Amal
Amal. Populist movement of Lebanese Shi ‘a Muslims that first emerged in 1975 and, subsequently, became an important political force in Lebanon.
Against a background of social exclusion and economic deprivation, the Shi‘a of Lebanon emerged as major political actors on the Lebanese scene. Well into the twentieth century, the Shi‘a were only bit players in Lebanon. They were unnoticed by other Lebanese, given scant attention by scholars, and presumed insignificant by Lebanese politicians. Socialized into a religious tradition that extolled sacrifice and presumed temporal injustice, the Shi‘a found ready confirmation for their beliefs in their mundane surroundings. Lebanon’s confessional (sectarian) political equation – in which privilege, office, and political rights were allocated according to sect – operated to the disadvantage of the Shi ‘a. This became pronounced as their population grew disproportionately to the country’s other major sects. In a political system dominated by Maronite and Sunni politicians, the Shi‘a were trapped by their confessional identity.
Although they lagged behind non-Shi‘a, the Shi‘a were still very much affected by the rapid modernization that had marked Lebanon since independence in 1943. Access to education produced a growing pool of individuals who were no longer content to confine their horizons to subsistence farming. Improved transportation eroded the geographic isolation of the community. A rapidly growing communications network, both within and outside of Lebanon, brought the outside world – with its political ideologies and its modern ideas and technologies – into even the most remote village.
Modernization of the agricultural sector, including an increasing emphasis on cash crops and farm mechanization, led to underemployment and unemployment. Many of the Shi‘a were forced to move off the land in order to survive. As the modernization process began to have an effect, and as the Shi‘a gained from exposure to horizons wider than the village, they became more aware of the disparities between them and their relatively affluent neighbors. Fleeing the poverty of the village and the drudgery of farm labor, many Shi‘a took work where they could find it in Beirut, usually as petty laborers or peddlers. This migration of labor led to the swelling of the population of the Lebanese capital by the 1960s. The Shi‘a made their homes in the squalid suburbs. Although some actually escaped from poverty, most remained dreadfully poor. Not surprisingly, these migrants from the country became a fertile pool for recruitment by radical parties that claimed to have answers to their difficulties.
More important, the dearth of economic opportunities within Lebanon factored into the movement of many Shi‘a men overseas, where opportunities in the Gulf states, and especially West Africa, provided a way out of poverty. Some made their fortunes and thereby gained the wherewithal to support political movements in their image. Later, the money earned by these Shi‘a migrants would play a crucial role in financing the growth of Shi‘a political activism within Lebanon. Though the Shi‘a as a whole are still relatively impoverished, many Shi‘a have done well as merchants, building contractors, and professionals. Yet, even among the affluent, there is an ethos of deprivation, a lingering memory imparted by a lifetime of accumulated grievances and slights.
The 1960s and 1970s also exposed the Lebanese Shi‘a to the vibrant and dynamic leadership of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr. Although born in Iran, Sadr traced his ancestry back to southern Lebanon and the village of Marakah. He moved to Lebanon in 1960 from Najaf, Iraq, where he had been studying Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) under the sponsorship of several of the most important ayatollahs of the day. He was a looming presence in the pre-civil war period, and it was under his direction and leadership that the Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived) – the forerunner of the Amal movement – emerged in 1974. Sadr was a populist leader with an agenda of reform, not destruction and revolution.
Although the Movement of the Deprived claimed to represent all of the politically dispossessed Lebanese, regardless of confession, it was transparently a party of the Shi‘a. The charismatic Sadr skillfully exploited Shi‘ism’s potent symbolism to remind his followers that they were people with a heritage of resistance and sacrifice. He revitalized the epic martyrdom of Husayn (the grandson of the prophet Muhammad) at Karbala in 680, and he inspired his followers to emulate the Husayn’s bravery.
Despite his magnetic appeal for many Shi‘a, Sadr’s movement was only one in a field of organizations that successfully mobilized the Shi‘a into political action. In Lebanon, as in Iraq among the Shi‘a, the Communist Party was the party of prominence in the 1970s. Only later, and under bizarre circumstances, did Sadr’s movement assume center stage for the Shi‘a. With the civil war that began in 1975, Sadr’s popular following was challenged by a number of militia organizations, including the Palestinian Fida‘iyan, which recruited many Shi‘a youths. Sadr’s appeal diminished in a setting where guns became commonplace adornments and the rhetoric of hatred and cruelty overwhelmed his rhetoric of reform.
War’s exuberance faded and, in the south, the heartland of Shi‘ism in Lebanon, the conflict destroyed villages, took lives and livelihoods, and alienated many Shi‘a from their political alliances. Increasingly, throughout 1977 and 1978, the Shi‘a often found themselves in the crossfire between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. This was a period of heightened suffering, especially in southern Lebanon, where a heavy price was paid for the armed Palestinian presence.
By the late 1970s, many – but by no means all – of the politicized Shi‘a deserted the political left and joined or supported the rejuvenated Amal movement. Amal means "hope," but it is also an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah (Lebanese Resistance Detachments). In 1978, the Israelis increased their military pressure on south Lebanon, thereby helping to stoke the tensions between the Shi‘a and the PLO, although subsequent Israeli errors would indicate that theirs was a very incomplete understanding of what was taking place among the Shi‘a. Amal began to take shape as a loose grouping of village homeguards, intent on circumscribing the influence of the PLO and thereby reducing the exposure of the Shi‘a to Israeli pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes.
With the Iranian Revolution gathering momentum in 1978, many Lebanese Shi‘a took inspiration from the actions of their Iranian co-religionists. If the Islamic Revolution was not a precise model for Lebanon, it was still an exemplar for action, and Amal, as an authentically Shi‘a movement, was the momentary beneficiary of this enthusiasm. Sadr was known to be a key supporter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) and an adversary of the shah (although his opposition had been tempered by a good dose of realism). Moreover, several key Amal officials, including the Iranian Mustafa Chamran, took up key positions in the new regime.
Ironically, it was also Sadr’s disappearance in 1978 that helped to retrieve the promise of his earlier efforts. In August 1978, he visited Libya with two companions, Shaykh Muhammad Shihadah Ya‘qub and journalist ‘Abbas Badr al-Din. The party has not been heard of since. Sadr became a hero to his followers, who revere his memory and take inspiration from his works and his plights. The symbol of a missing imam – reminiscent of the central dogma of Shi‘ism – is hard to assail, and even blood enemies were heard to utter words of praise for the missing leader. The reform movement Sadr founded became the largest Shi‘a organization in Lebanon. By 1982, when Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon, Amal was arguably the most dynamic force in Lebanese politics.
Amal’s calls for the reformation of the Lebanese political system went unheeded, however. The Maronite Christians, who have enjoyed the dominant role in the politics of modern Lebanon, were intent on preserving their power, not in sharing it. The Sunni Muslims, the Maronites’ junior partner , were also little interested in seeing the dimunition of their privileges to the advantage of the Shi‘a. Thus, the answer to Amal’s demands was calculated intransigence. The result was increased anger and frustration among the Shi‘a.
True to its reformist origins, the Amal leadership sought a role in the Lebanese political system in the exuberant second half of 1982. Although Lebanon’s civil war did not definitively end until 1990, the expulsion of the bulk of the PLO’s fighters from Lebanon and the energetic engagement of United States diplomacy seemed to signal that the worst was over. Amal leader Nabih Berri, the Sierra Leone born son of a Shi‘a trader, waited in vain for a call that never came. Meanwhile, though Israel earned the gratitude of many southern Shi‘a for expelling the widely disdained Palestinian gunmen, Israel remained in occupation of much of Lebanon, including all of the south.
By 1983, the hopes of 1982 were in tatters. United States diplomacy proved to be clumsy and poorly conceived, and Syria, defeated soundly by Israel in 1982, was determined to undermine Israel’s gains and America’s ambitions in Lebanon. An increasingly potent Lebanese resistance emerged, based initially in the parties of the left, but by the autumn of 1983 Amal was deeply implicated in the resistance. From 1982, onward, the Shi‘a community became increasingly militant, in no small measure because of an arbitrary campaign of intimidation and arrests by the Maronite led government.
The high point of Amal’s organized military power was in 1984. Amal fighters were heavily engaged against the Israeli occupation of Lebanese soil, and, in Beirut, Amal confronted the central government. After terrible shelling of the heavily populated southern suburbs by the army, Nabih Berri called successfully on Shi‘a soldiers to lay down their arms, whereupon Amal became the dominant force of the moment in West Beirut.
Shortly thereafter, in early 1984, United States marines withdrew from their positions in Beirut. Following the disastrous attack on the marine barracks in 1983 that killed more than two hundred marines, the departing marines left their positions to Amal militiamen. Amal moved to solidify its power position, while also maintaining pressure on Israel in the south, where the invading army consolidated its positions. Deadly, intense attacks prompted Israel to extricate most of its forces from Lebanon, while, in 1985, retaining a foothold in a self-proclaimed “security zone.”
For a time, the Amal leaders had some faith in United States promises, but, by 1985, those promises rang hollow and Amal was heavily influenced by Syria. Given the extant hatreds, Amal did not need much prodding to move to suppress surviving PLO positions in the environs of Beirut, but Syria was a generous supplier of arms and ammunition for Amal’s bloody war of the camps, which lasted until 1988.
Amal’s ascendancy, however, was promptly checked. A tactical alliance with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt crumbled, and among the Sunni Muslims fears of Shi‘a suzerainty sparked a variety of organizational ripostes. Amal’s moment of singular power was over.
Amal, which promised in the early 1980s to become the dominant organizational voice for the Shi‘a, faced a serious erosion in its following. Ineffective and even incompetent leadership, corruption, and more than a modicum of arrogance undermined its support, especially in the environs of Beirut.
Hizbullah (or “the Party of God”), the Iranian funded alternative to Amal, emerged after 1982 as a competent, dedicated, and well-led challenger. Although young Shi‘a clerics dominated the leadership of Hizbullah, it was noteworthy that Hizbullah was especially effective in recruiting among well-educated Shi‘a from secular professions, many of whom had lost confidence in Amal. In May 1988, fighting in Beirut suburbs, which saw the Hizbullah triumph over the Amal militia, underlined Hizbullah’s steady success in enlisting the Shi‘a, many of whom were ex-Amal members.
As the overall situation grew worse, Hizbullah gained supporters, although Amal remained a force with which to be reckoned. The persistent insecurity, the stalling of political reform, and the near total collapse of the Lebanese economy made religion a refuge, skillfully manipulated to be sure, in a situation where there were no other answers. Taking its cue from Iran, Hizbullah exploited the symbolism of Shi‘ism to enlist support. For instance, ‘Ashura’, the day on which the Shi‘a commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn more than thirteen hundred years ago, and certainly the most significant day of the Shi‘a calendar, became not just a plea for intercession or an act of piety, but a revolutionary statement.
Hizbullah enjoyed much less success in south Lebanon, where about one-third of the Shi‘a live. Anti-PLO animosity ran deep in the south, and Amal’s staunch stance against the restoration of an armed PLO presence in the area accurately reflected popular sentiment and distinguished Amal from Hizbullah.
The civil war ended in 1990, generally along the lines of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, which called for Muslim Christian parity in parliament and increased, marginally, the influence of the Shi‘a Muslims in the Lebanese political system. In agreement with the accord, Amal was disarmed in 1991 and the movement’s militia phase ended.
Amal’s rival, Hizbullah, however, did not disarm and continued to enjoy the toleration of Syria and the support of Iran. In addition, although Amal leaders had long railed against the corruption and arrogance of the zu‘ama’ (political bosses), senior Amal figures were susceptible to the same charges. Amal maintained an important core of support, especially in the south, but Hizbullah continued to siphon off members, who were attracted by Hizbullah’s network of social services and its reputation for integrity.
With the resumption of “normal” politics in Lebanon, Amal’s raison d’etre had to be modified radically. Although the killing stopped, for the most part, the aftermath of the civil war was a national economic crisis in which the real standard of living of the Lebanese declined dramatically. Amal’s capacity for conversion into a widely encompassing political movement was thus limited.
Nonetheless, Nabih Berri, long a political outsider, ascended in 1991 to the position of parliamentary speaker, the highest political position allotted to a Shi‘a, signifying both a personal success and a marker of Amal’s accomplishments since its creation in 1974. Popular movements tend to offer more than they can reasonably be expected to deliver, otherwise they would lose their populist base, and Amal is no exception. Yet, in the quest of the Shi‘a of Lebanon for dignity and political power, Amal’s role was central. The movement authentically symbolized the moderation and the project of reform that defines the vast majority of this community.
Amal Movement is short for Afwaq al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Resistance Detachments) the acronym for which, in Arabic, is "amal", meaning "hope."
Amal was founded in 1975 as the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a Shi'a political movement founded by Musa al-Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini a year earlier. It became one of the most important Shi'a Muslim militias during the Lebanese Civil War. Amal grew strong with the support of, and through its ties with, Syria and the 300,000 Shi'a internal refugees from southern Lebanon after the Israeli bombings in the early 1980s. Amal's practical objectives were to gain greater respect for Lebanon's Shi'ite population and the allocation of a larger share of governmental resources for the Shi'ite-dominated southern part of the country.
At its zenith, the militia had 14,000 troops. Amal fought a long campaign against Palestinian refugees during the Lebanese Civil War (called the War of the Camps). After the War of the Camps, Amal fought a bloody battle against rival Shi'a group Hezbollah for control of Beirut, which provoked Syrian military intervention. Hezbollah itself was formed by religious members of Amal who had left after Nabih Berri's assumption of full control and the subsequent resignation of most of Amal's earliest members.
The origins of the Amal movement lie with the Lebanese cleric of Iranian origin Imam Musa al-Sadr. In 1974, Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) was established by al-Sadr and member of parliament Hussein el-Husseini to attempt to reform the Lebanese system. While acknowledging its support base to be the “traditionally under-represented politically and economically disadvantaged” Shi'a community, it aimed, according to Palmer-Harik, to seek social justice for all deprived Lebanese. Although influenced by Islamic ideas, it was a secular movement trying to unite people along communal rather than religious or ideological lines. The Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Grégoire Haddad, was among the founders of the Movement.
On January 20, 1975, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments (also referred to in English as 'The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance') were formed as a military wing of The Movement of the Disinherited under the leadership of al-Sadr, and came to be popularly known as Amal (from the acronym Afwaj al-Muqawmat Al-Lubnaniyya). In 1978, al-Sadr disappeared in mysterious circumstances while visiting Libya, the Amal movement’s regional supporter at the time. Hussein el-Husseini became leader of Amal and was followed by Nabih Berri in April 1980 after el-Husseini resigned. One of the consequences of the rise of Berri, a less educated leader, was the increasing secular yet sectarian nature of the movement and a move away from an Islamic context for the movement.
In the summer of 1982, Husayn Al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of Amal, broke with Berri over his willingness to go along with United States. mediation in Lebanon rather than attack Israeli troops, his membership in the National Salvation Council alongside the Christians, and his opposition to pledging allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini.
Musawi formed the Islamist Islamic Amal Movement, based in Baalbeck. It was aided by the Islamic Republic of Iran which, in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, strove not only to help Lebanon's Shi'a, but to export the Pan-Islamic revolution to the rest of the Muslim world, something Musawi strongly supported.
About 1500 members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard or Pasdaran, arrived in Beqaa Valley that same time and "directly contributed to ensure the survival and growth of al-Musawi's newly-created small militia," providing training, indoctrination and funding. Iran was in many ways a natural ally of the Shia in Lebanon as it was far larger than Lebanon, oil-rich, and both Shi'a-majority and Shi'a-ruled, in fact, the only state ruled by Shi'a. And of course, founder Musa al-Sadr had come from Iran. Iran's generous funding meant generous pay for the militia's recruits that far exceeded what other Lebanese militias were able to offer. This was a major incentive among the impoverished Shi'a community, and induced a sizable number of Amal fighters to defected regularly to the ranks of Islamic Amal, and later to Hizb'allah.
However, while siding with Syria rather the Islamic Republic of Iran seriously weakened Amal, Berri and others in Amal were reluctant to follow Iran's lead. Their reasons reportedly included doubt that the policies of revolutionary Iran could solve Lebanon's sectarian problems; the belief that the Islamic Republic had done little to help solve the 1979 disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr; the perception that Iranian Islamic revolutionaries in power had done little to return the favor of Amal's extensive support for Iranian opposition activity against the Shah's regime, such as military training of senior Iranian revolutionaries in Lebanon in camps under Amal's auspices; alarm that several of Amal's most loyal friends within Iran's clerical establishment either disappeared or were killed or ousted by Ayatollah Khomeini in the period between 1980-81; and disapproval of the support and encouragement given to the PLO by Islamic revolutionaries in Iran as a natural spearhead in the holy war against Israel, despite the fact that PLO activity brought considerable trouble and hardship to the south Lebanese Shi'ites.
Islamic Amal went on to be particularly active in fighting Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. By August 1983, Islamic Amal and Hezbollah were effectively becoming one under the Hezbollah label, and by late 1984, Islamic Amal, along with all the known major groups in Lebanon, had been absorbed into Hezbollah.
The War of the Camps was a series of battles in the mid-1980s between Amal and Palestinian groups. The Druze-oriented Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Hezbollah supported the Palestinians while Syria backed Amal.
Although most of the Palestinian guerrillas were expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion, Palestinian militias began to regain their footing after the Israeli withdrawal from first Beirut, then Sidon and Tyre. Syria viewed this revival with some anxiety: though in the same ideological camp, Damascus had little control over most Palestinian organizations and was afraid that the build-up of Palestinian forces could lead to a new Israeli invasion. Moreover, Syria's minority Alawite regime was never comfortable with Sunni militias in Lebanon. In Lebanon, Shia-Palestinians relations had been very tense since the late 1960s. After the multi-national force withdrew from Beirut in February 1984, Amal and the PSP took control of west Beirut and Amal built a number of outposts around the camps (in Beirut but also in the south). On April 15, 1985, Amal and the PSP attacked Al-Murabitun, the main Lebanese Sunni militia and the closest ally of the PLO in Lebanon. Al-Murabitun were vanquished and their leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat was sent into exile. On May 19, 1985, heavy fighting erupted between Amal and the Palestinians for the control of the Sabra, Shatila and Burj el-Barajneh camps (all in Beirut). Despite its efforts, Amal could not take the control of the camps. The death toll remains unknown, with estimates ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand. This and heavy Arab pressure led to a cease-fire on June 17.
The situation remained tense and fights occurred again in September 1985 and March 1986. On May 19, 1986, heavy fighting erupted again. Despite new armaments provided by Syria, Amal could not take control of the camps. Many cease-fires were announced, but most of them did not last more than a few days. The situation began to cool after Syria deployed some troops on June 24, 1986.
There was tension in the south, an area where Shi'a and Palestinians were both present. This unavoidably led to frequent clashes. On September 29, 1986, fighting erupted at the Rashidiyye camp (Tyre). The conflict immediately spread to Sidon and Beirut. Palestinian forces managed to occupy the Amal-controlled town of Maghduche on the eastern hills of Sidon to open the road to Rashidiyye. Syrian forces helped Amal and Israel launched air strikes against PLO positions around Maghdouche. A cease-fire was negotiated between Amal and pro-Syrian Palestinian groups on December 15, 1986, but it was rejected by Yasser Arafat's Fatah. Fatah tried to appease the situation by giving some of its positions to Hezbollah and to the Murabitun. The situation became relatively calm for a while, but the bombing against the camps continued. In Beirut, a blockade of the camps led to a dramatic lack of food and medications inside the camps. In early 1987, the fighting spread to Hezbollah and the PSP who supported the Palestinians. The PSP quickly seized large portions of west Beirut. Consequently, Syria occupied west Beirut beginning February 21, 1987. In April 7, 1987, Amal finally lifted the siege and handed its positions around the camps to the Syrian army.
On February 17, 1988, Lt. Col William Higgins, American Chief of the United Nations Truce and Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) observer group in Lebanon, was abducted from his UN vehicle between Tyre and Nakara after a meeting with Abd al-Majid Salah, Amal's political leader in southern Lebanon. It soon became clear that Sheikh al-Musawi, the commander to Hezbollah's Islamic Resistance, had been personally responsible for the abduction of Lt. Col Higgins in close cooperation with both Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the local commander of Hezbollah's military wing, and Mustafa al-Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service. This was seen as a direct challenge to Amal by Hezbollah, and Amal responded by launching an offensive against Hezbollah in the south where it scored decisive military victories leading to the expulsion of a number of Hezbollah clergy to the Beqqa. In Beirut's southern suburbs, however, where fighting also raged, Hezbollah was much more successful. Elements within Hezbollah and the Iranian Pasdaran established a joint command to assassinate high-ranking Amal officials and carried out operations against Amal checkpoints and centers.
By May, Amal had suffered major losses, its members were defecting to Hezbollah, and by June, Syria had to intervene militarily to rescue Amal from defeat. In January 1989, a truce in the fighting between Hezbollah and Amal was arranged by Syrian and Iranian intervention. Under this agreement, Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon was recognized while Hezbollah and Amal was permitted to maintain only a nonmilitary presence through political, cultural, and informational programs.
Amal was a strong supporter of Syria after 1990 and endorsed Syria's military presence in Lebanon. After Rafiq Hariri's assassination in 2005, Amal opposed the Syrian withdrawal and did not take part in the Cedar revolution. Since 1990, the party has been continuously represented in the Lebanese parliament and the government. Amal is often criticized for corruption among its leaders. Nabih Berri was elected speaker of parliament in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009.
"Hope" see Amal.
Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah see Amal.
Lebanese Resistance Detachments see Amal.
Amal. Populist movement of Lebanese Shi ‘a Muslims that first emerged in 1975 and, subsequently, became an important political force in Lebanon.
Against a background of social exclusion and economic deprivation, the Shi‘a of Lebanon emerged as major political actors on the Lebanese scene. Well into the twentieth century, the Shi‘a were only bit players in Lebanon. They were unnoticed by other Lebanese, given scant attention by scholars, and presumed insignificant by Lebanese politicians. Socialized into a religious tradition that extolled sacrifice and presumed temporal injustice, the Shi‘a found ready confirmation for their beliefs in their mundane surroundings. Lebanon’s confessional (sectarian) political equation – in which privilege, office, and political rights were allocated according to sect – operated to the disadvantage of the Shi ‘a. This became pronounced as their population grew disproportionately to the country’s other major sects. In a political system dominated by Maronite and Sunni politicians, the Shi‘a were trapped by their confessional identity.
Although they lagged behind non-Shi‘a, the Shi‘a were still very much affected by the rapid modernization that had marked Lebanon since independence in 1943. Access to education produced a growing pool of individuals who were no longer content to confine their horizons to subsistence farming. Improved transportation eroded the geographic isolation of the community. A rapidly growing communications network, both within and outside of Lebanon, brought the outside world – with its political ideologies and its modern ideas and technologies – into even the most remote village.
Modernization of the agricultural sector, including an increasing emphasis on cash crops and farm mechanization, led to underemployment and unemployment. Many of the Shi‘a were forced to move off the land in order to survive. As the modernization process began to have an effect, and as the Shi‘a gained from exposure to horizons wider than the village, they became more aware of the disparities between them and their relatively affluent neighbors. Fleeing the poverty of the village and the drudgery of farm labor, many Shi‘a took work where they could find it in Beirut, usually as petty laborers or peddlers. This migration of labor led to the swelling of the population of the Lebanese capital by the 1960s. The Shi‘a made their homes in the squalid suburbs. Although some actually escaped from poverty, most remained dreadfully poor. Not surprisingly, these migrants from the country became a fertile pool for recruitment by radical parties that claimed to have answers to their difficulties.
More important, the dearth of economic opportunities within Lebanon factored into the movement of many Shi‘a men overseas, where opportunities in the Gulf states, and especially West Africa, provided a way out of poverty. Some made their fortunes and thereby gained the wherewithal to support political movements in their image. Later, the money earned by these Shi‘a migrants would play a crucial role in financing the growth of Shi‘a political activism within Lebanon. Though the Shi‘a as a whole are still relatively impoverished, many Shi‘a have done well as merchants, building contractors, and professionals. Yet, even among the affluent, there is an ethos of deprivation, a lingering memory imparted by a lifetime of accumulated grievances and slights.
The 1960s and 1970s also exposed the Lebanese Shi‘a to the vibrant and dynamic leadership of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr. Although born in Iran, Sadr traced his ancestry back to southern Lebanon and the village of Marakah. He moved to Lebanon in 1960 from Najaf, Iraq, where he had been studying Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence) under the sponsorship of several of the most important ayatollahs of the day. He was a looming presence in the pre-civil war period, and it was under his direction and leadership that the Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived) – the forerunner of the Amal movement – emerged in 1974. Sadr was a populist leader with an agenda of reform, not destruction and revolution.
Although the Movement of the Deprived claimed to represent all of the politically dispossessed Lebanese, regardless of confession, it was transparently a party of the Shi‘a. The charismatic Sadr skillfully exploited Shi‘ism’s potent symbolism to remind his followers that they were people with a heritage of resistance and sacrifice. He revitalized the epic martyrdom of Husayn (the grandson of the prophet Muhammad) at Karbala in 680, and he inspired his followers to emulate the Husayn’s bravery.
Despite his magnetic appeal for many Shi‘a, Sadr’s movement was only one in a field of organizations that successfully mobilized the Shi‘a into political action. In Lebanon, as in Iraq among the Shi‘a, the Communist Party was the party of prominence in the 1970s. Only later, and under bizarre circumstances, did Sadr’s movement assume center stage for the Shi‘a. With the civil war that began in 1975, Sadr’s popular following was challenged by a number of militia organizations, including the Palestinian Fida‘iyan, which recruited many Shi‘a youths. Sadr’s appeal diminished in a setting where guns became commonplace adornments and the rhetoric of hatred and cruelty overwhelmed his rhetoric of reform.
War’s exuberance faded and, in the south, the heartland of Shi‘ism in Lebanon, the conflict destroyed villages, took lives and livelihoods, and alienated many Shi‘a from their political alliances. Increasingly, throughout 1977 and 1978, the Shi‘a often found themselves in the crossfire between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. This was a period of heightened suffering, especially in southern Lebanon, where a heavy price was paid for the armed Palestinian presence.
By the late 1970s, many – but by no means all – of the politicized Shi‘a deserted the political left and joined or supported the rejuvenated Amal movement. Amal means "hope," but it is also an acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah (Lebanese Resistance Detachments). In 1978, the Israelis increased their military pressure on south Lebanon, thereby helping to stoke the tensions between the Shi‘a and the PLO, although subsequent Israeli errors would indicate that theirs was a very incomplete understanding of what was taking place among the Shi‘a. Amal began to take shape as a loose grouping of village homeguards, intent on circumscribing the influence of the PLO and thereby reducing the exposure of the Shi‘a to Israeli pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes.
With the Iranian Revolution gathering momentum in 1978, many Lebanese Shi‘a took inspiration from the actions of their Iranian co-religionists. If the Islamic Revolution was not a precise model for Lebanon, it was still an exemplar for action, and Amal, as an authentically Shi‘a movement, was the momentary beneficiary of this enthusiasm. Sadr was known to be a key supporter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) and an adversary of the shah (although his opposition had been tempered by a good dose of realism). Moreover, several key Amal officials, including the Iranian Mustafa Chamran, took up key positions in the new regime.
Ironically, it was also Sadr’s disappearance in 1978 that helped to retrieve the promise of his earlier efforts. In August 1978, he visited Libya with two companions, Shaykh Muhammad Shihadah Ya‘qub and journalist ‘Abbas Badr al-Din. The party has not been heard of since. Sadr became a hero to his followers, who revere his memory and take inspiration from his works and his plights. The symbol of a missing imam – reminiscent of the central dogma of Shi‘ism – is hard to assail, and even blood enemies were heard to utter words of praise for the missing leader. The reform movement Sadr founded became the largest Shi‘a organization in Lebanon. By 1982, when Israel launched its invasion of Lebanon, Amal was arguably the most dynamic force in Lebanese politics.
Amal’s calls for the reformation of the Lebanese political system went unheeded, however. The Maronite Christians, who have enjoyed the dominant role in the politics of modern Lebanon, were intent on preserving their power, not in sharing it. The Sunni Muslims, the Maronites’ junior partner , were also little interested in seeing the dimunition of their privileges to the advantage of the Shi‘a. Thus, the answer to Amal’s demands was calculated intransigence. The result was increased anger and frustration among the Shi‘a.
True to its reformist origins, the Amal leadership sought a role in the Lebanese political system in the exuberant second half of 1982. Although Lebanon’s civil war did not definitively end until 1990, the expulsion of the bulk of the PLO’s fighters from Lebanon and the energetic engagement of United States diplomacy seemed to signal that the worst was over. Amal leader Nabih Berri, the Sierra Leone born son of a Shi‘a trader, waited in vain for a call that never came. Meanwhile, though Israel earned the gratitude of many southern Shi‘a for expelling the widely disdained Palestinian gunmen, Israel remained in occupation of much of Lebanon, including all of the south.
By 1983, the hopes of 1982 were in tatters. United States diplomacy proved to be clumsy and poorly conceived, and Syria, defeated soundly by Israel in 1982, was determined to undermine Israel’s gains and America’s ambitions in Lebanon. An increasingly potent Lebanese resistance emerged, based initially in the parties of the left, but by the autumn of 1983 Amal was deeply implicated in the resistance. From 1982, onward, the Shi‘a community became increasingly militant, in no small measure because of an arbitrary campaign of intimidation and arrests by the Maronite led government.
The high point of Amal’s organized military power was in 1984. Amal fighters were heavily engaged against the Israeli occupation of Lebanese soil, and, in Beirut, Amal confronted the central government. After terrible shelling of the heavily populated southern suburbs by the army, Nabih Berri called successfully on Shi‘a soldiers to lay down their arms, whereupon Amal became the dominant force of the moment in West Beirut.
Shortly thereafter, in early 1984, United States marines withdrew from their positions in Beirut. Following the disastrous attack on the marine barracks in 1983 that killed more than two hundred marines, the departing marines left their positions to Amal militiamen. Amal moved to solidify its power position, while also maintaining pressure on Israel in the south, where the invading army consolidated its positions. Deadly, intense attacks prompted Israel to extricate most of its forces from Lebanon, while, in 1985, retaining a foothold in a self-proclaimed “security zone.”
For a time, the Amal leaders had some faith in United States promises, but, by 1985, those promises rang hollow and Amal was heavily influenced by Syria. Given the extant hatreds, Amal did not need much prodding to move to suppress surviving PLO positions in the environs of Beirut, but Syria was a generous supplier of arms and ammunition for Amal’s bloody war of the camps, which lasted until 1988.
Amal’s ascendancy, however, was promptly checked. A tactical alliance with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt crumbled, and among the Sunni Muslims fears of Shi‘a suzerainty sparked a variety of organizational ripostes. Amal’s moment of singular power was over.
Amal, which promised in the early 1980s to become the dominant organizational voice for the Shi‘a, faced a serious erosion in its following. Ineffective and even incompetent leadership, corruption, and more than a modicum of arrogance undermined its support, especially in the environs of Beirut.
Hizbullah (or “the Party of God”), the Iranian funded alternative to Amal, emerged after 1982 as a competent, dedicated, and well-led challenger. Although young Shi‘a clerics dominated the leadership of Hizbullah, it was noteworthy that Hizbullah was especially effective in recruiting among well-educated Shi‘a from secular professions, many of whom had lost confidence in Amal. In May 1988, fighting in Beirut suburbs, which saw the Hizbullah triumph over the Amal militia, underlined Hizbullah’s steady success in enlisting the Shi‘a, many of whom were ex-Amal members.
As the overall situation grew worse, Hizbullah gained supporters, although Amal remained a force with which to be reckoned. The persistent insecurity, the stalling of political reform, and the near total collapse of the Lebanese economy made religion a refuge, skillfully manipulated to be sure, in a situation where there were no other answers. Taking its cue from Iran, Hizbullah exploited the symbolism of Shi‘ism to enlist support. For instance, ‘Ashura’, the day on which the Shi‘a commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn more than thirteen hundred years ago, and certainly the most significant day of the Shi‘a calendar, became not just a plea for intercession or an act of piety, but a revolutionary statement.
Hizbullah enjoyed much less success in south Lebanon, where about one-third of the Shi‘a live. Anti-PLO animosity ran deep in the south, and Amal’s staunch stance against the restoration of an armed PLO presence in the area accurately reflected popular sentiment and distinguished Amal from Hizbullah.
The civil war ended in 1990, generally along the lines of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, which called for Muslim Christian parity in parliament and increased, marginally, the influence of the Shi‘a Muslims in the Lebanese political system. In agreement with the accord, Amal was disarmed in 1991 and the movement’s militia phase ended.
Amal’s rival, Hizbullah, however, did not disarm and continued to enjoy the toleration of Syria and the support of Iran. In addition, although Amal leaders had long railed against the corruption and arrogance of the zu‘ama’ (political bosses), senior Amal figures were susceptible to the same charges. Amal maintained an important core of support, especially in the south, but Hizbullah continued to siphon off members, who were attracted by Hizbullah’s network of social services and its reputation for integrity.
With the resumption of “normal” politics in Lebanon, Amal’s raison d’etre had to be modified radically. Although the killing stopped, for the most part, the aftermath of the civil war was a national economic crisis in which the real standard of living of the Lebanese declined dramatically. Amal’s capacity for conversion into a widely encompassing political movement was thus limited.
Nonetheless, Nabih Berri, long a political outsider, ascended in 1991 to the position of parliamentary speaker, the highest political position allotted to a Shi‘a, signifying both a personal success and a marker of Amal’s accomplishments since its creation in 1974. Popular movements tend to offer more than they can reasonably be expected to deliver, otherwise they would lose their populist base, and Amal is no exception. Yet, in the quest of the Shi‘a of Lebanon for dignity and political power, Amal’s role was central. The movement authentically symbolized the moderation and the project of reform that defines the vast majority of this community.
Amal Movement is short for Afwaq al-Muqawmat al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Resistance Detachments) the acronym for which, in Arabic, is "amal", meaning "hope."
Amal was founded in 1975 as the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a Shi'a political movement founded by Musa al-Sadr and Hussein el-Husseini a year earlier. It became one of the most important Shi'a Muslim militias during the Lebanese Civil War. Amal grew strong with the support of, and through its ties with, Syria and the 300,000 Shi'a internal refugees from southern Lebanon after the Israeli bombings in the early 1980s. Amal's practical objectives were to gain greater respect for Lebanon's Shi'ite population and the allocation of a larger share of governmental resources for the Shi'ite-dominated southern part of the country.
At its zenith, the militia had 14,000 troops. Amal fought a long campaign against Palestinian refugees during the Lebanese Civil War (called the War of the Camps). After the War of the Camps, Amal fought a bloody battle against rival Shi'a group Hezbollah for control of Beirut, which provoked Syrian military intervention. Hezbollah itself was formed by religious members of Amal who had left after Nabih Berri's assumption of full control and the subsequent resignation of most of Amal's earliest members.
The origins of the Amal movement lie with the Lebanese cleric of Iranian origin Imam Musa al-Sadr. In 1974, Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) was established by al-Sadr and member of parliament Hussein el-Husseini to attempt to reform the Lebanese system. While acknowledging its support base to be the “traditionally under-represented politically and economically disadvantaged” Shi'a community, it aimed, according to Palmer-Harik, to seek social justice for all deprived Lebanese. Although influenced by Islamic ideas, it was a secular movement trying to unite people along communal rather than religious or ideological lines. The Greek Catholic Archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Grégoire Haddad, was among the founders of the Movement.
On January 20, 1975, the Lebanese Resistance Detachments (also referred to in English as 'The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance') were formed as a military wing of The Movement of the Disinherited under the leadership of al-Sadr, and came to be popularly known as Amal (from the acronym Afwaj al-Muqawmat Al-Lubnaniyya). In 1978, al-Sadr disappeared in mysterious circumstances while visiting Libya, the Amal movement’s regional supporter at the time. Hussein el-Husseini became leader of Amal and was followed by Nabih Berri in April 1980 after el-Husseini resigned. One of the consequences of the rise of Berri, a less educated leader, was the increasing secular yet sectarian nature of the movement and a move away from an Islamic context for the movement.
In the summer of 1982, Husayn Al-Musawi, deputy head and official spokesman of Amal, broke with Berri over his willingness to go along with United States. mediation in Lebanon rather than attack Israeli troops, his membership in the National Salvation Council alongside the Christians, and his opposition to pledging allegiance to Ayatollah Khomeini.
Musawi formed the Islamist Islamic Amal Movement, based in Baalbeck. It was aided by the Islamic Republic of Iran which, in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, strove not only to help Lebanon's Shi'a, but to export the Pan-Islamic revolution to the rest of the Muslim world, something Musawi strongly supported.
About 1500 members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard or Pasdaran, arrived in Beqaa Valley that same time and "directly contributed to ensure the survival and growth of al-Musawi's newly-created small militia," providing training, indoctrination and funding. Iran was in many ways a natural ally of the Shia in Lebanon as it was far larger than Lebanon, oil-rich, and both Shi'a-majority and Shi'a-ruled, in fact, the only state ruled by Shi'a. And of course, founder Musa al-Sadr had come from Iran. Iran's generous funding meant generous pay for the militia's recruits that far exceeded what other Lebanese militias were able to offer. This was a major incentive among the impoverished Shi'a community, and induced a sizable number of Amal fighters to defected regularly to the ranks of Islamic Amal, and later to Hizb'allah.
However, while siding with Syria rather the Islamic Republic of Iran seriously weakened Amal, Berri and others in Amal were reluctant to follow Iran's lead. Their reasons reportedly included doubt that the policies of revolutionary Iran could solve Lebanon's sectarian problems; the belief that the Islamic Republic had done little to help solve the 1979 disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr; the perception that Iranian Islamic revolutionaries in power had done little to return the favor of Amal's extensive support for Iranian opposition activity against the Shah's regime, such as military training of senior Iranian revolutionaries in Lebanon in camps under Amal's auspices; alarm that several of Amal's most loyal friends within Iran's clerical establishment either disappeared or were killed or ousted by Ayatollah Khomeini in the period between 1980-81; and disapproval of the support and encouragement given to the PLO by Islamic revolutionaries in Iran as a natural spearhead in the holy war against Israel, despite the fact that PLO activity brought considerable trouble and hardship to the south Lebanese Shi'ites.
Islamic Amal went on to be particularly active in fighting Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon. By August 1983, Islamic Amal and Hezbollah were effectively becoming one under the Hezbollah label, and by late 1984, Islamic Amal, along with all the known major groups in Lebanon, had been absorbed into Hezbollah.
The War of the Camps was a series of battles in the mid-1980s between Amal and Palestinian groups. The Druze-oriented Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and Hezbollah supported the Palestinians while Syria backed Amal.
Although most of the Palestinian guerrillas were expelled during the 1982 Israeli invasion, Palestinian militias began to regain their footing after the Israeli withdrawal from first Beirut, then Sidon and Tyre. Syria viewed this revival with some anxiety: though in the same ideological camp, Damascus had little control over most Palestinian organizations and was afraid that the build-up of Palestinian forces could lead to a new Israeli invasion. Moreover, Syria's minority Alawite regime was never comfortable with Sunni militias in Lebanon. In Lebanon, Shia-Palestinians relations had been very tense since the late 1960s. After the multi-national force withdrew from Beirut in February 1984, Amal and the PSP took control of west Beirut and Amal built a number of outposts around the camps (in Beirut but also in the south). On April 15, 1985, Amal and the PSP attacked Al-Murabitun, the main Lebanese Sunni militia and the closest ally of the PLO in Lebanon. Al-Murabitun were vanquished and their leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat was sent into exile. On May 19, 1985, heavy fighting erupted between Amal and the Palestinians for the control of the Sabra, Shatila and Burj el-Barajneh camps (all in Beirut). Despite its efforts, Amal could not take the control of the camps. The death toll remains unknown, with estimates ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand. This and heavy Arab pressure led to a cease-fire on June 17.
The situation remained tense and fights occurred again in September 1985 and March 1986. On May 19, 1986, heavy fighting erupted again. Despite new armaments provided by Syria, Amal could not take control of the camps. Many cease-fires were announced, but most of them did not last more than a few days. The situation began to cool after Syria deployed some troops on June 24, 1986.
There was tension in the south, an area where Shi'a and Palestinians were both present. This unavoidably led to frequent clashes. On September 29, 1986, fighting erupted at the Rashidiyye camp (Tyre). The conflict immediately spread to Sidon and Beirut. Palestinian forces managed to occupy the Amal-controlled town of Maghduche on the eastern hills of Sidon to open the road to Rashidiyye. Syrian forces helped Amal and Israel launched air strikes against PLO positions around Maghdouche. A cease-fire was negotiated between Amal and pro-Syrian Palestinian groups on December 15, 1986, but it was rejected by Yasser Arafat's Fatah. Fatah tried to appease the situation by giving some of its positions to Hezbollah and to the Murabitun. The situation became relatively calm for a while, but the bombing against the camps continued. In Beirut, a blockade of the camps led to a dramatic lack of food and medications inside the camps. In early 1987, the fighting spread to Hezbollah and the PSP who supported the Palestinians. The PSP quickly seized large portions of west Beirut. Consequently, Syria occupied west Beirut beginning February 21, 1987. In April 7, 1987, Amal finally lifted the siege and handed its positions around the camps to the Syrian army.
On February 17, 1988, Lt. Col William Higgins, American Chief of the United Nations Truce and Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) observer group in Lebanon, was abducted from his UN vehicle between Tyre and Nakara after a meeting with Abd al-Majid Salah, Amal's political leader in southern Lebanon. It soon became clear that Sheikh al-Musawi, the commander to Hezbollah's Islamic Resistance, had been personally responsible for the abduction of Lt. Col Higgins in close cooperation with both Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid, the local commander of Hezbollah's military wing, and Mustafa al-Dirani, the former head of Amal's security service. This was seen as a direct challenge to Amal by Hezbollah, and Amal responded by launching an offensive against Hezbollah in the south where it scored decisive military victories leading to the expulsion of a number of Hezbollah clergy to the Beqqa. In Beirut's southern suburbs, however, where fighting also raged, Hezbollah was much more successful. Elements within Hezbollah and the Iranian Pasdaran established a joint command to assassinate high-ranking Amal officials and carried out operations against Amal checkpoints and centers.
By May, Amal had suffered major losses, its members were defecting to Hezbollah, and by June, Syria had to intervene militarily to rescue Amal from defeat. In January 1989, a truce in the fighting between Hezbollah and Amal was arranged by Syrian and Iranian intervention. Under this agreement, Amal's authority over the security of southern Lebanon was recognized while Hezbollah and Amal was permitted to maintain only a nonmilitary presence through political, cultural, and informational programs.
Amal was a strong supporter of Syria after 1990 and endorsed Syria's military presence in Lebanon. After Rafiq Hariri's assassination in 2005, Amal opposed the Syrian withdrawal and did not take part in the Cedar revolution. Since 1990, the party has been continuously represented in the Lebanese parliament and the government. Amal is often criticized for corruption among its leaders. Nabih Berri was elected speaker of parliament in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009.
"Hope" see Amal.
Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyah see Amal.
Lebanese Resistance Detachments see Amal.
Aman Allah
Aman Allah (Amanollah Khan) (Amanullah) (Aman Ullah) (June 1, 1892 - April 25, 1960). Amir (king) of Afghanistan (r.1919-1929). During his reign, he gained Afghanistan’s political independence from Great Britain and launched an ambitious program of modernization, opposition to which cost him his throne.
Aman Allah (June 1, 1892 – April 25, 1960) was the ruler of the Emirate of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929, first as Amir and after 1926 as Shah. He led Afghanistan to independence over its foreign affairs from the United Kingdom, and his rule was marked by dramatic political and social change.
Born in 1892, he was the son of Amir Habibullah and Sarwar Sultanah, the Ulya Hazrat (the queen). When Amir Habibullah was assassinated in Jalalabad (Jelalabad) in February 1919, Aman Allah was governor of Kabul and in possession of the arsenal and the treasury. He convinced the army and the Afghan power elite to prefer his claim to that of his uncle and elder brothers. He was crowned in Kabul over the prior claims of his uncle Nasrullah, whom he denounced as an usurper and an accomplice in the murder of his father.
Aman Allah demanded a revision of the Anglo-Afghan agreements concluded by Amir Abdul Rahman that left Britain in charge of Afghanistan’s foreign relations in exchange for protection from unprovoked Russian aggression and a subsidy in money and military materiel. British reluctance to accept a change in the status quo led to Afghan armed attacks, culminating in the start of the Third Anglo-Afghan War on May 3, 1919. Britain was war-weary and in no condition to wage war on the Indian frontier and, after lengthy negotiations in Rawalpindi, Mussoorie, and Kabul, peace was restored, leaving Afghanistan free and independent from British control.
Aman Allah became a national hero and turned his attention to reforming and modernizing his country. He established diplomatic and commercial relations with major European and Asian states; founded schools in which French, German, and English were the major languages of education; and promulgated a constitution which guaranteed the personal freedom and equal rights of all Afghans.
The Soviet leader V. I. Lenin welcomed Aman Allah’s anti-colonial stand, extended diplomatic recognition, and offered material assistance and a treaty. The Soviet policy of repression in Muslim Central Asia, however, quickly led to friction between the two states. Aman Allah soon sought relations with countries that did not seem to have territorial designs on the area. He established ties with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, although he failed to initiate official relations with the United States.
Aman Allah assumed the title of king in 1926, and, as an ardent reformer, was a contemporary of like-minded Muslim rulers such as Muhammad Reza in Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Advised by Ottoman educated Afghans and impressed by Turkey’s example, Aman Allah embarked on his own scheme of development. First, he gave the country its first constitution and three times convened the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), composed of various segments of the power elite, to ratify his important decisions. Second, he systematized the administrative divisions of the country into a territorial hierarchy of sub-districts, districts, and provinces. The centrally appointed administrators at each level were assisted by a locally elected consultative body. Third, he replaced tax farming with directly collected taxes in cash. Fourth, he tolerated a free press, entrusted the intelligentsia with responsible positions in the government, and spent a major portion of the revenue of the state on the expansion of education.
He built a new capital, named Darulaman ("Dar al-Aman" – “Abode of Peace”), which included a monumental parliament and other government buildings as well as villas of prominent Afghans. Social reforms included a new dress code that permitted women in Kabul to go unveiled and encouraged officials to wear Western dress.
Modernization proved costly for Afghanistan and was resented by the traditional elements of Afghan society. The Khost Rebellion, a tribal revolt in 1924, was suppressed, and Aman Allah felt secure enough to travel to Europe in December 1927. However, upon his return he faced increasing opposition and, in 1928, an uprising of Shinwari tribesmen, followed by attacks of the Kohdamani and Kuhistani forces of Habibullah Kalakani, forced the reformer king into exile. After an unsuccessful attempt at regaining the throne, he crossed the Indian border on May 23, 1929.
Aman Allah was succeeded by Nadir Shah (r. 1929-1933). As for Aman Allah, he settled in Italy and Switzerland until his death on April 26, 1960. He was buried in Jalalabad at the side of the tomb of Amir Habibullah.
Aman Allah was the third son of the Amir Habibullah Khan. When he helped assassinate his father on February 20, 1919, Aman Allah was already installed as the governor of Kabul and was in control of the army and the treasury. He quickly seized power, imprisoned any relatives with competing claims to the Kingship, and gained the allegiance of most of the tribal leaders.
Russia had recently undergone its Communist revolution, leading to strained relations between the country and the United Kingdom. Aman Allah recognized the opportunity to use the situation to gain Afghanistan's independence over its foreign affairs. He led a surprise attack against the British in India on May 3, 1919, beginning the third Anglo-Afghan war. After initial successes, the war quickly became a stalemate as the United Kingdom was still dealing with the costs of World War I. An armistice was reached in 1921, and Afghanistan became an independent nation.
Aman Allah enjoyed quite a bit of early popularity within Afghanistan and he used his influence to modernize the country. Aman Allah created new cosmopolitan schools for both boys and girls in the region and overturned centuries-old traditions such a strict dress codes for women. He increased trade with Europe and Asia. He also advanced a modernist constitution that incorporated equal rights and individual freedoms with the guidance of his father-in-law and Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi. His wife, Queen Soraya Tarzi played a huge role in regard to his policy towards women. Unfortunately, this rapid modernization created a backlash and a reactionary uprising known as the Khost rebellion was suppressed in 1924. He also met with many Bahá'ís in India and Europe where he brought back books that were prominently located in the Kabul library. This association later served as one of the accusations when he was overthrown.
At the time, Afghanistan's foreign policy was primarily concerned with the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Each attempted to gain the favor of Afghanistan and foil attempts by the other power to gain influence in the region. This effect was inconsistent, but generally favorable for Afghanistan. Aman Allah was even able to establish a limited Afghan Air Force consisting of donated Soviet planes.
After Aman Allah travelled to Europe in late 1927, opposition to his rule increased. An uprising in Jalalabad culminated in a march to the capital, and much of the army deserted rather than resist. Through public support Habibullah Kalakani became the next king of Afghanistan. However, his rule was short lived and was soon replaced by Nadir Khan. In early 1929, Aman Allah abdicated and went into temporary exile in India. Aman Allah attempted to return to Afghanistan, however he had little support from the people. From India, the ex-king traveled to Europe and settled in Italy, and later in Switzerland. Meanwhile, Nadir Khan made sure his return to Afghanistan was impossible by engaging in a propaganda war. Nadir Khan accused Aman Allah Khan of kufr with his pro western policies.
Aman Allah Khan died in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1960. Very few of his many reforms were continued once he was no longer in power.
Amanollah Khan see Aman Allah
Amanullah see Aman Allah
Aman Ullah see Aman Allah
Aman Allah (Amanollah Khan) (Amanullah) (Aman Ullah) (June 1, 1892 - April 25, 1960). Amir (king) of Afghanistan (r.1919-1929). During his reign, he gained Afghanistan’s political independence from Great Britain and launched an ambitious program of modernization, opposition to which cost him his throne.
Aman Allah (June 1, 1892 – April 25, 1960) was the ruler of the Emirate of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929, first as Amir and after 1926 as Shah. He led Afghanistan to independence over its foreign affairs from the United Kingdom, and his rule was marked by dramatic political and social change.
Born in 1892, he was the son of Amir Habibullah and Sarwar Sultanah, the Ulya Hazrat (the queen). When Amir Habibullah was assassinated in Jalalabad (Jelalabad) in February 1919, Aman Allah was governor of Kabul and in possession of the arsenal and the treasury. He convinced the army and the Afghan power elite to prefer his claim to that of his uncle and elder brothers. He was crowned in Kabul over the prior claims of his uncle Nasrullah, whom he denounced as an usurper and an accomplice in the murder of his father.
Aman Allah demanded a revision of the Anglo-Afghan agreements concluded by Amir Abdul Rahman that left Britain in charge of Afghanistan’s foreign relations in exchange for protection from unprovoked Russian aggression and a subsidy in money and military materiel. British reluctance to accept a change in the status quo led to Afghan armed attacks, culminating in the start of the Third Anglo-Afghan War on May 3, 1919. Britain was war-weary and in no condition to wage war on the Indian frontier and, after lengthy negotiations in Rawalpindi, Mussoorie, and Kabul, peace was restored, leaving Afghanistan free and independent from British control.
Aman Allah became a national hero and turned his attention to reforming and modernizing his country. He established diplomatic and commercial relations with major European and Asian states; founded schools in which French, German, and English were the major languages of education; and promulgated a constitution which guaranteed the personal freedom and equal rights of all Afghans.
The Soviet leader V. I. Lenin welcomed Aman Allah’s anti-colonial stand, extended diplomatic recognition, and offered material assistance and a treaty. The Soviet policy of repression in Muslim Central Asia, however, quickly led to friction between the two states. Aman Allah soon sought relations with countries that did not seem to have territorial designs on the area. He established ties with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, although he failed to initiate official relations with the United States.
Aman Allah assumed the title of king in 1926, and, as an ardent reformer, was a contemporary of like-minded Muslim rulers such as Muhammad Reza in Iran and Kemal Ataturk in Turkey. Advised by Ottoman educated Afghans and impressed by Turkey’s example, Aman Allah embarked on his own scheme of development. First, he gave the country its first constitution and three times convened the Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), composed of various segments of the power elite, to ratify his important decisions. Second, he systematized the administrative divisions of the country into a territorial hierarchy of sub-districts, districts, and provinces. The centrally appointed administrators at each level were assisted by a locally elected consultative body. Third, he replaced tax farming with directly collected taxes in cash. Fourth, he tolerated a free press, entrusted the intelligentsia with responsible positions in the government, and spent a major portion of the revenue of the state on the expansion of education.
He built a new capital, named Darulaman ("Dar al-Aman" – “Abode of Peace”), which included a monumental parliament and other government buildings as well as villas of prominent Afghans. Social reforms included a new dress code that permitted women in Kabul to go unveiled and encouraged officials to wear Western dress.
Modernization proved costly for Afghanistan and was resented by the traditional elements of Afghan society. The Khost Rebellion, a tribal revolt in 1924, was suppressed, and Aman Allah felt secure enough to travel to Europe in December 1927. However, upon his return he faced increasing opposition and, in 1928, an uprising of Shinwari tribesmen, followed by attacks of the Kohdamani and Kuhistani forces of Habibullah Kalakani, forced the reformer king into exile. After an unsuccessful attempt at regaining the throne, he crossed the Indian border on May 23, 1929.
Aman Allah was succeeded by Nadir Shah (r. 1929-1933). As for Aman Allah, he settled in Italy and Switzerland until his death on April 26, 1960. He was buried in Jalalabad at the side of the tomb of Amir Habibullah.
Aman Allah was the third son of the Amir Habibullah Khan. When he helped assassinate his father on February 20, 1919, Aman Allah was already installed as the governor of Kabul and was in control of the army and the treasury. He quickly seized power, imprisoned any relatives with competing claims to the Kingship, and gained the allegiance of most of the tribal leaders.
Russia had recently undergone its Communist revolution, leading to strained relations between the country and the United Kingdom. Aman Allah recognized the opportunity to use the situation to gain Afghanistan's independence over its foreign affairs. He led a surprise attack against the British in India on May 3, 1919, beginning the third Anglo-Afghan war. After initial successes, the war quickly became a stalemate as the United Kingdom was still dealing with the costs of World War I. An armistice was reached in 1921, and Afghanistan became an independent nation.
Aman Allah enjoyed quite a bit of early popularity within Afghanistan and he used his influence to modernize the country. Aman Allah created new cosmopolitan schools for both boys and girls in the region and overturned centuries-old traditions such a strict dress codes for women. He increased trade with Europe and Asia. He also advanced a modernist constitution that incorporated equal rights and individual freedoms with the guidance of his father-in-law and Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi. His wife, Queen Soraya Tarzi played a huge role in regard to his policy towards women. Unfortunately, this rapid modernization created a backlash and a reactionary uprising known as the Khost rebellion was suppressed in 1924. He also met with many Bahá'ís in India and Europe where he brought back books that were prominently located in the Kabul library. This association later served as one of the accusations when he was overthrown.
At the time, Afghanistan's foreign policy was primarily concerned with the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Each attempted to gain the favor of Afghanistan and foil attempts by the other power to gain influence in the region. This effect was inconsistent, but generally favorable for Afghanistan. Aman Allah was even able to establish a limited Afghan Air Force consisting of donated Soviet planes.
After Aman Allah travelled to Europe in late 1927, opposition to his rule increased. An uprising in Jalalabad culminated in a march to the capital, and much of the army deserted rather than resist. Through public support Habibullah Kalakani became the next king of Afghanistan. However, his rule was short lived and was soon replaced by Nadir Khan. In early 1929, Aman Allah abdicated and went into temporary exile in India. Aman Allah attempted to return to Afghanistan, however he had little support from the people. From India, the ex-king traveled to Europe and settled in Italy, and later in Switzerland. Meanwhile, Nadir Khan made sure his return to Afghanistan was impossible by engaging in a propaganda war. Nadir Khan accused Aman Allah Khan of kufr with his pro western policies.
Aman Allah Khan died in Zurich, Switzerland, in 1960. Very few of his many reforms were continued once he was no longer in power.
Amanollah Khan see Aman Allah
Amanullah see Aman Allah
Aman Ullah see Aman Allah
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