Friday, February 16, 2024

2024: Wafd - Wali

 Wafd

Wafd (Hizb al-Wafd) (Delegation Party). Name of a political party organized in Egypt by Sa‘d Zaghlul (1857-1927).  In 1918, Zaghlul led a delegation (in Arabic, wafd) which demanded that the British protectorate in Egypt be abolished.  After much unrest, the British created some form of independence for Egypt in 1922, and the Wafd organized itself as a political party in 1923, calling for internal autonomy, constitutional government, civil rights, and Egyptian control of both the Sudan and the Suez Canal.  After Egypt gained complete independence in 1936, Wafd governments were in constant conflict with the monarchy.  In 1952, the Revolutionary Command Council under Nasser put an end to both the monarchy and the Wafd.   But it was revived in 1978.

Wafd was the Egyptian nationalist political party that was the leading political organization of the country between World War I and the Nasser revolution (1918-1952), and central in the work for establishing Egyptian independence.  The full name of the organization would be translated as “Egyptian delegation.”

On November 13, 1918, Wafd was organized by Sa’ad Zaghlul in response to the end of World War I.   A delegation led by Zaghlul to the British high commissioner in Cairo demands a voice at the peace conferences following the World War, but this was refused.  From then on, three years of demonstrations and riots followed.  Through these years there were talks between the British and Wafd.

In March of 1919, the leaders of Wafd, Zaghlul, Ismail Sidqi and Hamid al-Basil were exiled for a short period.

In September of 1923, following the partial independence of 1922, Wafd established itself as a political party.

In February of 1924, Wafd won ninety percent of the seats in the First Chamber and formed a government.

In 1927, Zaghlul died, and the Egyptian nationalist movement was divided, into Wafd, now led by Mustafa Nahas Pasha, and King Fu’ad.

In 1931, the king sacked premier minister Nahas Pasha, and suspended the constitution of 1923.  

In April of 1936, elections returned Wafd to power, and a Regency Council ruled on behalf of Egypt’s new king, Faruk.  In August of 1936, Egypt became an independent kingdom.

In 1937, Wafd formed the League of Wafdist Youth, which developed into a para-military organization, called the Blueshirts.  

In February of 1938, King Faruk was 18, and tensions between him and Wafd reach the same level as under his father.  He had prime minister Nahas Pasha dismissed.  

In February of 1942, during World War II, when King Faruk exercised Italian sympathies, the British forced him to elect Nahas Pasha for the job as prime minister.  The authority of this Wafd government gave them the power to start talks with other Arab states about closer ties.  This eventually led to establishment of the Arab League in 1945.

In January of 1950, Wafd won the general election with an overwhelming majority.

In October of 1951, Wafd unilaterally abrogated the treaty with the British of 1936, which gave the British control over foreign interests and the safety of national minorities.  They also demanded a British withdrawal from the Suez Canal, and Wafd members took part in guerrilla attacks on their installations.

In January of 1952, King Faruk dismissed the Wafd government, following riots in Cairo.

In 1953, Wafd was dissolved together with all other parties by the Revolution Command Council.

In February of 1978, Wafd was reconstituted as a consequence of the legalization of political parties.  The new party was referred to as Neo-Wafd.

Wafd proved to be far more effective than other political groups to get popular support against British presence in Egypt, and exercised their power through demonstrations and riots in addition to participation in normal elections.  The core of Wafd’s supporters were the professional elite and the bourgeoisie.  

Wafd called for the internal autonomy, constitutional government, civil rights and Egyptian control over the Sudan and the Suez Canal.  Wafd was an important political factor in all fields of the society, by controlling four daily and four weekly newspapers.

Wafd formed the government of Egypt from 1924, and these governments were in constant conflicts with the ruling kings of Egypt, even after Egypt gained its independence in 1936.  The fall of Wafd in the 1950's came from strong discontent among normal Egyptians as well as military leaders, for their inconclusive dealing with the continued British presence in Egypt.

Easily the greatest factor contributing to popular disillusionment with the Wafd was the party's failure to boycott the Farouk government after it acceded to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The policies followed by the party during the Anglo-Egyptian crisis of the mid-1930s alienated many Egyptian nationalists - heretofore the single most reliable support bloc for the Wafd - and severed the party between its small but powerful accommodationist minority and its large but voiceless resistant majority. The failure of the Wafd to more aggressively oppose the continuation of the British presence left Egyptian politics devoid of a popularly legitimized leader or party.

The leaders of the Wafd were:

    * Saad Zaghlul Pasha 1919 to 1927
    * Mustafa el-Nahhas Pasha 1927 to 1952

The Wafd Party (literally "Delegation Party"; Ḥizb al-Wafd) was a nationalist liberal political party in Egypt. It was said to be Egypt's most popular and influential political party for a period from the end of World War I through the 1930s. During this time, it was instrumental in the development of the 1923 constitution and supported moving Egypt from dynastic rule to a constitutional monarchy, where power would be wielded by a nationally elected parliament. The party was dissolved in 1952, after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution.

The Wafd party was an Egyptian nationalist movement that came into existence in the aftermath of World War I. Although it was not the first nationalist group in Egypt, it had the longest lasting impact. It was preceded and influenced by smaller and less significant movements which evolved over time into the more modern and stronger nationalist Wafd Party. One of these earlier movements was the Urabi Revolt led by Ahmed Urabi in the early 1880s. This uprising fought against the ruling powers of the Egyptian Khedive and European interference with Egyptian affairs. Saad Zaghloul, the future creator and leader of the Wafd Party, was a follower of Orabi, and participated in the revolt.

The actual party began taking shape during World War I and was founded in November 1918. The original members included seven prominent figures of the Egyptian landed gentry and legal profession, including their leader Saad Zaghloul. They presented themselves with Zaghloul as their representative to Reginald Wingate, the British High Commissioner in Egypt and requested to represent Egypt at the Paris Peace Conference. They told Wingate that the main goal of the Wafd was the immediate termination of the British occupation of Egypt, but not of their intention to use the Paris Peace Conference to plead their case to the world powers. Zaghloul had created a delegation that involved representatives of most of the political and social groups of Egypt. Since it was full of so many different groups, it could not yet truly be considered a political party but more of a coalition. The Wafd had formed a constitution, outlining the ways that they wished to govern Egypt.

The Wafd was denied its request to go to London and speak with the home government, nor were they allowed to attend the Paris peace conference. The Wafd counteracted this by publishing memos and giving speeches ensuring that the delegations in Paris would know what the real Egyptian delegation desired. Zaghloul became a popular figure amongst the Egyptian public and was able to arouse popular discontent at Egypt's continued status as a British protectorate. British authorities arrested Zaghloul and three other leaders and had them exiled to the island of Malta in 1919. These deportations caused the opposite effect to what the British had hoped, and though attempts were made to keep it quiet, word spread and eventually led to a strike of law students. This strike became a demonstration with chants including "Long live Saad! … Long live Independence!" This started the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, and in the following days many more students began to strike, and the government and courts shut down entirely. Several riots and other disturbances broke out over Egypt, which were gradually suppressed by the British. The British then released Saad Zaghloul and his followers, hoping to create a rift in the Wafd leadership. However, the party became more unified, and the strikes continued.

The Wafd became a true party and one with widespread support of the people. The delegation made its way to Paris only to hear that United States President Woodrow Wilson supported the British Protectorate of Egypt. Although at this point the British were still in control, the Wafd was effectively leading the people of Egypt. In 1920, the British protectorate ended and the Wafd was placed in control of Egypt. The party rapidly became the dominant political organization in the country and was the governing party (albeit in a subordinate role to the executive power of the king) through most of the liberal period which came to an end with the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The three-decade period between Britain's nominal exit in 1922 and the nationalist revolution of 1952 saw the erection of an uneasy balance of power between the King, the British Residency, and the Wafd leadership, of which the Wafd was the least powerful. In the fragile stability of this triangle, the Wafd became Egypt's preeminent political organization, described by contemporary historians as "the first in the field," "the best organized," and "the strongest numerically." In the 1924 parliamentary election, the Wafd won 179 of 211 parliamentary seats. In 1936 it won 89% of the vote and 157 seats in Parliament.

However, ties between the Wafd and the two other axes of power – the King and the Residency – were strained by the party's raison d'etre of opposing British intervention in Egypt and the King's collusion therein. King Fuad I's relations with the Wafd were described as "cool," and ties between the monarch and the largest political party further deteriorated after Fuad's son Farouk, who succeeded his father to the sultanate, signed an unduly quiescent treaty with the British in 1936. This alienated the party that had arisen primarily out of popular resentment of British control of Egypt and commanded popular support by associating itself most closely with the nationalist struggle for full Egyptian independence.

The power vacuum resulting from the end of the British mandate over Egypt also precipitated a severe welfare provision vacuum which the new government failed to fill. By the 1930s, Egypt became a top destination for Christian missionary organizations, which funded and performed badly needed social services for the Egyptian middle and lower classes. Western Proselytism consortia beseeched their sponsors "to make heavy sacrifices so that Egyptian children could have a better education than their own parents could afford"; likewise, the proliferation of missionary-operated hospitals exposed the inadequacy of government-provided healthcare.

Further social unrest resulted from the government's inability to resolve metastasizing labor disputes threatening the Egyptian economy. The twin occurrences of the worldwide recession prompted by the Great Depression and a regional cotton crisis slowed Egypt's GDP growth through the late 1920s and most of the following two decades. The consequent instability in the labor market motivated early attempts at widespread unionization. Sensing a threat to its unrivaled power, the Wafd implemented numerous local labor conciliation boards, which were essentially toothless owing to the dearth of labor laws on a national level. Though the Wafd secured guarantees of a permanent national labor council, no significant labor laws were enacted; those that did gain passage were not enforced; and the Wafd was unable to effect any substantial change in the fiercely anti-union policy of the government.

During the 1920s, the party's leadership had placed very low emphasis on the recruitment and mobilization of youth. Complacent in its dominant parliamentary position, the Wafd did not pursue innovative methods of youth organization until at least the mid-1930s, leaving it hopelessly behind future competitors such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which had employed a far more effective local-franchising system since its inception in 1928.

After student demonstrations against the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the anti-labor policies of the government began to reveal cracks in the previously ironclad Wafd coalition, party leaders created a youth wing dubbed the "Blue Shirts." However, rather than capitalizing on the grassroots nature of the youth movements, the party instead tried to slot the Blue Shirts onto their own rung in the top-down Wafd hierarchy, presenting members with uniforms, badges, and a standardized salute – all under the motto "Obedience & Struggle." By June 1937, the Wafd feared that the Blue Shirts were becoming too militant, and thereafter further restricted their privileges. Having never fully embraced youth mobilization, by the close of the 1930s the uneasy Wafd leadership had essentially abandoned any efforts at intergenerational coalition-building.

Easily the greatest factor contributing to popular disillusionment with the Wafd was the party's failure to boycott the Farouk government after it acceded to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The policies followed by the party during the Anglo-Egyptian crisis of the mid-1930s alienated many Egyptian nationalists – heretofore the single most reliable support bloc for the Wafd – and severed the party between its small but powerful accommodationist minority and its large but voiceless resistant majority. The failure of the Wafd to more aggressively oppose the continuation of the British presence "left Egyptian politics devoid of a popularly legitimized leader or party."

The collapse of the widespread popular support once commanded by the Wafd has been historically attributed to the combined embattlements of three distinct trends in Egyptian politics of the pre-revolutionary era. The party, along with all other Egyptian political parties, was banned in January 1953 by Gamal Abdel Nasser following the Free Officers Revolution of 1952. The paper of the party, Al Misriwas also closed in 1954.


Hizb al-Wafd see Wafd
Delegation Party see Wafd


Wafrani
Wafrani (Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Wafrani) (Muhammad al-Ifrani)  (Mohammed al-Ifrani) (Muhammad al-Saghir ibn al-hajj Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Ifrani al-Marakkushi) (El Ifrani) (b. 1669/1670, Marrakesh, Morocco - d. 1727/1747 Marrakesh, Morocco).  Moroccan biographer and historian.  He is best known as the author of the great chronicle of the Sa‘di Sharifs of Morocco, covering the period from 1511 to the end of the seventeenth century.

Little is known about the life of El Ifrani. He was born in Marrakesh in 1669/1670, studied there and in Fez, and may have held a post in the entourage of Mulay Ismael Alawi, sultan of Morocco (1645-1727), on whose reign he wrote a now lost chronicle. Later in life, he became imam and khatib of the Ben Youssef Medrassa (also known as al-Yusufiyya) in Marrakesh. Certain sultans like Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah (1757-1790), were very strict in what the content of the education should be and even gave out manuals with regulations and works to be treated, but the teachers did as they pleased and that is how El Ifrani in the beginning of the 17th century wrote a work on the life of Ibn Sahl of Sevilla, an Andalusian poet of the 12th century while pretending to be teaching law and the hadith.

A number of the works of El Ifrani have survived, the most important of which is his biographical dictionary of men of the eleventh century of the hijra: Safwat man intashar min Akhbar Sulaha Al Qarn Al Hadi Ashar, briefly called "Safwat man intashar". This work contains the biographies of saints who lived in 17th century Morocco. It is the classic biographical dictionary of that time. Also famous is his history of the Saadi Dynasty, Nuzhat al-hadi bi-akhbar muluk al-qarn al-hadi, written shortly before 1724. The work, among others, relates the conquest of the Songhai Empire by the Saadian sultans.

Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Wafrani see Wafrani
Muhammad al-Ifrani see Wafrani
Mohammed al-Ifrani see Wafrani
Muhammad al-Saghir ibn al-hajj Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Ifrani al-Marakkushi see Wafrani
El Ifrani see Wafrani


Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah
Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah (Abu ‘Abd Allah Wahb ibn Munabbih) (Wahb ibn Munabbih)  (Abu 'Abd Allah al-Ṣana'ani al-Dhimari) (Wahb ibn Munabbih ibn Kamil ibn Sirajud-Din Dhee Kibaar Abu-Abdullah al-Yamani al-San'ani) (654-725/728/737).  Storyteller of Persian descent from Yemen.  He is celebrated for his Book of the Military Campaigns, describing the Prophet’s campaigns.  He was also an authority on the traditions of Jews and Christians.

Wahb ibn Munabbih was a Muslim traditionist of Dhimar (two days' journey from Sanaa) in Yemen.  He is counted among the Tabi‘in and narrated Isra'iliyat.

On his father's side he was descended from Persian knights, while his mother was a Himyarite.

His father, whose name was Munabbih ibn Kamil, had been converted to Islam in the lifetime of the Prophet, although a single authority, the "Al-Tibr al-Masluk", states that Wahb himself had turned from Judaism to Islam. His other biographers, however, including Al-Nawawi and Ibn Challikan, do not note that he was a Jew either in race or in religion. The fact that he was well versed in Jewish traditions, on which he wrote much, probably gave rise to the statement that he was a Jew, although he might have acquired his knowledge from his teacher Ibn 'Abbas.

Among Wahb's many writings may be mentioned his "Qiṣaṣ al-Anbiya'" ("Story of the Prophets") and "Kitab al-Isra'iliyat" ("Book of the Israelites," "Ḥajji Khalfa," iv. 518, v. 40). The former, which is believed to be his earliest literary work, is, as its title indicates, a collection of narratives concerning Biblical personages, the accounts being drawn from Jewish folk-lore though presented in Islamic guise. Thus, like Ibn 'Abbas and Ka'b al-Aḥbar, he was an authority for many legends narrated by Al-Ṭabari, Mas'udi, and others. The "Kitab al-Isra'iliyat," or "Book of Jewish Matters," is lost, but was apparently a collection of Jewish stories, many of them incorporated by a Jewish compiler into the "Arabian Nights." In the latter collection there are indeed many stories that bear the Jewish stamp, and some of them, such as the "Angel of Death," are ascribed to Wahb by the author of "Al-Tibr al-Masluk." There are also other stories which are attributed to Wahb, and many more which, from their Jewish character, may be traced to him. His Jewish learning may be illustrated by his opinion of the Shekinah (Arabic, "Sakinah") as stated by different Arabic authors.

Wahb was made a judge during the reign of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz.

Wahb's full name is given as "Abu 'Abd Allah al-Ṣana'ani al-Dhimari", or "Wahb ibn Munabbih ibn Kamil ibn Sirajud-Din Dhee Kibaar Abu-Abdullah al-Yamani al-San'ani.

Wahb also had a brother named Hammam ibn Munabbih, who is reported to have written 138 Hadiths in his Sahifa.

Wahb is said to have read more than seventy books on the prophets, and he was an extremely prolific narrator (rawi) of stories regarding Muhammad and Biblical personages. He had a son named Abdallah al-Abnawi. 



Abu 'Abd Allah Wahb ibn Munabbih see Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah
Wahb ibn Munabbih see Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Ṣana'ani al-Dhimari see Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah
Wahb ibn Munabbih ibn Kamil ibn Sirajud-Din Dhee Kibaar Abu-Abdullah al-Yamani al-San'ani see Wahb ibn Munabbih, Abu ‘Abd Allah


Wahhabi
Wahhabi  (Wahhabiya) (Wahabi). Arabic term which refers to a member of a fundamentalist Muslim sect founded by Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab).  The Wahhabi is now the dominant sect in Saudi Arabia.  The term Wahhabi has been used in West Africa to refer to militant anti-Western and anti-brotherhood movements, but it has no official tie to the Saudi doctrine.

Wahhabiya (Wahhabism) is an Arabic term which refers to a fundamentalist movement that took its name from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), an Islamic reformer from the 18th century of the Christian calendar, who was born in Arabia.  Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was influenced by Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya.  Having provoked negative reactions among his entourage, ‘Abd al-Wahhab sought refuge with Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud, the ruler of ‘Anaza from 1735 to 1765.  The Saudi family, after taking power in Arabia, made Wahhabism the official state doctrine.  Wahhabism is a fundamentalism that rejects all innovations, especially the brotherhoods and the cult of saints.  

Although, the name “Wahhabiya” was given to the movement by its opponents, the adherents of the movement have preferred to call themselves “Unitarians” (muwahhidun), because of their fervid emphasis on the divine unity and their corresponding diligence in uncovering and rooting out all attitudes and acts which could be regarded as idolatry.

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born near Riyadh of a branch of the Tamim tribe and received a sound Islamic education.  He traveled widely in search of learning and became expert in Sufi doctrine as well as in the more orthodox Islamic sciences.  Gradually his leanings became thoroughly Hanbalite.  Though he was often at the center of controversy, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s uncompromisingly strict religious views were accepted by the tribal chief Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud of nearby Dar‘iya.  Religious authority was assumed by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, political and military power by Ibn Sa‘ud.  This venture determined the future of the movement, which has continued to the present day as a powerful religio-political combination in Arabia, where the Sa‘udi dynasty and Wahhabi fundamentalism dominate absolutely.

Dar‘iya soon became a theocratic state and the center of an increasingly vast territory.  Ibn Sa‘ud’s able son, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, continued military conquests, with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as religious guide.  After the reformer’s death the fortunes of the Sa‘udi dynasty continued to advance.  Its territorial dominion eventually included all of the Hejaz and Najd, and much of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf.  The Wahhabis even went beyond Arabia in attacks on Damascus in Syria and Najaf in Iraq.  Later there was a significant branch of the movement in India.  

The nineteenth century brought forth reversals to the Sa‘udi dynasty, and Ottoman punitive expeditions, under Egyptian command, finally overthrew the first Wahhabi empire in 1818.  But early in the 20th century, the Sa‘udis regained their old position under the great ‘Abd al-‘Aziz II, who was crowned king of Hejaz and Najd in 1930.  His descendants continue to rule the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Wahhabi reforms were aimed at excising all beliefs and behavior not soundly rooted in the pristine period of Islam, roughly the first three centuries.  Thus, the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the four orthodox Sunni law schools -- fiqh -- were regarded as the normative sources for faith and order.  All else was viewed as bid‘a -- heresy.  Two classical figures had an especially forceful influence on the formation of Wahhabi doctrine: Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of the most conservative law school, and Ibn Taymiyya, the activist Hanbalite jurist, who wrote scathing denunciations of the veneration of saints.

The central issue around which the Wahhabi reforms revolved was the popular cult of saints.  The building of mausoleums, especially of the mosque-tomb type, and visiting them for veneration and blessings were declared to be shirk.  Early Wahhabis ruthlessly destroyed many shrines and stamped out all activities associated with them.  They scrutinized all aspects of their fellow believers’ behavior, to judge it as deviant or pure.  In this they were reminiscent of the Kharijites of early Islam.  They were particularly hostile toward Sufism in all forms, although ironically they resembled a Sufi order in the way in which they organized into cooperatives for work and, when necessary, holy warfare.

Centering all in absolute devotion to the one, transcendent, sovereign God, the Wahhabis declared that it is shirk to seek intercession of any creature with God (except for with Muhammad on the Last Day), or to utter any other than God’s name in prayer.  It is unbelief to deny divine predestination in all things, to interpret the Qur’an allegorically, or to claim knowledge of religion based on anything other than the Qur’an, the Sunna, or the consensus of the early orthodox legists.  Further, the rosary was forbidden in the meditation on the Divine Names (although the fingers could be used to keep count, as the Prophet is reported to have done.)  Mosques were to be utterly simple and functional, with neither minarets nor decorations.  Even celebration of the Prophet’s birthday -- mawlid -- was forbidden.

While the Wahhabis were relentless and at times cruel in their punishment of heresy -- and by their standards a very wide range of otherwise innocuous and commonplace attitudes and activities could be construed as such -- at bottom they were animated by an intense moral fervor which sought in all things to purify the total environment for the proper service of God.  Arabian Islam had sunk to a low level, and both private and public behavior in the sacred pilgrimage centers of Mecca and Medina was frequently corrupt and unrestrained. The Wahhabi movement as reform movement began to revitalize Arabian Islam.

The Wahhabi movement is significant also because it was a thoroughly indigenous, pre-modern reform within the bosom of Islam and not a reaction to Western ideas and incursions, as was the case with later movements across the Muslim world.

In spite of its fanatical puritanism and early excesses, Wahhabism did inspire later reformers in widely dispersed regions to overcome the stagnating effects of blind conformity to outmoded views and to make new efforts in applying the Qur’an and the Sunna to changing times.  In a sense, Wahhabism can be characterized as an imposing Muslim expression of the “Protestant principle,” which is “guardian against the attempts of the finite and conditional to usurp the place of the unconditional in thinking and acting.”

In more contemporary times, it is the Wahhabi movement which the oil riches of Saudi Arabia has allowed it to export to other lands.  Thus, Wahhabism has taken root in Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan, the disciples of Wahhabism, the group known as the taliban, succeeding in taking control of the country and, for a while, imposing Wahhabism throughout the land.  

 Wahhabi doctrine was introduced into India by Sayyid Ahmad Brelwi (1786-1831).  He established a permanent center in Patna, marched against the Sikh cities of the Punjab and took Peshawar in 1830.  His adherents started an insurrection in Lower Bengal.  In 1870, the older Muslim communities of India, both Shi‘a and Sunni, dissociated themselves from the Wahhabi doctrine of Holy War.

The term wahhabism is not used by Wahhibis themselves.  The term they use is muwahhidun.  Wahhabism is a term given to them by their opponents, and is now used by both European scholars and most Arabs.  The name wahhabims comes from their founder Abdul Wahhab.  The term muwahhidun is Arabic, and means unitarians.  

The muwahiduns started in 1912 to establish agricultural colonies, where people from different tribes lived together.  The inhabitants of these colonies were known as “brothers” (Arabic, ikhwan).  Each colony could house from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants.

The colonies were established near water sources, and were defended by arms.  Mud huts were built in place of traditional tents.

The Prohibitions of Wahhabism are:

1.  No other object for worship but God.
2.  Holy men or women must not be used to win favors from God.
3.  No other name than the names of Allah may enter a prayer.
4.  No smoking of tobacco.
5.  No shaving of beard.
6.  No abusive language.
7.  Rosaries are forbidden.
8.  Mosques must be built without minarets and all forms of ornaments.

The Commandments of Wahhabism are:

1. All men must attend public prayer, salat.
2. Alms, zakat, must be paid from all income.
3. Butchers slaughtering animals according to halal must have their life styles scrutinized.  It is not sufficient that they perform the basic rituals correctly.

The political fortunes of the Wahhābī were immediately allied to those of the Saʿūdī dynasty. By the end of the 18th century, they had brought all of Najd under their control, attacked Karbalāʾ, Iraq, a holy city of the Shīʿite branch of Islām, and occupied Mecca and Medina in western Arabia. The Ottoman sultan brought an end to the first Wahhābī empire in 1818, but the sect revived under the leadership of the Saʿūdī Fayṣal I. The empire was then somewhat restored until once again destroyed at the end of the 19th century by the Rashīdīyah of northern Arabia. The activities of Ibn Saʿūd in the 20th century eventually led to the creation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 and assured the Wahhābī religious and political dominance on the Arabian Peninsula.

Members of the Wahhābī call themselves al-Muwaḥḥidūn, “Unitarians,” a name derived from their emphasis on the absolute oneness of God (tawhid). They deny all acts implying polytheism, such as visiting tombs and venerating saints, and advocate a return to the original teachings of Islām as incorporated in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth (traditions of Muḥammad), with condemnation of all innovations (bidʿah). Wahhābī theology and jurisprudence, based, respectively, on the teachings of Ibn Taymīyah and on the legal school of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, stress literal belief in the Qurʿān and Ḥadīth and the establishment of a Muslim state based only on Islāmic law.

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Wahhabism (al-Wahhabiyya) is a reformist Islamic religious movement within Sunni Islam, based on the teachings of the 18th century Hanbali cleric Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (c. 1703–1792). The term "Wahhabism" is primarily an exonym (name used by outsiders). The term was not used by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself nor is it used by adherents to the movement, who typically prefer to be called "Salafi" (a term also used by followers of other Islamic reform movements). The movement's early followers referred to themselves as Muwahhidun (literally, "one who professes God's oneness" or "Unitarians"') derived from the term Tawhid ("the oneness of God"). The term "Wahhabi" has also been deployed by various outsiders as a sectarian and Islamophobic slur.  

The reform movement was established in central Arabia and later in southwestern Arabia and is followed primarily in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It opposed rituals related to the veneration of Muslim saints and pilgrimages to their tombs and shrines, which were widespread amongst the people of Najd. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers were highly inspired by the influential thirteenth-century Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah[f] (1263–1328 C.E/ 661 – 728 A.H) who called for a return to the purity of the first three generations (Salaf) to rid Muslims of inauthentic outgrowths (bidʻah), and regarded his works as core scholarly references in theology. While being influenced by their Hanbali doctrines, the movement repudiated Taqlid to legal authorities, including oft-cited scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350 C.E/ 751 A.H).[3]

Wahhabism has been variously described as "orthodox", "puritan(ical)", "revolutionary",[g] and as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship" by devotees. Socio-politically, the movement represented the first major Arab-led protest against the Turkish, Persian and foreign empires that dominated the Islamic world since the Mongol invasions and the fall of Abbasid Caliphate in the 13th century; and would later serve as a revolutionary impetus for 19th-century pan-Arabism.[h] In 1744, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud, a politico-religious alliance that continued for the next 150 years, culminating politically with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932. His movement would eventually arise as one of the most influential 18th century anti-colonial reform trends that spread across the Islamic World; advocating a return to pristine Islamic values based on the Qur’an and Sunnah for re-generating the social and political prowess of Muslims; and its revolutionary themes influenced numerous Islamic revivalists, scholars, pan-Islamist ideologues and anti-colonial activists as far as West Africa.[i]

For more than two centuries through to the present, Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab's teachings were championed as the official form of Islam and the dominant creed in three Saudi states. As of 2017, changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have led to widespread crackdown on Islamists in Saudi Arabia and rest of the Arab world. In 2018 Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman denied that anyone "can define this Wahhabism" or even that it exists. By 2021, the waning power of the religious clerics brought forth by the social, religious, economic, political changes, and a new educational policy asserting a "Saudi national identity" that emphasize non-Islamic components have led to what has been described as the "post-Wahhabi era" of Saudi Arabia.[j] The decision to celebrate the "Saudi Founding Day" annually on 22 February since 2022, to commemorate the 1727 establishment of Emirate of Dir'iyah by Muhammad ibn Saud, rather than the past historical convention that traced the beginning to the 1744 pact of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, have led to the official "uncoupling" of the religious clergy by the Saudi state.[k]

Alongside its basic definition as an 18th century reformist / revivalist movement,[l][5] the Wahhabi movement has also been characterized as a "movement for sociomoral reconstruction of society",[6] "a conservative reform movement ... the creed upon which the kingdom of Saudi Arabia was founded, and [which] has influenced Islamic movements worldwide",[7] and "a sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar" with footholds in "IndiaAfrica, and elsewhere", with a "steadfastly fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the tradition of ibn Hanbal".[8]

Supporters of the Wahhabi movement characterize it as being "pure Islam",[m] indistinct from Salafism, and in fact "the true Salafist movement"[10] seeking "a return to the pristine message of the Prophet" and attempted to free Islam from "superimposed doctrines" and superstitions".[11] They assert that the term used "most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority" with the intent of "conjuring up images of Saudi Arabia" and foreign interference.[12][8][13][14][15][16][17]

Opponents of the movement and what it stands for label it as "a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and shifting circumstances".[18] The term "Wahhabism" has also become as a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism, or strict and literal interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith".[19]

Abdallah al Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic University of Medina and member of the Saudi Consultative Council, has characterized the movement as "a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for power-sharing purposes", but not a distinct religious movement, because "it has no special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of religion that differ from the main body of Sunni Islam".[20]

The term "Wahhabi" should not be confused to Wahbi which is the dominant creed within Ibadism.[21] Since the colonial period, the Wahhabi epithet has been commonly invoked by various external observers to erroneously or pejoratively denote a wide range of reform movements across the Muslim world.[22] Algerian scholar Muhammad el Hajjoui states that it was Ottomans who first attached the label "Wahhabism" to the Sunni Hanbalis of Najd, hiring "Muslim scholars in all countries to compose, write and lie about the Hanbalis of Najd" for political purposes.[23][24][25][26][27][28]

Labelling by the term "Wahhabism" has historically been expansive beyond the doctrinal followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, who tend to all reject the label.[29][30][31][32][n]

Hence the term remains a controversial as well as a contested category. During the colonial era, the British Empire had commonly employed the term to refer to those Muslim scholars and thinkers seen as obstructive to their imperial interests; punishing them under various pretexts. Many Muslim rebels inspired by Sufi Awliyaa (saints) and mystical orders, were targeted by the British Raj as part of a wider "Wahhabi" conspiracy which was portrayed as extending from Bengal to Punjab. Despite sharing little resemblance with the doctrines of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, outside observers of the Muslim world have frequently traced various religious purification campaigns across the Islamic World to Wahhabi influence.[33][34][35][36] According to Qeyamuddin Ahmed:

"In the eyes of the British Government, the word Wahabi was synonymous with 'traitor' and 'rebel' ... The epithet became a term of religio-political abuse."[37]

In contemporary discourse, the post-Soviet states widely employ the term "Wahhabism" to denote any manifestation of Islamic assertion in neighbouring Muslim countries.[35] During the Soviet-era, the Muslim dissidents were usually labelled with terms such as "Sufi" and "fanatic" employing Islamophobic discourses that aroused hysteria of an underground religious activists threatening the stability of the Marxist order. By the late 1990s, the "Wahhabi" label would become the most common term to refer to the alleged "Islamic menace" in state propaganda, while "Sufism" was invoked as a "moderate" force that balanced the "radicalism" of those who were being accused as "Wahhabis". The old-guard of the post-Soviet states found the label useful to depict all opposition as extremists, thereby bolstering their 'strongman' credentials. In short, any Muslim critical of the religious or political status quo, came at risk of being labelled "Wahhabi".[38]

According to M. Reza Pirbhai, Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University, notions of a "Wahhabi conspiracy" against the West have in recent times resurfaced in various sections of the Western media; employing the term as a catch-all phrase to frame an official narrative that erases the concerns of broad and disparate disenchanted groups pursuing redress for local discontentment caused by neo-colonialism. The earliest mention of "Wahhabism" in The New York Times had appeared in a 1931 editorial which described it as a "traditional" movement; without associating it with "militant" or "anti-Western" trends. Between 1931 and 2007, The New York Times published eighty-six articles that mentioned the word "Wahhabism", out of which six articles had appeared before September 2001, while the rest were published since. During the 1990s, it began to be described as "militant", but not yet as a hostile force. By the 2000s, the 19th century terminology of "Wahhabism" had resurfaced, reprising its role as the " 'fanatical' and 'despotic' antithesis of a civilized world. Reza Pirbhai asserts that this use is deployed to manufacture an official narrative that assists imperial purposes by depicting a coherent and coordinated international network of ideological revolutionaries.[39] Common neo-liberal depictions of Wahhabism define it as a collection of restrictive dogmas, particularly for women, while neo-conservative depictions portray "Wahhabis" as "savages" or "fanatics".[40]

In general, the so-called Wahhabis do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including using a person's name to label an Islamic school (madhhab).[12][41][42] Due to its perceived negative overtones, the members of the movement historically identified themselves as "Muwahhidun", Muslims, etc. and more recently as "Salafis".[43] According to Robert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" and preferred to be called Muwahhidun (Unitarians).[44] Another preferred term was simply "Muslims", since they considered their creed to be the "pure Islam".[45] However, critics complain these terms imply that non-Wahhabi Muslims are either not monotheists or not Muslims.[45][46] Additionally, the terms Muwahhidun and Unitarians are associated with other sects, both extant and extinct.[47]

Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and / or prefer include Ahl al-Hadith ("People of the Hadith"), Salafi dawah ("Salafi preaching"), or al-da'wa ila al-tawhid ("preaching of monotheism" for the school rather than the adherents),[48] al-Tariqa al-Muhammadiyya ("the path of the Prophet Muhammad"),[49] al-Tariqa al-Salafiyya ("the way of the pious ancestors"),[49] "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab), etc.[51] Their self-designation "People of the Sunnah" was important for Wahhabism's authenticity, because during the Ottoman period only Sunnism was the legitimate doctrine.[52]

Other writers such as Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term "Salafi", maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use Wahhabi in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology; even then, its use is limited and often appears as Salafi / Wahhabi)".[12] A New York Times journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term Wahhabism, "feeling it sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic faith".[53] Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist here" [in Saudi Arabia] and challenged users of the term to locate any "deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the teachings of the Quran and Prophetic Hadiths".[54][55] Ingrid Mattson argues that "Wahhbism is not a sect: It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid Islam of rigid cultural practices that had [been] acquired over the centuries."[56]

On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd,[57] a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism.[58] Journalist Karen House calls Salafi "a more politically correct term" for Wahhabi.[59] In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors".[44] However, the confusion is further aggravated due to the common practice of various authoritarian governments broadly using the label "Wahhabi extremists" for all opposition, legitimate and illegitimate, to justify massive repressions on any dissident.[60]

(Another movement, whose adherents are also called "Wahhabi" but whom were Ibaadi Kharijites, has caused some confusion in North and sub-Saharan Africa, where the movement's leader – Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Rahman – lived and preached in the Eighth Century C.E. This movement is often mistakenly conflated with the Muwahhidun movement of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab.)[61]


Salafiyya movement is a term derived from "Salaf al-Salih", meaning "pious predecessors of the first three generations"; it refers to a wide range of reform movements within Sunni Islam across the world, that campaigns for the return of "pure" Islam, revival of the prophetic Sunnah, and the practices of the early generations of Islamic scholars.

Many scholars and critics distinguish between Wahhabi and Salafi. According to analyst Christopher M. Blanchard, Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia", while Salafiyya is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic world".[41] However, many view Wahhabism as the Salafism native to Arabia.[62] Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis."[10] Quintan Wiktorowicz asserts modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis.[63]

According to Joas Wagemakers, associate professor of Islamic and Arabic Studies at Utrecht UniversitySalafism consists of broad movements of Muslims across the world who aspire to live according to the precedents of the Salaf al-Salih; whereas "Wahhabism" – a term rejected by its adherents – refers to the specific brand of reformation (islah) campaign that was initiated by the 18th century scholar Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and evolved through his subsequent disciples in the central Arabian region of Najd. Despite their relations with Wahhabi Muslims of Najd; other Salafis have often differed theologically with the Wahhabis and hence do not identify with them. These included significant contentions with Wahhabis over their unduly harsh enforcement of their beliefs, their lack of tolerance towards other Muslims and their deficient commitment to their stated opposition to taqlid and advocacy of ijtihad.[64]

In doctrines of 'Aqida (creed), Wahhabis and Salafis resemble each other; particularly in their focus on Tawhid. However, the Muwahidun movement historically were concerned primarily about Tawhid al-Rububiyya (Oneness of Lordship) and Tawhid al-Uloohiyya (Oneness of Worship) while the Salafiyya movement placed an additional emphasis on Tawhid al-Asma wa Sifat (Oneness of Divine Names and Attributes); with a literal understanding of God's Names and Attributes.[65]

The Wahhabi movement started as a revivalist and reform movement in the Arabian Peninsula during the early 18th century, whose adherents described themselves as "Muwahhidun" (Unitarians).[o] A young Hanbali cleric named Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (1703–1792 C.E/ 1115-1206 A.H), the leader of the Muwahhidun and eponym of the Wahhabi movement, called upon his disciples to denounce certain beliefs and practices associated with cult of saints as idolatrous impurities and innovations in Islam (bid'ah).[67][13] His movement emphasized adherence to the Quran and hadith, and advocated the use of ijtihad.[66] Eventually, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud, offering political obedience and promising that protection and propagation of the Wahhabi movement meant "power and glory" and rule of "lands and men".[69]

18th and 19th century European historians, scholars, travellers and diplomats compared the Wahhabi movement with various Euro-American socio-political movements in the Age of RevolutionsCalvinist scholar John Ludwig Burckhardt, author of the well-received works “Travels in Arabia” (1829) and “Notes on the Bedouins and Wahábys” (1830), described the Muwahhidun as Arabian locals who resisted Turkish hegemony and its “Napoleonic” tactics. Historian Loius Alexander Corancez in his book “Histoire des Wahabis” described the movement as an Asiatic revolution that sought a powerful revival of Arab civilisation by establishing a new order in Arabia and cleansing all the irrational elements and superstitions which had been normalised through Sufi excesses from Turkish and foreign influences. Scottish historian Mark Napier attributed the successes of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s revolution to assistance from “frequent interpositions of Heaven".[70]

After the Unification of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabis were able spread their political power and consolidate their rule over the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf in 1939, Saudi Arabia had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to billions of dollars. This money – spent on books, media, schools, universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for journalists, academics and Islamic scholars – gave Wahhabi ideals a "preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world.[71]

The Wahhabi movement was part of the Islamic revivalist trends of the 18th and 19th centuries; such as the Mahdist movement in 19th century SudanSenussi movement in LibyaFulani movement of Uthman Dan Fodio in NigeriaFaraizi movement of Haji Shariatullah (1784–1840) in Bengal, the South Asian Mujahidin movement of Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi (1786–1831) and the Padri movement (1803–1837) in Indonesia, all of which are considered precursors to the Arab Salafiyya movement of late nineteenth century. These movements sought an Islamic Reformrenewal and socio-moral re-generation of the society through a direct return to the fundamental Islamic sources (Qur'an and Hadith) and responded to the military, economic, social, moral, cultural stagnation stagnations of the Islamic World. The cause of decline was identified as the departure of Muslims from true Islamic values brought about by the infiltration and assimilation of local, indigenous, un-Islamic beliefs and practices. The prescribed cure was the purification of Muslim societies through a return to "true Islam". The key programmes of these revival movements included:

  • Islam is the only solution;
  • A direct return to the Quran and the Sunnah;
  • Implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) is the objective;
  • Those who opposed the reform efforts were enemies of God.
  • Members of the movement, like the early Muslims during the era of the Salaf, were trained in piety and military skills. These movements waged their reformist efforts through preaching and Jihad.[72]

The Wahhabi movement was part of the overall current of various Islamic revivalist trends in the 18th century. It would be influenced by and in turn, influence many other Islamic reform-revivalist movements across the globe. The Ahl-i Hadith movement of Indian subcontinent was a Sunni revivalist movement inspired by the thoughts of Shah Waliullah Dehlawial-Shawkani, and Syed Ahmad Barelvi. They condemned taqlid and advocated for ijtihad based on scriptures.[73] Founded in the mid-19th century in Bhopal, it places great emphasis on hadith studies and condemns imitation to the canonical law schools. They identify with the early school of Ahl al-Hadith. During the late 19th century, Wahhabi scholars would establish contacts with Ahl-i-Hadith and many Wahhabi students would study under the Ahl-i-Hadith ulama, and later become prominent scholars in the Saudi Wahhabi establishment.[74][75]

The Wahhabi and Ahl-i-Hadith movements both oppose Sufi practices such as visiting shrines and seeking aid at the tombs of Islamic saints. Both the movements revived the teachings of the medieval Sunni theologian and jurist, Ibn Taymiyya, whom they both consider a Shaykh al-Islam. Suffering from the instabilities of 19th-century Arabia, many Wahhabi ulama would make their way to India and study under Ahl-i-Hadith patronage.[74][76] After the establishment of Saudi Arabia and the subsequent oil boom, the Saudi Sheikhs would repay their debts by financing the Ahl-i-Hadith movement. The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia Ibn Baz strongly supported the movement, and prominent Ahl-i-Hadith scholars were appointed to teach in Saudi Universities.[77][78]


During the early 19th century, Egyptian Muslim scholar Abd al Rahman al Jabarti had defended the Wahhabi movement. From the 19th century, prominent Arab Salafiyya reformers would maintain correspondence with Wahhabis and defend them against Sufi attacks. These included Shihab al Din al Alusi, Abd al Hamid al Zahrawi, Abd al Qadir al Jabarti, Abd al Hakim al Afghani, Nu'man Khayr al-Din Al-Alusi, Mahmud Shukri Al Alusi and his disciple Muhammad Bahjat Al-AthariJamal al Din al QasimiTahir al Jaza'iriMuhibb al Din al Khatib, Muhammad Hamid al Fiqi and most notably, Muhammad Rasheed Rida who was considered as the "leader of Salafis". All these scholars would correspond with Arabian and Indian Ahl-i-Hadith scholars and champion the reformist thought. They shared a common interest in opposing various Sufi practices, denouncing blind following and reviving correct theology and Hadith sciences. They also opened Zahiriyya library, Salafiyya library, Al Manar Library, etc., propagating Salafi thought as well as promoting scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Hazm. Rashid Rida would succeed in his efforts to rehabilitate Wahhabis in the Islamic World and would attain the friendship of many Najdi scholars. With the support of the Third Saudi State by the 1920s, a concept of "Salafiyya" emerged on a global scale claiming heritage to the thought of 18th-century Islamic reform movements and the pious predecessors (Salaf). Many of Rida's disciples would be assigned to various posts in Saudi Arabia and some of them would remain in Saudi Arabia. Others would spread the Salafi da'wa to their respective countries. Prominent amongst these disciples were the Syrian Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (1894–1976), Egyptian Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi (1892–1959) and the Moroccan Taqi al-Din al-Hilali(1894–1987).[79][80][81][82]

The Syrian-Albanian Islamic scholar Al-Albani (c. 1914–1999), an avid reader of Al-Manar and also student of Muhammad Bahjat al-Bitar (disciple of Rida and Al-Qasimi), was an adherent to the Salafiyya methodology. Encouraged by their call for hadith re-evaluation and revival, he would invest himself in Hadith studies, becoming a renowned Muhaddith. He followed in the footsteps of the ancient Ahl al-Hadith school and took the call of Ahl-i-Hadith. In the 1960s, he would teach in Saudi Arabia making a profound influence therein. By the 1970s, Albani's thoughts would gain popularity and the notion of "Salafi Manhaj" was consolidated.[83]

Original Salafiyya and its intellectual heritage were not hostile to competing Islamic legal traditions. However, critics argue that as Salafis aligned with Saudi promoted neo-Wahhabism, religious concessions for Saudi political patronage distorted the early thrust of the renaissance movement. The early Salafiyya leaders like Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1250–1835), Ibn al-Amir Al-San'ani (d.1225–1810), Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1354–1935), etc. advocated for Ijtihad (independent legal research) of Scriptures to solve the new contemporary demands and problems faced by Muslims living in a modern age through a pragmatic, juristic path faithful to the rich Islamic tradition. However, as other Salafi movements got increasingly sidelined by the Saudi-backed neo-Wahhabi Purists; the legal writings that were made easily accessible to the general public became often rigidly literalist and intolerant of the wider Sunni legal tradition, limited to a selective understanding of the Hanbalite works of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim.[84][85]

The Syrian-Albanian Salafi Muhaddith Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d.1999) publicly challenged the foundational methodologies of the neo-Wahhabite establishment. According to Albani, although Wahhabis doctrinally professed exclusive adherence to the Qur'an, the Hadith, and the Ijma of Salaf al-salih; in practice they almost solely relied on Hanbali jurisprudence for their fatwas—acting therefore as undeclared partisans of a particular madhab. As the most prominent scholar who championed anti-madhab doctrines in the 20th century, Albani held that adherence to a madhab was a bid'ah (religious innovation). Albani went as far as to castigate Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab as a "Salafi in creed, but not in Fiqh". He strongly attacked Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab on several points; claiming that the latter was not a mujtahid in fiqh and accused him of imitating the Hanbali school. Albani's outspoken criticism embarrassed the Saudi clergy, who finally expelled him from the Kingdom in 1963 when he issued a fatwa permitting women to uncover their face, which ran counter to Hanbali jurisprudence and Saudi standards.[86][87][88][89][90]

In addition, Albani would also criticise Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab for his weakness in hadith sciences. He distinguished between Salafism and Wahhabism, criticizing the latter while supporting the former. He had a complex relationship to each movement. Although he praised Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in general terms for his reformist efforts and contributions to the Muslim Ummah, Albani nonetheless censured his later followers for their harshness in Takfir.[91]: 68 : 220 

In spite of this, Albani's efforts at hadith revivalism and his claims of being more faithful to the spirit of Wahhabism than Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab himself; made the former's ideas highly popular amongst Salafi religious students across the World, including Saudi Arabia.[86][90]

In theology, Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (traditionalist) school which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbali legal school.[92][93] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on the zahir (apparent or literal) meaning of the Qur'an and hadith, and opposition to rational argumentation in matters of 'Aqidah (creed) favored by Ash'arite and Maturidite theologies.[94][95] However, Wahhabis diverged in some points of theology from other Athari movements.[96] Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab did not view the issue of God's Attributes and Names as a part of Tawhīd (monotheism), rather he viewed it in the broader context of aqāʾid (theology). While his treatises strongly emphasised Tawhid al-ulūhiyya (monotheism in Worship), Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab did not give prominence to the theology of God's Names and Attributes that was central to Ibn Taymiyya and the Salafi movement.[97] Following this approach, the early Wahhabi scholars had not elucidated the details of Athari theology such as Divine Attributes and other creedal doctrines. Influenced by the scholars of the Salafiyya movement, the later Wahhabis would revive Athari theological polemics beginning from the mid-twentieth century; which lead to charges of anthropomorphism against them by opponents such as Al-Kawthari. By contrast, the creedal treatises of early Wahhabis were mostly restricted to upholding Tawhid and condemning various practices of saint veneration which they considered as shirk (polytheism).[98] They also staunchly opposed Taqlid and advocated for Ijtihad.[99]

Hammad Ibn 'Atiq (d. 1883/ 1301 A.H) was one of the first Wahhabi scholars who seriously concerned himself with the question of God's Names and Attributes; a topic largely neglected by the previous Wahhabi scholars whose primary focus was limited to condemning idolatry and necrolatry. Ibn 'Atiq established correspondence with Athari scholars like Sīddïq Hasān Khán, an influential scholar of the Ahl al-Hadith movement in the Islamic principality of Bhopal. In his letters, Ibn 'Atiq praised Nayl al-Maram, Khan's Salafi commentary on Qur'an, which was published via prints in Cairo. He solicited Khan to accept his son as his disciple and requested Khan to produce and send more commentaries on the various treatises of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim. Khan accepted his request and embarked on a detailed study of the treatises of both the scholars. Hammad's son Sa'd ibn Atiq would study under Khan and various traditionalist theologians in India. Thus, various Wahhabi scholars began making efforts to appropriate Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's legacy into mainstream Sunni Islam by appropriating them to the broader traditionalist scholarship active across the Indian subcontinentIraqSyriaEgyptYemen, etc.[100]

The Hanafite scholar Ibn Abi al-Izz's sharh (explanation) on Al-Tahawi's creedal treatise Al-Aqida al-Tahawiyya proved popular with the later adherents of the Muwahidun movement; who regarded it as a true representation of the work, free from Maturidi influences and as a standard theological reference for the Athari creed. A number of Salafi and Wahhabi scholars have produced super-commentaries and annotations on the sharh, including Abd al-Aziz ibn BazMuhammad Nasiruddin al-AlbaniSaleh Al-Fawzan, etc. and is taught as a standard text at the Islamic University of Madinah.[101]

describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of those Muslims who argued that the "shahada" (i.e., the testimony of faith; "There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") alone made one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but "not an unbeliever."[102]

"Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ... any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother."

In Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al-Tawhid, he states that 'Ibādah (Worship) in Islam consists of conventional acts of devotion such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for the holy month of Ramadan (Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Isti'âna (seeking help), and Istigātha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Directing these deeds beyond Allah – such as through du'a or Istigāthā to the dead – are acts of shirk and in violation of the tenets of Tawhid (monotheism).[103][104] Based on the doctrine of Tawhid espoused in Kitab al-Tawhid, the followers of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab referred themselves by the designation "Al-Muwahhidun" (Unitarians).[105][106]

The essence of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's justification for fighting his opponents in Arabia can be summed up as his belief that the original pagans fought by Prophet Muhammad "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that they performed sacrifices, vows and supplications to other beings. According to Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, someone who perform such things even if their lives are otherwise exemplary; is not a Muslim but an unbeliever. Once such people have received the call to "true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and treasure are forfeit.[107][108] Clarifying his stance on Takfir, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab states:

"As for takfir, I only make takfir of whoever knows the religion of the Messenger and thereafter insults it, forbids people from it, and manifests enmity towards whoever practices it. This is who I make takfir of. And most of the ummah, and all praise is for God, is not like this... We do not make takfeer except on those matters which all of the ūlemá have reached a consensus on."[109]

The disagreement between Wahhabis and their opponents over the definition of worship (Ibadah) and monotheism (Tawhid) has remained much the same since 1740, according to David Commins: "One of the peculiar features of the debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries is its apparently static nature... the main points in the debate [have] stay[ed] the same [since 1740]."[102] According to another source, Wahhabi jurists were unique for their literal interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah which tended to re-inforce local practices of the region of Najd.[110] Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab included the need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to "ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.[111][112]


The Wahhabi scholars upheld the right of qualified scholars to perform Ijtihad on legal questions and condemned Taqleed of Mujtahids. This stance pitted them against the Ottoman Sufi ulema who shunned Ijtihad and obligated Taqleed. The Arab Salafiyya reformers of 19th and 20th centuries would defend the Wahhabis on the Ijtihad issue as well as join forces with Wahhabis to condemn various Sufi practices and orders (tariqats) which they considered to be reprehensible Bid'ah (innovations). Prominent amongst those Salafiyya ulema who backed Wahhabism included Khayr al-Din al-Alusi, Tahir al-Jaza'iriMuhammad Rashid RidaJamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Mahmud Shukri Al-Alusi, etc.[113]

Condemning the doctrine of blind-following (Taqlid) prevalent amongst the masses and obliging them to directly engage with the Scriptures; Sulāyman ibn Ābd-Allah Aal-Shaykh ( 1785–1818 C.E / 1199–1233 A.H) wrote:

"... what the believer must do, if the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of His Messenger (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) have reached him and he understands them with regard to any matter, is to act in accordance with them, no matter who he may be disagreeing with. This is what our Lord and our Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) have enjoined upon us, and all the scholars are unanimously agreed on that, apart from the ignorant blind followers and the hard-hearted. Such people are not scholars."[114]

The Wahhabis furthermore rejected the idea of closure of Ijtihad as an innovated principle. Although they professed adherence to Hanbali school, they refrained from taking its precepts as final. Since the issue of Ijtihad and Taqlid was amongst their principal concerns, Wahhabis developed a set of juristic procedures to solve legal questions. These included referencing Qur'an and Hadith as the primary sources of legislation. In case the solution was not accessible from the Scriptures, the principle of 'Ijma (consensus) was employed. Ijma was restricted to Ahl al-Sunnah and consisted of consensus of Companions of the ProphetSalaf as-Salih and the consensus of scholars. If any Hanbali interpretations were proven wrong through these principles, they must be abandoned. Defending their pro-Ijtihad stance, Wahhabis quoted Qur'anic verses which implied that only Qur'an and Hadith constituted the bases of sharia (Islamic law).[115][116] Prominent Wahhabi Qadi of the Second Saudi State, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan Aal-Al Shaykh (1196–1285 A.H / 1782–1868 C.E) strongly condemned the practice of Taqlid as a form of shirk (polytheism) in his treatises, writing:

".. One who asks for a religious verdict concerning an issue, he should examine the sayings and opinions of the Imams and scholars and take only what complies with Allah's Rulings and the teachings of His Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Allah, the Almighty says, {O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger.. and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to Allah and His Messenger...}. (Surah An-Nisa': 59) Thus, it is forbidden to prefer the opinion of any of Allah's creatures over the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him) and this is because to do so is an act of Shirk (polytheism); since it constitutes obedience to other than Allah (Glorified be He)."[117]

The Wahhabis also advocated a principle in Islamic legal theory often referred to as "the rule against Ijtihad reversal". This principle allows overturning a scholar's fatwa (legal judgement) when he bases it on personal Ijtihad (personal legal reasoning), rather than a clear textual source from Qur'an and Hadith. In effect, this allowed the Wahhabi qadis to remain autonomous. Opponents of Wahhabi movement harshly rebuked them for advocating Ijtihad and not recognising the finality of mad'habs (law schools).[118]

As a religious revivalist movement that works to bring Muslims back from what it considers as foreign accretions that have corrupted Islam,[119] and believes that Islam is a complete way of life which has prescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what it considers Islamic behavior. The Muwahhidun movement has been described by The Economist as the "strictest form of Sunni Islam".[120] On the other hand, religious critics assert that Wahhabism is not strict, castigating it as a distorted version of Islam that deviates from traditional Shari'a law, and argue that their practices are neither typical nor mired in the roots of Islam.[121][122] Unlike other schools of Sunnism, Wahhabis admonishes to ground Islamic principles solely on the Qur'an and Hadith,[123] rejecting much material derived within Islamic culture.

This does not mean, however, that all adherents agree on what is required or forbidden, or that rules have not varied by area or changed over time. In Saudi Arabia, the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi doctrines were visible as late as the 1990s; such as the conformity in dress, public deportment, public prayers.[124] Its presence was visible by the wide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics in mosques, teachers in schools, and Qadis (i.e. judges who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.[125]

Wahhabism is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not found elsewhere".[126] According to the American journalist Lawrence Wright, due to Wahhabi emphasis on the "purification of Islam"; the teaching becomes very repressive to the followers.[127]

While other Muslims might urge salat prayer, modest dress, and abstention from alcohol, for Wahhabis, prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men." Not only is modest dress prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by women (a black abaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified. Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco".[57]

Following the preaching and practice of ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following of sharia (Islamic law), an official committee was empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police")[126][128] in Saudi Arabia – the one country founded with the help of Wahhabi warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominated many aspects of the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and other social restrictions.[129]

A large number of practices was reported to be forbidden by Saudi Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have been forbidden as Bid'a (innovation) or shirk (polytheism) and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include performing or listening to music; dancing; fortune tellingamulets; non-religious television programs; smoking; playing backgammonchess, or cards; drawing human or animal figures; acting in a play or writing fiction; dissecting cadavers, even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of medical research; recorded music played over telephones on hold; or the sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital.[130][131][132][133][134][135] Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet),[136] the use of ornamentation on or in mosques, all of which is considered orthodoxy in the rest of the Islamic world.[137] Until 2018, driving of motor vehicles by women was allowed in every country except the Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia.[138] Certain forms of Dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is sometimes discouraged by Wahhabis.[139]

Wahhabism also emphasizes "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" or Islamic culture and the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,[140][141] on the grounds that the Sunnah forbids imitating non-Muslims.[142] Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by Wahhabi preachers as un-Islamic, include celebrating foreign days (such as Valentine's Day[143] or Mothers Day[140][142]) giving of flowers,[144] standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs.[134] Some Wahhabi activists have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.[53]

Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin. Juhayman al Utaybi declared football forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim, foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the foreign non-Muslim language used in matches.[145][146] In response, the Saudi Grand Mufti rebuked such fatwas and called on the religious police to prosecute its author.[147]

According to senior Saudi scholars, Islam forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without their husband's permission – permission which may be revoked at any time – on the grounds that the different physiological structures and biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a distinctive role to play in the family.[148] Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished with flogging,[149] although sex out of wedlock was permissible with a female slave until the practice of Islamic slavery was banned in 1962 (Prince Bandar bin Sultan was the product of "a brief encounter" between his father Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz – the Saudi defense minister for many years – and "his slave, a black servingwoman").[150][151]

Despite this strictness, throughout these years senior Saudi scholars in the kingdom made exceptions in ruling on what is haram (forbidden). Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Until 2018, movie theaters and driving by women were forbidden, except at the ARAMCO compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at KAUST were also in effect at ARAMCO.[152]

More general rules of permissiveness changed over time. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded his state into urban areas, especially the Hejaz.[153] After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in 1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965).[151] Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios.[153] Minarets for mosques and use of funeral markers, which were once forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance, which was once enforced by flogging, is no longer.[154]


Wahhabiya see Wahhabi
Wahabi see Wahhabi


Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al- (Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab) (Abdul Wahhab) (b. 1703, ʿUyaynah, Arabia [now in Saudi Arabia] - d. 1792, Ad-Dirʿīyah).  Born near Riyadh (in Uyayna) of a branch of the Tamim tribe and received a sound Islamic education.  He studied in Medina with teachers of the Hanbali school, as defined by Ibn Taymiyya.  He traveled widely in search of learning and became expert in Sufi doctrine as well as in the more orthodox Islamic sciences.  He lived 4 years in Basra, 5 years in Baghdad, 1 year in Kurdish areas, 2 years in Hamadhan, and 1 year in Esfahan around the mid-1730s.  Here he studied philosophy and Sufism before continuing to Qom.   After Qom, ‘Abd al-Wahhab returned to Uyayna, and started to preach his message.    

Gradually his leanings became thoroughly Hanbalite. ‘Abd al-Wahhab wrote the Book of Unity (Kitab al-Tawhid).  This book met with more opposition than interest, and after some time there, he was forced to flee to the medium sized town of Dar‘iya, whose chieftain Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud, gave him protection. Though he was often at the center of controversy, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s uncompromisingly strict religious views were accepted by the tribal chief Muhammad ibn Sa‘ud of nearby Dar‘iya.  According to sources that were very close to the court of Ibn Sa‘ud, the two made an arrangement, where ‘Abd al-Wahhab would be religious leader, leaving the secular power in the hands of Ibn Sa‘ud.  Thus, religious authority was assumed by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, political and military power by Ibn Sa‘ud.  This venture determined the future of the movement, which has continued to the present day as a powerful religio-political combination in Arabia, where the Sa‘udi dynasty and Wahhabi fundamentalism dominate absolutely.

In 1765, Ibn Sa‘ud died, but his successor, Abdul Aziz, also chose ‘Abd al-Wahhab as a religious guide.  In 1766, the doctrines of ‘Abd al-Wahhab won recognition among the scholars of Mecca.

As the area under the power of Abdul Aziz increased, the number of doctrines from ‘Abd al-Wahhab also increased.  

‘Abd al-Wahhab died a natural death at the age of 89.

Having completed his formal education in the holy city of Medina, in Arabia, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb lived abroad for many years. He taught for four years in Basra, Iraq, and in Baghdad he married an affluent woman whose property he inherited when she died. In 1736, in Iran, he began to teach against what he considered to be the extreme ideas of various exponents of Sufi doctrines. On returning to his native city, he wrote the Kitāb at-tawḥīd (“Book of Unity”), which is the main text for Wahhābī doctrines. His followers call themselves al-Muwaḥḥidūn, or “Unitarians”.  The term Wahhābī is generally used by non-Muslims and opponents.

ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s teachings have been characterized as puritanical and traditional, representing the early era of the Islamic religion. He made a clear stand against all innovations (bidʿah) in Islamic faith because he believed them to be reprehensible, insisting that the original grandeur of Islam could be regained if the Islamic community would return to the principles enunciated by the Prophet Muhammad. Wahhābī doctrines, therefore, do not allow for an intermediary between the faithful and Allah and condemn any such practice as polytheism. The decoration of mosques, the cult of saints, and even the smoking of tobacco were condemned.

When the preaching of these doctrines led to controversy, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was expelled from ʿUyaynah in 1744. He then settled in Ad-Dirʿīyah, capital of Ibn Saʿūd, a ruler of the Najd (now in Saudi Arabia).

The spread of Wahhābīsm originated from the alliance that was formed between ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Ibn Saʿūd, who, by initiating a campaign of conquest that was continued by his heirs, made Wahhābīsm the dominant force in Arabia since 1800.



Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab see Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-
Abdul Wahhab see Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab, Abdul see Wahhab, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-


Wahid, Abdurrahman
Wahid, Abdurrahman (Abdurrahman Wahid) (Abdurrahman Addakhil) (Gus Dur) (b. September 7, 1940, Denanyar, East Java, Dutch East Indies [now Indonesia] - d. December 30, 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia).  Member of the National Awakening Party (PKB) who was elected president of Indonesia on October 20, 1999, by an electoral assembly that voters had chosen in June.  The election marked the end of political dominance by the Golkar Party, which supported the dictatorship of former President Suharto for 32 years.  In May 1998, Suharto had resigned and installed B. J. Habibie as president.

Wahid offered the vice presidency to rival presidential candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle.  Wahid’s health appeared frail in 1999 after allegedly suffering two strokes and many observers speculated that he might not complete his five-year term.  Wahid’s government faced formidable challenges, including a severe recession and conflicts between pro-independence groups and pro-Indonesia militias in the province of East Timor.

Indonesians call Wahid “Gus Dur,” combining a Muslim title of respect with an abbreviation of his first name.  Wahid was born in the Indonesian province of East Java.  He studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, and earned a degree in 1970 from the University of Baghdad in Iraq.  As the leader of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama Muslims, Wahid advocated an inclusive, tolerant form of Islam.   

Wahid’s grandfathers were among the founders of the world’s largest Islamic organization, the 25-million-member Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Wahid studied the Qurʾān intensively at an East Javan pesantren (religious boarding school) founded by his paternal grandfather, Hasyim Asyʾari, and at institutes in Jakarta when his father was Indonesia’s first cabinet minister for religion. In 1965 Wahid earned a scholarship to study at the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo, but he bristled against the traditionalism of its faculty, and, instead of studying more scripture, he devoured New Wave movies, read French and English books, and studied Marxism. Leaving without taking a degree, he moved to Baghdad, where he soon began attracting attention with his religious writings.

After returning to Indonesia in the late 1960s, Wahid became a scholar. He was elevated to the post of general chairman of the NU in 1984. The organization then severed its ties to a Muslim-based political party and concentrated on social work and education. The managers of 6,500 pesantren nationwide—the backbone of the NU’s support—opposed any anti-government moves. Wahid was nonetheless widely perceived to present a threat to political authority for his promotion of a vision for the NU that would, in his words, “move toward the transformation of society, socially and culturally.”

As NU chief, Wahid was one of the most respected figures in Indonesian Islam and the most politically active. He headed the political discussion group Forum Demokrasi, which welcomed dissidents and human rights advocates. Wahid spoke frankly on national issues to ministers, diplomats, journalists, and others who consulted him. Deviating from the positions held by the leaders of many Muslim countries, he suggested normalizing ties with Israel and contended that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not religious. Many admired his defense of Indonesia’s Christian minority. Even the powerful military was keen to maintain good ties to a perceived bulwark against radical Islam. Honored in 1993 with the Magsaysay Award, Wahid was elected the following year to lead the World Council for Religion and Peace.

In 1990 Wahid declined to join the new Association of Muslim Intellectuals, accusing its chairman, B.J. Habibie, protégé of President Suharto and the country’s research and technology minister, of using Islam to gain power. Critics and even relatives conceded, however, that Wahid could not separate his own political stance from NU’s needs. In 1994 Suharto loyalists within the NU tried in vain to end Wahid’s chairmanship. In the wake of the Asian economic crisis (1997–98) that forced the resignations of Suharto and his successor Habibie, Wahid was elected president in 1999. He was the first candidate to win the presidency through a vote by the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat; MPR), as opposed to the earlier, consensus-seeking process. Economic and political instability, coupled with a corruption crisis in which Wahid himself was implicated, led to his impeachment and removal from office in 2001. After leaving office, Wahid encouraged interfaith dialogue for the promotion of world peace.



Abdurrahman Wahid see Wahid, Abdurrahman
Gus Dur see Wahid, Abdurrahman
Abdurrahman Addakhil see Wahid, Abdurrahman


wali
wali (waliy).  Term which means “protector,” “benefactor,” “companion,” or “governor.”  A wali is a friend of God -- a saint or a Sufi whose tomb is visited for its blessing.  A wali is also a legal guardian of a minor, woman, or incapacitated person.

For the Arabs, the word wali is synonymous with “saint.”  The companion word wilayat means “sainthood.”  How the terms wali and wilayat first came to be applied to Sufis is not known, but from an early date it was explained that the Qur’anic verse: “{God} loves them and they love {God}” {see Sura 5:59} meant that God is their friend, and they are God’s friends.  The Qur’an also contains repeated reference to “the friends of God” -- the awliya’ Allahi.

Saints are thought to constitute an invisible hierarchy, with a discrete cosmological ranking.  In all there are perhaps forty thousand “friends of God,” including three hundred chosen (akhyar), forty deputies (abdal), seven pious (abrar), four pillars (awtad), three substitutes (nuqaba’), and one pole or nourisher (qutb, ghawth).  The numbers in some categories vary, but the importance of this cosmological scheme for Sufi devotion cannot be overstated.  The qutb saint, in particular, is posited as the axis around which the entire universe revolves.  He is “the perfect man” (al-insan al-kamil), for the sake of whose perfection all the elements of nature, and even all other humans, have been brought into existence.  Muhammad was the perfect man in his time, but since the world would cease to function without a qutb saint, others have come after Muhammad, though they lacked his prophetic mandate.

Sainthood and prophethood, therefore, overlapped as authoritative categories for mystically minded Muslims.  The differentiation was as essential as it was problematic.  On the one hand, the qutb saint was differentiated from the hidden imam of the Shi‘ites (though they shared a common theological mold as salvific mediators); at the same time, he was distinguished from the Prophet Muhammad -- usually on a temporal basis, implying that the qutb was doing the work of the Prophet in his generation.  For some Sufi theorists, moreover, the distance of sainthood from prophethood was as slight as a single vowel: walayat meaning “lordship” was reserved for prophets, while wilayat or “friendship” was reserved for saints.

Wilayat also had a practical connotation. It defined the geographical area within which a particular saint was recognized as the preeminent spiritual leader for his generation.  In populous urban centers or remote regions of Asia where more than one Sufi order had been introduced, conflicting wilayat claims were inevitable, but they were less frequent and less intense than might be expected.  The Wahhabiya movement has been uncompromisingly opposed to the veneration of saints and has destroyed many shrines where the saints were venerated.

Walī (Arabic, plural Awliyā') is an Arabic word meaning "friend", "client", "kinsman", "patron".  It generally denotes "friend of God" in the phrase walīyu 'llāh. In English, wali most often means a Muslim saint or holy person. It should not be confused with the word Wāli which is an administrative title that was used in the Muslim Caliphate, and still today in some Muslim countries, such as the Wali of Swat.

waliy see wali


Walid I
Walid I (al-Walid I ibn ‘Abd al-Malik) (Al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik) (Al-Walid I) (Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Walīd ibn ʿAbd al-Malīk ibn Marwān) (668 - 715, Damascus [now in Syria]).  Umayyad caliph (r.705-715).  He was the great builder of the Umayyad dynasty.  In 706, he began the reconstruction of the basilica of St. John the Baptist at Damascus into a magnificent mosque.  He also built the Great Mosques at Mecca and Medina.  Other striking features of his reign were the arabization of the administration and the progress of conquests.   During his reign, the Arab empire attained its greatest extent from Transoxiana to Spain.

Al-Walīd, the eldest son of the caliph ʿAbd al-Malīk ibn Marwān, was fervently orthodox in his religious views. He had a great interest in architecture. As caliph, he confiscated the Christian Basilica of St. John the Baptist in Damascus and had the Great Mosque (Umayyad Mosque) erected on the site. He also had mosques built at Medina and Jerusalem. During al-Walīd’s reign, areas in Central Asia, in coastal northern Africa, and in Spain were conquered and brought under the influence of Islam. Although al-Walīd did not actively direct this expansion, he did give support to capable subordinate officers and officials, allowing them great autonomy in the conduct of their affairs.

al-Walid I ibn ‘Abd al-Malik see Walid I
Al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik see Walid I
Al-Walid I see Walid I
Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Walīd ibn ʿAbd al-Malīk ibn Marwān see Walid I


Walid II
Walid II (al-Walid II ibn Yazid II) (Walid ibn Yazid) (d. April 16, 744). Umayyad caliph (r.743-744).  He was remarkably cultivated, but also a libertine.  In 743, he sold Khalid al-Qasri, the former governor of Iraq, to the latter’s mortal enemy Yusuf ibn ‘Umar al-Thaqafi, which raised the Yemenis in Syria against him.  Before being caliph, he had built the hunting lodge Qusayr ‘Amra, and as a caliph he began with the construction of al-Mushatta.

Al-Walid succeeded to the throne on the death of his uncle, Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik, on February 6, 743. As al-Walid grew older, Hisham became more displeased with him and even urged him to step aside in favor of Hisham's son. Hisham spoke to al-Walid about his drinking and living a dissolute life. The caliph commanded al-Walid to send away his best drinking companion. He also cut off funds to the heir and strongly encouraged him to be more respectful in matters religious.

As heir, al-Walid was known for his open handedness. When he became caliph, he took special care of the crippled and blind. He increased the stipend. He named his two sons, al-Hakam and Uthman, to succeed him in that order. There's an eloquent letter on this theme dated May 21, 743 in at Tabari. At Tabari also quotes a number of al-Walid's poems.

Al-Walid at first confirmed Nasr ibn Sayyar as governor of Khurasan. However, bribed by Yusuf ibn Umar, the caliph dismissed Nasr. Al-Walid also appointed his uncle Yusuf ibn Muhammad governor of Medina. Yahya ibn Zayd was found in Khurasan. Nasr urged him to present himself to the caliph, bearing in mind the essential nature of Islamic unity. However, Yahya chose another path and after initial victory was slain.

Al-Walid put Sulayman ibn Hisham in prison. Such a deed, as well as his reputed drinking, singing and immorality aroused considerable opposition. Al-Walid was fond of versifying and he arranged horse races. The upright Yazid ibn al-Walid spoke against the new ruler's moral laxity. A group began plotting his assassination. When approached, Khalid ibn Abdallah declined to join in and even cautioned al-Walid. However, his vague warning aroused the ire of al-Walid who imprisoned Khalid and then gave him to Yusuf ibn Umar for an offer of fifty million dirhams. Yusuf tortured and killed Khalid. This intensely angered many of al-Walid's own relatives.

Hearing of the plot, Marwan ibn Muhammad wrote from Armenia urging a more prudent course of action, one more promising for the stability of the state and the preservation of the Umayyad house. This was disregarded and many armed men moved into Damascus. The caliph was besieged in a castle outside the city. He fought well, but on April 16, 744, at Al-Aghdaf [now in modern Jordan], he was defeated and killed by the forces of Sulayman ibn Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik. He was succeeded by his cousin Yazid III.

Walid II ibn Yazid II, al- see Walid II
Walid ibn Yazid see Walid II


Walide Sultan
Walide Sultan (Valide Sultana).  Title borne, in the Ottoman Empire, by the mother of the reigning sultan and only for the duration of her son’s reign.  
Valide Sultana see Walide Sultan


Walid ibn al-Mughira ibn ‘Abd Allah, al-
Walid ibn al-Mughira ibn ‘Abd Allah, al- (d. 622).  Opponent of the Prophet.  He was the head of the numerous and prosperous Banu Makhzum at Mecca.

Wali Songo

The history of arrival and spread of Islam in Indonesia is unclear. One theory states it arrived directly from Arabia before the 9th century, while another credits Sufi merchants and preachers for bringing Islam to Indonesian islands in the 12th or 13th century either from Gujarat in India or directly from the Middle East.  Before the arrival of Islam, the predominant religions in Indonesia were Hinduism and Buddhism. 


Initially, the spread of Islam was slow and gradual. Though historical documents are incomplete, the limited evidence suggests that the spread of Islam accelerated in the 15th century, as the military power of Melaka Sultanate in Malay Peninsular today Malaysia and other Islamic Sultanates dominated the region aided by episodes of Muslim coup such as in 1446, wars and superior control of maritime trading and ultimate markets.  During 1511, Tome Pires found animists and Muslims in the north coast of Java. Some rulers were Islamized Muslims, others followed the old Hindu and Buddhism.


By the reign of Sultan Agung of Mataram, most of the older Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Indonesia, had at least nominally converted to Islam. The last one to do so was Makassar in 1605. After the fall of the Majapahit empire, Bali became the refuge for the Hindu upper class, Brahmins and their followers that fled from Java, thus transferring the Hindu culture of Java to Bali.  Hinduism and Buddhism remained extant in some areas of East Java where it syncretized with animism. Their traditions also continued in East and Central Java where they earlier held a sway. Animism was also practiced in remote areas of other islands of Indonesia.


The spread of Islam in eastern islands of Indonesia is recorded in 1605 when three Islamic pious men collectively known as Dato' Tallu came to Makasar, namely Dato'ri Bandang (Abdul Makmur or Khatib Tunggal), Dato'ri Pattimang (Sulaiman Ali or Khatib Sulung) and Dato'ri Tiro (Abdul Jawad or Khatib Bungsu). According to Christian Pelras (1985), Dato' Tallu converted the Kings of Gowa and Tallo to Islam and changed their name to Sultan Muhammad.


The spread of Islam was initially driven by increasing trade links outside of the archipelago. Traders and the royalty of major kingdoms were usually the first to convert to Islam. Dominant kingdoms included Mataram in Central Java, and the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore in the Maluku Islands to the east. By the end of the 13th century, Islam had been established in North Sumatra; by the 14th in northeast Malaya, Brunei, the southern Philippines northeast and among some courtiers of East Java; and the 15th in Malacca and other areas of the Malay Peninsula. Although it is known that the spread of Islam began in the west of the archipelago, the fragmentary evidence does not suggest a rolling wave of conversion through adjacent areas; rather, it suggests the process was complicated and slow.


Despite being one of the most significant developments in Indonesian history, historical evidence is fragmentary and generally uninformative such that understandings of the coming of Islam to Indonesia are limited. There is considerable debate amongst scholars about what conclusions can be drawn about the conversion of Indonesian peoples. The primary evidence, at least of the earlier stages of the process, are gravestones and a few travellers' accounts, but these can only show that indigenous Muslims were in a certain place at a certain time. This evidence cannot explain more complicated matters such as how lifestyles were affected by the new religion or how deeply it affected societies. It should not be assumed, for example, that because a ruler was known to be a Muslim, that the process of Islamization of that area was complete. Instead, what is known is that the Islamization process was, and remains to this day, continuous in Indonesia. Nevertheless, a clear turning point occurred when the Hindu empire Majapahit in Java fell to the Islamized Demak Sultanate. In 1527, the Muslim ruler renamed newly conquered Sunda Kelapa as Jayakarta (meaning "precious victory") which was eventually shortened to Jakarta.  Islamization increased rapidly in the wake of this conquest, spurred on by the spiritual influences of the revered Sufi saints Wali Songo (or Nine Saints).


Malik Ibrahim (b. before 1350, Kashan, Persia - d. April 7, 1419, Gapurosukolilo, Gresik), also known as Sunan Gresik or Kakek Bantal, was the first of the Wali Songo, the nine men generally thought to have introduced Islam to Java (Indonesia).


Ibrahim's origin is unclear, although it is generally agreed that he originated from outside of Java. He is thought to have been born in the first half of the 14th century. Ibrahim is known by several names in the Babad Tanah Jawi and other texts. In the texts, Ibrahim is identified as Makhdum Ibrahim as-Samarqandy (localised to Syekh Ibrahim Asmarakandi). This indicates a possible origin from Samarkand in modern-day Uzbekistan. 


Malik Ibrahim was born in Kashan, Persia (modern day Iran).  Malik Ibrahim belonged to a Sayyid and highly educated family in Kashan.  His great grandfather migrated from Samarkand to Kashan. Ibrahim came to Java with his father, Syekh Jumadil Qubro or Kubro, and his brother Maulana Ishaq, from Persia. They were descendants of Muhammad through Hussein ibn Ali. According to this version, Qubro stayed in Java while his sons went abroad for dakwah. Ibrahim went to Champa (in modern-day Vietnam), while his brother went to Pasai in northern Sumatra. During his 13 years in Champa, Ibrahim provided healthcare and taught farmers more efficient ways to grow crops. He also married one of the king's daughters, whose name has been Indonesianised as Dewi Candrawulan, and had two sons. When he felt that he had converted enough people in Champa to Islam, Ibrahim returned to Java without his family.


Ibrahim landed at Sembalo, Learn, Manyar (9 kilometres (5.6 mi) north of modern-day Gresik) in the late 14th century, where he became acquainted with the local people. He began trading out of the harbor, dealing equally with people from different castes - different social classes based on the dominant Hindu religion. By doing so, Ibrahim found popular support from the lower castes, which led to numerous conversions. He also continued his work from Champa, teaching the locals ways to improve harvests and treating the ill.


Through his trading, Ibrahim also became acquainted with the ruling class and nobles. After journeying to Trowulan to meet the king of Majapahit, he was granted a landing on the outskirts of Gresik which was used for preaching. Ibrahim also founded an Islamic boarding school there. 


A legend associated with Ibrahim is that one day, while travelling, he came across a young woman about to be sacrificed to the gods in order to end a long-standing drought. After stopping a group of men from stabbing the woman, Ibrahim prayed for rain.  When his prayers were answered, the group he had faced converted to Islam.


Ibrahim died on 12 Rabi' al-Awwal, 822 AH (April 7, 1419 CC). He was buried in Gapura village, Gresik, East Java. 


Before the 19th century, Ibrahim was not considered one of the Wali Songo, the saints who spread Islam to Java. After his grave was rediscovered in the early 19th century, he was included in the core group. He was first listed as a Wali Songo in Babad Dipanegara. Today his grave, which is without a headstone, is a common destination for pilgrims, who read the Qu'ran and the life of Muhammad; they also partake in a dish unique to the area, harisah rice porridge. In 2005 over 1.5 million pilgrims went to the grave, for which there is an entry fee. Most come on the anniversary of his death, based on the Islamic calendar. 


Near Ibrahim's grave is a stone marker bearing an inscription in Arabic, translated below:

This is the grave of a man who is sure to be forgiven by Allah and be granted happiness by The All-Gracious, the teacher of princes and adviser to sultans and viziers, friend of the poor and destitute. The great religious teacher: Malik Ibrahim, renowned for his goodness. May Allah grant His pleasure and grace, and bring him to heaven. He died on Senin, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal, 822 Hijri.

Both of Ibrahim's sons went on to spread Islam to Java after they became adults. The eldest, Ali Rahmatullah, is better known as Sunan Ampel and is a member of the Wali Songo himself. The youngest was named Ali Murthada.  Ibrahim's work in eastern Java was continued by Raden Paku (later known as Susuhunan Giri) in Giri (now part of the Jepara Regency of Central Java)  and Raden Rahmat, who founded an Islamic school in Ngampel, near Surabaya. 

Every year, the Gresik city government holds a festival to celebrate Ibrahim's birth. Known as Gebyar Maulid, the festival also serves to promote local culture.


The Wali Songo (also transcribed as Wali Sanga) are revered saints of Islam in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java, because of their historic role in the spread of Islam in Indonesia. The word wali is Arabic for "trusted one" ("guardian" in other contexts in Indonesia) or "friend of God" ("saint" in this context), while the word sanga is Javanese for group of monks or the number nine. Thus, the term is often translated as "Sangha of saints".


Although referred to as a group, there is good evidence that fewer than nine were alive at any given time. Also, there are sources that use the term "Wali Sanga" to refer to saintly mystic(s) other than the most well-known nine individuals.


Each man is often attributed the title sunan in Javanese, which may derive from suhun, in this context meaning "honored".


Most of the wali were also called raden during their lifetimes, because they were members of royal houses. 


The graves of the Wali Sanga are venerated as locations of ziarah (ziyarat) or local pilgrimage in Java. The graves are also known as pundhen in Javanese.


The earliest Wali Sanga was Malik Ibrahim. He is thought to have been in the first half of the 14th century.  Malik Ibrahim was of Sayyid lineage and came from a highly educated family in Kashan. His great-grandfather migrated from Samarqand, and that is why his family is also known as Samarqandi.  They were originally a converted Central Asian Muslim pir from Samarkand. With centuries of Turkish, Mongol and Ottoman rule over Middle East, many of them started claiming Sayyid ancestry to legitimize their rule over the population. 


Syekh Jumadil Kubra, to whom all the saints of Java appear to be related, is a name that appears to almost certainly be a corruption of Najmuddin al-Kubra.  The name Syekh Jumadil Kubra has attached itself to various legendary and mythical personalities,.  These personalities have a common connection in that they are the ancestors or preceptors of the founders of Islam in Java - an oblique acknowledgement, perhaps, of the prestige of the Qubrowi in the period of Islamization.


The sufis themselves traced their ancestors to erstwhile Hindu and Buddhist Javanese kings. Tracing the lineage earlier than Malik Ibrahim is problematic, but most scholars agree that Kubra's lineages are of Chinese descent and not Arab. Although Kubra's silsila -- his spiritual genealogy -- is listed in various Javanese royal chronicles (such as Sejarah Banten) to denote ancestral lineage from erstwhile Hindu Kings, the term in Sufism refers to a lineage of teachers. 


Although popular belief sometimes refers to the wali sanga as "founders" of Islam on Java, the religion was present by the time the Chinese Muslim admiral Zheng He arrived during his first voyage (1405-1407 CC).


Many of the earliest Wali Sanga had Chinese ancestry both paternally and maternally. For example, Sunan Ampel (Chinese name Bong Swi Ho), Sunan Bonang (Ampel's son, Bong Ang), and Sunan Kalijaga (Gan Si Cang).


Dewi Candrawulan, a Muslim Princess from Champa, was the mother of Raden Rahmat (Prince Rahmat), who was later known by the name of Sunan Ampel. Sunan Ampel was the son of Maulana Malik Ibrahim, and the ancestor or teacher of some of the other Wali Sanga.


The composition of the nine saints varies, depending on different sources. The following list is widely accepted, but its authenticity relies much on repeated citations of a handful of early sources, reinforced as "facts" in school textbooks and other modern accounts. This list differs somewhat from the names suggested in the Babad Tanah Jawi manuscripts.


One theory about the variation of composition is that there was a loose council of nine religious leaders, and that as older members retired or died, new members were brought into this council.  However, it should be borne in mind that the term "wali sanga" was created retroactively by historians, and so there was no official "group of nine" that had membership. Further, the differences in chronology of the wali suggest that there might never have been a time when nine of them were alive contemporaneously.

At first, it was not easy for Islam to enter and thrive in the archipelago. Even in the historical record, in a span of about 800 years, Islam had not been able to establish a substantial presence. Notes from the time of the Tang Dynasty of China indicated that merchants from the Middle East had come to the kingdom of Shih-li-fo-shi (Srivijaya) in Sumatra, and Holing (Kalinga) in Java in the year 674 CC, i.e., in the transitional period of Caliph Ali to Muawiyah.  In the 10th century, a group of Persians called the Lor came to Java. They lived in an area in Ngudung (Kudus), also known as Loram (from the word "Lor" which means North). They also formed other communities in other areas, such as in Gresik. The existence of the gravestone of Fatimah binti Maimun bin Hibatallah in Gresi, dated to the 10th century CC, is considered evidence of the incoming migration of the Persian tribes.


In his notes, Marco Polo relates that when returning from China to Italy in 1292 CC, he did not travel via the Silk Road, but instead traveled by sea towards the Persian Gulf. He stopped in Perlak, a port city in Aceh, southern Malacca.  According to Polo, in Perlak there were three groups, namely (1) ethnic Chinese, who were all Muslims; (2) Westerners (Persians), also entirely Muslim; and (3) indigenous people in the hinterland, who worshipped trees, rocks, and spirits. In his testimony, Polo said, regarding the "Kingdom of Ferlec (Perlak)"  - "This kingdom, you must know, is so much frequented by the Saracen merchants that they have converted the natives to the Law of Mohammet — I mean the townspeople only, for the Java hill-people live for all the world like beasts, and eat human flesh, as well as all other kinds of flesh, clean or unclean. And they worship this, that, and the other thing; for in fact the first thing that they see on rising in the morning, that they do worship for the rest of the day.

One hundred years after Polo, the Chinese Muslim Admiral Zheng He came to Java in 1405 CC. When he stopped in Tuban, he noted that there were 1,000 Chinese religious Muslim families there. In Gresik, he also found there were 1,000 Chinese Muslim families, with the same amount reported in Surabaya. On Zheng He's seventh (last) visit to Java in 1433 CC, he invited his scribe named Ma Huan.  According to Ma Huan, the Chinese and the Arab population of the cities on the northern beaches of Java were all Muslim, while the indigenous population were mostly non-Muslim as they were worshipping the trees, rocks, and spirits.


Early in the 15th century CC, Ali Murtadho and Ali Rahmat, sons of Malik Ibrahim (also known as Sheikh Ibrahim Samarqandi), relocated from the Kingdom of Champa (Southern Vietnam) to Java, and settled in the Tuban area, precisely in the Gesikharjo Village at Palang District. Malik Ibrahim was buried there in 1419. After the funeral, both of his sons then headed to the capital of Majapahit, because their aunt (Princess Dwarawati) was married to the King of Majapahit.  By the King's order, both of them then were appointed as officials of the Majapahit Empire. Ali Murtadho as Raja Pandhita (Minister of Religion) for the Musims, while Ali Rahmat was appointed as Imam (High Priest for Muslims) in Surabaya.  Ali Rahmat was known as Raden Rahmat (Prince Rahmat), who then became Sunan Ampel. 


In sum, multiple sources and conventional wisdom agree that the Wali Sanga contributed to the propagation of Islam (but not its original introduction) in the area now known as Indonesia. However, it is difficult to prove the extent of their influence in quantitative terms such as an increase in the number of adherents or masjids in the areas of their work in contrast to localities where they were not active. 


Some of the family relationships described below are well-documented; others are less certain. Even today, it is common in Java for a family friend to be called "uncle" or "brother" despite the lack of a blood relationship. 

  • Sunan Gresik (Malik Ibrahim): Arrived on Java 1404 CC, died in 1419 CC, buried in Gresik, East Java. Activities included commerce, healing, and improvement of agricultural techniques. Father of Sunan Ampel and uncle of Sunan Giri.
  • Sunan Ampel: Born in Champa (Southern Vietnam) in 1401 CC, died in 1481 CC in Demak, Central Java. Can be considered a focal point of the wali sanga. He was the son of Sunan Gresik and the father of Sunan Bonang and Sunan Dradjat. Sunan Ampel was also the cousin and father-in-law of Sunan Giri. In addition, Sunan Ampel was the grandfather of Sunan Kudus. Sunan Bonang in turn taught Sunan Kalijaga, who was the father of Sunan Muria. Sunan Ampel was also the teacher of Raden Patah. 
  • Sunan Giri: Born in Blambangan (now Banyuwangi, the easternmost part of Java) in 1442 CC. His father Maulana Ishak was the brother of Maulana Malik Ibrahim. Sunan Giri's grave is in Gresik near Surabaya. 
  • Sunan Bonang: Born in 1465 CC in Rembang (near Tuban) on the north coast of Central Java. Died in 1525 CC and buried in Tuban. Brother of Sunan Drajat. Composed songs for gamelan orchestra.
  • Sunan Drajat: Born in 1470 CC. Brother of Sunan Bonang. Composed songs for gamelan orchestra.
  • Sunan Kudus: Died 1550 CC, buried in Kudus. Possible originator of wayang golek puppetry.
  • Sunan Kalijaga: His birth name is Raden Mas Said, and he is the son of Adipati Tuban. Buried in Kadilangu, Demak. Used wayang kulit shadow puppets and gamelan music to convey spiritual teachings.
  • Sunan Muria: Buried in Gunung Muria, Kudus. Son of Sunan Kalijaga and Dewi Soejinah (sister of Sunan Giri).
  • Sunan Gunung Jati: Buried in Cirebon. Founder and first ruler of the Cirebon Sultanate. His son, Maulana Hasanudin, became the founder and the first ruler of the Banten Sultanate.


Wali Ullah, Shah
Wali Ullah, Shah (Shah Wali Ullah) (Shah Waliullah) (Shah Wali Allah) (Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlvi) (b. February 21, 1703, Delhi [India] - d. August 20, 1762, Delhi [India]).  Distinguished Muslim thinker of eighteenth century North India.  Shah Wali Ullah was deeply influenced by a youthful stay in the Hijaz, where he encountered a newly vital commitment to the study of the recorded traditions (hadith) of the Prophet as a basis of intellectual renewal and a foundation for social well-being.  His subsequent writings de-emphasized the teachings of the historic law schools in favor of study of the Qur’an (which he translated into Persian) and the hadith.  Even more ambitiously, he tried to show the essential unity of the fruits of the epistemologically distinctive Islamic strands of reason (aql), tradition (naql), and the gnosis (ma’rifa) of the Sufis.  His work took on urgency in the wake of the decline of the Mughal Empire and he sought out Muslim rulers who would work in consultation with scholars like himself in order to create conditions where Muslim law could flourish.  Institutionally, he was the head of the Madrasa-i Rahimiyya, a school founded by his renowned father in Delhi.  He was also a revered Sufi elder among the Naqshbandis.  Later reformers in the subcontinent looked to him as an exemplar in personality and attainments, a guide to the study of the revealed sciences, a spokesman for an authoritative role for scholars in a properly ruled polity, and an opponent of intellectual and sectarian disunity.

Shāh Walī Allāh received a traditional Islamic education from his father and is said to have memorized the Qurʾān at the age of seven. In 1732 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca, and he then remained in the Hejaz (now in Saudi Arabia) to study religion with eminent theologians. He reached adulthood at a time of disillusionment following the death in 1707 of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor of India. Because large areas of the empire had been lost to Hindu and Sikh rulers of the Deccan and the Punjab, Indian Muslims had to accept the rule of non-Muslims. This challenge occupied Walī Allāh’s adult life.

Walī Allāh believed that the Muslim polity could be restored to its former splendor by a policy of religious reform that would harmonize the religious ideals of Islam with the changing social and economic conditions of India. According to him, religious ideas were universal and eternal, but their application could meet different circumstances. The main tool of his policy was the doctrine of tatbīq, whereby the principles of Islam were reconstructed and reapplied in accordance with the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth (the spoken traditions attributed to Muhammad). He thereby allowed the practice of ijtihād (independent thinking by theologians in matters relating to Islamic law), which hitherto had been curtailed. As a corollary, he reinterpreted the concept of taqdīr (determinism) and condemned its popularization, qismat (narrow fatalism, or absolute predetermination). Walī Allāh held that man could achieve his full potential by his own exertion in a universe that was determined by God. Theologically, he opposed the veneration of saints or anything that compromised strict monotheism. He was jurisprudentially eclectic, holding that a Muslim could follow any of the four schools of Islamic law on any point of dogma or ritual.

The best known of Walī Allāh’s voluminous writings was Asrār ad-dīn (“The Secrets of Belief”). His annotated Persian translation of the Qurʾān is still popular in India and Pakistan.

Walī Allāh received a traditional Islamic education from his father and is said to have memorized the Qurʾān at the age of seven. In 1732 he made a pilgrimage to Mecca, and he then remained in the Hejaz (now in Saudi Arabia) to study religion with eminent theologians. He reached adulthood at a time of disillusionment following the death in 1707 of Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor of India. Because large areas of the empire had been lost to Hindu and Sikh rulers of the Deccan and the Punjab, Indian Muslims had to accept the rule of non-Muslims. This challenge occupied Walī Allāh’s adult life.

Walī Allāh believed that the Muslim polity could be restored to its former splendor by a policy of religious reform that would harmonize the religious ideals of Islam with the changing social and economic conditions of India. According to him, religious ideas were universal and eternal, but their application could meet different circumstances. The main tool of his policy was the doctrine of tatbīq, whereby the principles of Islam were reconstructed and reapplied in accordance with the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth (the spoken traditions attributed to Muhammad). He thereby allowed the practice of ijtihād (independent thinking by theologians in matters relating to Islamic law), which hitherto had been curtailed. As a corollary, he reinterpreted the concept of taqdīr (determinism) and condemned its popularization, qismat (narrow fatalism, or absolute predetermination). Walī Allāh held that man could achieve his full potential by his own exertion in a universe that was determined by God. Theologically, he opposed the veneration of saints or anything that compromised strict monotheism. He was jurisprudentially eclectic, holding that a Muslim could follow any of the four schools of Islamic law on any point of dogma or ritual.

The best known of Walī Allāh’s voluminous writings was Asrār ad-dīn (“The Secrets of Belief”). His annotated Persian translation of the Qurʾān is still popular in India and Pakistan.

Wali Allah was an Islamic scholar and reformer. He worked for the revival of Muslim rule and intellectual learning in South Asia, during a time of waning Muslim power.  He despised the divisions and deviations within Islam and its practice in India and hoped to "purify" the religion and unify all Indian Muslims under the "banner of truth".  He is also thought to have anticipated a number of progressive, social, economic, and political ideas of the modern era such as social reform, equal rights, labor protection, welfare entitlement of all to food, clothing, and housing.

 
Shah Wali Ullah see Wali Ullah, Shah
Shah Waliullah see Wali Ullah, Shah
Shah Wali Allah see Wali Ullah, Shah
Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlvi see Wali Ullah, Shah


Wali, Yousef
Yousef Wali (April 2, 1930 – September 5, 2020) was an Egyptian politician who served as Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation from 1982 to 2004. During Wali's tenure as Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and as a Deputy Prime Minister, he worked to obtain funding for research and development in agriculture which helped Egypt increase the productivity of the land for crops such as maize, wheat, rice, and cotton to unprecedented rates.