Legam -- (the Campaign for Step by Step Abolition of the Death Penalty), five years for "assembly and collusion against national security," a year for "propaganda against the system" for her interviews with international media and her March 2014 meeting with the European Union's then High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. In January 2019, Mohammadi began a hunger strike with the detained British-Iranian citizen Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe in Evin Prison to protest being denied access to medical care. In July 2020, Mohammadi showed symptoms of a COVID-19 infection, from which she appeared to have recovered by August. On October 8, 2020, Mohammadi was released from prison.
In March 2021, Mohammadi penned the following foreword to the Iran Human Rights Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran:
"The execution of people like Navid Afkari and Ruhollah Zam in the past year, have been the most ambiguous executions in Iran. Issuing the death penalty for Ahmadreza Djalali is one of the most erroneous sentences and the reasons for the issuance of these death sentences need to be carefully examined. These people have been sentenced to death after being held in solitary confinement and subjected to horrific psychological and mental torture, that is why I do not consider the judicial process to be fair or just; I see keeping defendants in solitary confinement, forcing them to make untrue and false confessions that are used as the key evidence in issuing these sentences. That’s why I am particularly worried about the recent arrests in Sistan and Baluchistan and Kurdistan, and I hope that anti-death penalty organizations will pay special attention to the detainees because I fear that we will be facing another wave of executions over the coming year."
"Narges Mohammadi: Violence of Death Penalty is Worse Than War", Iran Human Rights, March 30, 2021.
In May 2021, Branch 1188 of Criminal Court Two in Tehran sentenced Mohammadi to two-and-a-half years in prison, 80 lashes, and two separate fines for charges including "spreading propaganda against the system". Four months later, she received a summons to begin serving this sentence, which she did not respond to as she considered the conviction unjust.
On November 16, 2021, Mohammadi was arrested in Karaj, Alborz, while attending a memorial for Ebrahim Ketabar, who was killed by Iranian security forces during nationwide protests in November 2019. Her arrest was condemned as arbitrary by Amnesty International and the International Federation of Human Rights.
In December 2022, during the Mahsa Amini protests, the BBC published a report by Mohammadi detailing the sexual and physical abuse of detained women. In January 2023, she gave a report from prison detailing the condition of women in Evin Prison, including a list of 58 prisoners and the interrogation process and tortures they have gone through.
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. See Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza.
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. See Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza.
Mohmand
Mohmand (Momand). Name of a Pathan or Afghan tribe on the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The Mohmand are a clan of Sarban Pashtuns, living primarily in northeastern Afghanistan and in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.
In Pakistan, the Mohmands live in the Mohmand Agency and down to the plains of Peshawar, Charsadda, and Mardan. Mohmands are also scattered throughout Pakistan in urban areas including Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta.
In Afghanistan, they are mainly found in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.
Momand see Mohmand
Mohmand (Momand). Name of a Pathan or Afghan tribe on the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The Mohmand are a clan of Sarban Pashtuns, living primarily in northeastern Afghanistan and in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.
In Pakistan, the Mohmands live in the Mohmand Agency and down to the plains of Peshawar, Charsadda, and Mardan. Mohmands are also scattered throughout Pakistan in urban areas including Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta.
In Afghanistan, they are mainly found in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.
Momand see Mohmand
Molbog
Molbog (Molebugan) (Molebuganon). One of the minor Muslim groups of the Philippines, the Molbog are the aboriginal population of Balabac Island, located between Palawan and Borneo. The Molbog constitute the majority of the overall local population. In the outer islands of the Balabac archipelago, the Molbog are intermixed with other Muslim groups, mainly the Sama. Molbog can also be found in the southernmost tip of Palawanon, and in Banggi, a big island south of Balabac that is in Malaysian territory.
The name Molbog derives from malubog, which means “unclear/turbid water.” Tradition says that the name was given by early sailors and merchants and referred to the island as well as its inhabitants.
The Molbog are one of the groups last Islamized. According to tradition, the first Islamic missionaries arrived in Balabac from Borneo seven pangkat (generations) ago, more or less during the last half of the eighteenth century.
The story of the conversion is painted with the shades of legend. Many figures common to Sulu Muslims such as alims walking on the water from Mecca, hajjis gifted with powerful amulets and mighty sultans are credited for almost instantaneous conversion, while proselytization was undoubtedly long and uneven. Spanish sources report the existence of “pagans” at the end of the nineteenth century.
Contact between Molbog and Muslim developed in three stages. At first it was occasional. Balabac was visited by Muslim merchants, provided a refuge for Sama pirates and was sometimes subjected to slave raids. No stable and continuous relationship was established.
As a result of the expansion of Sulu at the expense of Brunei, the second stage began. Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, some Tausug and Jama Mapun settled in Balabac. These individuals, possibly former slave traders or merchants, were able to obtain the subjection of some groups of Molbog in exchange for protection from other foreign intruders. Using the title Datu, they imposed taxation and ruled the local population. In this period, new Islamic elements penetrated deeped into Molbog culture. The newcomers generally merged with the local population. They married Molbog women and introduced part of their former cultural heritage.
A third stage is characterized by the successful spread of Islam throughout the island as well as by a more direct control of Balabac by the Sulu sultanate. The local kalibugan (mestizo) rulers in Balaback were the offspring of marriages between the first Tausug settlers and the Molbog. They used the title panglima (official representative of the sultan) and collected taxes to send once a year to Batarasa, in the mainland Palawan, where part of the Sulu royal family transferred during the nineteenth century.
The control by the sultan was strict. He had ultimate word in questions of succession, and his emissaries directly and frequently interfered with local problems. After American rule was established at the beginning of this century, the process of Islamization was still in progress. In different periods, imams and Islamic teachers came to Balabac for short visits, and it was only after the first years of the century that all the Molbog came to profess the Islamic faith.
The Molbog (are concentrated in Balabak Island and are also found in other islands of the coast of Palawan as far north as Panakan. The word Malubog means "murky or turbid water".
The Molbog are probably a migrant people from nearby North Borneo. Judging from their dialect and some socio-cultural practices, they seem to be related to the Orang Tidung or Tirum (Camucone in Spanish), an Islamized indigenous group native to the northeast coast of Sabah. However, some Sama words (of the Jama Mapun variant) and Tausug words are found in the Malbog dialect. This plus a few characteristics of their socio-cultural life style distinguish them from the Orang Tidung.
Molbog livelihood includes subsistence farming fishing and occasional barter trading with the Sulu Bangsa Moro and nearby Sabah market centers.
In the past, both the Molbog and the Palawanon Muslims were ruled by Sulu datus, thus forming the outer political periphery of the Sulu Sultanate. Inter-marriage between Tausug and the Molbog hastened the Islamization of the Molbog. The offspring of these inter-marriages are known as kolibugan or "half-breed".
Molebugan see Molbog
Molebuganon see Molbog
Molbog (Molebugan) (Molebuganon). One of the minor Muslim groups of the Philippines, the Molbog are the aboriginal population of Balabac Island, located between Palawan and Borneo. The Molbog constitute the majority of the overall local population. In the outer islands of the Balabac archipelago, the Molbog are intermixed with other Muslim groups, mainly the Sama. Molbog can also be found in the southernmost tip of Palawanon, and in Banggi, a big island south of Balabac that is in Malaysian territory.
The name Molbog derives from malubog, which means “unclear/turbid water.” Tradition says that the name was given by early sailors and merchants and referred to the island as well as its inhabitants.
The Molbog are one of the groups last Islamized. According to tradition, the first Islamic missionaries arrived in Balabac from Borneo seven pangkat (generations) ago, more or less during the last half of the eighteenth century.
The story of the conversion is painted with the shades of legend. Many figures common to Sulu Muslims such as alims walking on the water from Mecca, hajjis gifted with powerful amulets and mighty sultans are credited for almost instantaneous conversion, while proselytization was undoubtedly long and uneven. Spanish sources report the existence of “pagans” at the end of the nineteenth century.
Contact between Molbog and Muslim developed in three stages. At first it was occasional. Balabac was visited by Muslim merchants, provided a refuge for Sama pirates and was sometimes subjected to slave raids. No stable and continuous relationship was established.
As a result of the expansion of Sulu at the expense of Brunei, the second stage began. Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, some Tausug and Jama Mapun settled in Balabac. These individuals, possibly former slave traders or merchants, were able to obtain the subjection of some groups of Molbog in exchange for protection from other foreign intruders. Using the title Datu, they imposed taxation and ruled the local population. In this period, new Islamic elements penetrated deeped into Molbog culture. The newcomers generally merged with the local population. They married Molbog women and introduced part of their former cultural heritage.
A third stage is characterized by the successful spread of Islam throughout the island as well as by a more direct control of Balabac by the Sulu sultanate. The local kalibugan (mestizo) rulers in Balaback were the offspring of marriages between the first Tausug settlers and the Molbog. They used the title panglima (official representative of the sultan) and collected taxes to send once a year to Batarasa, in the mainland Palawan, where part of the Sulu royal family transferred during the nineteenth century.
The control by the sultan was strict. He had ultimate word in questions of succession, and his emissaries directly and frequently interfered with local problems. After American rule was established at the beginning of this century, the process of Islamization was still in progress. In different periods, imams and Islamic teachers came to Balabac for short visits, and it was only after the first years of the century that all the Molbog came to profess the Islamic faith.
The Molbog (are concentrated in Balabak Island and are also found in other islands of the coast of Palawan as far north as Panakan. The word Malubog means "murky or turbid water".
The Molbog are probably a migrant people from nearby North Borneo. Judging from their dialect and some socio-cultural practices, they seem to be related to the Orang Tidung or Tirum (Camucone in Spanish), an Islamized indigenous group native to the northeast coast of Sabah. However, some Sama words (of the Jama Mapun variant) and Tausug words are found in the Malbog dialect. This plus a few characteristics of their socio-cultural life style distinguish them from the Orang Tidung.
Molbog livelihood includes subsistence farming fishing and occasional barter trading with the Sulu Bangsa Moro and nearby Sabah market centers.
In the past, both the Molbog and the Palawanon Muslims were ruled by Sulu datus, thus forming the outer political periphery of the Sulu Sultanate. Inter-marriage between Tausug and the Molbog hastened the Islamization of the Molbog. The offspring of these inter-marriages are known as kolibugan or "half-breed".
Molebugan see Molbog
Molebuganon see Molbog
Mole-Dagbane Speaking Peoples
Mole-Dagbane Speaking Peoples. The many societies of the Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples of northern Ghana and the adjacent parts of neighboring countries are built upon a common linguistic and historical base. The societies range from small isolates of a couple of thousand to the several million Mossi, most of whom live in Upper Volta. Most of the other 30 or so societies number in the tens of thousands, the largest being the Grusi and Dogamba. Muslims account for no more that thirty-five percent of the entire Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples, with the largest concentration among the Mossi.
The Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples are not so much “Muslim” as they are “influenced by Muslims.” They affect the economy and society of the entire region without being politically or numerically dominant. Indeed, so ethnically pluralist is the region that the leading historian of Islam in the region has distinguished the “dispersion of Muslims” from “the spread of Islam.”
The Volta Basin location is important to the Mole-Dagbane peoples, both in terms of their general history and specifically with respect to Islam. Since ancient times long-distance trade routes have crisscrossed the West African savanna, linking its peoples with each other and with the culturally distinct populations of the coastal rain forests to the south and with the Mediterranean world across the Sahara. Three major routes converge in Mole-Dagbane territory. One starts in the land of the Akan peoples, the most well-known and powerful of whom are the Asante. A second begins in the northwest part of the Middle Volta, where a succession of Manding empires and their cities of Jenne, Mopti and Timbuktu have been centers of Islamic learning as well as trade. A third connects with the great Hausa cities and states of northern Nigeria: Sokoto, Kano, Zaria and Katsina, all major Islamic and economic centers.
In the past, the Akan peoples traded gold and kola nuts (a caffeine-rich stimulant much sought throughout the savanna, especially by Muslims denied alcohol by their faith). In return, the savanna states traded for salt (from the Saharan mines) and slaves. The latter were in great demand once the Trans-Atlantic slave trade developed. Except for some gold and slaves (often Mole-Dagbane), the Middle Volta peoples controlled trade routes rather than resources. But those routes and their trade were very important. The Akan “Gold Coast” was the main source of gold for Europe and the Arab world through the Middle Ages until the Spanish conquest of Peru and Mexico. It was the trade through the Middle Volta which brought the cavalry and traders from elsewhere who introduced state government and Islam to the Mole-Dagbane farming peoples.
Sometime around the thirteenth century, cavalry, possibly from Nigeria, entered the Middle Volta Basin. Militarily superior, they were able to conquer local people and establish states. Defining dates and sequences is still difficult, not least because the traditionally “senior” state of Mamprusi was in recent centuries weak in power and in oral tradition. Also, “Mossi” cavalry were in the region some two centuries before the earliest known state. (“Mossi” in a historical context is frequently applied to all these immigrant state-founding cavalry.) By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, datable references to wars with Mossi appear in records of Mali and Songhay. Nevertheless, none of the currently existing states can be reliably dated earlier than about 1480, the approximate date for foundation of Mamprusi and Dagomba. The northern (modern) Mossi states were founded a generation or so later. In each case, “founding” means establishing a state over pre-existing farming groups, whose Mole-Dagbane languages became the languages of the “Mossi” cavalry elite as well.
The various Manding-speaking peoples moved outwards from their Upper Niger River homeland at different times. The rise of the Mali Empire and its successors added greater importance to Manding movements. They were the source for the diffusion of Islam into the western Sudan savanna, including the Hausa, and their traders, the Dyula, known also as Wangara, who figure heavily in early accounts of the West African interior.
Dates for these developments are not firmly established, but it has been argued that the Dyula from Mali brought Islam into the Volta Basin beginning in the late fourteenth century, with the pace accelerating in the next century. The late fifteenth century saw the founding of the Mole-Dagbane “Mossi” states out of the somewhat earlier cavalry influx. Gonja, a state with a Mande elite south of Dagomba, rose in the late 1500s. The first Akan state, to the south, arose roughly contemporaneously with the Mole-Dagbane states. Hausa histories from Kano first mention kola nuts, which come only from the Akan forests, in the early fifteenth century. The period 1350-1600, then, saw the rise of trade between the Akan forest peoples and and the Mali Mandinka to their northwest and the Hausa to the northeast. The traders were Muslim.
Mole-Dagbani is spoken by about fifteen percent (15%) of the nation's population, the name of which is a portmaneau of two closely related languages: Moore language (Mole), spoken by the Mossi, and Dagbani language (Dagbane) spoken by the Dagomba, two related peoples. The majority of the Mossi live in Burkina Faso, which the Dagomba mainly reside in Northern Ghana. Its speakers are culturally the most varied. For centuries, the area inhabited by Mole-Dagbane peoples has been the scene of movements of people engaged in conquest, expansion, and north-south and east-west trade. Hence, Hausas, Gurunsi, Fulanis, Zabaremas, Dyulas and Bassaris are all integrated into the Dagbani areas, and many speak the language. For these reasons, a considerable degree of heterogeneity, particularly of political structure, developed here. Many terms from Arabic, Hausa and Dyula are seen in the language, due to the importance of trans-Saharan and West African trade and the historic importance that the Islamic religion has had in the area.
Mole-Dagbane Speaking Peoples. The many societies of the Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples of northern Ghana and the adjacent parts of neighboring countries are built upon a common linguistic and historical base. The societies range from small isolates of a couple of thousand to the several million Mossi, most of whom live in Upper Volta. Most of the other 30 or so societies number in the tens of thousands, the largest being the Grusi and Dogamba. Muslims account for no more that thirty-five percent of the entire Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples, with the largest concentration among the Mossi.
The Mole-Dagbane-speaking peoples are not so much “Muslim” as they are “influenced by Muslims.” They affect the economy and society of the entire region without being politically or numerically dominant. Indeed, so ethnically pluralist is the region that the leading historian of Islam in the region has distinguished the “dispersion of Muslims” from “the spread of Islam.”
The Volta Basin location is important to the Mole-Dagbane peoples, both in terms of their general history and specifically with respect to Islam. Since ancient times long-distance trade routes have crisscrossed the West African savanna, linking its peoples with each other and with the culturally distinct populations of the coastal rain forests to the south and with the Mediterranean world across the Sahara. Three major routes converge in Mole-Dagbane territory. One starts in the land of the Akan peoples, the most well-known and powerful of whom are the Asante. A second begins in the northwest part of the Middle Volta, where a succession of Manding empires and their cities of Jenne, Mopti and Timbuktu have been centers of Islamic learning as well as trade. A third connects with the great Hausa cities and states of northern Nigeria: Sokoto, Kano, Zaria and Katsina, all major Islamic and economic centers.
In the past, the Akan peoples traded gold and kola nuts (a caffeine-rich stimulant much sought throughout the savanna, especially by Muslims denied alcohol by their faith). In return, the savanna states traded for salt (from the Saharan mines) and slaves. The latter were in great demand once the Trans-Atlantic slave trade developed. Except for some gold and slaves (often Mole-Dagbane), the Middle Volta peoples controlled trade routes rather than resources. But those routes and their trade were very important. The Akan “Gold Coast” was the main source of gold for Europe and the Arab world through the Middle Ages until the Spanish conquest of Peru and Mexico. It was the trade through the Middle Volta which brought the cavalry and traders from elsewhere who introduced state government and Islam to the Mole-Dagbane farming peoples.
Sometime around the thirteenth century, cavalry, possibly from Nigeria, entered the Middle Volta Basin. Militarily superior, they were able to conquer local people and establish states. Defining dates and sequences is still difficult, not least because the traditionally “senior” state of Mamprusi was in recent centuries weak in power and in oral tradition. Also, “Mossi” cavalry were in the region some two centuries before the earliest known state. (“Mossi” in a historical context is frequently applied to all these immigrant state-founding cavalry.) By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, datable references to wars with Mossi appear in records of Mali and Songhay. Nevertheless, none of the currently existing states can be reliably dated earlier than about 1480, the approximate date for foundation of Mamprusi and Dagomba. The northern (modern) Mossi states were founded a generation or so later. In each case, “founding” means establishing a state over pre-existing farming groups, whose Mole-Dagbane languages became the languages of the “Mossi” cavalry elite as well.
The various Manding-speaking peoples moved outwards from their Upper Niger River homeland at different times. The rise of the Mali Empire and its successors added greater importance to Manding movements. They were the source for the diffusion of Islam into the western Sudan savanna, including the Hausa, and their traders, the Dyula, known also as Wangara, who figure heavily in early accounts of the West African interior.
Dates for these developments are not firmly established, but it has been argued that the Dyula from Mali brought Islam into the Volta Basin beginning in the late fourteenth century, with the pace accelerating in the next century. The late fifteenth century saw the founding of the Mole-Dagbane “Mossi” states out of the somewhat earlier cavalry influx. Gonja, a state with a Mande elite south of Dagomba, rose in the late 1500s. The first Akan state, to the south, arose roughly contemporaneously with the Mole-Dagbane states. Hausa histories from Kano first mention kola nuts, which come only from the Akan forests, in the early fifteenth century. The period 1350-1600, then, saw the rise of trade between the Akan forest peoples and and the Mali Mandinka to their northwest and the Hausa to the northeast. The traders were Muslim.
Mole-Dagbani is spoken by about fifteen percent (15%) of the nation's population, the name of which is a portmaneau of two closely related languages: Moore language (Mole), spoken by the Mossi, and Dagbani language (Dagbane) spoken by the Dagomba, two related peoples. The majority of the Mossi live in Burkina Faso, which the Dagomba mainly reside in Northern Ghana. Its speakers are culturally the most varied. For centuries, the area inhabited by Mole-Dagbane peoples has been the scene of movements of people engaged in conquest, expansion, and north-south and east-west trade. Hence, Hausas, Gurunsi, Fulanis, Zabaremas, Dyulas and Bassaris are all integrated into the Dagbani areas, and many speak the language. For these reasons, a considerable degree of heterogeneity, particularly of political structure, developed here. Many terms from Arabic, Hausa and Dyula are seen in the language, due to the importance of trans-Saharan and West African trade and the historic importance that the Islamic religion has had in the area.
Molla
Molla. See Mullah.
Molla. See Mullah.
Mollah
Mollah. See Mullah.
Mollah. See Mullah.
Monarchs
Monarchs. Islam’s expansion faced the ummah (community) with the issue of mulk (royal authority). This term was already used, sometimes pejoratively, under the Umayyads (661-750), who were criticized for betraying an ideal. Sura 2:247-249 cites the Hebrew prophet emphasizing that God alonge made and unmade kings, whom he endowed with knowledge and power, not wealth. Their dyah (“sign”) was the Ark, a sakinah, and Moses’ and Aaron’s relics. Shi‘a traditions mention the imams’ sakinah (the divine radiance), legitimating hereditary charisma.
God’s throne overspreads heaven and earth (Suras 2:256 and 25:60). The Last Day will mark mulk’s return to God (Sura 22:55). His law, shari‘a, preexists any earthly law. Man’s purpose is the exemplifciation and execution of shari‘a, and the purpose of the dar al-Islam (Muslim lands) is the elimination of the dar al-harb (non-Muslim lands). Except in Shi‘a doctine, the Prophet died without nominating successors in his secular, leadership role. Those closest to him solved the dilemma by reference to Arab practice. By ijma’ (consensus) they selected the venerable among his companions, his first four deputies (khulafa’ – “rightly guided”), because they were best versed in the law revealed to the Prophet. Sura 4:62, however, while primarily enjoining obedience to God and the messenger, affords some scope for flexibility by adding, “and those in charge among you.”
The aim of such great jurists as al-Maturidi (d. 944), Baqillani (d. 1013), Baghdadi (d. 1037), al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Juwayni (d. 1085), al-Ghazali (d. 1111), and Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328) was adherence to revelation, maintaining Muslim piety, and, never more than in the paramount matter of leadership of the community, matching Muslim theory with practice. Mu‘tazili rationalizations needed refuting, but, beginning in the ninth century, the Sunni jurists had first to combat two extremes: Shi‘a doctrine that only the descendants of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali were rightful leaders of the community and, notably after the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 873, that in effect secular rulers were only tolerable under the aegis of the fuqaha’ (those qualified to interpret the law); and the Khariji doctrine that, if sound of body and mind, any Muslim might be elected caliph. Given that opposition to God’s law and the consensus of the Prophet’s people, “who can never agree on error,” was heresy, the Sunni jurists’ watchwords were maslahah (commonweal for Muslims to fulfil God’s purpose), ittigaq al-ahwa’ (unanimous agreement on what is desirable), and on the negative side, mafsadah (what causes corruption), and especially, fitnah (economic and social disruption).
In a situation lacking dichotomy between spiritual and temporal authority, the jurists’ problem was soon compounded by the rise of more than one acliphate, the ‘Abbasid (749-1258) in Baghdad rivaled by others in Spain and Egypt. Although for reasons where theology and law were intertwined, the jurists sought the caliph’s warrant, from 821 onward, provincial amirs assumed and made hereditary local sovereignty as malik or sultan, and in 945, the Shi‘a Buyids captured the caliph’s capital, Baghdad. They demonstrated pre-Islamic Iranian kisrawi or khosroan influence by reviving Sassanian royal titles.
Such changes defied the Shi‘a theory of nass (imams by prophetic designation) as well as the Sunni bay‘ah (mutally agreed “bargain” between ruler and ruled). Al-Farabi (d. 950), philosopher rather than jurist, anticipated developments by stipulating that a king should be skilled and powerful enough to be in fact philosopher-king, whether he were honored or not, rich or poor, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) described the inqilab (transformation) of the caliphate to mulk as “natural,” but decadent, implying Arab Muslims’ loss of ‘asabiyah (strong common feeling). Ruzbihan Khunji (d. 1521) accepted kings as world managers provided that they protected shari‘a and enabled the people to be dutiful Muslims.
The pre-Islamic Iranian din and dawlah (twinning of kingship and religion in mutual inter-dependence) as invoked, and crystalized in the Seljuk compromise with the caliphate. Under the Buyids, the jurist al-Mawardi said a restrained caliphate might function provided the restraining force upheld shari‘a. New rulers’ other primary duties related to taxes and defending Islamic territory. Al-Ghazali was less concerned with the sultan-caliph relationship than with preservation of the religious life. Order, avoidance of fitnah, was vital.
When the Mongol Hulegu Khan ended the ‘Abbasid caliphate, the symbol of authority from the Prophet’s kinsmen and companions disappeared, though the Muzaffarid Mubariz al-Din Muhammad (1313-1357) in Fars and certain North African aspirants to kingship sought legitimation from an ‘Abbasid descendant in Cairo. The legal implications and Islam’s exposure to unbelievers’ infiltrations consequent on this not being lost on religious teachers around him, Il-Khanid caliph Ghazan’s conversion to Islam in 1295 appears to have initiated an attempt to fill the void. He was assiduously apostrophized by his minister and apologist, Rashid al-Din, as Padshah-i Islam, and proof of the intention seems evident in the adoption of the ‘Abbasid black banner.
For the Shi ‘a the dilemma might have seemed resolved when, challenged by Sunni Ottoman and Mughal neighbors, the Safavids (1501-1722) made Shi‘ism the religion of Iran, though both the shah and his Ottoman enemy styled themselves to each other as sovereign of Islam. Because Twelver Shi‘ism claimed Safavid descent from the seventh imam, Musa al-Kazim (d. 799), it might seem to have combined imamate and mulk. In effect, it caused tension between the ‘ulama’ and king.
An Afghan Sunni leader’s defeat of the Safavids and their subsequent final removal by their erstwhile liberator, Nadir Shah, left Iran still officially Shi‘a. By 1979, a monarch had allowed his version of kisrawiyah seriously to distort the delicate balance between the divine and mundane which Islam requires to be kept, at least as nearly as possible, in equilibrium. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini replaced the shah in the Iranian Revolution. Enthusiastic followers called the ayatollah “imam,” but he instituted what he termed, and depersonalized as, vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent): one sufficiently knowledgeable in shari‘a to be viable as curator of maslahah until the awaited Hidden Imam’s return. Kingship banished, a fresh experiment in application of the ideal began: according to pure Islamic theory, not so much a political-social experiment as an attempt to retrieve from mafsadah God’s purpose for man.
In Saudi Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ud took the title of king in 1924. Foreign oil agreements, obviating dependence on local finance, consolidated his position. Morocco’s old dynasty became a constitutional monarchy in 1962. Faced by modern Muslims’ re-purification concerns, these kingdoms’ survival, owing much to their creators’ abilities, largely depends on their heirs’ capacity. Represented as “Western” innovations, these monarchies might, whatever their credentials, look beholden to forces threatening Islam.
Monarchs. Islam’s expansion faced the ummah (community) with the issue of mulk (royal authority). This term was already used, sometimes pejoratively, under the Umayyads (661-750), who were criticized for betraying an ideal. Sura 2:247-249 cites the Hebrew prophet emphasizing that God alonge made and unmade kings, whom he endowed with knowledge and power, not wealth. Their dyah (“sign”) was the Ark, a sakinah, and Moses’ and Aaron’s relics. Shi‘a traditions mention the imams’ sakinah (the divine radiance), legitimating hereditary charisma.
God’s throne overspreads heaven and earth (Suras 2:256 and 25:60). The Last Day will mark mulk’s return to God (Sura 22:55). His law, shari‘a, preexists any earthly law. Man’s purpose is the exemplifciation and execution of shari‘a, and the purpose of the dar al-Islam (Muslim lands) is the elimination of the dar al-harb (non-Muslim lands). Except in Shi‘a doctine, the Prophet died without nominating successors in his secular, leadership role. Those closest to him solved the dilemma by reference to Arab practice. By ijma’ (consensus) they selected the venerable among his companions, his first four deputies (khulafa’ – “rightly guided”), because they were best versed in the law revealed to the Prophet. Sura 4:62, however, while primarily enjoining obedience to God and the messenger, affords some scope for flexibility by adding, “and those in charge among you.”
The aim of such great jurists as al-Maturidi (d. 944), Baqillani (d. 1013), Baghdadi (d. 1037), al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Juwayni (d. 1085), al-Ghazali (d. 1111), and Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328) was adherence to revelation, maintaining Muslim piety, and, never more than in the paramount matter of leadership of the community, matching Muslim theory with practice. Mu‘tazili rationalizations needed refuting, but, beginning in the ninth century, the Sunni jurists had first to combat two extremes: Shi‘a doctrine that only the descendants of the Prophet’s son-in-law ‘Ali were rightful leaders of the community and, notably after the occultation of the Twelfth Imam in 873, that in effect secular rulers were only tolerable under the aegis of the fuqaha’ (those qualified to interpret the law); and the Khariji doctrine that, if sound of body and mind, any Muslim might be elected caliph. Given that opposition to God’s law and the consensus of the Prophet’s people, “who can never agree on error,” was heresy, the Sunni jurists’ watchwords were maslahah (commonweal for Muslims to fulfil God’s purpose), ittigaq al-ahwa’ (unanimous agreement on what is desirable), and on the negative side, mafsadah (what causes corruption), and especially, fitnah (economic and social disruption).
In a situation lacking dichotomy between spiritual and temporal authority, the jurists’ problem was soon compounded by the rise of more than one acliphate, the ‘Abbasid (749-1258) in Baghdad rivaled by others in Spain and Egypt. Although for reasons where theology and law were intertwined, the jurists sought the caliph’s warrant, from 821 onward, provincial amirs assumed and made hereditary local sovereignty as malik or sultan, and in 945, the Shi‘a Buyids captured the caliph’s capital, Baghdad. They demonstrated pre-Islamic Iranian kisrawi or khosroan influence by reviving Sassanian royal titles.
Such changes defied the Shi‘a theory of nass (imams by prophetic designation) as well as the Sunni bay‘ah (mutally agreed “bargain” between ruler and ruled). Al-Farabi (d. 950), philosopher rather than jurist, anticipated developments by stipulating that a king should be skilled and powerful enough to be in fact philosopher-king, whether he were honored or not, rich or poor, Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) described the inqilab (transformation) of the caliphate to mulk as “natural,” but decadent, implying Arab Muslims’ loss of ‘asabiyah (strong common feeling). Ruzbihan Khunji (d. 1521) accepted kings as world managers provided that they protected shari‘a and enabled the people to be dutiful Muslims.
The pre-Islamic Iranian din and dawlah (twinning of kingship and religion in mutual inter-dependence) as invoked, and crystalized in the Seljuk compromise with the caliphate. Under the Buyids, the jurist al-Mawardi said a restrained caliphate might function provided the restraining force upheld shari‘a. New rulers’ other primary duties related to taxes and defending Islamic territory. Al-Ghazali was less concerned with the sultan-caliph relationship than with preservation of the religious life. Order, avoidance of fitnah, was vital.
When the Mongol Hulegu Khan ended the ‘Abbasid caliphate, the symbol of authority from the Prophet’s kinsmen and companions disappeared, though the Muzaffarid Mubariz al-Din Muhammad (1313-1357) in Fars and certain North African aspirants to kingship sought legitimation from an ‘Abbasid descendant in Cairo. The legal implications and Islam’s exposure to unbelievers’ infiltrations consequent on this not being lost on religious teachers around him, Il-Khanid caliph Ghazan’s conversion to Islam in 1295 appears to have initiated an attempt to fill the void. He was assiduously apostrophized by his minister and apologist, Rashid al-Din, as Padshah-i Islam, and proof of the intention seems evident in the adoption of the ‘Abbasid black banner.
For the Shi ‘a the dilemma might have seemed resolved when, challenged by Sunni Ottoman and Mughal neighbors, the Safavids (1501-1722) made Shi‘ism the religion of Iran, though both the shah and his Ottoman enemy styled themselves to each other as sovereign of Islam. Because Twelver Shi‘ism claimed Safavid descent from the seventh imam, Musa al-Kazim (d. 799), it might seem to have combined imamate and mulk. In effect, it caused tension between the ‘ulama’ and king.
An Afghan Sunni leader’s defeat of the Safavids and their subsequent final removal by their erstwhile liberator, Nadir Shah, left Iran still officially Shi‘a. By 1979, a monarch had allowed his version of kisrawiyah seriously to distort the delicate balance between the divine and mundane which Islam requires to be kept, at least as nearly as possible, in equilibrium. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini replaced the shah in the Iranian Revolution. Enthusiastic followers called the ayatollah “imam,” but he instituted what he termed, and depersonalized as, vilayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent): one sufficiently knowledgeable in shari‘a to be viable as curator of maslahah until the awaited Hidden Imam’s return. Kingship banished, a fresh experiment in application of the ideal began: according to pure Islamic theory, not so much a political-social experiment as an attempt to retrieve from mafsadah God’s purpose for man.
In Saudi Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ud took the title of king in 1924. Foreign oil agreements, obviating dependence on local finance, consolidated his position. Morocco’s old dynasty became a constitutional monarchy in 1962. Faced by modern Muslims’ re-purification concerns, these kingdoms’ survival, owing much to their creators’ abilities, largely depends on their heirs’ capacity. Represented as “Western” innovations, these monarchies might, whatever their credentials, look beholden to forces threatening Islam.
Mongke
Mongke (Möngke Khan) (Mongka) (Mangu) (Mangku) (b. January 10, 1209, Mongolia - d. August 11, 1259, Szechwan, China). Fourth Great Khan of the Mongol Empire (r.1251-1259). He sent his brother Qubilai Khan to begin the subjugation of the Sung Empire in South China, and his other brother Hulegu, the founder of the Il-Khanid dynasty, was commissioned to march west against the Isma‘ilis of Persia and the ‘Abbasid caliphate. He was notable for his interest in and tolerance of a wide range of religions. The Franciscan missionary Willem van Ruysbroeck (William of Rubruck) visited his court at Karakorum in 1253-4.
Möngke,was the grandson of Genghis Khan and heir to the great Mongol empire. Elected great khan in 1251, he was the last man who held this title to base his capital at Karakorum, in central Mongolia. Under his rule the city achieved an unprecedented splendor, and the Mongol Empire continued to expand at a rapid rate. Its territory became so large and diverse that Möngke was the last great khan capable of exerting real authority over all the Mongol conquests.
In the West, Möngke’s armies, led by his brother Hülegü (c. 1217–65), launched an attack on Iran, crushing the last resistance there by the end of 1256. The Mongols then advanced on Iraq, taking the capital at Baghdad in 1258. From there they moved into Syria in 1259, took Damascus and Aleppo, and reached the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
In the East, Möngke’s armies, under the command of his other brother, the famous Kublai (1215–94), outflanked the Chinese in the south and captured the Thai kingdom of Nan-chao, located in present-day Yunnan Province in China. They then brought much of present-day Vietnam under their suzerainty. Meanwhile the main Mongol forces began to advance against China proper. In 1257 Möngke took personal charge of his armies within China.
While conducting the war in China at Fishing Town in modern-day Chongqing, Möngke died near the site of the siege on August 11, 1259. His youngest wife, Chubei, died a month after Mongke at the Liupanshan Mountains.
Möngke was succeeded by his brother Kublai, who completed the conquest of China. A strict man, Möngke tried to preserve the old Mongol way of life. His contemporaries judged him to be a benevolent ruler.
As the only Great Khan to have ever been killed in action, several different accounts have been published as to how he perished. Some reports indicated that he died of cholera. Persian accounts assert that he died of dysentry. He is also reported to have been killed by an arrow shot by a Chinese archer during the siege. However, the most popular account states that he died of a wound caused by cannon fire or a projectile launched from a Song Chinese trebuchet, while the Mongolians covered up the story by claiming that his death was due to illness to maintain their soldiers' morale. While Möngke left a will declaring that the town should be massacred once taken, its siege continued for another 17 years before the defenders of the town surrendered themselves to Kublai Khan, who promised to spare the lives of the town's residents.
Möngke's death led to the 4-year succession war between his two younger brothers: Kublai Khan and Ariq Boke. Though Kublai Khan eventually won the battle against Ariq Boke, the succession war essentially marked the end of the unified Mongol empire. When Kublai Khan established the Yuan Dynasty in China in 1271, Möngke Khan was placed on the official record of the dynasty as Xianzong
Mongke Khan see Mongke
Mongka see Mongke
Mangu see Mongke
Mangku see Mongke
Mongke (Möngke Khan) (Mongka) (Mangu) (Mangku) (b. January 10, 1209, Mongolia - d. August 11, 1259, Szechwan, China). Fourth Great Khan of the Mongol Empire (r.1251-1259). He sent his brother Qubilai Khan to begin the subjugation of the Sung Empire in South China, and his other brother Hulegu, the founder of the Il-Khanid dynasty, was commissioned to march west against the Isma‘ilis of Persia and the ‘Abbasid caliphate. He was notable for his interest in and tolerance of a wide range of religions. The Franciscan missionary Willem van Ruysbroeck (William of Rubruck) visited his court at Karakorum in 1253-4.
Möngke,was the grandson of Genghis Khan and heir to the great Mongol empire. Elected great khan in 1251, he was the last man who held this title to base his capital at Karakorum, in central Mongolia. Under his rule the city achieved an unprecedented splendor, and the Mongol Empire continued to expand at a rapid rate. Its territory became so large and diverse that Möngke was the last great khan capable of exerting real authority over all the Mongol conquests.
In the West, Möngke’s armies, led by his brother Hülegü (c. 1217–65), launched an attack on Iran, crushing the last resistance there by the end of 1256. The Mongols then advanced on Iraq, taking the capital at Baghdad in 1258. From there they moved into Syria in 1259, took Damascus and Aleppo, and reached the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
In the East, Möngke’s armies, under the command of his other brother, the famous Kublai (1215–94), outflanked the Chinese in the south and captured the Thai kingdom of Nan-chao, located in present-day Yunnan Province in China. They then brought much of present-day Vietnam under their suzerainty. Meanwhile the main Mongol forces began to advance against China proper. In 1257 Möngke took personal charge of his armies within China.
While conducting the war in China at Fishing Town in modern-day Chongqing, Möngke died near the site of the siege on August 11, 1259. His youngest wife, Chubei, died a month after Mongke at the Liupanshan Mountains.
Möngke was succeeded by his brother Kublai, who completed the conquest of China. A strict man, Möngke tried to preserve the old Mongol way of life. His contemporaries judged him to be a benevolent ruler.
As the only Great Khan to have ever been killed in action, several different accounts have been published as to how he perished. Some reports indicated that he died of cholera. Persian accounts assert that he died of dysentry. He is also reported to have been killed by an arrow shot by a Chinese archer during the siege. However, the most popular account states that he died of a wound caused by cannon fire or a projectile launched from a Song Chinese trebuchet, while the Mongolians covered up the story by claiming that his death was due to illness to maintain their soldiers' morale. While Möngke left a will declaring that the town should be massacred once taken, its siege continued for another 17 years before the defenders of the town surrendered themselves to Kublai Khan, who promised to spare the lives of the town's residents.
Möngke's death led to the 4-year succession war between his two younger brothers: Kublai Khan and Ariq Boke. Though Kublai Khan eventually won the battle against Ariq Boke, the succession war essentially marked the end of the unified Mongol empire. When Kublai Khan established the Yuan Dynasty in China in 1271, Möngke Khan was placed on the official record of the dynasty as Xianzong
Mongke Khan see Mongke
Mongka see Mongke
Mangu see Mongke
Mangku see Mongke
Mongols
Mongols (Islamic Mongols). Refers to the nomadic horsemen from northeastern Asia who under Jenghiz Khan and his descendants overran most of Asia in the thirteenth century. Mongols is the name of a tribe whose original home was in the eastern part of the present day Mongolia. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under Jenghiz Khan and his successors, they established by military conquest the most extensive continuous land empire known to history. They invaded the Khwarazm-Shah’s empire in 1219-1223 and sacked the great cities of Khurasan, Herat and Nishapur. The effect of the Mongolian invasion on Persian agriculture, heavily dependent on irrigation by means of underground water channels (in Arabic, qanat) was even more serious. South Persia, on the other hand, escaped virtually unscathed. In general, the more long-term effects of the period of Mongol rule in the Islamic world are likely to have been, for the most part, deleterious. The 40 years of pagan Il-Khanid government before the accession of Mahmud Ghazan in 1295 seem to have been characterized by ruthless and short-sighted exploitation. Mahmud Ghazan declared his conversion to Islam, and the Mongols in Persia duly followed his example, at least in name. He introduced administrative reforms, which probably had some beneficial effect.
Following the death of Jenghiz Khan in 1227, his vast empire was divided up among his four sons, Jochi, Chaghatai, Ogedei (successor as Great Khan), and Tolui, who thereby became founding fathers of the Mongol tribal organizations (ulus). Once Tolui’s son, Mongke (r. 1251-1260), had become Great Khan of Mongolia, he entrusted his brothers Kubilai and Hulagu with the conquest of China and Persia. Hulagu conquered Iranian territory in 1256, launched the Mongol assault on Baghdad in 1258, and founded the empire of the Ilkhanids, who converted to Islam in 1326 (under Khan Tarmashirin), leading to the split between Islamic Transoxiana and “heathen” Mongolistan. In the name of the Chaghatai ulus, Timur (r. 1370-1405) conquered vast territories in the west and claimed the inheritance of the Ilkhanids. The Jochi ulus (in Russia, the western part of the empire) partially converted to Islam (under Berke Khan) and finally in 1313 (under Khan Uzbek). The Jochi tribes were united as the Golden Horde in 1378 (under Khan Toqtamish), but were defeated by Timur (1495/96) in the battle for the leadership of the Islamic Mongols.
Islam in Mongolia is mainly practised by the ethnic Kazakhs of Bayan-Ölgii and Khovd aimag in western Mongolia. In addition, a number of small Kazakh communities can be found in various cities and towns spread throughout the country. Historically however, the majority of the Mongol elite during the Mongol Empire generally favored Islam over other faiths as three of the four major khanates adopted Islam.
Islam first gained the notice of the Mongols, after Genghis Khan had conquered Afghanistan. In 1222 he, on his way back to Mongolia, visited Bukhara in Transoxiana. It was believed he inquired about Islam, and subsequently approved of Muslim tenets - as well as Christian, Taoist, and Buddhist tenets - except the Hajj, considering it unnecessary. However, he continued his worship of Tangri as his ancestors had done.
The earliest evidence of Islam in Mongolia is dated to 1254, when the Franciscan William of Rubruck visited the court of the great khan Mongke at Karakorum. He celebrated Easter at a Nestorian Christian church but also noted seven temples of the "idolators" (probably Buddhist and Taoist temples), and two mosques. Therefore, historians date the arrival of Islam to Mongolia to between 1222 and 1254.
It was the Mameluke ruler Baybars who played an important role in bringing many Golden Horde Mongols to Islam. Baybars developed strong ties with the Mongols of the Golden Horde and took steps for the Golden Horde Mongols to travel to Egypt. The arrival of the Golden Horde Mongols to Egypt resulted in a significant number of Mongols accepting Islam. By the1330's, three of the four major khanates of the Mongol Empire had become Muslim. These were the Golden Horde, Hulagu's Ulus and Chagatai's Ulus. The Yuan Empire also embraced Muslim peoples such as the Uyghurs and Persians.
Although the court of the Yuan Empire adopted Tibetan Buddhism as the official religion, the majority of the ordinary Mongols, especially those who continued living in Mongolia proper remained Shamanists. After the decline of the Yuan Dynasty, Shamanism once again became the dominant religion. To varying degrees, political and economic relations with Muslim nations such as Moghulistan and the Uyghurs continued.
The Muslim Kazakhs began to settle in the Jungaria and Altai regions in the late nineteenth century. The majority of these Kazakhs were the Kerei and Naiman clans, many of them escaping persecution from Czarist Russia. When independence Bogdo Khan Mongolia was established on December 29, 1911, the Kazakhs in Xinjian and Altai regions sought patronage of the restored Khanate. The Government of Bogdo Khan admitted them and allowed them to settle in the western region of Mongolia's Kobdo territory.
Bayan-Ölgii aimag was established as part of the administrative reforms of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1940. As a result of historically high birth rates, the Muslim population in Mongolia increased between 1956-1989. However, there was a decline in the Muslim population in 1990-1993 due to the large wave of repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs (so called oralmans) to Kazakhstan following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Islam is freely practiced in the country since Mongolia became a democracy in 1990.
Islamic Mongols see Mongols
Mongols (Islamic Mongols). Refers to the nomadic horsemen from northeastern Asia who under Jenghiz Khan and his descendants overran most of Asia in the thirteenth century. Mongols is the name of a tribe whose original home was in the eastern part of the present day Mongolia. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, under Jenghiz Khan and his successors, they established by military conquest the most extensive continuous land empire known to history. They invaded the Khwarazm-Shah’s empire in 1219-1223 and sacked the great cities of Khurasan, Herat and Nishapur. The effect of the Mongolian invasion on Persian agriculture, heavily dependent on irrigation by means of underground water channels (in Arabic, qanat) was even more serious. South Persia, on the other hand, escaped virtually unscathed. In general, the more long-term effects of the period of Mongol rule in the Islamic world are likely to have been, for the most part, deleterious. The 40 years of pagan Il-Khanid government before the accession of Mahmud Ghazan in 1295 seem to have been characterized by ruthless and short-sighted exploitation. Mahmud Ghazan declared his conversion to Islam, and the Mongols in Persia duly followed his example, at least in name. He introduced administrative reforms, which probably had some beneficial effect.
Following the death of Jenghiz Khan in 1227, his vast empire was divided up among his four sons, Jochi, Chaghatai, Ogedei (successor as Great Khan), and Tolui, who thereby became founding fathers of the Mongol tribal organizations (ulus). Once Tolui’s son, Mongke (r. 1251-1260), had become Great Khan of Mongolia, he entrusted his brothers Kubilai and Hulagu with the conquest of China and Persia. Hulagu conquered Iranian territory in 1256, launched the Mongol assault on Baghdad in 1258, and founded the empire of the Ilkhanids, who converted to Islam in 1326 (under Khan Tarmashirin), leading to the split between Islamic Transoxiana and “heathen” Mongolistan. In the name of the Chaghatai ulus, Timur (r. 1370-1405) conquered vast territories in the west and claimed the inheritance of the Ilkhanids. The Jochi ulus (in Russia, the western part of the empire) partially converted to Islam (under Berke Khan) and finally in 1313 (under Khan Uzbek). The Jochi tribes were united as the Golden Horde in 1378 (under Khan Toqtamish), but were defeated by Timur (1495/96) in the battle for the leadership of the Islamic Mongols.
Islam in Mongolia is mainly practised by the ethnic Kazakhs of Bayan-Ölgii and Khovd aimag in western Mongolia. In addition, a number of small Kazakh communities can be found in various cities and towns spread throughout the country. Historically however, the majority of the Mongol elite during the Mongol Empire generally favored Islam over other faiths as three of the four major khanates adopted Islam.
Islam first gained the notice of the Mongols, after Genghis Khan had conquered Afghanistan. In 1222 he, on his way back to Mongolia, visited Bukhara in Transoxiana. It was believed he inquired about Islam, and subsequently approved of Muslim tenets - as well as Christian, Taoist, and Buddhist tenets - except the Hajj, considering it unnecessary. However, he continued his worship of Tangri as his ancestors had done.
The earliest evidence of Islam in Mongolia is dated to 1254, when the Franciscan William of Rubruck visited the court of the great khan Mongke at Karakorum. He celebrated Easter at a Nestorian Christian church but also noted seven temples of the "idolators" (probably Buddhist and Taoist temples), and two mosques. Therefore, historians date the arrival of Islam to Mongolia to between 1222 and 1254.
It was the Mameluke ruler Baybars who played an important role in bringing many Golden Horde Mongols to Islam. Baybars developed strong ties with the Mongols of the Golden Horde and took steps for the Golden Horde Mongols to travel to Egypt. The arrival of the Golden Horde Mongols to Egypt resulted in a significant number of Mongols accepting Islam. By the1330's, three of the four major khanates of the Mongol Empire had become Muslim. These were the Golden Horde, Hulagu's Ulus and Chagatai's Ulus. The Yuan Empire also embraced Muslim peoples such as the Uyghurs and Persians.
Although the court of the Yuan Empire adopted Tibetan Buddhism as the official religion, the majority of the ordinary Mongols, especially those who continued living in Mongolia proper remained Shamanists. After the decline of the Yuan Dynasty, Shamanism once again became the dominant religion. To varying degrees, political and economic relations with Muslim nations such as Moghulistan and the Uyghurs continued.
The Muslim Kazakhs began to settle in the Jungaria and Altai regions in the late nineteenth century. The majority of these Kazakhs were the Kerei and Naiman clans, many of them escaping persecution from Czarist Russia. When independence Bogdo Khan Mongolia was established on December 29, 1911, the Kazakhs in Xinjian and Altai regions sought patronage of the restored Khanate. The Government of Bogdo Khan admitted them and allowed them to settle in the western region of Mongolia's Kobdo territory.
Bayan-Ölgii aimag was established as part of the administrative reforms of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1940. As a result of historically high birth rates, the Muslim population in Mongolia increased between 1956-1989. However, there was a decline in the Muslim population in 1990-1993 due to the large wave of repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs (so called oralmans) to Kazakhstan following the break-up of the Soviet Union. Islam is freely practiced in the country since Mongolia became a democracy in 1990.
Islamic Mongols see Mongols
monk
monk (in Arabic, rahib). In the Qur’an, monks are the religious leaders of the Christians. In one place they are said to live at the expense of other people, in another the Christians’ friendship to their fellow-believers is said to be due to their priests and monks.
There is no such thing as monasticism in Islam. It is a human created thing. Allah said in the holy Quran: "We sent Noah and Abraham and placed in the progeny of them both the Prophethood and the Book. Then some of their descendants adopted guidance but many became transgressors. After them We sent Our Messengers, one after the other and followed them with Jesus son of Mary and gave him the Gospel, and We put in the hearts of those who followed him, compassion and mercy, but monasticism they themselves invented-we did not prescribe it for them: they invented it themselves in order to seek Allah's good will. But then they did not observe it as it should have been observed. We gave those of them who had believed their rewards, but most of them are transgressors." (57:26-27)
While most Muslims do not believe in monasticism (emphasizing the Qur'anic injunction [Qur'an 57:27] in which Allah says that monasticism is a man-made practice that is not divinely prescribed), various Muslim Sufi orders, or "tariqas" encourage practices that resemble those of monastic brotherhoods in other faiths.
Dervishes—initiates of Sufi orders—believe that love is a projection of the essence of God to the universe. Many of the dervishes are mendicant ascetics who have taken the vow of poverty. Though some of them are beggars by choice, others work in common professions. Many Egyptian Qadirites, for example, are fishermen.
All genuine dervish brotherhoods trace their origins from two of the close companions of Muhammad, Ali ibn Abu Talib and Abu Bakr. They differ from spiritual brotherhoods of Christianity in that they usually do not live together in a 'monastery' setting; it is actually a stipulation that they have families, and earn an ethical living.
Whirling dance, practiced by the Mevlevi order in Turkey, is just one of the physical methods to try to reach religious ecstasy (majdhb) and connection with Allah. Rif'ai, in their mystical states, apparently skewer themselves without engendering any harm. Other groups include the Shadhili, a gnosis based order who practice the 'hadra' or 'presence', a dance-like breathing exercise involving the repetition of divine names. All genuine brotherhoods and subgroups chant verses of Qur'an, and must follow their form of sharia, or sacred law.
Traditionally monks in Sufism have been known as fakirs. This term has also been applied to Hindu monks.
rahib see monk
fakir see monk
monk (in Arabic, rahib). In the Qur’an, monks are the religious leaders of the Christians. In one place they are said to live at the expense of other people, in another the Christians’ friendship to their fellow-believers is said to be due to their priests and monks.
There is no such thing as monasticism in Islam. It is a human created thing. Allah said in the holy Quran: "We sent Noah and Abraham and placed in the progeny of them both the Prophethood and the Book. Then some of their descendants adopted guidance but many became transgressors. After them We sent Our Messengers, one after the other and followed them with Jesus son of Mary and gave him the Gospel, and We put in the hearts of those who followed him, compassion and mercy, but monasticism they themselves invented-we did not prescribe it for them: they invented it themselves in order to seek Allah's good will. But then they did not observe it as it should have been observed. We gave those of them who had believed their rewards, but most of them are transgressors." (57:26-27)
While most Muslims do not believe in monasticism (emphasizing the Qur'anic injunction [Qur'an 57:27] in which Allah says that monasticism is a man-made practice that is not divinely prescribed), various Muslim Sufi orders, or "tariqas" encourage practices that resemble those of monastic brotherhoods in other faiths.
Dervishes—initiates of Sufi orders—believe that love is a projection of the essence of God to the universe. Many of the dervishes are mendicant ascetics who have taken the vow of poverty. Though some of them are beggars by choice, others work in common professions. Many Egyptian Qadirites, for example, are fishermen.
All genuine dervish brotherhoods trace their origins from two of the close companions of Muhammad, Ali ibn Abu Talib and Abu Bakr. They differ from spiritual brotherhoods of Christianity in that they usually do not live together in a 'monastery' setting; it is actually a stipulation that they have families, and earn an ethical living.
Whirling dance, practiced by the Mevlevi order in Turkey, is just one of the physical methods to try to reach religious ecstasy (majdhb) and connection with Allah. Rif'ai, in their mystical states, apparently skewer themselves without engendering any harm. Other groups include the Shadhili, a gnosis based order who practice the 'hadra' or 'presence', a dance-like breathing exercise involving the repetition of divine names. All genuine brotherhoods and subgroups chant verses of Qur'an, and must follow their form of sharia, or sacred law.
Traditionally monks in Sufism have been known as fakirs. This term has also been applied to Hindu monks.
rahib see monk
fakir see monk
Moors
Moors (in Arabic, al-Mar). Rather vague term used in Europe to indicate the ancient Muslims of Spain and the inhabitants of the Mediterranean ports of North Africa.
The Moors, who are almost totally Sunni Muslim, live in western North Africa. They constitute about fifty-eight percent of Mauritania’s population; ten percent of Morocco’s; three percent of Mali’s; and trace percentages in Senegal and The Gambia. A Moor is regarded as any person, irrespective of skin color, who speaks any of the numerous dialects of Hassaniya, a language which, in its purest form, draws heavily on the original Yemeni Arabic spoken by the Bani Hassan tribe which invaded northwest Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Largely nomadic, Moorish society is hierarchical, composed of tribal confederations, tribal and clan segments, subsegments and tent units. The social system resembles that of other Saharan and Arab desert societies with variation due to West African ecology and history. The complex structure of society, developed in nomadic life, emerged from the constant state of insecurity in a harsh desert environment characterized by fratricidal wars, banditry and organized raids.
The Moors recognize four major divisions, based upon elements of heritage, race and occupation. At the top are those called the white Moors, composed of an aristocracy and its tributaries, then two types of slaves and finally occupational castes.
A bidan (white Moor) is ethnologically defined as a nomad of Berber-Arab origin. Living primarily in Saharan Mauritania and Mali, the bidan becomes progressively darker in skin color toward the south as a result of black African admixtures. (Other elements entering the Moorish ethnic group include the non-Negroid Fulani and the Negroid Wolof and Soninke.)
The bidan upper elements of Moorish society are divided into two strata. The nobility, or the suzerains, are generally referred to as ‘adma, or bones; the second, commoners or tributaties, are called lahma, or flesh. The ‘adma is composed of the hassan (warriors) and the zawya (religious leaders). Before the French “pacification,” the hassan generally had political pre-eminence over the zawya.
Traditionally, the function of the hassan is to protect the zawya; each zawya tribe has its particular hassan protector. An important zawya tribe may have several hassani tribes as protectors or vice versa. Such arrangements and verbal treaties do not, however, imply any kind of zawya vassalage to the hassan. The zawya provide moral, spiritual, legal and political services to their protectors, instruct their children, minister to their sick and wounded, act as intercessors between God and man, chase away evil spirits, prevent curses and the evil eye and settle disputes. The hassan and zawya complement each other.
Below the two ‘adma aristocratic classes come the lahma, or tributaries, who are in a position similar to that of the clients in ancient Rome. They are grouped into tribes which may be vassals of either the hassan or zawya tribes. They must marry at their social level. They, too, may be men of war or of religion, although those with martial traditions serve as auxiliary forces. Modern government injunctions to disarm have led most of them to a life of monasticism. Many still in remote areas pay tribute to their ‘adma overlords.
The sudan (black) Moors form the lower classes of Moorish society. They live in a world of their own, usually in slavery. Although slavery has been outlawed, it remains basic in the social and economic structure of the Moors. The juridical abandonment of the term ‘abd (slave) and its replacement by that of hartani (freedman) for a sudan Moor cannot hide the continued survival of slavery in northwest Africa.
Two kinds of slaves exist: the ‘abd-le-tilad, who belongs to the tent and constitutes membership in the family, and the ‘abd-le-tarbiya, an acquired slave. Many Moors, whether in Mauritania or Mali, remain oblivious to governmental provisions outlawing slavery. Those who are aware of them consider the laws impractical. In their view, owners would be ruined without slaves and many slaves would not know what to do with their freedom. Many freed slaves refuse to leave their masters, while others form a destitute proletariat in the urban centers.
The fourth element in Moorish society is represented by the occupational castes, usually regarded as aliens by both ‘adma and lahma, although they have similar characteristics. Among them are the m’allmin (craftsmen), the aghazazir (salt miners), the ighyuwn (bards) and two fast disappearing tribes of namadi (hunters) and imraguen (fishermen). These are not castes in the traditional sense of the term, but remnants of aborigines who have kept their ethnic purity through insularity.
Moors follow the Maliki school of Islamic law. Two main tariqa flourish among them. The Qadiri is the most widespread, characterized by a multitude of secret societies replete with mysticism. The Tijani is a second major brotherhood. Less important is the Shadhiliyya tariqa.
Mar, al- see Moors
Moors (in Arabic, al-Mar). Rather vague term used in Europe to indicate the ancient Muslims of Spain and the inhabitants of the Mediterranean ports of North Africa.
The Moors, who are almost totally Sunni Muslim, live in western North Africa. They constitute about fifty-eight percent of Mauritania’s population; ten percent of Morocco’s; three percent of Mali’s; and trace percentages in Senegal and The Gambia. A Moor is regarded as any person, irrespective of skin color, who speaks any of the numerous dialects of Hassaniya, a language which, in its purest form, draws heavily on the original Yemeni Arabic spoken by the Bani Hassan tribe which invaded northwest Africa during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Largely nomadic, Moorish society is hierarchical, composed of tribal confederations, tribal and clan segments, subsegments and tent units. The social system resembles that of other Saharan and Arab desert societies with variation due to West African ecology and history. The complex structure of society, developed in nomadic life, emerged from the constant state of insecurity in a harsh desert environment characterized by fratricidal wars, banditry and organized raids.
The Moors recognize four major divisions, based upon elements of heritage, race and occupation. At the top are those called the white Moors, composed of an aristocracy and its tributaries, then two types of slaves and finally occupational castes.
A bidan (white Moor) is ethnologically defined as a nomad of Berber-Arab origin. Living primarily in Saharan Mauritania and Mali, the bidan becomes progressively darker in skin color toward the south as a result of black African admixtures. (Other elements entering the Moorish ethnic group include the non-Negroid Fulani and the Negroid Wolof and Soninke.)
The bidan upper elements of Moorish society are divided into two strata. The nobility, or the suzerains, are generally referred to as ‘adma, or bones; the second, commoners or tributaties, are called lahma, or flesh. The ‘adma is composed of the hassan (warriors) and the zawya (religious leaders). Before the French “pacification,” the hassan generally had political pre-eminence over the zawya.
Traditionally, the function of the hassan is to protect the zawya; each zawya tribe has its particular hassan protector. An important zawya tribe may have several hassani tribes as protectors or vice versa. Such arrangements and verbal treaties do not, however, imply any kind of zawya vassalage to the hassan. The zawya provide moral, spiritual, legal and political services to their protectors, instruct their children, minister to their sick and wounded, act as intercessors between God and man, chase away evil spirits, prevent curses and the evil eye and settle disputes. The hassan and zawya complement each other.
Below the two ‘adma aristocratic classes come the lahma, or tributaries, who are in a position similar to that of the clients in ancient Rome. They are grouped into tribes which may be vassals of either the hassan or zawya tribes. They must marry at their social level. They, too, may be men of war or of religion, although those with martial traditions serve as auxiliary forces. Modern government injunctions to disarm have led most of them to a life of monasticism. Many still in remote areas pay tribute to their ‘adma overlords.
The sudan (black) Moors form the lower classes of Moorish society. They live in a world of their own, usually in slavery. Although slavery has been outlawed, it remains basic in the social and economic structure of the Moors. The juridical abandonment of the term ‘abd (slave) and its replacement by that of hartani (freedman) for a sudan Moor cannot hide the continued survival of slavery in northwest Africa.
Two kinds of slaves exist: the ‘abd-le-tilad, who belongs to the tent and constitutes membership in the family, and the ‘abd-le-tarbiya, an acquired slave. Many Moors, whether in Mauritania or Mali, remain oblivious to governmental provisions outlawing slavery. Those who are aware of them consider the laws impractical. In their view, owners would be ruined without slaves and many slaves would not know what to do with their freedom. Many freed slaves refuse to leave their masters, while others form a destitute proletariat in the urban centers.
The fourth element in Moorish society is represented by the occupational castes, usually regarded as aliens by both ‘adma and lahma, although they have similar characteristics. Among them are the m’allmin (craftsmen), the aghazazir (salt miners), the ighyuwn (bards) and two fast disappearing tribes of namadi (hunters) and imraguen (fishermen). These are not castes in the traditional sense of the term, but remnants of aborigines who have kept their ethnic purity through insularity.
Moors follow the Maliki school of Islamic law. Two main tariqa flourish among them. The Qadiri is the most widespread, characterized by a multitude of secret societies replete with mysticism. The Tijani is a second major brotherhood. Less important is the Shadhiliyya tariqa.
Mar, al- see Moors
Moors
Moors (Sri Lankan Moors). Name given to the Muslims of Sri Lanka who settled there prior to the British conquest of the island in 1795. As with the Muslims of the Philippines, known as Moros, the name is one that has been given to the Islamic population by Europeans. In both cases, the people identify themselves as Muslims rather than Moors or Moros. They number slightly more than one million, and their historical background and social characteristics closely resemble those of the Muslims of peninsular India -- the Mappilas or Kerala and the Labbais of Tamil Nadu. That is, Sri Lankan Muslims evolved from the commercial settlements of the Arab Muslim traders who first arrived in Sri Lanka in the late seventh or the early eighth century of the Christian calendar. Some of these Muslims probably came directly from Arabia while others arrived via Kerala, but the majority of the later settlers must have come from Tamil Nadu, as Tamil is the major language among them. The majority of Muslims in Sri Lanka still make their living as merchants, although there is a community of Muslim agriculturalists in eastern Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Moors (commonly referred to as Muslims) are the third largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka comprising eight percent (8%) of the country's total population. They are predominantly followers of Islam. The Moors trace their ancestry to Arab traders who settled in Sri Lanka some time between the eighth and fifteenth centuries. The Arabic language brought by the early merchants is no longer spoken, though many Arabic words and phrases are still commonly used. Until the recent past, the Moors employed Arwi as their native language, though this is also extinct as a spoken language.
Moors today use Tamil as their primary language with influence from Arabic. Those from central and southern Sri Lanka also widely use Sinhala, an Indo-European language spoken by the ethnic Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Moors lived primarily in coastal trading and agricultural communities, preserving their Islamic cultural heritage while adopting many Southern Asian customs. During the period of Portuguese colonization, the Moors suffered widespread persecution, and many fled to the Central Highlands and the East Coast, where their descendants remain.
The Tamils of Sri Lanka, throughout history, have attempted to categorize the Sri Lankan Moors as belonging to the Tamil race. It is claimed that this was a bid to eliminate the minority community from having its own unique identity. The Government of Sri Lanka, however, treats the Muslims as of Arab origin and as a distinct ethnic group from the Tamils.
The manner in which Islam developed in Sri Lanka is very similar to that on the Malabar coast of India. Tradition has recorded that Arabs who had settled down on the Malabar coast used to travel from the port of Cranganore to Sri Lanka on pilgrimage to pay homage to what they believed to be the footprint of Adam on the top of a mountain, which, until today, is called Adam's Peak.
Ibn Batuta, the famous 14th century Arab traveller, recorded many facets about early Arab influence in Sri Lanka in his travelogues.
Before the end of the 7th century, a colony of Muslim merchants had established themselves in Ceylon. Fascinated by the scenic splendor and captivated by the traditions associated with Adam's Peak, Muslim merchants arrived in large numbers and some of them decided to settle in the island encouraged by the cordial treatment they received by the local rulers. Most of them lived along the coastal areas in peace and prosperity, maintaining contacts, both cultural and commercial, with Baghdad, Hadramout, Oman and other Islamic cities.
The first Arabs who practiced Islam arrived in Sri Lanka around the 7th/8th century of the Christian calendar, and there is evidence that there was a settled community of Arabs in Ceylon in pre-Islamic times.
The circumstances that helped the growth of Muslim settlements were varied. Most of the majority Sinhalese depended more on agriculture than trade, thus trade was wide open to the Muslims. The Sinhalese Kings considered the Muslim settlements favorably on account of the revenue that they brought with them through their contacts overseas both in trade and in politics. The religious tolerance of the local population was also another vital factor in the development of Muslim settlements in Ceylon.
The early Muslim settlements were set up mainly around ports on account of the nature of their trade. It is also assumed that many of the Arab traders may not have brought their womenfolk along with them when they settled in Ceylon. Hence they would have been compelled to marry the Sinhalese and Tamil women of the island after converting them to Islam. The fact that a large number of Moors in Sri Lanka speak the Tamil language can be attributed to the possibility that they were trading partners with the Tamils of South India and had to learn Tamil in order to carry out their business. The integration with the Muslims of Tamil Nadu, in South India, may have also contributed to this. It is also possible that the Arabs who had already migrated to Ceylon, prior to Islam, had adopted the Tamil language as a medium of communication in their intercourse with the Tamil speaking Muslims of South India. The Muslims were very skillful traders who gradually built-up a very lucrative trading post in Ceylon. A whole colony of Arab Muslims is said to have landed at Beruwela (South Western coast) in the Kalutara District in 1024.
Though the Muslims did not engage in propagating Islam amongst the natives of Ceylon, many of the native women they married were converted to Islam.
Muslims have always maintained very cordial relationships with the Sinhalese Royalty and the local population. There is evidence that they were closer to the Sinhalese than to the Tamils. The Muslims' relationship with the Sinhalese kings grew stronger and in the 14th century they even fought with them against the expanding Tamil kingdom and its maritime influence.
By the beginning of the 16th. century, the Muslims of Sri Lanka, the descendants of the original Arab traders, had settled down comfortably on the island. They were very successful in trade and commerce and integrated socially with the customs of the local people. They had become an inseparable, and even more, an indispensable part of society. This period was one of ascendancy in peace and prosperity for the Sri Lankan Muslims.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Moors in Sri Lanka has grown from approximately 100,000 persons in the 1800s to over 2 million in 2005. (the population of Sri Lanka is 21,128,772 as of 2009) In the past, Moors were found throughout Sri Lanka, mostly within urban coastal regions. However, during Portuguese rule in the 1600s they were persecuted on the basis of their religion and were forced to retreat into the Kandyan highlands and the East Coast, which were under the rule of local kings. As a result, there are substantial Moor populations in these regions today. In recent times, the Sri Lankan Civil War has produced large population movements in the northern region of the country, resulting in significant demographic changes. Hence the once-flourishing Muslim (mostly Moor) community is now non-existent in the Northern Province of the country as a result of ethnic cleansing carried out by Tamil Tiger rebels in 1991. Most of the expelled Northern population now reside in the western Puttalam region of the country.
Sri Lankan Moors see Moors
Moors (Sri Lankan Moors). Name given to the Muslims of Sri Lanka who settled there prior to the British conquest of the island in 1795. As with the Muslims of the Philippines, known as Moros, the name is one that has been given to the Islamic population by Europeans. In both cases, the people identify themselves as Muslims rather than Moors or Moros. They number slightly more than one million, and their historical background and social characteristics closely resemble those of the Muslims of peninsular India -- the Mappilas or Kerala and the Labbais of Tamil Nadu. That is, Sri Lankan Muslims evolved from the commercial settlements of the Arab Muslim traders who first arrived in Sri Lanka in the late seventh or the early eighth century of the Christian calendar. Some of these Muslims probably came directly from Arabia while others arrived via Kerala, but the majority of the later settlers must have come from Tamil Nadu, as Tamil is the major language among them. The majority of Muslims in Sri Lanka still make their living as merchants, although there is a community of Muslim agriculturalists in eastern Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Moors (commonly referred to as Muslims) are the third largest ethnic group in Sri Lanka comprising eight percent (8%) of the country's total population. They are predominantly followers of Islam. The Moors trace their ancestry to Arab traders who settled in Sri Lanka some time between the eighth and fifteenth centuries. The Arabic language brought by the early merchants is no longer spoken, though many Arabic words and phrases are still commonly used. Until the recent past, the Moors employed Arwi as their native language, though this is also extinct as a spoken language.
Moors today use Tamil as their primary language with influence from Arabic. Those from central and southern Sri Lanka also widely use Sinhala, an Indo-European language spoken by the ethnic Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Moors lived primarily in coastal trading and agricultural communities, preserving their Islamic cultural heritage while adopting many Southern Asian customs. During the period of Portuguese colonization, the Moors suffered widespread persecution, and many fled to the Central Highlands and the East Coast, where their descendants remain.
The Tamils of Sri Lanka, throughout history, have attempted to categorize the Sri Lankan Moors as belonging to the Tamil race. It is claimed that this was a bid to eliminate the minority community from having its own unique identity. The Government of Sri Lanka, however, treats the Muslims as of Arab origin and as a distinct ethnic group from the Tamils.
The manner in which Islam developed in Sri Lanka is very similar to that on the Malabar coast of India. Tradition has recorded that Arabs who had settled down on the Malabar coast used to travel from the port of Cranganore to Sri Lanka on pilgrimage to pay homage to what they believed to be the footprint of Adam on the top of a mountain, which, until today, is called Adam's Peak.
Ibn Batuta, the famous 14th century Arab traveller, recorded many facets about early Arab influence in Sri Lanka in his travelogues.
Before the end of the 7th century, a colony of Muslim merchants had established themselves in Ceylon. Fascinated by the scenic splendor and captivated by the traditions associated with Adam's Peak, Muslim merchants arrived in large numbers and some of them decided to settle in the island encouraged by the cordial treatment they received by the local rulers. Most of them lived along the coastal areas in peace and prosperity, maintaining contacts, both cultural and commercial, with Baghdad, Hadramout, Oman and other Islamic cities.
The first Arabs who practiced Islam arrived in Sri Lanka around the 7th/8th century of the Christian calendar, and there is evidence that there was a settled community of Arabs in Ceylon in pre-Islamic times.
The circumstances that helped the growth of Muslim settlements were varied. Most of the majority Sinhalese depended more on agriculture than trade, thus trade was wide open to the Muslims. The Sinhalese Kings considered the Muslim settlements favorably on account of the revenue that they brought with them through their contacts overseas both in trade and in politics. The religious tolerance of the local population was also another vital factor in the development of Muslim settlements in Ceylon.
The early Muslim settlements were set up mainly around ports on account of the nature of their trade. It is also assumed that many of the Arab traders may not have brought their womenfolk along with them when they settled in Ceylon. Hence they would have been compelled to marry the Sinhalese and Tamil women of the island after converting them to Islam. The fact that a large number of Moors in Sri Lanka speak the Tamil language can be attributed to the possibility that they were trading partners with the Tamils of South India and had to learn Tamil in order to carry out their business. The integration with the Muslims of Tamil Nadu, in South India, may have also contributed to this. It is also possible that the Arabs who had already migrated to Ceylon, prior to Islam, had adopted the Tamil language as a medium of communication in their intercourse with the Tamil speaking Muslims of South India. The Muslims were very skillful traders who gradually built-up a very lucrative trading post in Ceylon. A whole colony of Arab Muslims is said to have landed at Beruwela (South Western coast) in the Kalutara District in 1024.
Though the Muslims did not engage in propagating Islam amongst the natives of Ceylon, many of the native women they married were converted to Islam.
Muslims have always maintained very cordial relationships with the Sinhalese Royalty and the local population. There is evidence that they were closer to the Sinhalese than to the Tamils. The Muslims' relationship with the Sinhalese kings grew stronger and in the 14th century they even fought with them against the expanding Tamil kingdom and its maritime influence.
By the beginning of the 16th. century, the Muslims of Sri Lanka, the descendants of the original Arab traders, had settled down comfortably on the island. They were very successful in trade and commerce and integrated socially with the customs of the local people. They had become an inseparable, and even more, an indispensable part of society. This period was one of ascendancy in peace and prosperity for the Sri Lankan Muslims.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the population of Moors in Sri Lanka has grown from approximately 100,000 persons in the 1800s to over 2 million in 2005. (the population of Sri Lanka is 21,128,772 as of 2009) In the past, Moors were found throughout Sri Lanka, mostly within urban coastal regions. However, during Portuguese rule in the 1600s they were persecuted on the basis of their religion and were forced to retreat into the Kandyan highlands and the East Coast, which were under the rule of local kings. As a result, there are substantial Moor populations in these regions today. In recent times, the Sri Lankan Civil War has produced large population movements in the northern region of the country, resulting in significant demographic changes. Hence the once-flourishing Muslim (mostly Moor) community is now non-existent in the Northern Province of the country as a result of ethnic cleansing carried out by Tamil Tiger rebels in 1991. Most of the expelled Northern population now reside in the western Puttalam region of the country.
Sri Lankan Moors see Moors
Morceli, Noureddine
Morceli, Noureddine (b. February 28, 1970). Most dominant middle distance runner of the early 1990s. Born in Tenes, Algeria, Morceli was unbeaten in 45 finals at 1500 meters and 1 mile from 1992 to 1996. In that period, he set six world records in the 1500, 2000 and 3000 meters and the mile outdoors and the 1000 and 1500 meters indoors. He won the 1500 meters at the 1991 World Indoor Championship; at the1991, 1993, and 1995 World Championships; and at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. He also won the mile at the 1994 and 1998 Goodwill Games.
Born in Ténès, Noureddine Morceli rose to athletic prominence after winning the silver medal in the 1500 meters at the World Junior Championships in 1988.
Morceli attended college in Riverside, California, and throughout his career, in winter, he would return there to enjoy the mild climate and train. In 1990, he moved up to senior class and set the seasons best mark of 3:37.87 in 1500 meter run. He continued this dominance into 1991, when he broke the world indoor record for 1500 meters at Seville on February 28, setting a new mark of 3:34.16. Only nine days later, on the same track, he won the 1500 meters title at the World Indoor Championships. Throughout the outdoor season 1991 Morceli remained undefeated over 1500 meters. At several Grand Prix meetings he ran times around 3:31 min. At the World Championships in Tokyo, Morceli was already a clear favorite for the 1500 meters and he won easily. He set a new World Championships record (3:32.84) and finished with a remarkable two-second-lead between him and the silver medalist Wilfred Kirochi (Kenya).
In the beginning of 1992, Morceli ran a new 1000 meter indoor world record of 2:15.26. There seemed to be no greater certainty for a gold medal at the Olympic Games in Barcelona later that year than Morceli. However, prior to the Olympic Games Morceli lost unexpectedly to Gennaro di Napoli in Rome and David Kibet in Oslo. There were signs that he was not in the same shape as the year before. Nevertheless, in the Olympic semi-final he looked strong. The Olympic final was run at a woefully slow pace, with the field passing through the 800 meter mark in a slower time than in the women's final. That was not the sort of pace to which Morceli had become accustomed, or that he was comfortable with, and when the frantic sprint for home began, he found himself unable to respond, eventually finishing a disappointing seventh. Only three days after the final Morceli set a world season's best in Monaco and a week later he broke his personal best to win in Zurich in 3:30.76. In September 1992 Morceli set a new 1500 meter world record of 3:28.86 in Rieti.
In 1993 Morceli narrowly missed his own world record when he won the Mediterranean Games in Narbonne in 3:29.20 min. By that time Morceli had set himself a new aim: to break Steve Cram's eight-year-old record over the Mile (3:46.32). Throughout the season he was virtually without any serious competitors. In Monaco, he narrowly missed the 3000 meter world record. There was even talk that he might skip the World Championships in order to concentrate fully on the world-record hunt. However, in the end he decided to take part. At the World Championships in Stuttgart, the final of 1500 meter started at a relatively slow pace, but Morceli was always in complete control, sprinting away in the last lap to win easily and retain his world title. In the following weeks, he failed twice to set a new world record over the Mile in Berlin and Brussels. But just two days after the race in Brussels he astonished everyone by crushing the old record with a time of 3:44.39.
In 1994, Morceli set the new 3000 meter world record, clocking 7:25.11. He also experimented successfully with the 5000 meters. In Zurich, he outsprinted the rest of the field to take the victory and also won the 5000 meter race in Rieti. The only defeat of the season came when Morceli opted for an unusual 800 meter appearance in Cologne. Morceli broke the 2000 meter world record in the following season, setting a new mark of 4:47.88. Nine days later, Morceli set the last world record of his magnificent career, when he lowered his own 1500 meter record to 3:27.37 in Nice. Only a few days after this he almost broke the record again when he triumphed in 3:27.52 in Monaco. Later on that year he defended easily the 1500 meter World Champion title in Gothenburg. Shortly after, Morceli tried to improve on his Mile record in Zurich but did not succeed.
At the start of the 1996 season, Morceli set a world season's best of 3:29.50 in the 1500 meter run. However, a new and serious opponent suddenly appeared on the scene, when Hicham El Guerrouj won in Hengelo in a time of 3:29.51. At the 1996 Summer Olympics, Morceli was under enormous pressure. The final was run at an average pace when his main rival, Hicham El Guerrouj, fell down on the final lap. Morceli accelerated and crossed the line first ahead of the defending Olympic champion, Fermin Cacho. At the end of 1996 Morceli suffered his first 1500 meter defeat in four years at the hands of El Guerrouj in Milan. In the 1997 World Championships at Athens, Morceli was fourth in the 1500 meters and in 1999, at Seville, he qualified for his fifth straight 1500 meter final at a World Championships. However, during the race, he dropped out at the final lap bell while well out of medal contention. Morceli's last appearance at a major international championships was at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.
Notably, Morceli was coached by his brother Abderrahmane who ran for Algeria in the Moscow Olympics of 1980 and in Los Angeles in 1984.
After his running career came to an end, Morceli served as an ambassador of the sport by assisting with the International Olympic Commission, the African Games, as well as assisting the development of young track and field athletes in Algeria.
Morceli, Noureddine (b. February 28, 1970). Most dominant middle distance runner of the early 1990s. Born in Tenes, Algeria, Morceli was unbeaten in 45 finals at 1500 meters and 1 mile from 1992 to 1996. In that period, he set six world records in the 1500, 2000 and 3000 meters and the mile outdoors and the 1000 and 1500 meters indoors. He won the 1500 meters at the 1991 World Indoor Championship; at the1991, 1993, and 1995 World Championships; and at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. He also won the mile at the 1994 and 1998 Goodwill Games.
Born in Ténès, Noureddine Morceli rose to athletic prominence after winning the silver medal in the 1500 meters at the World Junior Championships in 1988.
Morceli attended college in Riverside, California, and throughout his career, in winter, he would return there to enjoy the mild climate and train. In 1990, he moved up to senior class and set the seasons best mark of 3:37.87 in 1500 meter run. He continued this dominance into 1991, when he broke the world indoor record for 1500 meters at Seville on February 28, setting a new mark of 3:34.16. Only nine days later, on the same track, he won the 1500 meters title at the World Indoor Championships. Throughout the outdoor season 1991 Morceli remained undefeated over 1500 meters. At several Grand Prix meetings he ran times around 3:31 min. At the World Championships in Tokyo, Morceli was already a clear favorite for the 1500 meters and he won easily. He set a new World Championships record (3:32.84) and finished with a remarkable two-second-lead between him and the silver medalist Wilfred Kirochi (Kenya).
In the beginning of 1992, Morceli ran a new 1000 meter indoor world record of 2:15.26. There seemed to be no greater certainty for a gold medal at the Olympic Games in Barcelona later that year than Morceli. However, prior to the Olympic Games Morceli lost unexpectedly to Gennaro di Napoli in Rome and David Kibet in Oslo. There were signs that he was not in the same shape as the year before. Nevertheless, in the Olympic semi-final he looked strong. The Olympic final was run at a woefully slow pace, with the field passing through the 800 meter mark in a slower time than in the women's final. That was not the sort of pace to which Morceli had become accustomed, or that he was comfortable with, and when the frantic sprint for home began, he found himself unable to respond, eventually finishing a disappointing seventh. Only three days after the final Morceli set a world season's best in Monaco and a week later he broke his personal best to win in Zurich in 3:30.76. In September 1992 Morceli set a new 1500 meter world record of 3:28.86 in Rieti.
In 1993 Morceli narrowly missed his own world record when he won the Mediterranean Games in Narbonne in 3:29.20 min. By that time Morceli had set himself a new aim: to break Steve Cram's eight-year-old record over the Mile (3:46.32). Throughout the season he was virtually without any serious competitors. In Monaco, he narrowly missed the 3000 meter world record. There was even talk that he might skip the World Championships in order to concentrate fully on the world-record hunt. However, in the end he decided to take part. At the World Championships in Stuttgart, the final of 1500 meter started at a relatively slow pace, but Morceli was always in complete control, sprinting away in the last lap to win easily and retain his world title. In the following weeks, he failed twice to set a new world record over the Mile in Berlin and Brussels. But just two days after the race in Brussels he astonished everyone by crushing the old record with a time of 3:44.39.
In 1994, Morceli set the new 3000 meter world record, clocking 7:25.11. He also experimented successfully with the 5000 meters. In Zurich, he outsprinted the rest of the field to take the victory and also won the 5000 meter race in Rieti. The only defeat of the season came when Morceli opted for an unusual 800 meter appearance in Cologne. Morceli broke the 2000 meter world record in the following season, setting a new mark of 4:47.88. Nine days later, Morceli set the last world record of his magnificent career, when he lowered his own 1500 meter record to 3:27.37 in Nice. Only a few days after this he almost broke the record again when he triumphed in 3:27.52 in Monaco. Later on that year he defended easily the 1500 meter World Champion title in Gothenburg. Shortly after, Morceli tried to improve on his Mile record in Zurich but did not succeed.
At the start of the 1996 season, Morceli set a world season's best of 3:29.50 in the 1500 meter run. However, a new and serious opponent suddenly appeared on the scene, when Hicham El Guerrouj won in Hengelo in a time of 3:29.51. At the 1996 Summer Olympics, Morceli was under enormous pressure. The final was run at an average pace when his main rival, Hicham El Guerrouj, fell down on the final lap. Morceli accelerated and crossed the line first ahead of the defending Olympic champion, Fermin Cacho. At the end of 1996 Morceli suffered his first 1500 meter defeat in four years at the hands of El Guerrouj in Milan. In the 1997 World Championships at Athens, Morceli was fourth in the 1500 meters and in 1999, at Seville, he qualified for his fifth straight 1500 meter final at a World Championships. However, during the race, he dropped out at the final lap bell while well out of medal contention. Morceli's last appearance at a major international championships was at the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney.
Notably, Morceli was coached by his brother Abderrahmane who ran for Algeria in the Moscow Olympics of 1980 and in Los Angeles in 1984.
After his running career came to an end, Morceli served as an ambassador of the sport by assisting with the International Olympic Commission, the African Games, as well as assisting the development of young track and field athletes in Algeria.
Moriscos
Moriscos (Mouriscos). In modern historical terminology, the term “Moriscos” is used to refer (a) to those Spanish Muslims who under various degrees of duress, were, between 1499 and 1526, converted to Christianity, and (b) to their descendants who continued to live in Spain until the Expulsion of 1609-1614.
A Morisco (in Spanish) or Mourisco (in Portuguese), meaning "Moor-like", was a converted (converso) Catholic inhabitant of Spain and Portugal of Muslim heritage. Over time the term was used in a pejorative sense applied to those nominal converso Catholics who were suspected of secretly practicing Islam (crypto-Muslim).
In the medieval period al-Andalus Muslims who had come under Iberian Christian rule, as a result of the incremental Reconquista, were known as Mudéjars. There was a tolerance with discrimination, although with treatment as inferiors from Catholic authorities. The victory of the Catholic Monarchs in the Battle of Granada in 1492 ended the last Islamic rule and al-Andalus territory on the Iberian peninsula. The pre-established Treaty of Granada (1491) guaranteed religious and cultural freedoms for Muslims and Jews in the imminent transition from Emirate of Granada to Province of Castile. The Alhambra Decree (1492) promptly rescinded the Jews' rights, expelling both the observant and the conversos suspected of secretly practicing Judaism (crypto-Judaism) called Marranos. The Decree set a precedent for upcoming persecution and later expulsion of Muslims and Moriscos.
When peaceful Catholic conversion efforts on the part of Granada's first archbishop, Hernando de Talavera, brought subversive Moorish opposition, Cardinal Jimenez de Cisneros took stronger measures: with forced conversions, burning Islamic texts, and prosecuting some of Granada's Muslims and Moriscos by the Inquisition. In response to these and other violations of the Treaty, Granada's Muslim population rebelled in 1499. The revolt lasted until early 1501, giving the Spanish authorities an excuse to void the terms of the Treaty for Muslims too now. In 1501 the terms of the Treaty of Granada protections were abandoned.
In 1501 Castilian authorities delivered an ultimatum to Granada's Muslims: they could either convert to Christianity or be expelled. Most did convert, to not be forced to leave their homeland. Many continued to dress in their traditional fashion, speak Arabic, and some secretly practiced Islam (crypto-Muslims). Many used the aljamiado writing system, i.e., Castilian or Aragonese texts in Arabic writing with scattered Arabic expressions. In 1502, Queen Isabella I of Castile formally rescinded toleration of Islam for the entire Kingdom of Castile. In 1508, Castilian authorities banned traditional Moorish clothing. With the absorption of Navarre into the crown of Castile in 1512, the Muslims of Navarre were ordered to convert or leave by 1515.
However, King Ferdinand, as ruler of the Kingdom of Aragon, continued to tolerate the large Muslim population living in his territory. Since the crown of Aragon was juridically independent of Castile, their policies towards Muslims could and did differ in this period. Historians have suggested that the crown of Aragon was inclined to tolerate Islam in its realm because the landed nobility there depended on the cheap, plentiful labor of Muslim vassals. But, the landed elite's exploitation of Aragon's Muslims exacerbated class resentments. In the 1520s, when Valencian artisans rebelled against the local nobility in the Revolt of the Brotherhoods, the rebels "saw that the simplest way to destroy the power of the nobles in the countryside would be to free their vassals, and this they did by baptizing them." The Inquisition and monarchy decided to prohibit the forcibly baptized Muslims of Valencia from returning to Islam. In the last step, King Charles V issued a decree compelling all Muslims in the crown of Aragon to convert to Catholicism or leave Spain by the end of January 1526. Thus, through the threat of expulsion, many Muslims of Spain became Moriscos.
Until the reign of King Philip II in the Iberian Union, Moriscos were less subject to prosecution by the Inquisition. By contrast, the 1492 Alhambra Treaty had forced Jewish people expelled unless becoming conversos, called Marranos, were still more often prosecuted than Moriscos. Some Moriscos rose to positions of wealth and prominence and wielded influence in society. Moreover, Aragonese and Valencian nobles in particular were interested in keeping their Morisco vassals under personal control; they tried to protect them from Inquisitorial prosecution by advocating patience and religious instruction. However, in 1567, Philip II changed tack. He directed Moriscos to give up their Muslim names and traditional Muslim dress, and prohibited their speaking Arabic. In addition, their children were to be educated by Christian priests. In reaction, there was a Morisco uprising in the Alpujarras from 1568 to 1571.
Spanish spies reported that the Ottoman Emperor Selim II was planning to attack Malta in the Mediterranean below Sicily, and from there advance to Spain. It was reported Selim wanted to incite an uprising among Spanish Moriscos. In addition, "some four thousand Turks and Berbers had come into Spain to fight alongside the insurgents in the Alpujarras", a region near Granada and an obvious military threat. "The excesses committed on both sides were without equal in the experience of contemporaries; it was the most savage war to be fought in Europe that century." After the Castilian forces defeated the Islamic insurgents, they expelled some eighty thousand Moriscos from the Granada Province. Most settled elsewhere in Castile. The 'Alpujarras Uprising' hardened the attitude of the monarchy. As a consequence, the Spanish Inquisition increased prosecution and persecution of Moriscos after the uprising.
French Huguenots were in contact with the Moriscos in plans against Spain in the 1570s. Around 1575, plans were made for a combined attack of Aragonese Moriscos and Huguenots from Béarn under Henri de Navarre against Spanish Aragon, in agreement with the king of Algiers and the Ottoman Empire, but these projects foundered with the arrival of John of Austria in Aragon and the disarmament of the Moriscos. In 1576, a three-pronged fleet from Istanbul was planned to disembark between Murcia and Valencia while the French Huguenots would invade from the north and the Moriscos accomplish their uprising, but the Ottoman fleet failed to arrive.
Toward the end of the 16th century, Morisco writers challenged the perception that their culture was alien to Spain. Their literary works expressed early Spanish history in which Arabic-speaking Spaniards played a positive role. Chief among such works is Miguel de Luna's Verdadera historia del rey don Rodrigo (c. 1545-1615).
At the instigation of the Duke of Lerma and the Viceroy of Valencia, Archbishop Juan de Ribera, Philip III expelled the moriscos from Spain between 1609 (Valencia) and 1614 (Castile). They were ordered to depart "under the pain of death and confiscation, without trial or sentence... to take with them no money, bullion, jewels or bills of exchange... just what they could carry." Estimates for the number expelled in this second wave have varied, although contemporary accounts set the number at around 300,000 (about four percent (4%) of the Spanish population). The majority were expelled from the Crown of Aragon (modern day Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia). In contrast, the majority in the first wave were expelled from Andalusia shortly after the events of 1492. Some historians have blamed the subsequent economic collapse of the Spanish Mediterranean on the attempted replacement of morisco workers by Christian newcomers. Not only were there fewer of the new laborers, but they were not as familiar with the local techniques.
Adult moriscos were often assumed to be covert Muslims (i.e. crypto-Muslims), but the arrangements for expulsion of their children presented Catholic Spain with a dilemma. As the children had all been baptized, the government could not legally or morally transport them to Muslim lands. Some authorities proposed that children should be forcibly separated from their parents, but sheer numbers showed this to be impractical. Consequently, the official destination of the expellees was generally stated to be France (more specifically Marseille). After the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, about 150,000 moriscos went there. Most of the moriscos then migrated to North Africa, leaving only about 40,000 to settle permanently in France.
Those moriscos who wished to remain Catholic were generally able to find new homes in Italy (especially Livorno). The overwhelming majority of the refugees settled in Muslim-held lands, mostly in the Ottoman Empire (Algeria and Tunisia) or Morocco.
Many modern scholars have emphasized that the Moriscos were the originators of the Barbary Corsairs. They had formed a network which had stretched from Morocco to Libya. Based in mainly fortified towns of North Africa, Morisco men were the basic corsairs against Christians. Some Morisco mercenaries (in the service of the Moroccan sultan), armed with European-style guns, crossed the Sahara and conquered Timbuktu and the Niger Curve in 1591. A Morisco worked as military advisor for Sultan Al-Ashraf Tumanbay II of Egypt (the last Egyptian Mameluke Sultan) during his struggle against the Ottoman invasion in 1517 led by Sultan Selim I. The Morisco military advisor suggested that Sultan Tumanbey use men armed with guns instead of depending mainly on cavalries. Arabic sources recorded that Moriscos of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt joined Ottoman armies. Many Moriscos of Egypt joined the army in the time of Muhammad Ali of Egypt.
Numerous Moriscos remained in Spain, living among the Christian population. Some stayed on for genuine religious reasons, some for merely economic reasons. It is estimated that in the kingdom of Granada alone, between 10,000 and 15,000 Moriscos remained after the general expulsion of 1609. Scholars have suggested that the Mercheros (also Quinquis), a group of nomadic tinkerers traditionally based in the northern half of Spain, may have had their origin among surviving Moriscos.
Miguel de Cervantes' writings, such as Don Quixote and Conversation of the Two Dogs, offered interesting views of Moriscos and put them in a favorable light. In the first part of Don Quixote (before the expulsion), a Morisco translates a found document containing the Arabic "history" that Cervantes is merely "publishing". In the second part, after the expulsion, Ricote is a Morisco and a good mate of Sancho Panza. He cares more about money than religion, and left for Germany, from where he returned as a false pilgrim to un-bury his treasure. He, however, admits the righteousness of their expulsion. His daughter María Félix is brought to Berbery but suffers since she is a sincere Christian.
In historical studies of minoritization, morisco is sometimes applied to other historical crypto-Muslims, in places such as Norman Sicily, 9th-century Crete, and other areas along the medieval Christian-Muslim frontier.
In the racial classification of colonial Spanish America, morisco was used as a term for the child of a mulatto and Spaniard.
In October 2006, the Andalusian Parliament asked the three parliamentary groups that form the majority to support an amendment that would ease the way for morisco descendants to gain Spanish citizenship. The proposal was originally made by IULV-CA, the Andalusian branch of the United Left. Spanish Civil Code Art. 22.1, in its current form, provides concessions to nationals of the Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, and Portugal as well as to the descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled by Spain. It allows them to seek citizenship after two years rather than the customary ten years required for residence in Spain.
This measure could benefit about five million Moroccan citizens, who are considered to be descendants of moriscos. It could also benefit an indeterminate number of people in Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Libya, Egypt and Turkey.
Since 1992 some Spanish and Moroccan historians and academics have been demanding equitable treatment for Moriscos similar to that offered to Sephardic Jews. The bid was welcomed by Mansur Escudero, the chairman of Islamic Council of Spain.
Mouriscos see Moriscos
Moriscos (Mouriscos). In modern historical terminology, the term “Moriscos” is used to refer (a) to those Spanish Muslims who under various degrees of duress, were, between 1499 and 1526, converted to Christianity, and (b) to their descendants who continued to live in Spain until the Expulsion of 1609-1614.
A Morisco (in Spanish) or Mourisco (in Portuguese), meaning "Moor-like", was a converted (converso) Catholic inhabitant of Spain and Portugal of Muslim heritage. Over time the term was used in a pejorative sense applied to those nominal converso Catholics who were suspected of secretly practicing Islam (crypto-Muslim).
In the medieval period al-Andalus Muslims who had come under Iberian Christian rule, as a result of the incremental Reconquista, were known as Mudéjars. There was a tolerance with discrimination, although with treatment as inferiors from Catholic authorities. The victory of the Catholic Monarchs in the Battle of Granada in 1492 ended the last Islamic rule and al-Andalus territory on the Iberian peninsula. The pre-established Treaty of Granada (1491) guaranteed religious and cultural freedoms for Muslims and Jews in the imminent transition from Emirate of Granada to Province of Castile. The Alhambra Decree (1492) promptly rescinded the Jews' rights, expelling both the observant and the conversos suspected of secretly practicing Judaism (crypto-Judaism) called Marranos. The Decree set a precedent for upcoming persecution and later expulsion of Muslims and Moriscos.
When peaceful Catholic conversion efforts on the part of Granada's first archbishop, Hernando de Talavera, brought subversive Moorish opposition, Cardinal Jimenez de Cisneros took stronger measures: with forced conversions, burning Islamic texts, and prosecuting some of Granada's Muslims and Moriscos by the Inquisition. In response to these and other violations of the Treaty, Granada's Muslim population rebelled in 1499. The revolt lasted until early 1501, giving the Spanish authorities an excuse to void the terms of the Treaty for Muslims too now. In 1501 the terms of the Treaty of Granada protections were abandoned.
In 1501 Castilian authorities delivered an ultimatum to Granada's Muslims: they could either convert to Christianity or be expelled. Most did convert, to not be forced to leave their homeland. Many continued to dress in their traditional fashion, speak Arabic, and some secretly practiced Islam (crypto-Muslims). Many used the aljamiado writing system, i.e., Castilian or Aragonese texts in Arabic writing with scattered Arabic expressions. In 1502, Queen Isabella I of Castile formally rescinded toleration of Islam for the entire Kingdom of Castile. In 1508, Castilian authorities banned traditional Moorish clothing. With the absorption of Navarre into the crown of Castile in 1512, the Muslims of Navarre were ordered to convert or leave by 1515.
However, King Ferdinand, as ruler of the Kingdom of Aragon, continued to tolerate the large Muslim population living in his territory. Since the crown of Aragon was juridically independent of Castile, their policies towards Muslims could and did differ in this period. Historians have suggested that the crown of Aragon was inclined to tolerate Islam in its realm because the landed nobility there depended on the cheap, plentiful labor of Muslim vassals. But, the landed elite's exploitation of Aragon's Muslims exacerbated class resentments. In the 1520s, when Valencian artisans rebelled against the local nobility in the Revolt of the Brotherhoods, the rebels "saw that the simplest way to destroy the power of the nobles in the countryside would be to free their vassals, and this they did by baptizing them." The Inquisition and monarchy decided to prohibit the forcibly baptized Muslims of Valencia from returning to Islam. In the last step, King Charles V issued a decree compelling all Muslims in the crown of Aragon to convert to Catholicism or leave Spain by the end of January 1526. Thus, through the threat of expulsion, many Muslims of Spain became Moriscos.
Until the reign of King Philip II in the Iberian Union, Moriscos were less subject to prosecution by the Inquisition. By contrast, the 1492 Alhambra Treaty had forced Jewish people expelled unless becoming conversos, called Marranos, were still more often prosecuted than Moriscos. Some Moriscos rose to positions of wealth and prominence and wielded influence in society. Moreover, Aragonese and Valencian nobles in particular were interested in keeping their Morisco vassals under personal control; they tried to protect them from Inquisitorial prosecution by advocating patience and religious instruction. However, in 1567, Philip II changed tack. He directed Moriscos to give up their Muslim names and traditional Muslim dress, and prohibited their speaking Arabic. In addition, their children were to be educated by Christian priests. In reaction, there was a Morisco uprising in the Alpujarras from 1568 to 1571.
Spanish spies reported that the Ottoman Emperor Selim II was planning to attack Malta in the Mediterranean below Sicily, and from there advance to Spain. It was reported Selim wanted to incite an uprising among Spanish Moriscos. In addition, "some four thousand Turks and Berbers had come into Spain to fight alongside the insurgents in the Alpujarras", a region near Granada and an obvious military threat. "The excesses committed on both sides were without equal in the experience of contemporaries; it was the most savage war to be fought in Europe that century." After the Castilian forces defeated the Islamic insurgents, they expelled some eighty thousand Moriscos from the Granada Province. Most settled elsewhere in Castile. The 'Alpujarras Uprising' hardened the attitude of the monarchy. As a consequence, the Spanish Inquisition increased prosecution and persecution of Moriscos after the uprising.
French Huguenots were in contact with the Moriscos in plans against Spain in the 1570s. Around 1575, plans were made for a combined attack of Aragonese Moriscos and Huguenots from Béarn under Henri de Navarre against Spanish Aragon, in agreement with the king of Algiers and the Ottoman Empire, but these projects foundered with the arrival of John of Austria in Aragon and the disarmament of the Moriscos. In 1576, a three-pronged fleet from Istanbul was planned to disembark between Murcia and Valencia while the French Huguenots would invade from the north and the Moriscos accomplish their uprising, but the Ottoman fleet failed to arrive.
Toward the end of the 16th century, Morisco writers challenged the perception that their culture was alien to Spain. Their literary works expressed early Spanish history in which Arabic-speaking Spaniards played a positive role. Chief among such works is Miguel de Luna's Verdadera historia del rey don Rodrigo (c. 1545-1615).
At the instigation of the Duke of Lerma and the Viceroy of Valencia, Archbishop Juan de Ribera, Philip III expelled the moriscos from Spain between 1609 (Valencia) and 1614 (Castile). They were ordered to depart "under the pain of death and confiscation, without trial or sentence... to take with them no money, bullion, jewels or bills of exchange... just what they could carry." Estimates for the number expelled in this second wave have varied, although contemporary accounts set the number at around 300,000 (about four percent (4%) of the Spanish population). The majority were expelled from the Crown of Aragon (modern day Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia). In contrast, the majority in the first wave were expelled from Andalusia shortly after the events of 1492. Some historians have blamed the subsequent economic collapse of the Spanish Mediterranean on the attempted replacement of morisco workers by Christian newcomers. Not only were there fewer of the new laborers, but they were not as familiar with the local techniques.
Adult moriscos were often assumed to be covert Muslims (i.e. crypto-Muslims), but the arrangements for expulsion of their children presented Catholic Spain with a dilemma. As the children had all been baptized, the government could not legally or morally transport them to Muslim lands. Some authorities proposed that children should be forcibly separated from their parents, but sheer numbers showed this to be impractical. Consequently, the official destination of the expellees was generally stated to be France (more specifically Marseille). After the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, about 150,000 moriscos went there. Most of the moriscos then migrated to North Africa, leaving only about 40,000 to settle permanently in France.
Those moriscos who wished to remain Catholic were generally able to find new homes in Italy (especially Livorno). The overwhelming majority of the refugees settled in Muslim-held lands, mostly in the Ottoman Empire (Algeria and Tunisia) or Morocco.
Many modern scholars have emphasized that the Moriscos were the originators of the Barbary Corsairs. They had formed a network which had stretched from Morocco to Libya. Based in mainly fortified towns of North Africa, Morisco men were the basic corsairs against Christians. Some Morisco mercenaries (in the service of the Moroccan sultan), armed with European-style guns, crossed the Sahara and conquered Timbuktu and the Niger Curve in 1591. A Morisco worked as military advisor for Sultan Al-Ashraf Tumanbay II of Egypt (the last Egyptian Mameluke Sultan) during his struggle against the Ottoman invasion in 1517 led by Sultan Selim I. The Morisco military advisor suggested that Sultan Tumanbey use men armed with guns instead of depending mainly on cavalries. Arabic sources recorded that Moriscos of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt joined Ottoman armies. Many Moriscos of Egypt joined the army in the time of Muhammad Ali of Egypt.
Numerous Moriscos remained in Spain, living among the Christian population. Some stayed on for genuine religious reasons, some for merely economic reasons. It is estimated that in the kingdom of Granada alone, between 10,000 and 15,000 Moriscos remained after the general expulsion of 1609. Scholars have suggested that the Mercheros (also Quinquis), a group of nomadic tinkerers traditionally based in the northern half of Spain, may have had their origin among surviving Moriscos.
Miguel de Cervantes' writings, such as Don Quixote and Conversation of the Two Dogs, offered interesting views of Moriscos and put them in a favorable light. In the first part of Don Quixote (before the expulsion), a Morisco translates a found document containing the Arabic "history" that Cervantes is merely "publishing". In the second part, after the expulsion, Ricote is a Morisco and a good mate of Sancho Panza. He cares more about money than religion, and left for Germany, from where he returned as a false pilgrim to un-bury his treasure. He, however, admits the righteousness of their expulsion. His daughter María Félix is brought to Berbery but suffers since she is a sincere Christian.
In historical studies of minoritization, morisco is sometimes applied to other historical crypto-Muslims, in places such as Norman Sicily, 9th-century Crete, and other areas along the medieval Christian-Muslim frontier.
In the racial classification of colonial Spanish America, morisco was used as a term for the child of a mulatto and Spaniard.
In October 2006, the Andalusian Parliament asked the three parliamentary groups that form the majority to support an amendment that would ease the way for morisco descendants to gain Spanish citizenship. The proposal was originally made by IULV-CA, the Andalusian branch of the United Left. Spanish Civil Code Art. 22.1, in its current form, provides concessions to nationals of the Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, and Portugal as well as to the descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled by Spain. It allows them to seek citizenship after two years rather than the customary ten years required for residence in Spain.
This measure could benefit about five million Moroccan citizens, who are considered to be descendants of moriscos. It could also benefit an indeterminate number of people in Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Libya, Egypt and Turkey.
Since 1992 some Spanish and Moroccan historians and academics have been demanding equitable treatment for Moriscos similar to that offered to Sephardic Jews. The bid was welcomed by Mansur Escudero, the chairman of Islamic Council of Spain.
Mouriscos see Moriscos
Mori-Ule Sise
Mori-Ule Sise (d. 1845). Initiator of the Dyula revolutionary movement in West Africa. The Dyula, a class of Mandinka (usually Muslim) traders who wandered widely and settled in different parts of west Africa, had for centuries been content to leave political organization to the non-Muslim farmers among whom they lived. Mori-Ule was the first Dyula to attempt to secure a political empire. He was a native of Bate who had studied in Futa Jalon. He left there in 1825 to found the city of Medina, where he gathered followers and in 1835 launched a jihad against his non-Muslim neighbors. He succeeded in nearby Toron and Konyan, but was killed at Worodugu when one of his own disciples, Vakaba Ture, allied with his enemies (in 1845). Both men were forerunners of the famous Dyula leader Samori Toure.
Mori-Ule Sise (d. 1845). Initiator of the Dyula revolutionary movement in West Africa. The Dyula, a class of Mandinka (usually Muslim) traders who wandered widely and settled in different parts of west Africa, had for centuries been content to leave political organization to the non-Muslim farmers among whom they lived. Mori-Ule was the first Dyula to attempt to secure a political empire. He was a native of Bate who had studied in Futa Jalon. He left there in 1825 to found the city of Medina, where he gathered followers and in 1835 launched a jihad against his non-Muslim neighbors. He succeeded in nearby Toron and Konyan, but was killed at Worodugu when one of his own disciples, Vakaba Ture, allied with his enemies (in 1845). Both men were forerunners of the famous Dyula leader Samori Toure.
Moro
Moro. Term that is applied to a Muslim people in the Philippines. Spanish colonialism in the Philippines began with the conquest of the coastal stretches of Luzon and the central Visayas in the second half of the sixteenth century. During that time, the Spaniards came into direct contact and conflict with various groups professing Islam in the southern part of the archipelago on Mindanao and in the Sulu chain of islands. The most important of these different people were the Taosug and Samal of the Sulu Archipelago, the Magindanao of Cotabato, and the Maranao of Lanao and Cotabato. The Spanish bureaucracy and friars called them Moros, a term that was originaly used to describe the islamicized North Africans who, under Arab leadership, ruled the Iberian Peninsula from the eighth to the sixteenth century.
The term Moro provided an ideological prelude in the Philippines to the Spanish colonial state’s drive (1565-1898) to colonize Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Spaniards created an image, a composite portrait, of the Muslim Filipino’s “character,” that became a major intellectual justification for Spanish retaliation and religious incursion against the Muslim south over the ensuing four centuries. Thus Moro, a foreign appellation imposed on the Muslim Filipinos, carried pejorative connotations. Until recently, it was synonymous with a specific social disposition and attitude associated with ignorance, depravity, and treachery, and the label Moro, in turning history into myth, connoted an Islamic people in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao who were considered to be savages, pirates, and slavers.
Since the 1970s, a deepening Islamic consciousness and an increased unity among Muslim Filipinos in the face of the politics of national integration in the Philippines has led some to speak openly of themselves as Bangsa Moro (“the Muslim people”). In the context of the conflict in the Mindanao Sulu area, the designation Moro was promoted by the Moro National Liberation Front as a way of giving Muslims a new sense of pride and self-awareness and of transcending the old ethno-linguistic categories of Taosug, Magindanao, Maranao, and Samal.
In the 13th century, the arrival of Arab missionaries from Saudi Arabia, including Makhdum Karim, in Tawi-Tawi initiated the conversion of the native population into Islam. Trade between Malaysia and Indonesia helped establish the Islamic religion in the southern Philippines.
In 1457, the introduction of Islam led to the creation of Sultanates. This included the sultanates of Buayan, Maguindanao and Sulu, which is considered the oldest Muslim government in the country until its annexation by the United States in 1898.
The inhabitants of pre-Hispanic Philippines practiced Islam, Hindu-Buddhism, and Animism. The Malay kingdoms interacted, and traded with various tribes throughout the islands, governing several territories ruled by chieftains called Rajah, Datu and Sultan.
An 1858 German map of the Southeast Asia showing the Spanish territory (Spanische Besitzungen) in the Philippines.
The Spaniards arrived in 1521 and the Philippines became part of the Spanish Empire in 1565. The sultanates, however, actively resisted the Spaniards, thus maintaining their relative independence, enabling them to develop an Islamic culture and identity, different from the rest of the Christianized Malays which the Spaniards called "Indios" (Indians).
With intentions of colonizing the islands, the Spaniards made incursions into Moro territory. They also began erecting military stations and garrisons with Catholic missions, which attracted Christianized natives of civilian settlements. The most notable of these are Zamboanga and Cotabato.
Feeling threatened by these actions, the Moros decided to challenge the Spanish government. They began conducting raids on Christian coastal towns. These Moro raids reached a fevered pitched during the reign of Datu Bantilan in 1754.
The string of coastal fortifications, military garrisons and forts built by the Spaniards ensured that these raids, although destructive to the Philippine economies of the coastal settlements, were eventually stifled. The advent of steam-powered naval ships finally drove the antiquated Moro navy of colorful paraws and vintas to their bases. The Sultanate of Sulu, the only sultanate left standing, itself soon fell under a concerted naval and ground attack from Spanish forces.
In 1876, the Spaniards launched a campaign to colonize Jolo and made a final bid to establish a government in the southern islands. On February 21 of that year, the Spaniards assembled the largest contingent in Jolo, consisting of 9,000 soldiers in 11 transports, 11 gunboats and 11 steamboats. José Malcampo occupied Jolo and established a Spanish settlement with Pascual Cervera appointed to set up a garrison and serve as military governor. He served from March 1876 to December 1876 and was followed by José Paulin (December 1876-April 1877), Carlos Martínez (September 1877-February 1880), Rafael de Rivera (1880-1881), Isidro G. Soto (1881-1882), Eduardo Bremon, (1882), Julian Parrado (1882-1884), Francisco Castilla (1884-1886), Juan Arolas (1886-1893), Caésar Mattos (1893), Venancio Hernández (1893-1896) and Luis Huerta (1896-1899).
By 1878, they had fortified Jolo with a perimeter wall and tower gates, built inner forts called Puerta Blockaus, Puerta España and Puerta Alfonso XII, and two outer fortifications named Princesa de Asturias and Torre de la Reina. Troops including a cavalry with its own lieutenant commander were garrisoned within the protective confine of the walls. In 1880, Rafael Gonzales de Rivera, who was appointed the governor, dispatched the 6th Regiment to govern Siasi and Bongao islands.
After gaining independence from the United States, the Moro population, which was isolated from the mainstream by their leaders, experienced discrimination by the Philippine government, which gave rise to armed secession movements.
The struggle for independence has been in existence for several centuries, starting from the Spanish period, the Moro rebellion during the United States occupation and up to the present day.
Modern day Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines began between the 1960s and 1980s. During that period, the Philippine government envisioned a new country in which Christians and Muslims would be assimilated into the dominant culture. This vision, however, was generally rejected by both groups, who feared that it was just a euphemistic equivalent of assimilation. Because of this, the government realized that there was a need for a specialized agency to deal with the Muslim community, so they set up the Commission for National Integration in the 1960s, which was later replaced by the Office of Muslim Affairs, and Cultural Communities.
Concessions were made to the Muslims after the creation of these agencies, with the Moro population receiving exemptions from national laws prohibiting polygamy and divorce. In 1977, the Philippine government attempted to move a step further by harmonizing Muslim customary law with the national law.
Unfortunately, most of these achievements were seen as superficial. The Muslims, still dissatisfied with the past Philippine governments' corrupt policies and mis-understanding established the Moro National Liberation Front led by Nur Misuari with the intention of creating their independent homeland. This initiated the Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines, and created fractures between Muslims, Christians, and people of other religions. The MNLF is the only recognized representative organization for the Muslims of the Philippines by the Organization of Islamic Nations (OIC).
By the 1970s, a paramilitary organization composed mainly of Christian Ilonggo residents of mainland Mindanao, called the Ilagas began operating in Cotabato. In retaliation, Muslim armed bands, such as the Blackshirts of Cotabato and the Barracudas of Lanao, began to appear and fight the Ilagas. The Armed Forces of the Philippines were deployed to install peace; however, their presence only seemed to create more violence. A Chavacano version of the Ilagas, the Mundo Oscurro, was also organized in Zamboanga and Basilan.
In 1981, internal divisions within the MNLF caused the establishment of an Islamic paramilitary breakaway organization called the MILF. The group continued the insurgency when the MNLF signed a Peace Deal with the Philippine Government in 1994.
In 1987, peace talks with the MNLF began with the intention of establishing an autonomous region for Muslims in Mindanao. On August 1, 1989, through Republic Act No. 6734, known as the Organic Act, a 1989 plebiscite was held in 18 provinces in Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan. This was to determine if the residents would want to be part of an Autonomous Region. Out of all the Provinces and cities participating in the plebiscite, only four provinces opted to join, namely: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Even its regional capital, Cotabato City, rejected joining the autonomous region.
This still led to the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, however. A second plebiscite, held in 2001, included Basilan (except its capital, Isabela City) and Marawi City in the autonomous region.
Moro. Term that is applied to a Muslim people in the Philippines. Spanish colonialism in the Philippines began with the conquest of the coastal stretches of Luzon and the central Visayas in the second half of the sixteenth century. During that time, the Spaniards came into direct contact and conflict with various groups professing Islam in the southern part of the archipelago on Mindanao and in the Sulu chain of islands. The most important of these different people were the Taosug and Samal of the Sulu Archipelago, the Magindanao of Cotabato, and the Maranao of Lanao and Cotabato. The Spanish bureaucracy and friars called them Moros, a term that was originaly used to describe the islamicized North Africans who, under Arab leadership, ruled the Iberian Peninsula from the eighth to the sixteenth century.
The term Moro provided an ideological prelude in the Philippines to the Spanish colonial state’s drive (1565-1898) to colonize Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The Spaniards created an image, a composite portrait, of the Muslim Filipino’s “character,” that became a major intellectual justification for Spanish retaliation and religious incursion against the Muslim south over the ensuing four centuries. Thus Moro, a foreign appellation imposed on the Muslim Filipinos, carried pejorative connotations. Until recently, it was synonymous with a specific social disposition and attitude associated with ignorance, depravity, and treachery, and the label Moro, in turning history into myth, connoted an Islamic people in the Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao who were considered to be savages, pirates, and slavers.
Since the 1970s, a deepening Islamic consciousness and an increased unity among Muslim Filipinos in the face of the politics of national integration in the Philippines has led some to speak openly of themselves as Bangsa Moro (“the Muslim people”). In the context of the conflict in the Mindanao Sulu area, the designation Moro was promoted by the Moro National Liberation Front as a way of giving Muslims a new sense of pride and self-awareness and of transcending the old ethno-linguistic categories of Taosug, Magindanao, Maranao, and Samal.
In the 13th century, the arrival of Arab missionaries from Saudi Arabia, including Makhdum Karim, in Tawi-Tawi initiated the conversion of the native population into Islam. Trade between Malaysia and Indonesia helped establish the Islamic religion in the southern Philippines.
In 1457, the introduction of Islam led to the creation of Sultanates. This included the sultanates of Buayan, Maguindanao and Sulu, which is considered the oldest Muslim government in the country until its annexation by the United States in 1898.
The inhabitants of pre-Hispanic Philippines practiced Islam, Hindu-Buddhism, and Animism. The Malay kingdoms interacted, and traded with various tribes throughout the islands, governing several territories ruled by chieftains called Rajah, Datu and Sultan.
An 1858 German map of the Southeast Asia showing the Spanish territory (Spanische Besitzungen) in the Philippines.
The Spaniards arrived in 1521 and the Philippines became part of the Spanish Empire in 1565. The sultanates, however, actively resisted the Spaniards, thus maintaining their relative independence, enabling them to develop an Islamic culture and identity, different from the rest of the Christianized Malays which the Spaniards called "Indios" (Indians).
With intentions of colonizing the islands, the Spaniards made incursions into Moro territory. They also began erecting military stations and garrisons with Catholic missions, which attracted Christianized natives of civilian settlements. The most notable of these are Zamboanga and Cotabato.
Feeling threatened by these actions, the Moros decided to challenge the Spanish government. They began conducting raids on Christian coastal towns. These Moro raids reached a fevered pitched during the reign of Datu Bantilan in 1754.
The string of coastal fortifications, military garrisons and forts built by the Spaniards ensured that these raids, although destructive to the Philippine economies of the coastal settlements, were eventually stifled. The advent of steam-powered naval ships finally drove the antiquated Moro navy of colorful paraws and vintas to their bases. The Sultanate of Sulu, the only sultanate left standing, itself soon fell under a concerted naval and ground attack from Spanish forces.
In 1876, the Spaniards launched a campaign to colonize Jolo and made a final bid to establish a government in the southern islands. On February 21 of that year, the Spaniards assembled the largest contingent in Jolo, consisting of 9,000 soldiers in 11 transports, 11 gunboats and 11 steamboats. José Malcampo occupied Jolo and established a Spanish settlement with Pascual Cervera appointed to set up a garrison and serve as military governor. He served from March 1876 to December 1876 and was followed by José Paulin (December 1876-April 1877), Carlos Martínez (September 1877-February 1880), Rafael de Rivera (1880-1881), Isidro G. Soto (1881-1882), Eduardo Bremon, (1882), Julian Parrado (1882-1884), Francisco Castilla (1884-1886), Juan Arolas (1886-1893), Caésar Mattos (1893), Venancio Hernández (1893-1896) and Luis Huerta (1896-1899).
By 1878, they had fortified Jolo with a perimeter wall and tower gates, built inner forts called Puerta Blockaus, Puerta España and Puerta Alfonso XII, and two outer fortifications named Princesa de Asturias and Torre de la Reina. Troops including a cavalry with its own lieutenant commander were garrisoned within the protective confine of the walls. In 1880, Rafael Gonzales de Rivera, who was appointed the governor, dispatched the 6th Regiment to govern Siasi and Bongao islands.
After gaining independence from the United States, the Moro population, which was isolated from the mainstream by their leaders, experienced discrimination by the Philippine government, which gave rise to armed secession movements.
The struggle for independence has been in existence for several centuries, starting from the Spanish period, the Moro rebellion during the United States occupation and up to the present day.
Modern day Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines began between the 1960s and 1980s. During that period, the Philippine government envisioned a new country in which Christians and Muslims would be assimilated into the dominant culture. This vision, however, was generally rejected by both groups, who feared that it was just a euphemistic equivalent of assimilation. Because of this, the government realized that there was a need for a specialized agency to deal with the Muslim community, so they set up the Commission for National Integration in the 1960s, which was later replaced by the Office of Muslim Affairs, and Cultural Communities.
Concessions were made to the Muslims after the creation of these agencies, with the Moro population receiving exemptions from national laws prohibiting polygamy and divorce. In 1977, the Philippine government attempted to move a step further by harmonizing Muslim customary law with the national law.
Unfortunately, most of these achievements were seen as superficial. The Muslims, still dissatisfied with the past Philippine governments' corrupt policies and mis-understanding established the Moro National Liberation Front led by Nur Misuari with the intention of creating their independent homeland. This initiated the Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines, and created fractures between Muslims, Christians, and people of other religions. The MNLF is the only recognized representative organization for the Muslims of the Philippines by the Organization of Islamic Nations (OIC).
By the 1970s, a paramilitary organization composed mainly of Christian Ilonggo residents of mainland Mindanao, called the Ilagas began operating in Cotabato. In retaliation, Muslim armed bands, such as the Blackshirts of Cotabato and the Barracudas of Lanao, began to appear and fight the Ilagas. The Armed Forces of the Philippines were deployed to install peace; however, their presence only seemed to create more violence. A Chavacano version of the Ilagas, the Mundo Oscurro, was also organized in Zamboanga and Basilan.
In 1981, internal divisions within the MNLF caused the establishment of an Islamic paramilitary breakaway organization called the MILF. The group continued the insurgency when the MNLF signed a Peace Deal with the Philippine Government in 1994.
In 1987, peace talks with the MNLF began with the intention of establishing an autonomous region for Muslims in Mindanao. On August 1, 1989, through Republic Act No. 6734, known as the Organic Act, a 1989 plebiscite was held in 18 provinces in Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan. This was to determine if the residents would want to be part of an Autonomous Region. Out of all the Provinces and cities participating in the plebiscite, only four provinces opted to join, namely: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Even its regional capital, Cotabato City, rejected joining the autonomous region.
This still led to the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, however. A second plebiscite, held in 2001, included Basilan (except its capital, Isabela City) and Marawi City in the autonomous region.
Moro National Liberation Front
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Political organization founded in 1969 by young radical Muslim leaders in the Philippines. The Moro National Liberation Front had as its primary objective to “reacquire the Bangsa Moro people’s political freedom and independence from the clutches of Filipino terror and enslavement.” Its first leader was Nur Misuari, a Tausug Muslim and graduate of Asian studies at the University of the Philippines. The Bangsa Moro Army of the MLNF began fighting for secession after Philippine president Ferdinand E. Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. After several years of hostilities and thousands of fatalities, a cease fire was arranged with diplomatic pressure from some Arab-league nations. With much of its leadership in exile, the MNLF is now dormant.
To safeguard Moro (Philippine Muslim) interests and cultural identity, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1969 by a group of young, progressive Moros headed by Nur Misuari, a former student activist at the University of the Philippines. The formation of the MNLF was in response to the historical manifestation of religious and political animosity between the Christian majority and Muslim minority in the Philippines. In addition, the acceleration of national integration and development programs during the 1950s and 1960s resulted in an influx of Christian settlers into Moroland (Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan). The Moros suspected the government’s motives behind integration and feared that it intended to destroy their Muslim community (ummah).
When President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law in the Philippines in 1972, the conflict between Christians and Muslims intensified. The MNLF was able to obtain the support of Muslim leaders such as President Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi of Libya and Tun Mustapha Harun, Chief Minister of Sabah, Malaysia. In 1974, the Central Committee of the MNLF issued a manifesto declaring its intention to establish an independent Bangsa Moro Republik. With the support of Libya and other member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the MNLF was able to escalate the war during 1973-1976, which forced the Philippine government to sign the Tripoli Agreement conceding full autonomy to Moroland.
The rapid ascendancy of the MNLF, however, can be attributed not so much to effective organization as to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, including the prior existence of various Moro armed groups fighting against the government and the support of several Muslim countries in response to the plight of the Moros. The MNLF was a loosely knit organization and had been unable to establish a clear chain of command. The thirteen-member Central Committee contented itself with setting broad policy outlines.
The toll of the armed conflict was tremendous, and the MNLF’s success was short-lived. The Philippine government failed to abide by the Tripoli Agreement, the ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed in late 1977. In the same year, Misuari’s leadership was challenged and other factions -- the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) -- emerged. Although the divisions within the movement reflected underlying ideological and ethnic differences, the various factions were founded on the basis of a common ideology, Islam. The MNLF is more socially progressive, with strong support from the ethnic Tausug, while the MNLF-RG draws its support from the more conservative Maranao, and the MILF from religious and conservative elements of the Maguindanao.
Under President Corazon Aquino, the Philippine government again failed to proceed with a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement but was committed to a constitutional provision granting limited autonomy to the Muslims in the south. The MNLF, however, dissociated itself from the institution of the autonomy provisions. Rather, it called on the different Moro factions to unite in a renewed armed struggle for an independent Moro state.
The MNLF-led movement must be credited with some success in terms of the recognition achieved for Muslims. For example, Muslims have been able to extract concessions from successive Philippine governments under Marcos and Aquino. These include the official recognition of Islam and Moro culture, the establishment of shari‘a courts, and the granting of limited autonomy. The Muslims have also received educational and economic assistance from Muslim countries, and the MNLF itself has been given observer status in the OIC.
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Political organization founded in 1969 by young radical Muslim leaders in the Philippines. The Moro National Liberation Front had as its primary objective to “reacquire the Bangsa Moro people’s political freedom and independence from the clutches of Filipino terror and enslavement.” Its first leader was Nur Misuari, a Tausug Muslim and graduate of Asian studies at the University of the Philippines. The Bangsa Moro Army of the MLNF began fighting for secession after Philippine president Ferdinand E. Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. After several years of hostilities and thousands of fatalities, a cease fire was arranged with diplomatic pressure from some Arab-league nations. With much of its leadership in exile, the MNLF is now dormant.
To safeguard Moro (Philippine Muslim) interests and cultural identity, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed in 1969 by a group of young, progressive Moros headed by Nur Misuari, a former student activist at the University of the Philippines. The formation of the MNLF was in response to the historical manifestation of religious and political animosity between the Christian majority and Muslim minority in the Philippines. In addition, the acceleration of national integration and development programs during the 1950s and 1960s resulted in an influx of Christian settlers into Moroland (Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan). The Moros suspected the government’s motives behind integration and feared that it intended to destroy their Muslim community (ummah).
When President Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law in the Philippines in 1972, the conflict between Christians and Muslims intensified. The MNLF was able to obtain the support of Muslim leaders such as President Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi of Libya and Tun Mustapha Harun, Chief Minister of Sabah, Malaysia. In 1974, the Central Committee of the MNLF issued a manifesto declaring its intention to establish an independent Bangsa Moro Republik. With the support of Libya and other member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the MNLF was able to escalate the war during 1973-1976, which forced the Philippine government to sign the Tripoli Agreement conceding full autonomy to Moroland.
The rapid ascendancy of the MNLF, however, can be attributed not so much to effective organization as to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, including the prior existence of various Moro armed groups fighting against the government and the support of several Muslim countries in response to the plight of the Moros. The MNLF was a loosely knit organization and had been unable to establish a clear chain of command. The thirteen-member Central Committee contented itself with setting broad policy outlines.
The toll of the armed conflict was tremendous, and the MNLF’s success was short-lived. The Philippine government failed to abide by the Tripoli Agreement, the ceasefire collapsed, and fighting resumed in late 1977. In the same year, Misuari’s leadership was challenged and other factions -- the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) -- emerged. Although the divisions within the movement reflected underlying ideological and ethnic differences, the various factions were founded on the basis of a common ideology, Islam. The MNLF is more socially progressive, with strong support from the ethnic Tausug, while the MNLF-RG draws its support from the more conservative Maranao, and the MILF from religious and conservative elements of the Maguindanao.
Under President Corazon Aquino, the Philippine government again failed to proceed with a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement but was committed to a constitutional provision granting limited autonomy to the Muslims in the south. The MNLF, however, dissociated itself from the institution of the autonomy provisions. Rather, it called on the different Moro factions to unite in a renewed armed struggle for an independent Moro state.
The MNLF-led movement must be credited with some success in terms of the recognition achieved for Muslims. For example, Muslims have been able to extract concessions from successive Philippine governments under Marcos and Aquino. These include the official recognition of Islam and Moro culture, the establishment of shari‘a courts, and the granting of limited autonomy. The Muslims have also received educational and economic assistance from Muslim countries, and the MNLF itself has been given observer status in the OIC.
Morsi, Mohamed
Mohamed Morsi was educated in Egyptian public schools and universities. He was later granted a scholarship from the Egyptian government to prepare for a Ph.D. degree in the United States. Morsi was a Member of Parliament in the People's Assembly of Egypt from 2000 to 2005, and a leading member in the Muslim Brotherhood. He became Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) when it was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. He stood as the FJP's candidate for the May–June 2012 presidential election.
Morsi's victory in the presidential election was announced on June 24, 2012 after he won the run-off election winning 51.7 percent of the vote against Ahmed Shafik, deposed leader Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister.
As president, Morsi granted himself unlimited powers on the pretext that he would "protect" the nation from the Mubarak-era power structure, which he called "remnants of the old regime" (Arabic: فلول, ALA-LC: Foloul), and the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts. In late November, he issued an Islamist-backed draft constitution and called for a referendum, an act that his opponents called an "Islamist coup"." These issues, along with complaints of prosecutions of journalists and attacks on nonviolent demonstrators, brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets in the2012 Egyptian protests.
On June 30, 2013, mass protests erupted across Egypt which saw millions of protesters calling for the president's resignation. In response to the events, Morsi was given a 48 hour ultimatum by the military to meet the people's demands and to solve political differences or else they would intervene by implementing their own road map for the country and made it clear that they were not planning a coup.
Morsi was declared unseated on July 3, 2013 by a council consisting of defense minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, opposition leader Mohamed El Baradei, the Grand Imam of Al Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb, and Coptic Pope Tawadros II. The military suspended the constitution, and established a new administration headed by the chief justice, and initiated a "brutal" crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.
On September 1, 2013, prosecutors referred Morsi to trial on charges of inciting deadly violence. The date was set for November 4, 2013 and he was being tried on charges of incitement of murder and violence.
Mohamed Morsi (Arabic: محمد محمد مرسى عيسى العياط, ALA-LC: Muḥammad Muḥammad Mursī ‘Īsá al-‘Ayyāṭ) (b. August 20, 1951) is an Egyptian politician who served as the fifth president of Egypt, from June 30, 2012 to July 3, 2013, when he was removed by the military after mass protests. He is considered by most to be the first democratically elected head of state in Egyptian history. Although his predecessors also held elections, these were generally marred by irregularities and allegations of rigging. He was also the first president to have first assumed his duty after an election, as opposed to coming to power as revolutionaries (in the case of Gamal Abdel Nasser) or as appointed successors (Sadat, Mubarak).
Mohamed Morsi was educated in Egyptian public schools and universities. He was later granted a scholarship from the Egyptian government to prepare for a Ph.D. degree in the United States. Morsi was a Member of Parliament in the People's Assembly of Egypt from 2000 to 2005, and a leading member in the Muslim Brotherhood. He became Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) when it was founded by the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of the 2011 Egyptian revolution. He stood as the FJP's candidate for the May–June 2012 presidential election.
Morsi's victory in the presidential election was announced on June 24, 2012 after he won the run-off election winning 51.7 percent of the vote against Ahmed Shafik, deposed leader Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister.
As president, Morsi granted himself unlimited powers on the pretext that he would "protect" the nation from the Mubarak-era power structure, which he called "remnants of the old regime" (Arabic: فلول, ALA-LC: Foloul), and the power to legislate without judicial oversight or review of his acts. In late November, he issued an Islamist-backed draft constitution and called for a referendum, an act that his opponents called an "Islamist coup"." These issues, along with complaints of prosecutions of journalists and attacks on nonviolent demonstrators, brought hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets in the2012 Egyptian protests.
On June 30, 2013, mass protests erupted across Egypt which saw millions of protesters calling for the president's resignation. In response to the events, Morsi was given a 48 hour ultimatum by the military to meet the people's demands and to solve political differences or else they would intervene by implementing their own road map for the country and made it clear that they were not planning a coup.
Morsi was declared unseated on July 3, 2013 by a council consisting of defense minister Abdul Fatah al-Sisi, opposition leader Mohamed El Baradei, the Grand Imam of Al Azhar Ahmed el-Tayeb, and Coptic Pope Tawadros II. The military suspended the constitution, and established a new administration headed by the chief justice, and initiated a "brutal" crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.
On September 1, 2013, prosecutors referred Morsi to trial on charges of inciting deadly violence. The date was set for November 4, 2013 and he was being tried on charges of incitement of murder and violence.
