Franjiyah
Franjiyah (Sulayman Franjiyah) (Suleiman Franjieh) (Suleiman Kabalan Frangieh, last name also spelled Frangié, Franjieh, or Franjiyeh) (June 15, 1910 - July 23, 1992). President of Lebanon from 1970 to 1976. His presidency caused the Lebanese Civil War, which raged from 1975 to 1990, as well as the invitation to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, which continued until 2005.
Franjiyah was born on June 15, 1910 in Zgharta, into a wealthy and influential Maronite Christian family. The Franjiyah family comprised the leadership of one of Lebanon’s strongest clans.
During the 1930s, Franjiyah received his education in Tripoli and Beirut. In 1957, Franjieh was implicated in the assassination of members of a rival clan. He fled to Syria where he became friends with the future president Hafiz al-Assad. Upon his return to Lebanon, he became leader of the Franjiyah clan, and started on his political career.
During May and June of 1958, Franjiyah supported the forces that opposed president Camille Chamoun in the civil war.
In 1960, Franjiyah was elected to parliament and became minister in the government. In 1961, he stepped down as minister.
In 1968, Franjiyah was appointed minister in a new government. In 1970, he once again stepped down as minister. In August of 1970, as he campaigned for the presidency, Franjiyah received the support of Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel. He defeated Elias Sarkis, but only with the narrowest margin in the parliament: one vote.
In April of 1975, the Lebanese Civil War erupted. In 1976, Franjiyah issued a Constitutional Reform Document, where he changed the 6:5 ratio between Christians and Muslims in the parliament into a 5:5 parity. This reform was not carried through. In September 1976, when his presidency came to an end, Franjiyah joined the Lebanese Front of Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel.
In June 1978, Gemayel had Franjiyah’s son, Tony, killed. Franjiyah turned against Gemayel and joined the camp of Walid Jumblatt and Rashid Karami. With this murder, progress towards ending the civil war was derailed.
In 1988, when Lebanon sprouted two governments, Franjiyah supported the parliamentarian party, in opposition to Michel Aoun.
In 1992, in the first general elections after the Civil War, Franjiyah’s party received half of the Maronite seats in the parliament.
On July 23, 1992, Sulayman Franjiyah died in Beirut.
In his politics as president of Lebanon, Franjiyah was anti-Palestinian. He was also autocratic and nepotistic allowing clansmen to be given important positions independent of their qualifications. He became very unpopular with Muslims and nationalists, but the first general elections after the Civil War in 1992 proved that he was still popular among Christians. However, Franjiyah was also the man behind a suggestion of parliamentarian reform in 1976, giving the Muslims more influence. This was not carried through until 1989, but then as part of the agreement that led to the end of the civil war.
Sulayman Franjiyah see Franjiyah
Franjiyah, Sulayman see Franjiyah
Suleiman Franjieh see Franjiyah
Franjieh, Suleiman see Franjiyah
Suleiman Kabalan Frangieh see Franjiyah
Frangieh, Suleiman Kabalan see Franjiyah
Franjiyah (Sulayman Franjiyah) (Suleiman Franjieh) (Suleiman Kabalan Frangieh, last name also spelled Frangié, Franjieh, or Franjiyeh) (June 15, 1910 - July 23, 1992). President of Lebanon from 1970 to 1976. His presidency caused the Lebanese Civil War, which raged from 1975 to 1990, as well as the invitation to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, which continued until 2005.
Franjiyah was born on June 15, 1910 in Zgharta, into a wealthy and influential Maronite Christian family. The Franjiyah family comprised the leadership of one of Lebanon’s strongest clans.
During the 1930s, Franjiyah received his education in Tripoli and Beirut. In 1957, Franjieh was implicated in the assassination of members of a rival clan. He fled to Syria where he became friends with the future president Hafiz al-Assad. Upon his return to Lebanon, he became leader of the Franjiyah clan, and started on his political career.
During May and June of 1958, Franjiyah supported the forces that opposed president Camille Chamoun in the civil war.
In 1960, Franjiyah was elected to parliament and became minister in the government. In 1961, he stepped down as minister.
In 1968, Franjiyah was appointed minister in a new government. In 1970, he once again stepped down as minister. In August of 1970, as he campaigned for the presidency, Franjiyah received the support of Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel. He defeated Elias Sarkis, but only with the narrowest margin in the parliament: one vote.
In April of 1975, the Lebanese Civil War erupted. In 1976, Franjiyah issued a Constitutional Reform Document, where he changed the 6:5 ratio between Christians and Muslims in the parliament into a 5:5 parity. This reform was not carried through. In September 1976, when his presidency came to an end, Franjiyah joined the Lebanese Front of Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel.
In June 1978, Gemayel had Franjiyah’s son, Tony, killed. Franjiyah turned against Gemayel and joined the camp of Walid Jumblatt and Rashid Karami. With this murder, progress towards ending the civil war was derailed.
In 1988, when Lebanon sprouted two governments, Franjiyah supported the parliamentarian party, in opposition to Michel Aoun.
In 1992, in the first general elections after the Civil War, Franjiyah’s party received half of the Maronite seats in the parliament.
On July 23, 1992, Sulayman Franjiyah died in Beirut.
In his politics as president of Lebanon, Franjiyah was anti-Palestinian. He was also autocratic and nepotistic allowing clansmen to be given important positions independent of their qualifications. He became very unpopular with Muslims and nationalists, but the first general elections after the Civil War in 1992 proved that he was still popular among Christians. However, Franjiyah was also the man behind a suggestion of parliamentarian reform in 1976, giving the Muslims more influence. This was not carried through until 1989, but then as part of the agreement that led to the end of the civil war.
Sulayman Franjiyah see Franjiyah
Franjiyah, Sulayman see Franjiyah
Suleiman Franjieh see Franjiyah
Franjieh, Suleiman see Franjiyah
Suleiman Kabalan Frangieh see Franjiyah
Frangieh, Suleiman Kabalan see Franjiyah
Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) (National Liberation Front) (Jabhat al-Taḩrīr al-Waţanī). Socialist political party in Algeria. It was set up on November 1, 1954 as a merger of other smaller groups, to obtain independence for Algeria from France.. It was the ruling party of Algeria through the struggle for independence (1954-1962). The FLN was the only legal party of the country from 1962 to 1989. Central in the FLN’s claim to sole power, was the notion that the FLN, together with the ALN (Armee de liberation nationale), won the liberation war against the French, and that the war had cost Algeria one million lives. This is not really true, since the FLN did not win any military war: the liberation came through diplomatic efforts and the real number of casualties was estimated to be 400,000. Nevertheless, it was the FLN that initiated the military actions against the French (on November 1, 1954). At this time, other parties were preparing for non-violent actions to free Algeria from France, but within the following year, the FLN had gathered all groups in a joint battle against France.
The FLN is a continuation of the main revolutionary body that directed the war for independence against France. It was created by the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA), and emergent paramilitary networks continuing the nationalist tradition of the Algerian People's Party (PPA). The CRUA urged all the warring factions of the nationalist movement to unite and fight against France. By 1956 - two years into the war - nearly all the nationalist organizations in Algeria had joined the FLN, which had established itself as the main nationalist group through both co-opting and coercing smaller organizations. The most important group that remained outside the FLN was Messali Hadj's Mouvement national algérien (MNA). At this time the FLN reorganized into something like a provisional government. It consisted of a five-man executive and legislative body, and was organized territorially into six wilayas, following the Ottoman era administrative boundaries.
The FLN's armed wing during the war was called the Armée de Libération nationale (ALN). It was divided into guerrilla units fighting France and the MNA in Algeria (and wrestling with Messali's followers over control of the expatriate community, in the so-called "café wars" in France), and another, stronger component more resembling a traditional army. These units were based in neighboring Arab countries (notably in Oujda in Morocco, and Tunisia), and although they infiltrated forces and ran weapons and supplies across the border, they generally saw less action than the rural guerrilla forces. Si Ahmed Belbachir Haskouri, a leading Moroccan diplomat in Great Britain, was the FLN's arms coordinator in London, England, where he used his own personal bank account to deposit FLN funds and where he was in charge of sending weapons through the two mentioned routes, namely the Western Algerian border and the Tunisian border with Algeria. These units were later to emerge under the leadership of army commander Colonel Houari Boumédiène as a powerful opposition to the political cadres of the FLN's exile government, the GPRA, and they would eventually come to dominate Algerian politics.
The war for independence continued until March 1962 when finally, the French government signed the Évian Accords, a cease-fire agreement with the FLN. In July the same year, the Algerian people approved of the cease-fire agreement with France in a referendum, supporting economic and social cooperation between the two countries as well. Full independence followed, and the FLN seized control over the country. Political opposition in the form of the MNA and Communist organizations was outlawed, and Algeria constituted as a one-party state. The FLN became its only legal and ruling party.
Immediately after independence, the party experienced a severe internal power struggle. Political leaders coalesced into two grand camps: a Political Bureau formed by the radical Ahmed Ben Bella, who was assisted by the border army, faced off against the political leadership in the former exile government. Boumédiène's army quickly put down resistance and installed Ben Bella as President. The single most powerful political constituency remained the former ALN, which had entered largely unscathed from exile and was now organized as the country's armed forces. Added to this were regionally powerful guerrilla irregulars and others who jockeyed for influence in the party. In building his one-party regime, Ben Bella purged remaining dissidents (such as Ferhat Abbas), but also quickly ran into opposition from Boumédiène as he tried to assert himself independently from the army.
In 1965, tension between Boumédiène and Ben Bella culminated in a coup d'état after Ben Bella had tried to sack one of the Colonel's closest collaborators, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika (who was in 1999 elected President of Algeria). A statist-socialist and anti-colonial nationalist, Boumédiène ruled through decree and "revolutionary legitimacy", marginalizing the FLN in favor of his personal decision-making and the military establishment, even while retaining the one-party system.
Boumédiène held tight control over party leadership until his death in 1978, at which time the party reorganized again under the leadership of the military's next candidate, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid. The military remained well represented on the FLN Central Committee, and is widely held to have been the real power-broker in the country. During the 1980s the FLN toned down the socialist content of its program, enacting some free-market reforms and purging Boumédiène stalwarts.
However, it was not until 1988 that massive demonstrations and riots jolted the country towards major political reform. Rival political organizations were permitted after the Algerian Constitution was amended to allow a multi-party system and democracy. The FLN was cut off from its privileged position in the state apparatus and military.
The electoral gains of the Islamist FIS, however, led to a military coup d'état against the weakened FLN government in 1992. Algeria was under direct military rule for some time, and after formal democracy was restored, the FLN remained outside the ruling apparatus; the military clans in power then drew political legitimacy from other parties. The party remained in opposition to the government during the first part of the Algerian Civil War, notably in 1995 signing the Sant'Egidio Platform, which was highly critical of the military establishment. However, after internal power struggles and a leadership change, it returned to supporting the Presidency.
The FLN's ideology was primarily Algerian nationalist, understood as a movement within a wider Arab nationalism. It essentially drew its political self-legitimization from three sources: Nationalism, and the revolutionary war against France; Socialism, loosely interpreted as a popular anti-exploitation creed; Islam, defined as a main foundation for the national consciousness, and a crucial factor in solidifying the Algerian identity as separate from that of French Algerians or pied-noirs.
As the name implies, the FLN viewed itself as a "front" composed of different social sectors and ideological trends, even if the concept of a mono-lithical Algerian polity gradually submerged this vision. A separate party ideology was not well developed at the time of independence, except insofar as it focused on the liberation of Algeria. Its nationalist outlook was also closely interwoven with anti-Colonialism and anti-Imperialism, something which would remain a lasting characteristic of Algerian foreign policy; but also with pan-Arab solidarity. This latter aspect led to the denial of or refusal to deal with the separate Berber identity held by as many as 30% of Algerians, something which caused fierce opposition and led to the splintering of the movement immediately after independence, as Hocine Aït Ahmed set up the Berberist and pro-democracy Socialist Forces Front (FFS).
The organization committed itself to Socialism, but understood this along the lines of Arab Socialism, and opposed doctrinaire Marxism. The existence of different classes in Algerian society was generally rejected, even if several of the party's top ideologues were influenced to varying degrees by Marxist analysis. Borrowed Marxist terminology was instead commonly reinterpreted by party radicals in terms of the conflict with France, e.g., casting the colonizer in the role of economic exploiter-oppressor as well as national enemy, while the label of "bourgeoisie" was applied to uncoöperative or pro-French elites. The FLN did, for pragmatical reasons, absorb Communist activists into its ranks during the War of Independence, but refused to allow them to organize separately after the war, and quickly moved to dissolve the pro-Moscow Algerian Communist Party (PCA). This proved of little significance, however, since independent Algeria was set up as a single-party system under the FLN soon thereafter. Many Communist intellectuals were later co-opted into the regime at various stages, notably during the early Ben Bella and late Boumédiènne years, but the ban on their party and refusal to accept Marxism remained in place.
Also strongly present as an ideological influence on the FLN was Algerian Islam, especially of the reformist-nationalist variety espoused by Ben Badis and his group of nationalist ulema. The movement absolutely rejected atheism and was not overtly secularist, contrary to widespread perception in the West, and during the war Islam was perhaps its most important mobilizing ideology. Still, after independence, the party would in practice assume a strongly modernist interpretation of Islam, supported social transformation of Algerian society, the emancipation of women, etc, and worked only through secular institutions. Religion was thus relegated to the role of legitimizing the party-regime. This was especially the case under the presidency of Colonel Houari Boumédiènne (1965-78), but even then Islam was considered the state religion and a crucial part of Algerian identity, and Boumédiènne himself took pride in his Quranic training. His predecessor Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-65) was more committed to the Islamic component of the regime, although always viewed as more of an Arab nationalist than an Islamic activist (and he remains far removed from what is today referred to as Algeria's Islamists). Boumédiènnes successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid (1979-92) would tone down the Socialist aspect of the movement, and during the mid- to late 1980s he re-introduced religiously conservative legislation in an attempt to appease growing Islamist opposition. During and after the Algerian Civil War, the party's position remained that of claiming Algerian Islam as a main influence, while simultaneously arguing that this must be expressed as a progressive and modern faith, even if the party generally kept in line with the conservative social mores of Algeria's population. It strongly condemned the radical-fundamentalist religious teachings of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Islamist groups, even while supporting the inclusion of non-violent Islamist parties in the political system and working with them.
During all periods of Algerian post-colonial history, except for a few years (1990-96), the FLN was a pillar of the political system, and was primarily viewed as a "pro-system" party. Its role as Algeria's liberator remained the absolute cornerstone of the party's self-perception, and the defining feature of its otherwise somewhat fluid ideology. The FLN became close to president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was made honorary chairman. It mixes its traditional populist interpretations of Algeria's nationalist-revolutionary and Islamic heritage with a pro-system conservatism, and support for gradual pro-market reform qualified by statist reflexes. Since the breakdown of the single-party system and its detachment from the state structure in 1988-1990, the FLN was in favor of multi-party democracy, whereas before that, it upheld itself as the only organization representing the Algerian people.
The FLN received 34.3% of the parliamentary vote in the elections of 2002 and 199 seats in parliament. The FLN's former secretary-general Ali Benflis, emerged as a rival to the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, but lost his struggle for control over the party. Benflis won 6.4% of the vote at the presidential elections of April 8, 2004. Abdelaziz Belkhadem took control of the party after the elections, and was later promoted to Prime Minister of Algeria. The FLN serves as one of the three parties in the ruling Presidential Alliance (with the National Rally for Democracy/RND, and the Movement of Society for Peace/MSP-Hamas).
At the 2007 elections, the FLN received 136 seats in Parliament after losing 63 seats but remaining the largest party in Algeria. With other large parties remaining in coalition with the FLN, Belkhadem was able to form another government.
FLN see Front de Liberation Nationale
National Liberation Front see Front de Liberation Nationale
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Watani see Front de Liberation Nationale
At the 2007 elections, the FLN received 136 seats in Parliament after losing 63 seats but remaining the largest party in Algeria. With other large parties remaining in coalition with the FLN, Belkhadem was able to form another government.
FLN see Front de Liberation Nationale
National Liberation Front see Front de Liberation Nationale
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Watani see Front de Liberation Nationale
Front Islamique du Salut
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) (al-Jabhah al-Islāmiyah lil-Inqādh). An outlawed Islamist political party in Algeria. The FIS became illegal in 1992. Central in the militant opposition to the regime of Algeria, the FIS, for years, was the strongest opponent to the existing regime in Algeria. Before 1992, the FIS was gaining ground in democratic elections. However, on the eve of their final victory, they were forced out of Algeria’s democratic structure. After 1992, the FIS conducted an armed battle against the governors of Algeria, whom the FIS considered to be usurpers.
In 1989 and 1990, there were large demonstrations in favor of a society governed by the shari'a (Islamic law) and for an arabization of the society. The FIS was a result of the rebellion among the youth of Algiers in October 1988, that soon spread to other cities like Oran, Mostagenem and Blida over the period from 1989 to 1992. The FIS was founded in March 1989, and was officially legalized in September the same year.
The FIS participated in the local elections in June 12, 1990, where they won a clear victory to the ruling FLN, with 65% against 28%. The FIS got the majority in half of the counties, included most of the larger cities. The only exception to this pattern was in Kabylia and in Sahara. These elections were free and fair, but were boycotted by some of the big opposition parties.
When FIS representatives took office they governed the counties like they were umma, and little concern was shown for individual rights. In their discourse democracy was regarded as something Western, and strange to the Algerian society.
The FIS was controlled by a council, called Majlisu ash-Shura, made up of thirty to forty members. The FIS was in the early 1990s divided into two fractions, those who wanted to go the path of democracy and general elections, and the “Afghans,” veterans from the Afghani battle against Soviet occupation.
Inside the Majlisu ash-Shura, there were another division line, between the Salafis and the Jaza’irs. The Salafis was a group that wanted to adjust society to the teaching of the Qur’an, while the Jaza’irs wanted to interpret the Qur’an to time and the culture.
The leaders were, in their civilian lives, a high school teacher (Ali Belhadj [Salafi]), professor in psychology (Abassi Madani [Salafi]), and an oil engineer (Abdelkader Hachani [Jaza’ir]).
The Jaza’irs came into leading position in 1991, and by this time the FIS started to prepare for the elections. But the FIS was, at this time, not only a political party, it had also organized itself as a labor movement, that was used to instigate strikes, like it did in June 1992.
The Algerian government realized that FIS had started to be a strong political movement. However, instead of outlawing the party, the government tried to manipulate its structures: Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani were arrested, in order to make Abdelkader Hachani, the moderate, the leader.
Hachani was conducting the electoral, and was putting his sympathizers in central positions. However, there were strong undercurrents inside the party that opposed going to the elections while leaders like Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani were still arrested.
Tensions were strong, and on November 28, 1991, there was an attempt by the “Afghans” where three police officers were killed. The FIS had demanded the release of its leaders, but gave this demand up on December 14, less than two weeks before the elections. The FIS that participated in these elections was an effective body, that in the last days up to the election day registered citizens and effectively gave many Algerians their very first identity card.
In the first round of elections, the FIS won 188 of the 429 seats in the national assembly. The FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) won only 15, and was even beaten by the FFS (Front de Forces Socialistes) which won 25 seats. This meant that a large number of the seats were undecided, and up for a second round of elections.
The difference in real votes, was less clear, the FIS had won “only” twice as many ballots as the FLN. Despite its relative success in gaining parliament seats, the FFS had received even less votes, only one third of the FIS. The election turnout was fairly good with 59%. Even if the FIS did not have the total majority it appeared that they were in a position to win more than half of the seats in the national assembly.
Following the elections, the FIS was afraid that they could provoke strong actions from the government’s side. It was the leader of RCD (Rassamblement pour la culture et la democratie), a party that had received only a fraction of the expected ballots in the election, who first demanded that the second round of elections should be called off. This demand was not met with understanding by former prime minister Mouloud Hamrouche of the FLN.
The central issue in the ongoing discussions was now “democracy”: Would a democratically elected FIS respect democracy? And could the elections be called off, without jeopardizing the democracy?
The general staff of the Algerian military soon came up with a strong ultimatum: President Chadly had to be removed, and the FIS forbidden.
In January 1992, Algeria moved from civilian rule to military control. The reaction from the FIS and Islamist groups was to take to arms, and after 1992 Algeria found itself in a state of near civil war. AIS, the military branch of the FIS was the acting part of the organization, and was involved in many actions against the government troops.
However, at the same time there were on-going talks between the jailed leaders of the FIS and the government, especially because the Algerian leaders realized that the FIS was the lesser of two evils – their worst opponents were really the extremist group, the GIA.
In 1996, Algeria introduced a new constitution which banned parties that define themselves on religious grounds. By this constitution, Algeria sought to institute a democratic framework while excluding the FIS. At the same time, the FIS appeared to have been effectively suppressed.
A few FIS leaders, notably Rabah Kebir, had escaped into exile abroad. During 1994, they carried out negotiations in Italy with other political parties, notably the FLN and FFS, and came out with a mutual agreement on January 14, 1995: the Sant'Egidio platform. This set forth a set of principles: respect for human rights and multi-party democracy, rejection of army rule and dictatorship, recognition of Islam, Arabness, and Berberness as essential aspects of Algerianness, demand for the release of FIS leaders, and an end to extrajudicial killing and torture on all sides. To the surprise of many, even Ali Belhadj endorsed the agreement. However, a crucial signatory was missing: the government itself. As a result, the platform had little if any effect.
Despite the government's extremely hostile reaction to the Rome Platform, a third attempt at negotiations took place, starting in April 1995 with a letter from Madani condemning acts of violence, and hopes were raised. However, the FIS did not offer enough concessions to satisfy the government, demanding, as usual, that FIS leaders should be released before FIS could call for a ceasefire. In July 1995 Zeroual announced that the talks had failed, for the last time.
In 1995, the GIA turned on the AIS in earnest. Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased (resulting in an estimated 60 deaths in March 1995 alone), and the GIA reiterated its death threats against FIS and AIS leaders, claiming to be the "sole prosecutor of jihad" and angered by their negotiation attempts. On July 11, they assassinated a co-founder of FIS, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, in Paris (although some question the authenticity of their statement claiming credit for this.)
The AIS, faced with attacks from both sides and wanting to dissociate itself from the GIA's civilian massacres, declared a unilateral ceasefire on September 21, 1997, and disbanded in 1999. Thousands of AIS fighters surrendered and handed over their weapons to the authorities. In January 2000, those fighters obtained amnesty under the terms of the "Civil Concord" decreed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after his election in April 1999. Both Mezrag and Benaïcha offered their services to the authorities to fight the GIA and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which has links to al-Qaida.
On July 2, 2003, Belhadj and Madani were released. (The former had been in jail, the latter had been moved to house arrest in 1997.) Foreign media were banned from covering the event locally, and FIS itself remained banned. However, the release of Belhadj and Madani had little apparent impact. After a decade of vicious civil conflict, there was little enthusiasm in Algeria for reopening old wounds.
FIS see Front Islamique du Salut
Islamic Salvation Front see Front Islamique du Salut
al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah lil-Inqadh see Front Islamique du Salut
Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) (al-Jabhah al-Islāmiyah lil-Inqādh). An outlawed Islamist political party in Algeria. The FIS became illegal in 1992. Central in the militant opposition to the regime of Algeria, the FIS, for years, was the strongest opponent to the existing regime in Algeria. Before 1992, the FIS was gaining ground in democratic elections. However, on the eve of their final victory, they were forced out of Algeria’s democratic structure. After 1992, the FIS conducted an armed battle against the governors of Algeria, whom the FIS considered to be usurpers.
In 1989 and 1990, there were large demonstrations in favor of a society governed by the shari'a (Islamic law) and for an arabization of the society. The FIS was a result of the rebellion among the youth of Algiers in October 1988, that soon spread to other cities like Oran, Mostagenem and Blida over the period from 1989 to 1992. The FIS was founded in March 1989, and was officially legalized in September the same year.
The FIS participated in the local elections in June 12, 1990, where they won a clear victory to the ruling FLN, with 65% against 28%. The FIS got the majority in half of the counties, included most of the larger cities. The only exception to this pattern was in Kabylia and in Sahara. These elections were free and fair, but were boycotted by some of the big opposition parties.
When FIS representatives took office they governed the counties like they were umma, and little concern was shown for individual rights. In their discourse democracy was regarded as something Western, and strange to the Algerian society.
The FIS was controlled by a council, called Majlisu ash-Shura, made up of thirty to forty members. The FIS was in the early 1990s divided into two fractions, those who wanted to go the path of democracy and general elections, and the “Afghans,” veterans from the Afghani battle against Soviet occupation.
Inside the Majlisu ash-Shura, there were another division line, between the Salafis and the Jaza’irs. The Salafis was a group that wanted to adjust society to the teaching of the Qur’an, while the Jaza’irs wanted to interpret the Qur’an to time and the culture.
The leaders were, in their civilian lives, a high school teacher (Ali Belhadj [Salafi]), professor in psychology (Abassi Madani [Salafi]), and an oil engineer (Abdelkader Hachani [Jaza’ir]).
The Jaza’irs came into leading position in 1991, and by this time the FIS started to prepare for the elections. But the FIS was, at this time, not only a political party, it had also organized itself as a labor movement, that was used to instigate strikes, like it did in June 1992.
The Algerian government realized that FIS had started to be a strong political movement. However, instead of outlawing the party, the government tried to manipulate its structures: Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani were arrested, in order to make Abdelkader Hachani, the moderate, the leader.
Hachani was conducting the electoral, and was putting his sympathizers in central positions. However, there were strong undercurrents inside the party that opposed going to the elections while leaders like Ali Belhadj and Abassi Madani were still arrested.
Tensions were strong, and on November 28, 1991, there was an attempt by the “Afghans” where three police officers were killed. The FIS had demanded the release of its leaders, but gave this demand up on December 14, less than two weeks before the elections. The FIS that participated in these elections was an effective body, that in the last days up to the election day registered citizens and effectively gave many Algerians their very first identity card.
In the first round of elections, the FIS won 188 of the 429 seats in the national assembly. The FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) won only 15, and was even beaten by the FFS (Front de Forces Socialistes) which won 25 seats. This meant that a large number of the seats were undecided, and up for a second round of elections.
The difference in real votes, was less clear, the FIS had won “only” twice as many ballots as the FLN. Despite its relative success in gaining parliament seats, the FFS had received even less votes, only one third of the FIS. The election turnout was fairly good with 59%. Even if the FIS did not have the total majority it appeared that they were in a position to win more than half of the seats in the national assembly.
Following the elections, the FIS was afraid that they could provoke strong actions from the government’s side. It was the leader of RCD (Rassamblement pour la culture et la democratie), a party that had received only a fraction of the expected ballots in the election, who first demanded that the second round of elections should be called off. This demand was not met with understanding by former prime minister Mouloud Hamrouche of the FLN.
The central issue in the ongoing discussions was now “democracy”: Would a democratically elected FIS respect democracy? And could the elections be called off, without jeopardizing the democracy?
The general staff of the Algerian military soon came up with a strong ultimatum: President Chadly had to be removed, and the FIS forbidden.
In January 1992, Algeria moved from civilian rule to military control. The reaction from the FIS and Islamist groups was to take to arms, and after 1992 Algeria found itself in a state of near civil war. AIS, the military branch of the FIS was the acting part of the organization, and was involved in many actions against the government troops.
However, at the same time there were on-going talks between the jailed leaders of the FIS and the government, especially because the Algerian leaders realized that the FIS was the lesser of two evils – their worst opponents were really the extremist group, the GIA.
In 1996, Algeria introduced a new constitution which banned parties that define themselves on religious grounds. By this constitution, Algeria sought to institute a democratic framework while excluding the FIS. At the same time, the FIS appeared to have been effectively suppressed.
A few FIS leaders, notably Rabah Kebir, had escaped into exile abroad. During 1994, they carried out negotiations in Italy with other political parties, notably the FLN and FFS, and came out with a mutual agreement on January 14, 1995: the Sant'Egidio platform. This set forth a set of principles: respect for human rights and multi-party democracy, rejection of army rule and dictatorship, recognition of Islam, Arabness, and Berberness as essential aspects of Algerianness, demand for the release of FIS leaders, and an end to extrajudicial killing and torture on all sides. To the surprise of many, even Ali Belhadj endorsed the agreement. However, a crucial signatory was missing: the government itself. As a result, the platform had little if any effect.
Despite the government's extremely hostile reaction to the Rome Platform, a third attempt at negotiations took place, starting in April 1995 with a letter from Madani condemning acts of violence, and hopes were raised. However, the FIS did not offer enough concessions to satisfy the government, demanding, as usual, that FIS leaders should be released before FIS could call for a ceasefire. In July 1995 Zeroual announced that the talks had failed, for the last time.
In 1995, the GIA turned on the AIS in earnest. Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased (resulting in an estimated 60 deaths in March 1995 alone), and the GIA reiterated its death threats against FIS and AIS leaders, claiming to be the "sole prosecutor of jihad" and angered by their negotiation attempts. On July 11, they assassinated a co-founder of FIS, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, in Paris (although some question the authenticity of their statement claiming credit for this.)
The AIS, faced with attacks from both sides and wanting to dissociate itself from the GIA's civilian massacres, declared a unilateral ceasefire on September 21, 1997, and disbanded in 1999. Thousands of AIS fighters surrendered and handed over their weapons to the authorities. In January 2000, those fighters obtained amnesty under the terms of the "Civil Concord" decreed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after his election in April 1999. Both Mezrag and Benaïcha offered their services to the authorities to fight the GIA and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which has links to al-Qaida.
On July 2, 2003, Belhadj and Madani were released. (The former had been in jail, the latter had been moved to house arrest in 1997.) Foreign media were banned from covering the event locally, and FIS itself remained banned. However, the release of Belhadj and Madani had little apparent impact. After a decade of vicious civil conflict, there was little enthusiasm in Algeria for reopening old wounds.
FIS see Front Islamique du Salut
Islamic Salvation Front see Front Islamique du Salut
al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah lil-Inqadh see Front Islamique du Salut
Fu’ad I
Fu’ad I (Fuad I) (March 26, 1868 – April 28, 1936). Sultan (1917-1922) and later King (1922-1936) of Egypt and Sudan, Sovereign of Nubia, Kordofan, and Darfur. The ninth ruler of Egypt and Sudan from the Muhammad Ali Dynasty, he became Sultan of Egypt and Sudan in 1917, succeeding his elder brother Sultan Husayn Kamil. He substituted the title of King for Sultan when the United Kingdom formally recognized Egyptian independence in 1922.
The son of Isma‘il Pasha, Fu’ad was born on March 26, 1868, in Cairo and was originally named Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha. He was educated in Italy during the 1880s. Fu’ad was a general in the Egyptian army from 1892 until 1895. In 1908, he played an important role in the founding of the Egyptian University (now named Cairo University) at Giza, serving for a time as its president. Fu’ad succeeded his brother, Hussein Kamil (1853-1917), to the sultanate.
In 1919, the British initiated the drafting of a treaty to ensure the independence of Egypt. Over the next few years, many disagreements surfaced through public debates concerning the subject matter of the talks with Great Britain. During this period, the Wafd party was the strongest group in Egyptian society.
Fu’ad became king of Egypt in 1922, upon the nominal termination of the British protectorate. Fu’ad introduced an Egyptian constitution the next year. Although opposed to British domination, Fu’ad was an adversary of the powerful Wafd, or Nationalist party, with which he waged a struggle for power throughout his reign, succeeding temporarily in imposing his personal rule on the country by dissolution of Parliament in 1928-29 and from 1930 to 1935.
Fu’ad died on April 28, 1936, in Cairo. He was succeeded by his son, Faruk I.
Fu’ad’s reign was not one of stability. His strongest opponent was the very popular Wafd party, with its leader Saad Zaghlul. However, while fighting against very popular political parties, Fu’ad succeeded in remaining fairly popular among the Egyptians. Indeed, during his reign, Fu’ad founded schools, encouraged the new university at Giza (Gizeh) and the reform of al-Azhar, and promoted numerous cultural institutions.
Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad I
Fuad I see Fu’ad I
The son of Isma‘il Pasha, Fu’ad was born on March 26, 1868, in Cairo and was originally named Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha. He was educated in Italy during the 1880s. Fu’ad was a general in the Egyptian army from 1892 until 1895. In 1908, he played an important role in the founding of the Egyptian University (now named Cairo University) at Giza, serving for a time as its president. Fu’ad succeeded his brother, Hussein Kamil (1853-1917), to the sultanate.
In 1919, the British initiated the drafting of a treaty to ensure the independence of Egypt. Over the next few years, many disagreements surfaced through public debates concerning the subject matter of the talks with Great Britain. During this period, the Wafd party was the strongest group in Egyptian society.
Fu’ad became king of Egypt in 1922, upon the nominal termination of the British protectorate. Fu’ad introduced an Egyptian constitution the next year. Although opposed to British domination, Fu’ad was an adversary of the powerful Wafd, or Nationalist party, with which he waged a struggle for power throughout his reign, succeeding temporarily in imposing his personal rule on the country by dissolution of Parliament in 1928-29 and from 1930 to 1935.
Fu’ad died on April 28, 1936, in Cairo. He was succeeded by his son, Faruk I.
Fu’ad’s reign was not one of stability. His strongest opponent was the very popular Wafd party, with its leader Saad Zaghlul. However, while fighting against very popular political parties, Fu’ad succeeded in remaining fairly popular among the Egyptians. Indeed, during his reign, Fu’ad founded schools, encouraged the new university at Giza (Gizeh) and the reform of al-Azhar, and promoted numerous cultural institutions.
Ahmed Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad I
Fuad I see Fu’ad I
Fu’ad Pasha
Fu’ad Pasha (Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha) (Fuat Pasha) (Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha) (1815-1869). Five times the Ottoman Foreign Minister and twice Grand Vizier. He was a convinced westernizer, and tried to preserve the Ottoman empire through diplomacy and reform.
Fu'ad Pasha was an Ottoman statesman known for his leadership during the Crimean War and in the Tanzimat reforms within the Ottoman Empire.
Fu'ad Pasha was a “Europeanized” man who was fluent in French and was able to negotiate on the same level as his European counterparts. He became the first secretary of the Turkish embassy in London in 1840. During 1848 he was employed on special missions in the principalities and at St. Petersburg. In 1851, he was sent to Egypt as a special commissioner. In that year, he became minister for foreign affairs, a post to which he was reappointed on four subsequent occasions and which he held at the time of his death. During the Crimean War, he commanded the troops on the Greek frontier and distinguished himself by his bravery. He was the Turkish delegate at the Treaty of Paris in 1856; was charged with a mission to Syria in 1860; served as grand vizier two times; and minister of war. He accompanied the sultan Abdülaziz on his journey to Egypt and Europe.
Fu'ad Pasha was an important reformer during the Tanzimat period. He (along with officials such as Ali Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Paşa and Ahmet Mithat Paşa) was an official that was dedicated to the implementation of all of the reforms that came along with the program. He had hoped that the Tanzimat reforms would find salvation for the empire by creating among its peoples the bond of equal citizenship based on Ottoman nationality, the obstacles they faced were too great and the time too late. He realized the importance of change and saw it as a necessary evolution that the Ottoman Empire needed to make. However, in his efforts to create an image of a modern Ottoman Empire, Fu'ad Pasha believed that by giving non-Muslim subjects of the Empire equal rights via the Millet system would dull their nationalist and separatist tendencies. He, along with the other three reformers, believed that in order to save the empire, a sense of “Ottomanism” needed to be created.
Due to his success at executing the changes of the Tanzimat program, Fu'ad Pasha was sent to Syria during 1860 to enforce Ottoman law after the outbreak of war. He arrived in Beirut on July 17, 1860, armed with extreme power granted to him by the Sultan. His goal was to protect the Ottoman power over the region as well as keep out the European influence. For example, in order to send a message to the anti-Ottoman forces, he had some Damascus notables hanged for their lack of regard for the Ottoman commitment to a multi-ethnic state. Fu'ad Pasha saw the events of 1860 in Syria as the converse to the idea of modernism as exhibited by Europe. He chaired the Beirut Commission in 1860 that included Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia.
In an attempt to centralize and stabilize authority in Syria, while maintaining British interests, a British representative suggested Fu'ad Pasha as the leader for the region of Syria. Fu'ad Pasha, who was “Europeanized”, seemed to be aligned with Western ideals that the British wanted to preserve in the Middle East. In the area of Mount Lebanon and Syria, Fu'ad Pasha saw the necessity for authority and modernity under a central ruling body. He sought to rid the area of old tribal rule and put the area under Ottoman authority. Reforms created a more unified state that was under the control and authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Fu'ad Pasha’s work of centralizing Ottoman control in Syria was an example of Ottoman nationalism that encouraged patriotism in Ottoman territories but also strengthened the hierarchical relationship of the “father figure” of Sultan and his relationship with the citizens.
Fu'ad Pasha retired due to ill health to Nice, France, where he died in 1869.
Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fu’ad Pasha (Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha) (Fuat Pasha) (Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha) (1815-1869). Five times the Ottoman Foreign Minister and twice Grand Vizier. He was a convinced westernizer, and tried to preserve the Ottoman empire through diplomacy and reform.
Fu'ad Pasha was an Ottoman statesman known for his leadership during the Crimean War and in the Tanzimat reforms within the Ottoman Empire.
Fu'ad Pasha was a “Europeanized” man who was fluent in French and was able to negotiate on the same level as his European counterparts. He became the first secretary of the Turkish embassy in London in 1840. During 1848 he was employed on special missions in the principalities and at St. Petersburg. In 1851, he was sent to Egypt as a special commissioner. In that year, he became minister for foreign affairs, a post to which he was reappointed on four subsequent occasions and which he held at the time of his death. During the Crimean War, he commanded the troops on the Greek frontier and distinguished himself by his bravery. He was the Turkish delegate at the Treaty of Paris in 1856; was charged with a mission to Syria in 1860; served as grand vizier two times; and minister of war. He accompanied the sultan Abdülaziz on his journey to Egypt and Europe.
Fu'ad Pasha was an important reformer during the Tanzimat period. He (along with officials such as Ali Pasha, Mustafa Reshid Paşa and Ahmet Mithat Paşa) was an official that was dedicated to the implementation of all of the reforms that came along with the program. He had hoped that the Tanzimat reforms would find salvation for the empire by creating among its peoples the bond of equal citizenship based on Ottoman nationality, the obstacles they faced were too great and the time too late. He realized the importance of change and saw it as a necessary evolution that the Ottoman Empire needed to make. However, in his efforts to create an image of a modern Ottoman Empire, Fu'ad Pasha believed that by giving non-Muslim subjects of the Empire equal rights via the Millet system would dull their nationalist and separatist tendencies. He, along with the other three reformers, believed that in order to save the empire, a sense of “Ottomanism” needed to be created.
Due to his success at executing the changes of the Tanzimat program, Fu'ad Pasha was sent to Syria during 1860 to enforce Ottoman law after the outbreak of war. He arrived in Beirut on July 17, 1860, armed with extreme power granted to him by the Sultan. His goal was to protect the Ottoman power over the region as well as keep out the European influence. For example, in order to send a message to the anti-Ottoman forces, he had some Damascus notables hanged for their lack of regard for the Ottoman commitment to a multi-ethnic state. Fu'ad Pasha saw the events of 1860 in Syria as the converse to the idea of modernism as exhibited by Europe. He chaired the Beirut Commission in 1860 that included Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia.
In an attempt to centralize and stabilize authority in Syria, while maintaining British interests, a British representative suggested Fu'ad Pasha as the leader for the region of Syria. Fu'ad Pasha, who was “Europeanized”, seemed to be aligned with Western ideals that the British wanted to preserve in the Middle East. In the area of Mount Lebanon and Syria, Fu'ad Pasha saw the necessity for authority and modernity under a central ruling body. He sought to rid the area of old tribal rule and put the area under Ottoman authority. Reforms created a more unified state that was under the control and authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Fu'ad Pasha’s work of centralizing Ottoman control in Syria was an example of Ottoman nationalism that encouraged patriotism in Ottoman territories but also strengthened the hierarchical relationship of the “father figure” of Sultan and his relationship with the citizens.
Fu'ad Pasha retired due to ill health to Nice, France, where he died in 1869.
Keceji-zade Fu’ad Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
Kececizade Mehmet Fuat Pasha see Fu’ad Pasha
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