Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali (Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib) (1601/1602/1603, Tabriz, Iran - 1677). One of the most prolific poets of his time. He is highly praised by critics.
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣāʾib, also called Ṣāʾib of Tabriz, or Ṣāʾib of Eṣfahān, was a Persian poet and one of the greatest masters of a form of classical Arabic and Persian lyric poetry characterized by rhymed couplets and known as the ghazel.
Ṣāʾib was educated in Eṣfahān, and in about 1626/27 he traveled to India, where he was received into the court of Shāh Jahān. He stayed for a time in Kabul and in Kashmir, returning home after several years abroad. After his return Shāh ʿAbbas II bestowed upon him the title King of Poets.
Ṣāʾib’s reputation is based primarily on some 300,000 couplets, including his epic poem Qandahār-nāma (“The Campaign Against Qandahār”). His “Indian style” verses reveal an elegant wit, a gift for the aphorism and the proverb, and a keen appreciation of philosophical and intellectual exercise. In addition to his remarkable output of Persian verse, Ṣāʾib wrote poetry in Turkish.
Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Tabriz see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Esfahan see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
King of Poets see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali (Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib) (1601/1602/1603, Tabriz, Iran - 1677). One of the most prolific poets of his time. He is highly praised by critics.
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣāʾib, also called Ṣāʾib of Tabriz, or Ṣāʾib of Eṣfahān, was a Persian poet and one of the greatest masters of a form of classical Arabic and Persian lyric poetry characterized by rhymed couplets and known as the ghazel.
Ṣāʾib was educated in Eṣfahān, and in about 1626/27 he traveled to India, where he was received into the court of Shāh Jahān. He stayed for a time in Kabul and in Kashmir, returning home after several years abroad. After his return Shāh ʿAbbas II bestowed upon him the title King of Poets.
Ṣāʾib’s reputation is based primarily on some 300,000 couplets, including his epic poem Qandahār-nāma (“The Campaign Against Qandahār”). His “Indian style” verses reveal an elegant wit, a gift for the aphorism and the proverb, and a keen appreciation of philosophical and intellectual exercise. In addition to his remarkable output of Persian verse, Ṣāʾib wrote poetry in Turkish.
Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Sa’ib see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Tabriz see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Sa'ib of Esfahan see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
King of Poets see Sa’ib, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali
Said, Edward
Said, Edward (Edward Said) (Edward Wadie Saïd) (Idwārd Wadīʿ Saʿīd) (Edward William Sa'id) (b. November 1, 1935, Jerusalem, British Mandate of Palestine - d. September 25, 2003, New York City, New York, United States). Palestinian-American literary theorist and advocate for Palestinian rights. Said’s broad fame was principally connected to his book Orientalism, published in 1978, in which he strong criticizes Western social, historical and religious studies of the Middle East and North Africa. Said accuses Western scientists of often being victims of prejudices, of reducing Oriental cultures and religions in comparison to Western cultures and religions. In general, Said protests against Western disposition to paint Asia as exotic, different, traditional sensual and fanatic. Said was educated at Victoria College in Cairo, Mount Hermon School and Princeton and Harvard Universities.
Said was born in 1935 in Jerusalem -- then part of British-ruled Palestine -- and was raised in Egypt before moving to the United States as a student. He was for many years the leading United States advocate for the Palestinian cause.
Said's writings have been translated into 26 languages and his most influential book, Orientalism was credited with forcing Westerners to re-examine their perceptions of the Islamic world. His work covered a plethora of other subjects from English literature, his academic specialty, to music and culture. His later books include Musical Elaborations (1991) and Cultural Imperialism (1993).
Many of Said's books -- including The Question of Palestine (1979), Covering Islam (1981), After the Last Sky (1986), and Blaming the Victims (1988) -- were influenced directly by Said's involvement with Palestine. He was a prominent member of the Palestinian parliament-in-exile for fourteen years before stepping down in 1991.
A professor at Columbia University for most of his academic career, Said was consistently critical of Israel for what he regarded as mistreatment of the Palestinians. He prompted a controversy in 2000 when he threw a rock toward an Israeli guardhouse on the Lebanese border. Columbia did not censure him, saying the stone was not directed at anyone, no law was broken and that his actions were protected by principles of academic freedom.
Said's outspoken stance made him many enemies. He suffered repeated death threats and, in 1985, he was called a Nazi by the Jewish Defense League and his university office was set on fire.
After the signing of the Oslo peace accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Said also criticized Yasser Arafat because he believed the PLO leader had made a bad deal for the Palestinians.
Edward Wadie Said, sometimes Edward William Said, was a Palestinian American academic, political activist, and literary critic who examined literature in light of social and cultural politics and was an outspoken proponent of the political rights of the Palestinian people and the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
Said’s father, Wadie (William) Ibrahim, was a wealthy businessman who had lived some time in the United States and apparently, at some point, took United States citizenship. In 1947, Wadie moved the family from Jerusalem to Cairo in order to avoid the conflict that was beginning over the United Nations partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab areas. In Cairo, Said was educated in English-language schools before transferring to the exclusive Northfield Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts in the United States in 1951. He attended Princeton University (B.A., 1957) and Harvard University (M.A., 1960; Ph.D., 1964), where he specialized in English literature. He joined the faculty of Columbia University as a lecturer in English in 1963 and in 1967 was promoted to assistant professor of English and comparative literature. His first book, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), was an expansion of his doctoral thesis. The book examines Conrad’s short stories and letters for the underlying tension of the author’s narrative style; it is concerned with the cultural dynamics of beginning a work of literature or scholarship.
Said was promoted to full professor in 1969, received his first of several endowed chairs in 1977, and in 1978 published Orientalism, his best-known work and one of the most influential scholarly books of the 20th century. In it Said examined Western scholarship of the “Orient,” specifically of the Arab Islamic world (though he was an Arab Christian), and argued that early scholarship by Westerners in that region was biased and projected a false and stereotyped vision of “otherness” on the Islamic world that facilitated and supported Western colonial policy.
Although he never taught any courses on the Middle East, Said wrote numerous books and articles in his support of Arab causes and Palestinian rights. He was especially critical of United States and Israeli policy in the region, and this led him into numerous, often bitter, polemics with supporters of those two countries. He was elected to the Palestine National Council (the Palestinian legislature in exile) in 1977, and, though he supported a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he became highly critical of the Oslo peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in the early 1990s.
His books about the Middle East include The Question of Palestine (1979), Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (1981), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (1988; co-edited with Christopher Hitchens), The Politics of Dispossession (1994), and Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (1995). Among his other notable books are The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983), Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature: Yeats and Decolonization (1988), Musical Elaborations (1991), and Culture and Imperialism (1993). His autobiography, Out of Place (1999), reflects the ambivalence he felt over living in both the Western and Eastern traditions.
In addition to his political and academic pursuits, Said was an accomplished musician and pianist.
Edward Said died at age 67 in the early morning of September 25, 2003, in New York City, after a 12 year-long battle with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. He was survived by his wife of 33 years, Mariam (née Cortas); a son, Wadie, and a daughter, Najla.
Edward Said see Said, Edward
Edward Wadie Saïd see Said, Edward
Idwārd Wadīʿ Saʿīd see Said, Edward
Edward William Sa'id see Said, Edward
Said’s father, Wadie (William) Ibrahim, was a wealthy businessman who had lived some time in the United States and apparently, at some point, took United States citizenship. In 1947, Wadie moved the family from Jerusalem to Cairo in order to avoid the conflict that was beginning over the United Nations partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab areas. In Cairo, Said was educated in English-language schools before transferring to the exclusive Northfield Mount Hermon School in Massachusetts in the United States in 1951. He attended Princeton University (B.A., 1957) and Harvard University (M.A., 1960; Ph.D., 1964), where he specialized in English literature. He joined the faculty of Columbia University as a lecturer in English in 1963 and in 1967 was promoted to assistant professor of English and comparative literature. His first book, Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography (1966), was an expansion of his doctoral thesis. The book examines Conrad’s short stories and letters for the underlying tension of the author’s narrative style; it is concerned with the cultural dynamics of beginning a work of literature or scholarship.
Said was promoted to full professor in 1969, received his first of several endowed chairs in 1977, and in 1978 published Orientalism, his best-known work and one of the most influential scholarly books of the 20th century. In it Said examined Western scholarship of the “Orient,” specifically of the Arab Islamic world (though he was an Arab Christian), and argued that early scholarship by Westerners in that region was biased and projected a false and stereotyped vision of “otherness” on the Islamic world that facilitated and supported Western colonial policy.
Although he never taught any courses on the Middle East, Said wrote numerous books and articles in his support of Arab causes and Palestinian rights. He was especially critical of United States and Israeli policy in the region, and this led him into numerous, often bitter, polemics with supporters of those two countries. He was elected to the Palestine National Council (the Palestinian legislature in exile) in 1977, and, though he supported a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he became highly critical of the Oslo peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in the early 1990s.
His books about the Middle East include The Question of Palestine (1979), Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (1981), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (1988; co-edited with Christopher Hitchens), The Politics of Dispossession (1994), and Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process (1995). Among his other notable books are The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983), Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature: Yeats and Decolonization (1988), Musical Elaborations (1991), and Culture and Imperialism (1993). His autobiography, Out of Place (1999), reflects the ambivalence he felt over living in both the Western and Eastern traditions.
In addition to his political and academic pursuits, Said was an accomplished musician and pianist.
Edward Said died at age 67 in the early morning of September 25, 2003, in New York City, after a 12 year-long battle with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. He was survived by his wife of 33 years, Mariam (née Cortas); a son, Wadie, and a daughter, Najla.
Edward Said see Said, Edward
Edward Wadie Saïd see Said, Edward
Idwārd Wadīʿ Saʿīd see Said, Edward
Edward William Sa'id see Said, Edward
Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed
Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed (Mehmed Said Halim Pasha) (Said Halim Pasha</I.) (b. January 18, 1865, Cairo, Egypt - December 6, 1921, Rome, Italy). Islamic reformer and Ottoman grand vizier (1913-1916). Born in Cairo, Said Halim was the grandson of Muhammad ‘Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. At the age of six, he came to Istanbul when his father was exiled by Khedive Ismail. Tutors taught Said Halim Arabic, Persian, French, and English. Later he was sent to Switzerland where he read political science. On his return to Istanbul he was appointed to the Council of State in May 1888 and given the rank of a civil pasha. He continued to ascend the administrative ladder and gain new honors.
For an independent minded and cosmopolitan intellectual, life under Abdulhamid (r.1876-1908) was suffocating. Therefore, Said Halim withdrew to his villa on the Bosphorus and devoted his energies to the study of history and religion, concerned as he was about the decline and stagnation of the Muslim world vis-a-vis the West. An imperial spy denounced him as subversive, and he was exiled to Egypt and Europe. There he joined the Young Turks, supporting their activities financially. He returned to Istanbul after constitutional rule was restored in July 1908.
Said Halim became a member of the inner circle of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and leader of the Islamist faction. In December 1908, he was appointed to the senate and the Islamic Education Committee. He entered the cabinet in January 1912 as president of the Council of State. In January 1913, during the Balkan wars, he became foreign minister. He was appointed grand vizier on June 11, 1913, while retaining the foreign ministry. At a time when the Ottoman government was accused of pursuing a policy of Turkification, its Sadrazam was an ardent Islamist who wrote only in French and Arabic. The appointment was designed to appease Arab/Islamic sentiment in the empire. Said Halim resigned on February 3, 1917, but remained in the senate, devoting himself to writing. The British who occupied Istanbul after the armistice of October 1918 arrested him in March 1919 and deported him to Malta. Released on April 29, 1921, he went to Rome, where he was assassinated by an Armenian nationalist on December 6, 1921.
Apart from his political role, Said Halim Pasha was also the secularly educated spokesman for the conservative Islamist faction of the Young Turks. His articles appeared in Sirat-i Mustakim and Sebil urresad, but not in the radical Islam mecmuasi, the organ of the Turkists. Between 1910and 1921, he wrote influential essays later published in various editions under the title Buhranlarimiz (Our Crises). Notable among these are “Islamic Fanaticism and its Meaning, and Fanaticism” and “Our Social Crisis” (1916), “Our Crisis of Ideas” (1917), “An Essay on the Decline of Islam” and “Islamization” (1918), and “Political Organization in Islam” (1921). The last essay was also published in French.
Said Halim was concerned with countering the West’s criticism of Islam. He argued that Islam was a rational religion that encouraged scientific thought and did not regard science as inimical to faith. Since the problems of Western society were different from those of Islamic society, he thought it was damaging to imitate and borrow blindly ideas such as constitutionalism. The world of Islam should find its own traditions and heritage, especially the shari‘a. As for “Muslim fanaticism,” he argued that the phrase reflected “in reality, not the Muslims’ enmity towards Christians, but the West’s inherent enmity towards the East.”
Said Halim Pasha was one of the signers in Ottoman-German Alliance. Yet, he resigned after the incident of the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, an event which served to cement the Ottoman-German alliance during World War I. It is claimed that Mehmed V wanted a person in whom he trusted as Vizier, and that he asked Said Halim to stay in his post as long as possible. Said Halim's second term lasted until 1916, made short because of continuous clashes between him and the Committee of Union and Progress, which was the Imperial Government of the Ottoman Empire.
During the military trials of World War I in the Ottoman Empire, he was accused of treason as he had his signature under Ottoman-German Alliance. He was exiled May 29, 1919 to a prison on Malta. He was acquitted from the accusations and set free in 1921 at which time he moved to Sicily. He wanted to return to the Turkish capital, Istanbul in 1921, but this request was rejected. He was assassinated in Rome soon after by agents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation for his role in the Armenian Genocide.
Mehmed Said Halim Pasha see Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed
Said Halim Pasha see Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed
Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed (Mehmed Said Halim Pasha) (Said Halim Pasha</I.) (b. January 18, 1865, Cairo, Egypt - December 6, 1921, Rome, Italy). Islamic reformer and Ottoman grand vizier (1913-1916). Born in Cairo, Said Halim was the grandson of Muhammad ‘Ali, the founder of modern Egypt. At the age of six, he came to Istanbul when his father was exiled by Khedive Ismail. Tutors taught Said Halim Arabic, Persian, French, and English. Later he was sent to Switzerland where he read political science. On his return to Istanbul he was appointed to the Council of State in May 1888 and given the rank of a civil pasha. He continued to ascend the administrative ladder and gain new honors.
For an independent minded and cosmopolitan intellectual, life under Abdulhamid (r.1876-1908) was suffocating. Therefore, Said Halim withdrew to his villa on the Bosphorus and devoted his energies to the study of history and religion, concerned as he was about the decline and stagnation of the Muslim world vis-a-vis the West. An imperial spy denounced him as subversive, and he was exiled to Egypt and Europe. There he joined the Young Turks, supporting their activities financially. He returned to Istanbul after constitutional rule was restored in July 1908.
Said Halim became a member of the inner circle of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and leader of the Islamist faction. In December 1908, he was appointed to the senate and the Islamic Education Committee. He entered the cabinet in January 1912 as president of the Council of State. In January 1913, during the Balkan wars, he became foreign minister. He was appointed grand vizier on June 11, 1913, while retaining the foreign ministry. At a time when the Ottoman government was accused of pursuing a policy of Turkification, its Sadrazam was an ardent Islamist who wrote only in French and Arabic. The appointment was designed to appease Arab/Islamic sentiment in the empire. Said Halim resigned on February 3, 1917, but remained in the senate, devoting himself to writing. The British who occupied Istanbul after the armistice of October 1918 arrested him in March 1919 and deported him to Malta. Released on April 29, 1921, he went to Rome, where he was assassinated by an Armenian nationalist on December 6, 1921.
Apart from his political role, Said Halim Pasha was also the secularly educated spokesman for the conservative Islamist faction of the Young Turks. His articles appeared in Sirat-i Mustakim and Sebil urresad, but not in the radical Islam mecmuasi, the organ of the Turkists. Between 1910and 1921, he wrote influential essays later published in various editions under the title Buhranlarimiz (Our Crises). Notable among these are “Islamic Fanaticism and its Meaning, and Fanaticism” and “Our Social Crisis” (1916), “Our Crisis of Ideas” (1917), “An Essay on the Decline of Islam” and “Islamization” (1918), and “Political Organization in Islam” (1921). The last essay was also published in French.
Said Halim was concerned with countering the West’s criticism of Islam. He argued that Islam was a rational religion that encouraged scientific thought and did not regard science as inimical to faith. Since the problems of Western society were different from those of Islamic society, he thought it was damaging to imitate and borrow blindly ideas such as constitutionalism. The world of Islam should find its own traditions and heritage, especially the shari‘a. As for “Muslim fanaticism,” he argued that the phrase reflected “in reality, not the Muslims’ enmity towards Christians, but the West’s inherent enmity towards the East.”
Said Halim Pasha was one of the signers in Ottoman-German Alliance. Yet, he resigned after the incident of the pursuit of Goeben and Breslau, an event which served to cement the Ottoman-German alliance during World War I. It is claimed that Mehmed V wanted a person in whom he trusted as Vizier, and that he asked Said Halim to stay in his post as long as possible. Said Halim's second term lasted until 1916, made short because of continuous clashes between him and the Committee of Union and Progress, which was the Imperial Government of the Ottoman Empire.
During the military trials of World War I in the Ottoman Empire, he was accused of treason as he had his signature under Ottoman-German Alliance. He was exiled May 29, 1919 to a prison on Malta. He was acquitted from the accusations and set free in 1921 at which time he moved to Sicily. He wanted to return to the Turkish capital, Istanbul in 1921, but this request was rejected. He was assassinated in Rome soon after by agents of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation for his role in the Armenian Genocide.
Mehmed Said Halim Pasha see Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed
Said Halim Pasha see Said Halim Pasha, Mehmed
Sa‘id ibn al-‘As ibn Sa‘id
Sa‘id ibn al-‘As ibn Sa‘id (c.623-678). Governor of Kufa and Medina. He was nominated by the Caliph ‘Uthman as a member of the committee to establish a definite text of the Qur’an.
Sa‘id ibn al-‘As ibn Sa‘id (c.623-678). Governor of Kufa and Medina. He was nominated by the Caliph ‘Uthman as a member of the committee to establish a definite text of the Qur’an.
Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Sa‘id ibn Sultan (Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan) (Said bin Sultan Al-Said) (Sa‘id bin Sulṭān) (1791 - October 19, 1856). Sultan of Muscat and Oman from November 20, 1804 to June 4, 1856. Member of the Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty and the greatest ruler of the united sultanate of Oman and Zanzibar who ruled 1806 to 1856. Under strong British pressure he restricted the slave trade. In 1832, he made Zanzibar the capital of his empire. His greatest achievement was the extension of his African dominions into a commercial empire. He asserted his authority over the Arab and Swahili colonies from Mogadishu to Cape Delgado, including Mombasa. In 1854, he ceded the Kuria Muria Islands to Great Britain.
Born in 1791, Saʿīd succeeded his father jointly with his brother Salīm in 1804, but their cousin Badr immediately usurped the throne. In 1806, Saʿīd assassinated Badr and became virtual sole ruler, though Salīm, a non-entity, had titular status until his death in 1821. Although Europeans frequently called him imam and sultan, Saʿīd himself used the style sayyid. He was never elected to the purely religious office of imam that all his predecessors held.
His earlier years were complicated by family and tribal quarrels, by Anglo-French rivalry in the Indian Ocean, by the expansion of the Wahhābī Muslim puritan movement in Arabia, and by the incessant depredations of the Qawāsim pirates. He developed a small army and a fleet that also served mercantile purposes. His pilgrimage to Mecca in 1824 demonstrated that he had overcome both internal and external enemies and could risk absence from his own land.
At this time, the eastern African coast was divided into numerous small states owing allegiance to Oman because Oman had expelled the Portuguese from the states in 1698. At Saʿīd’s accession, Omani weakness made this allegiance little more than nominal, for at Mombasa the Mazarʾi family had set up a virtually independent dynasty. In 1822 Saʿīd sent an expedition that drove them from Pemba Island. A British naval force occupied Mombasa irregularly from 1824 to 1826, when the action was repudiated by the British government. In 1827 Saʿīd went to assert his authority in person. One effect was greatly to increase the revenues remitted. There ensued a struggle between Saʿīd and the Mazarʾi for Mombasa that ended only in 1837 when, by a ruse, he took some 30 of the enemy captive. All were deported and some were killed. If he preferred peaceable settlements, Saʿīd could show himself as ruthless as any Mamelūke.
Saʿīd first visited Zanzibar in 1828. Shortly thereafter, he acquired the only two properties on which cloves were then grown. He lived to make the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba the largest clove producers in the world. By 1834, it was believed that he intended to transfer his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, but, until the 1840s, he divided his time more or less equally between them. His interest in East Africa was not simply to gain increased tax revenue. It was primarily commercial. From the 1820s, caravans from Zanzibar reversed the immemorial system of trade by which African products had been brought to the coast by African caravans. At that time, the Zanzibar caravans, Saʿīd’s among them at latest by 1839, actively sought ivory, slaves, and other products, and a wholly new commercial system was created reaching beyond Lake Tanganyika and into modern Uganda. At a formal level, the transfer of Sa'id's
court and other changes were marked by the establishment in Zanzibar of foreign consulates: United States (1837), Britain (1841), France (1844). These countries, with Germany, became the principal buyers, but Saʿīd also exported goods in his own ships to Arabia and India and, occasionally, to Europe and to the United States. By the 1840s he had made Zanzibar the principal power in eastern Africa and the commercial capital of the western Indian Ocean. There was no false modesty in his remark, “I am nothing but a merchant.” Trade was his predominant interest.
Throughout his reign he was under British pressure to end the slave trade. He told a captain of the Royal Navy that “to put down the slave trade with the Muslims, that is a stone too heavy for me to lift without some strong hand to help me.” By a treaty of collaboration with Britain concluded in 1822, he agreed to forbid his subjects to sell slaves to the subjects of Christian powers. By 1842 the average annual import of slaves was reported as approximately 15,000, some doubtless necessitated by the development of the clove plantations. In 1845 he signed a further treaty with Britain, prohibiting both the export and import of slaves from or into his African dominions. His domestic slaves may have numbered more than 1,000. On his death, his will freed them but not his plantation slaves.
Saʿīd’s commercial empire had no developed system of administration. His government was essentially personal and patriarchal, and he sat daily in public to settle cases and complaints. He depended heavily in his commercial ventures on Indian merchants, whose immigration he encouraged. His naval force was commanded by officers who also traded on his behalf. Saʿīd belonged to the Ibāḍī sect of Islām, which, if puritanical, is notably tolerant of others. A majority of his subjects were Sunnite Muslims, and for them he appointed a special judge.
His daughter Salamah’s Memoirs of an Arabian Princess (1886) gives an intimate portrait of his private life. He left no children by his legal wives, but he maintained some 70 surias, or concubines, chiefly Circassians or Ethiopians, by whom he had 25 sons and an unknown number of daughters. Strict in his habits, lavish in his generosity, he was an affectionate father, taking great pleasure in elaborate family gatherings. He had a patriarchal relationship with his many slaves, whose weddings he sometimes attended. He was a keen horseman and practical seaman. He died at sea in 1856 and was greatly mourned by his subjects. His will divided his dominions between his sons Mājid, who became ruler of Zanzibar, and Thuwayn, who received Muscat and Oman. Saʿīd, wrote the British consul, was “most truly every man’s friend: he wishes to do good to all.”
Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Said bin Sultan Al-Said see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Sa‘id bin Sulṭān see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Sa‘id ibn Sultan (Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan) (Said bin Sultan Al-Said) (Sa‘id bin Sulṭān) (1791 - October 19, 1856). Sultan of Muscat and Oman from November 20, 1804 to June 4, 1856. Member of the Al Bu Sa‘id dynasty and the greatest ruler of the united sultanate of Oman and Zanzibar who ruled 1806 to 1856. Under strong British pressure he restricted the slave trade. In 1832, he made Zanzibar the capital of his empire. His greatest achievement was the extension of his African dominions into a commercial empire. He asserted his authority over the Arab and Swahili colonies from Mogadishu to Cape Delgado, including Mombasa. In 1854, he ceded the Kuria Muria Islands to Great Britain.
Born in 1791, Saʿīd succeeded his father jointly with his brother Salīm in 1804, but their cousin Badr immediately usurped the throne. In 1806, Saʿīd assassinated Badr and became virtual sole ruler, though Salīm, a non-entity, had titular status until his death in 1821. Although Europeans frequently called him imam and sultan, Saʿīd himself used the style sayyid. He was never elected to the purely religious office of imam that all his predecessors held.
His earlier years were complicated by family and tribal quarrels, by Anglo-French rivalry in the Indian Ocean, by the expansion of the Wahhābī Muslim puritan movement in Arabia, and by the incessant depredations of the Qawāsim pirates. He developed a small army and a fleet that also served mercantile purposes. His pilgrimage to Mecca in 1824 demonstrated that he had overcome both internal and external enemies and could risk absence from his own land.
At this time, the eastern African coast was divided into numerous small states owing allegiance to Oman because Oman had expelled the Portuguese from the states in 1698. At Saʿīd’s accession, Omani weakness made this allegiance little more than nominal, for at Mombasa the Mazarʾi family had set up a virtually independent dynasty. In 1822 Saʿīd sent an expedition that drove them from Pemba Island. A British naval force occupied Mombasa irregularly from 1824 to 1826, when the action was repudiated by the British government. In 1827 Saʿīd went to assert his authority in person. One effect was greatly to increase the revenues remitted. There ensued a struggle between Saʿīd and the Mazarʾi for Mombasa that ended only in 1837 when, by a ruse, he took some 30 of the enemy captive. All were deported and some were killed. If he preferred peaceable settlements, Saʿīd could show himself as ruthless as any Mamelūke.
Saʿīd first visited Zanzibar in 1828. Shortly thereafter, he acquired the only two properties on which cloves were then grown. He lived to make the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba the largest clove producers in the world. By 1834, it was believed that he intended to transfer his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, but, until the 1840s, he divided his time more or less equally between them. His interest in East Africa was not simply to gain increased tax revenue. It was primarily commercial. From the 1820s, caravans from Zanzibar reversed the immemorial system of trade by which African products had been brought to the coast by African caravans. At that time, the Zanzibar caravans, Saʿīd’s among them at latest by 1839, actively sought ivory, slaves, and other products, and a wholly new commercial system was created reaching beyond Lake Tanganyika and into modern Uganda. At a formal level, the transfer of Sa'id's
court and other changes were marked by the establishment in Zanzibar of foreign consulates: United States (1837), Britain (1841), France (1844). These countries, with Germany, became the principal buyers, but Saʿīd also exported goods in his own ships to Arabia and India and, occasionally, to Europe and to the United States. By the 1840s he had made Zanzibar the principal power in eastern Africa and the commercial capital of the western Indian Ocean. There was no false modesty in his remark, “I am nothing but a merchant.” Trade was his predominant interest.
Throughout his reign he was under British pressure to end the slave trade. He told a captain of the Royal Navy that “to put down the slave trade with the Muslims, that is a stone too heavy for me to lift without some strong hand to help me.” By a treaty of collaboration with Britain concluded in 1822, he agreed to forbid his subjects to sell slaves to the subjects of Christian powers. By 1842 the average annual import of slaves was reported as approximately 15,000, some doubtless necessitated by the development of the clove plantations. In 1845 he signed a further treaty with Britain, prohibiting both the export and import of slaves from or into his African dominions. His domestic slaves may have numbered more than 1,000. On his death, his will freed them but not his plantation slaves.
Saʿīd’s commercial empire had no developed system of administration. His government was essentially personal and patriarchal, and he sat daily in public to settle cases and complaints. He depended heavily in his commercial ventures on Indian merchants, whose immigration he encouraged. His naval force was commanded by officers who also traded on his behalf. Saʿīd belonged to the Ibāḍī sect of Islām, which, if puritanical, is notably tolerant of others. A majority of his subjects were Sunnite Muslims, and for them he appointed a special judge.
His daughter Salamah’s Memoirs of an Arabian Princess (1886) gives an intimate portrait of his private life. He left no children by his legal wives, but he maintained some 70 surias, or concubines, chiefly Circassians or Ethiopians, by whom he had 25 sons and an unknown number of daughters. Strict in his habits, lavish in his generosity, he was an affectionate father, taking great pleasure in elaborate family gatherings. He had a patriarchal relationship with his many slaves, whose weddings he sometimes attended. He was a keen horseman and practical seaman. He died at sea in 1856 and was greatly mourned by his subjects. His will divided his dominions between his sons Mājid, who became ruler of Zanzibar, and Thuwayn, who received Muscat and Oman. Saʿīd, wrote the British consul, was “most truly every man’s friend: he wishes to do good to all.”
Sayyid Sa'id ibn Sultan see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Said bin Sultan Al-Said see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Sa‘id bin Sulṭān see Sa‘id ibn Sultan
Sa‘id Pasha
Sa‘id Pasha (b. 1822, Cairo, Egypt - d. January 18, 1863, Alexandria, Egypt). Khedive of Egypt (r.1854-1863). He relieved the economic position of the people by promulgating an agrarian law, attempted to abolish the slave trade, and in 1856 granted to Ferdinand de Lesseps the permit to construct the Suez Canal. The town of Port Said is named after him.
Sa’id Pasha was the Ottoman viceroy (khedive) of Egypt (1854–63) whose administrative policies fostered the development of individual landownership and reduced the influence of the sheikhs (village headmen).
Saʿīd was the fourth son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, viceroy of Egypt (1805–48). While still a child, he was compelled on orders from his father to make daily rounds of the European consuls residing in Egypt in order to overcome his shyness and improve his French. As a result he befriended Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French consul. Their friendship would lead to the construction of the Suez Canal years later. During the reign of his father, Saʿīd became head of the navy, a position he retained during the rule of ʿAbbās I (1848–54) despite their mutual enmity.
In 1854, Saʿīd succeeded ʿAbbās as viceroy of Egypt. He was influenced by Western forms of landownership, and, under pressure from Western financiers to change Egypt’s traditional system of land tenure, he enacted, in 1855, a law that permitted the male descendants of a peasant to inherit his land. Three years later, Saʿīd passed another law limiting land inheritance to Muslims, thus considerably reducing the circle of relatives entitled to an inheritance. Few peasants owned land, however, and these provisions had limited applicability. To correct the situation, an article in the second law provided that a peasant who held a plot of land for five consecutive years and paid the taxes on it would acquire irrevocable ownership and the right to sell, mortgage, or exchange his land.
This increase in the property rights of peasants was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the authority of the sheikhs, who lost the right to distribute land among the peasants, either on the death of a peasant or at periodic intervals. Saʿīd abolished the collective responsibility of a village for payment of taxes, a practice that had permitted the sheikhs to divide the village tax burden among the peasants, and he levied taxes directly on individual cultivators. He also confiscated some of the land held by the sheikhs and drafted their sons, who had hitherto been exempt, into the army.
Saʿīd attempted innovations in other areas. In 1861 he established a commission to work out a municipal code for Egyptian cities. Nothing came of this initiative, largely because of the opposition of foreign powers. Saʿīd also unsuccessfully attempted to end the flourishing slave trade by banning the importation of slaves from the Sudan. One of his most momentous acts was to grant a concession to a French company in 1856 for the construction of the Suez Canal. By 1859, both Saʿīd and the Ottoman sultan had come to oppose the plan, and, for the rest of Saʿīd’s reign, work continued on the canal without official permission.
Sa’id Pasha was the Ottoman viceroy (khedive) of Egypt (1854–63) whose administrative policies fostered the development of individual landownership and reduced the influence of the sheikhs (village headmen).
Saʿīd was the fourth son of Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha, viceroy of Egypt (1805–48). While still a child, he was compelled on orders from his father to make daily rounds of the European consuls residing in Egypt in order to overcome his shyness and improve his French. As a result he befriended Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French consul. Their friendship would lead to the construction of the Suez Canal years later. During the reign of his father, Saʿīd became head of the navy, a position he retained during the rule of ʿAbbās I (1848–54) despite their mutual enmity.
In 1854, Saʿīd succeeded ʿAbbās as viceroy of Egypt. He was influenced by Western forms of landownership, and, under pressure from Western financiers to change Egypt’s traditional system of land tenure, he enacted, in 1855, a law that permitted the male descendants of a peasant to inherit his land. Three years later, Saʿīd passed another law limiting land inheritance to Muslims, thus considerably reducing the circle of relatives entitled to an inheritance. Few peasants owned land, however, and these provisions had limited applicability. To correct the situation, an article in the second law provided that a peasant who held a plot of land for five consecutive years and paid the taxes on it would acquire irrevocable ownership and the right to sell, mortgage, or exchange his land.
This increase in the property rights of peasants was accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the authority of the sheikhs, who lost the right to distribute land among the peasants, either on the death of a peasant or at periodic intervals. Saʿīd abolished the collective responsibility of a village for payment of taxes, a practice that had permitted the sheikhs to divide the village tax burden among the peasants, and he levied taxes directly on individual cultivators. He also confiscated some of the land held by the sheikhs and drafted their sons, who had hitherto been exempt, into the army.
Saʿīd attempted innovations in other areas. In 1861 he established a commission to work out a municipal code for Egyptian cities. Nothing came of this initiative, largely because of the opposition of foreign powers. Saʿīd also unsuccessfully attempted to end the flourishing slave trade by banning the importation of slaves from the Sudan. One of his most momentous acts was to grant a concession to a French company in 1856 for the construction of the Suez Canal. By 1859, both Saʿīd and the Ottoman sultan had come to oppose the plan, and, for the rest of Saʿīd’s reign, work continued on the canal without official permission.
Saint
Saint (Wali) (Wilayah) (Walayah). The word “saint” and “sainthood” are used cross-culturally to describe persons of exceptional spiritual merit and the status attained by such persons. These terms are originally derived from Christian experience. It must not be assumed that all features of Christian sainthood are reproduced in Islam.
The approximate equivalent in Arabic to “saint” is wali (plural, awliya’); wilayah or walayah may be translated as “sainthood.” The literal meaning of wali is “friend,” “helper,” or “patron.” There is no passage in the Qur’an that explicitly recognizes saints or sanctions the institution of sainthood. In fact, the message of the Qur’an regarding wali is quite different. It repeatedly emphasizes that God and God alone is the wali of the believers and that there is no wali or helper but God. {See Suras 2:107, 2:120, 3:68, 9:116; and 18.26.} Humankind is sternly warned against taking “friends” or seeking aid from any but God (see Suras 6:14 and 42:9), as have the wrongdoers who take each other as friends (see Suras 8:73 and 45:19) and those who are the awliya’ of Satan instead of God (see Suras 4:76, 7:30 and 16:63). In addition, the Qur’an disallows intercession (shafa‘ah) by any but God (see Suras 2:48 and 74:48). There is neither wali nor shafi’ (intercessor) except God (see Sura 6:51).
Nevertheless, those who read wali as “saint” have found support in the scriptures. The revelation mentions that the believers may be “friends” to one another (see Suras 5:55 and 9:71), and some Sufi exegetes have interpreted verse 62 of the tenth surah of the Qur’an – “As for the friends (awliya’) of God, no fear shall come upon thme, nor shall they grieve” -- as referring to a class of persons selected by God for special favor, possessing esoteric knowledge, or even guarded from committing major sins. Sufi exegesis has sometimes seized on qualifying phrases in verses banning intercession -- for instance, “There is no intercessor except by His permission” (see Sura 10:3).-- to suggest that there are indeed some granted special favor by God who may intercede on behalf of others. The Sufis also point to a number of hadiths that describe the qualities and privileges of awliya.
Sainthood in Islam is informal. Saints become saints by acclamation. There is no process of canonization and no constituted body to apply it, as in Catholicism. Consequently, there are many types of saints. Popular saints are the focus of local cults emerging from a stratum of pre-Islamic religion. These saints are associated with simple shrines or even natural objects such as springs or trees, and their veneration involves a variety of folk practices. A large number of such saints are found in North Africa, where they are known as murabit (“he who watches [through the night over his soul]” -- in French, marabout). A host of popular saints was once venerated by the Arab population of Palestine, and similar figures are still a focus of folk religious life in present day Lebanon. In Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and Anatolia some saints were formerly shared by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim worshipers, but as political events and social developments have separated these religious groups, ecumenical saint-worship has declined.
Sufism has served in the past to absorb local customs and culture and to bring non-Islamic and peasant populations into the fold of Islam. Thus, the majority of popular saints are also Sufi saints. The tombs of such saints often serve as the focal point of the Sufi lodges (khanaqah, ribat, zawiyah, or tekke) in which members of the fraternities reside or meet and Sufi ceremonies are performed. The anniversary of the birth or death of the saint (mawlid) may involve a more elaborate festival featuring songs and processions. Some Sufi shaykhs, unlike Christian saints, are acclaimed as saints while still living. These may be called on to dispense advice and mediate disputes. Sufi sainthood, in any case, has fulfilled and continues to fulfill an important social function, as saintly authority sometimes remains in one family through generations, and tribal and other social structures are reinforced through allegiance to particular saints.
Another category of saints is the past saints of Sufi legend. Most of these are not identified with tombs. Their memorials are contained instead in brief tales of their wise sayings, virtues, and miracles related in the biographical anecdotes that comprise an important part of Sufi literature. (Some contemporary saints have been the subjects of mroe lengthy biographies.) A significant number of popular, Sufi, and legendary saints are women. Muslim women, it seems, have found it easier to gain spiritual fame outside of mainstream Islam.
Finally, Sufi mystical speculation presents an elaborate hierarchy of saints. These awliya’ comprise a divinely elected class, according to some accounts numbering several hundred. Their existence is said to be as necessary as that of the prophets, the chief of them being the “pole” (qutb) around which the very universe revolves.
The mainstream Twelver Shi‘as do not speak of saints, since the spiritual rank of wilayah is already occupied by their imams who, much like the Sufi saints, are God’s elect, sustain the existence of the world, worked miracles in their lifetime, and continue to intercede for their followers with God. Iranian Shiism, however, does allow for a kind of lesser sainthood and absorption of local pilgrimage sites and folk practices by attaching these to relatives of the imams. There are many such imamzadah (“related to the imams”) shrines in Iran, some rather rudimentary and doubtful but nevertheless still active. A large and elaborate shrine has lately been constructed over the remains of Ayatollah Khomeini near the Bihisht-i Zahra cemetery outside Tehran and is already a favorite place of pilgrimage. Khomeini has certainly become a “saint” in a practical, if not theological, sense. His charisma far outweighs that of any other deceased member of the religious hierarchy, and he may well become the only true Shi‘a saint apart from the imams and imamzadahs.
The chief function of the Islamic saints, similar to that of the Christian saints, is to intercede with God on behalf of those who appeal to them. The power the saints are granted to facilitate the affairs of tehir devotees and smooth their way to God is called barakah or “blessing.” The tombs of the saints -- or, during their lives, their residences -- are the object of pilgrimage (ziyarah) by those who hope to obtain this barakah. Barakah is often thought to be transferred by physical touch from the tomb or person of the saint to the petitioner. Some popular saints are noted for dispensing particular kinds of favors: for instance, a female saint may be expert in granting children to the women who specially visit her or otherwise settling domestic matters. Allegiance to saints, saint pilgrimage, and seeking of barakah have lessened with modern times, particularly with the decline of Sufism. These practices, however, do survive, particularly among urban poor and rural populations.
Some Muslims have been opposed to sainthood as being un-Islamic in both conception and practice; the Qur’anic texts referred to above enter into this controversy. Seeking intercession, belief in miracles, and pilgrimages to saints’ tombs have been particularly disapproved. The dangers in these are thought to be violation of monotheism and setting up others as equal to the Prophet. An effort was made by the theologians to admit sainthood while protecting the position of the prophets by distinguishing the full-blown miracles (mu‘jizat) of the former from the mere “charismata” (karamat) of the latter. Some written creeds even listed belief in the awliya’ as an article of faith. Nevertheless, sainthood and saint worship were frequent targets of the orthodox ‘ulama’. Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328) was perhaps the most prominent critic of sainthood. He vigorously condemned the visiting of tombs and other popular practices as corruption of the true religion. Ibn Taymiyah has influenced many Islamic thinkers to seek a return to pure, “original” Islam, and they have also followed him in condemning sainthood. The present Saudi regime upholds Wahhabism, a movement originating in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century that also traces its spiritual descent to Ibn Taymiyah. The government and religious hierarchy of Saudi Arabia thus seek to suppress any manifestation of saint worship. This is particularly significant since the Saudis have great religious influence in the Muslim world. A second type of criticism of sainthood is exclusively modern. This trend of thought sees saint worship as a prime manifestation of the irrationality and obscurantism which has weakened the Muslim world. The Egyptian reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) was one of those who expressed this opinion. The revered Pakistani thinker Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and other subcontinental modernists have also considered the numerous local saints (called pirs, “elders”) as founts of superstition and upholders of the feudal system and have thus called for the elimination of “pirism.”
Saints and their shrines have often been centers of political power. Within the context of the modern nation-state, governments have tried either to suppress or to co-opt saintly institutions. The secularizing measures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s included suppression of the Turkish shrines and devaluing of saintly personality. In Pakistan, various regimes have combined programs tending to strike at the economic and spiritual authority of living pirs with a conspicuous effort to make the state the overseer of the shrines and to patronize ceremonies associated with them. The pirs have responded to this by competing in the political system -- for instance by influencing or putting up candidates -- and have thus managed to maintain some independence and defend their interests. The Egyptian government has lately found it useful to patronize the saints and protect pilgrims and festivals in order to counter the Islamists who, in true fundamentalist fashion, abhor saint-worship. Armed soldiers can be seen around some shrines at festival times. It seems that devotion to the saints is considered a politically safe diversion for the urbanizing masses.
Wali see Saint
Wilayah see Saint
Walayah see Saint
Saint (Wali) (Wilayah) (Walayah). The word “saint” and “sainthood” are used cross-culturally to describe persons of exceptional spiritual merit and the status attained by such persons. These terms are originally derived from Christian experience. It must not be assumed that all features of Christian sainthood are reproduced in Islam.
The approximate equivalent in Arabic to “saint” is wali (plural, awliya’); wilayah or walayah may be translated as “sainthood.” The literal meaning of wali is “friend,” “helper,” or “patron.” There is no passage in the Qur’an that explicitly recognizes saints or sanctions the institution of sainthood. In fact, the message of the Qur’an regarding wali is quite different. It repeatedly emphasizes that God and God alone is the wali of the believers and that there is no wali or helper but God. {See Suras 2:107, 2:120, 3:68, 9:116; and 18.26.} Humankind is sternly warned against taking “friends” or seeking aid from any but God (see Suras 6:14 and 42:9), as have the wrongdoers who take each other as friends (see Suras 8:73 and 45:19) and those who are the awliya’ of Satan instead of God (see Suras 4:76, 7:30 and 16:63). In addition, the Qur’an disallows intercession (shafa‘ah) by any but God (see Suras 2:48 and 74:48). There is neither wali nor shafi’ (intercessor) except God (see Sura 6:51).
Nevertheless, those who read wali as “saint” have found support in the scriptures. The revelation mentions that the believers may be “friends” to one another (see Suras 5:55 and 9:71), and some Sufi exegetes have interpreted verse 62 of the tenth surah of the Qur’an – “As for the friends (awliya’) of God, no fear shall come upon thme, nor shall they grieve” -- as referring to a class of persons selected by God for special favor, possessing esoteric knowledge, or even guarded from committing major sins. Sufi exegesis has sometimes seized on qualifying phrases in verses banning intercession -- for instance, “There is no intercessor except by His permission” (see Sura 10:3).-- to suggest that there are indeed some granted special favor by God who may intercede on behalf of others. The Sufis also point to a number of hadiths that describe the qualities and privileges of awliya.
Sainthood in Islam is informal. Saints become saints by acclamation. There is no process of canonization and no constituted body to apply it, as in Catholicism. Consequently, there are many types of saints. Popular saints are the focus of local cults emerging from a stratum of pre-Islamic religion. These saints are associated with simple shrines or even natural objects such as springs or trees, and their veneration involves a variety of folk practices. A large number of such saints are found in North Africa, where they are known as murabit (“he who watches [through the night over his soul]” -- in French, marabout). A host of popular saints was once venerated by the Arab population of Palestine, and similar figures are still a focus of folk religious life in present day Lebanon. In Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and Anatolia some saints were formerly shared by Jewish, Christian, and Muslim worshipers, but as political events and social developments have separated these religious groups, ecumenical saint-worship has declined.
Sufism has served in the past to absorb local customs and culture and to bring non-Islamic and peasant populations into the fold of Islam. Thus, the majority of popular saints are also Sufi saints. The tombs of such saints often serve as the focal point of the Sufi lodges (khanaqah, ribat, zawiyah, or tekke) in which members of the fraternities reside or meet and Sufi ceremonies are performed. The anniversary of the birth or death of the saint (mawlid) may involve a more elaborate festival featuring songs and processions. Some Sufi shaykhs, unlike Christian saints, are acclaimed as saints while still living. These may be called on to dispense advice and mediate disputes. Sufi sainthood, in any case, has fulfilled and continues to fulfill an important social function, as saintly authority sometimes remains in one family through generations, and tribal and other social structures are reinforced through allegiance to particular saints.
Another category of saints is the past saints of Sufi legend. Most of these are not identified with tombs. Their memorials are contained instead in brief tales of their wise sayings, virtues, and miracles related in the biographical anecdotes that comprise an important part of Sufi literature. (Some contemporary saints have been the subjects of mroe lengthy biographies.) A significant number of popular, Sufi, and legendary saints are women. Muslim women, it seems, have found it easier to gain spiritual fame outside of mainstream Islam.
Finally, Sufi mystical speculation presents an elaborate hierarchy of saints. These awliya’ comprise a divinely elected class, according to some accounts numbering several hundred. Their existence is said to be as necessary as that of the prophets, the chief of them being the “pole” (qutb) around which the very universe revolves.
The mainstream Twelver Shi‘as do not speak of saints, since the spiritual rank of wilayah is already occupied by their imams who, much like the Sufi saints, are God’s elect, sustain the existence of the world, worked miracles in their lifetime, and continue to intercede for their followers with God. Iranian Shiism, however, does allow for a kind of lesser sainthood and absorption of local pilgrimage sites and folk practices by attaching these to relatives of the imams. There are many such imamzadah (“related to the imams”) shrines in Iran, some rather rudimentary and doubtful but nevertheless still active. A large and elaborate shrine has lately been constructed over the remains of Ayatollah Khomeini near the Bihisht-i Zahra cemetery outside Tehran and is already a favorite place of pilgrimage. Khomeini has certainly become a “saint” in a practical, if not theological, sense. His charisma far outweighs that of any other deceased member of the religious hierarchy, and he may well become the only true Shi‘a saint apart from the imams and imamzadahs.
The chief function of the Islamic saints, similar to that of the Christian saints, is to intercede with God on behalf of those who appeal to them. The power the saints are granted to facilitate the affairs of tehir devotees and smooth their way to God is called barakah or “blessing.” The tombs of the saints -- or, during their lives, their residences -- are the object of pilgrimage (ziyarah) by those who hope to obtain this barakah. Barakah is often thought to be transferred by physical touch from the tomb or person of the saint to the petitioner. Some popular saints are noted for dispensing particular kinds of favors: for instance, a female saint may be expert in granting children to the women who specially visit her or otherwise settling domestic matters. Allegiance to saints, saint pilgrimage, and seeking of barakah have lessened with modern times, particularly with the decline of Sufism. These practices, however, do survive, particularly among urban poor and rural populations.
Some Muslims have been opposed to sainthood as being un-Islamic in both conception and practice; the Qur’anic texts referred to above enter into this controversy. Seeking intercession, belief in miracles, and pilgrimages to saints’ tombs have been particularly disapproved. The dangers in these are thought to be violation of monotheism and setting up others as equal to the Prophet. An effort was made by the theologians to admit sainthood while protecting the position of the prophets by distinguishing the full-blown miracles (mu‘jizat) of the former from the mere “charismata” (karamat) of the latter. Some written creeds even listed belief in the awliya’ as an article of faith. Nevertheless, sainthood and saint worship were frequent targets of the orthodox ‘ulama’. Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328) was perhaps the most prominent critic of sainthood. He vigorously condemned the visiting of tombs and other popular practices as corruption of the true religion. Ibn Taymiyah has influenced many Islamic thinkers to seek a return to pure, “original” Islam, and they have also followed him in condemning sainthood. The present Saudi regime upholds Wahhabism, a movement originating in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century that also traces its spiritual descent to Ibn Taymiyah. The government and religious hierarchy of Saudi Arabia thus seek to suppress any manifestation of saint worship. This is particularly significant since the Saudis have great religious influence in the Muslim world. A second type of criticism of sainthood is exclusively modern. This trend of thought sees saint worship as a prime manifestation of the irrationality and obscurantism which has weakened the Muslim world. The Egyptian reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) was one of those who expressed this opinion. The revered Pakistani thinker Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and other subcontinental modernists have also considered the numerous local saints (called pirs, “elders”) as founts of superstition and upholders of the feudal system and have thus called for the elimination of “pirism.”
Saints and their shrines have often been centers of political power. Within the context of the modern nation-state, governments have tried either to suppress or to co-opt saintly institutions. The secularizing measures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s included suppression of the Turkish shrines and devaluing of saintly personality. In Pakistan, various regimes have combined programs tending to strike at the economic and spiritual authority of living pirs with a conspicuous effort to make the state the overseer of the shrines and to patronize ceremonies associated with them. The pirs have responded to this by competing in the political system -- for instance by influencing or putting up candidates -- and have thus managed to maintain some independence and defend their interests. The Egyptian government has lately found it useful to patronize the saints and protect pilgrims and festivals in order to counter the Islamists who, in true fundamentalist fashion, abhor saint-worship. Armed soldiers can be seen around some shrines at festival times. It seems that devotion to the saints is considered a politically safe diversion for the urbanizing masses.
Wali see Saint
Wilayah see Saint
Walayah see Saint
Sa’iqa
Sa’iqa (As-Sa'iqa) (Al-Saika) (Saika) (Saeqa). Arabic term which means “lightning.” Sa’iqa is the name of a Palestinian-Syrian organization in existence since 1968.
As-Sa'iqa (from Arabic meaning storm or thunderbolt; also known as the Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War) was a Palestinian Baathist political and military faction created and controlled by Syria. It is the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba'th Party, and was a member organization of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
As-Sa'iqa was formed as an organization by the Syrian Ba'th Party in September 1966, but was first activated in December 1968, when Syria tried to build up an alternative to Yassir Arafat, then emerging with his Fatah faction as the primary Palestinian fedayeen leader and politician. As-Sa'iqa was initially the second-largest group within the PLO, after Fatah.
As-Sa'iqa was also used in the Ba'thist power struggle then in play in Syria, by President Salah Jadid to counter the ambitions of Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad. When al-Assad seized power in the November 1970 "Corrective Revolution", the organization was purged and its leadership replaced with al-Assad loyalists (although Jadid loyalists held on to the as-Sai'qa branch active in the Palestinian camps in Jordan until mid-1971, when they were arrested). As new Secretary-General (after Mahmud al-Ma'ayta, who had recently succeeded Yusuf Zu'ayyin), al-Assad chose Zuhayr Muhsin, a Palestinian Ba'thist who had come to Syria as a refugee from Jordan. He was repeatedly promoted by Syria as a candidate for the post as Chairman of the PLO, to replace Arafat, but never gained support from other factions.
The organization was, and is, utilized by Syria as a proxy force in the Palestinian movement. While this prevented as-Sa'iqa from gaining widespread popularity among Palestinians, it became an important force in the Palestinian camps in Syria, as well as in Lebanon. During the Lebanese Civil War, Syria built the movement into one of the most important Palestinian fighting units, but also forced it to join in Syrian offensives against the PLO when relations between al-Assad and Arafat soured. This led to as-Sa'iqa's expulsion from the PLO in 1976, but it was re-admitted in December the same year, after the situation had cooled down, and after Syria named this as a condition for further support for the PLO. The attacks on the PLO led to large-scale defections of Syrian-based Palestinians from the movement. As Saiqa was as well responsible of the Damour Massacre in 1976 and many other barbaric mass murders.
After Muhsin's assassination in 1979, 'Isam al-Qadi became the new Secretary-General. The movement remained active during the Lebanese Civil War, and again joined Syria, the Lebanese Shi'a Amal Movement and Abu Musa's Fatah al-Intifada in attacks on the PLO during the War of the Camps in 1984-85, and for the remainder of the Civil War (which lasted until 1990). This again led to mass-defections of Palestinians from the movement, and reportedly its ranks were filled with non-Palestinian Syrian army recruits. After the end of the Civil War, the movement was nearly out of contact with the PLO mainstream, and exerted influence only in Syria and in Syrian-occupied parts of Lebanon. It kept lobbying within the PLO against the various peace proposals advanced by Arafat, and was part of the Syrian-based National Alliance that opposed Arafat.
After the end of the Lebanese Civil War and the 1993 signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement, as-Sai'qa has largely lost its usefulness to the Syrian government, and the state and size of the organization has deteriorated. Today, it is wholly insignificant outside Syria, although it retains a presence in Lebanon (its future is uncertain after the end in 2005 of the Syrian Army's presence in Lebanon). It is extremely weak in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and was not active during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Its importance to Syria lessened, both because the PLO diminished in importance compared to the Palestinian National Authority (which as-Sai'qa boycotted), and because Damascus changed its strategy to supporting the Palestinian Islamist factions Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
As-Sa'iqa was led by a Secretary-General. It had a representative on the PLO Executive Committee, but he boycotted sessions of the PLO EC. During much of the 1970s, as-Sai'qa's representatives in the PLO EC held the prestigious and sensitive post as Head of the Military Department, which reflected the military importance of the movement in these years.
Syrian backing in the 1970s gave as-Sa'iqa a military weight far greater than its political influence, which had always been small. During the Lebanese civil war, as-Sa'iqa was often the second largest Palestinian faction in fighting strength, after Yassir Arafat's Fatah movement.
Under the name Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution - possibly the name of the armed wing of as-Sa'iqa - the organization committed a number of international terrorist attacks. Among these are the 1979 takeover of the Egyptian embassy in Ankara, Turkey and a kidnapping of Jews emigrating by train through Austria from the Soviet Union to Israel. After the early 1990s, the organization did not commit any known attacks, and was not listed on the United States State Department's List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
As-Sa'iqa's political agenda is identical to that of Ba'thist Syria, i.e. Arab socialist, nationalist and strongly committed to Pan-Arab doctrine. While this reflects its Ba'thist program, it also used Pan-Arabism as a means of supporting the primacy of its sponsor, Syria, over the Arafat-led PLO's claim to exclusive representation of the Palestinian people. Thus, it rejected "Palestinization" of the conflict with Israel, insisting on the necessary involvement of the greater Arab nation. This occasionally went to extremes, with as-Sa'iqa leaders denying the existence of a separate Palestinian people within the wider Arab nation.
The group generally took a hard line stance (reflecting that of Syria) on issues such as the recognition of Israel, the Oslo Accords, and other questions of Palestinian goals and political orientation. It was a member of the 1974 Rejectionist Front, despite supporting the Ten Point Program that initially caused the PLO/Rejectionist Front split.
Saika see Sa’iqa
As-Sa'iqa see Sa’iqa
Al-Saika see Sa’iqa
Saeqa see Sa’iqa
Lightning see Sa’iqa
Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War see Sa’iqa
Sa’iqa (As-Sa'iqa) (Al-Saika) (Saika) (Saeqa). Arabic term which means “lightning.” Sa’iqa is the name of a Palestinian-Syrian organization in existence since 1968.
As-Sa'iqa (from Arabic meaning storm or thunderbolt; also known as the Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War) was a Palestinian Baathist political and military faction created and controlled by Syria. It is the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba'th Party, and was a member organization of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
As-Sa'iqa was formed as an organization by the Syrian Ba'th Party in September 1966, but was first activated in December 1968, when Syria tried to build up an alternative to Yassir Arafat, then emerging with his Fatah faction as the primary Palestinian fedayeen leader and politician. As-Sa'iqa was initially the second-largest group within the PLO, after Fatah.
As-Sa'iqa was also used in the Ba'thist power struggle then in play in Syria, by President Salah Jadid to counter the ambitions of Defence Minister Hafez al-Assad. When al-Assad seized power in the November 1970 "Corrective Revolution", the organization was purged and its leadership replaced with al-Assad loyalists (although Jadid loyalists held on to the as-Sai'qa branch active in the Palestinian camps in Jordan until mid-1971, when they were arrested). As new Secretary-General (after Mahmud al-Ma'ayta, who had recently succeeded Yusuf Zu'ayyin), al-Assad chose Zuhayr Muhsin, a Palestinian Ba'thist who had come to Syria as a refugee from Jordan. He was repeatedly promoted by Syria as a candidate for the post as Chairman of the PLO, to replace Arafat, but never gained support from other factions.
The organization was, and is, utilized by Syria as a proxy force in the Palestinian movement. While this prevented as-Sa'iqa from gaining widespread popularity among Palestinians, it became an important force in the Palestinian camps in Syria, as well as in Lebanon. During the Lebanese Civil War, Syria built the movement into one of the most important Palestinian fighting units, but also forced it to join in Syrian offensives against the PLO when relations between al-Assad and Arafat soured. This led to as-Sa'iqa's expulsion from the PLO in 1976, but it was re-admitted in December the same year, after the situation had cooled down, and after Syria named this as a condition for further support for the PLO. The attacks on the PLO led to large-scale defections of Syrian-based Palestinians from the movement. As Saiqa was as well responsible of the Damour Massacre in 1976 and many other barbaric mass murders.
After Muhsin's assassination in 1979, 'Isam al-Qadi became the new Secretary-General. The movement remained active during the Lebanese Civil War, and again joined Syria, the Lebanese Shi'a Amal Movement and Abu Musa's Fatah al-Intifada in attacks on the PLO during the War of the Camps in 1984-85, and for the remainder of the Civil War (which lasted until 1990). This again led to mass-defections of Palestinians from the movement, and reportedly its ranks were filled with non-Palestinian Syrian army recruits. After the end of the Civil War, the movement was nearly out of contact with the PLO mainstream, and exerted influence only in Syria and in Syrian-occupied parts of Lebanon. It kept lobbying within the PLO against the various peace proposals advanced by Arafat, and was part of the Syrian-based National Alliance that opposed Arafat.
After the end of the Lebanese Civil War and the 1993 signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement, as-Sai'qa has largely lost its usefulness to the Syrian government, and the state and size of the organization has deteriorated. Today, it is wholly insignificant outside Syria, although it retains a presence in Lebanon (its future is uncertain after the end in 2005 of the Syrian Army's presence in Lebanon). It is extremely weak in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and was not active during the al-Aqsa Intifada. Its importance to Syria lessened, both because the PLO diminished in importance compared to the Palestinian National Authority (which as-Sai'qa boycotted), and because Damascus changed its strategy to supporting the Palestinian Islamist factions Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
As-Sa'iqa was led by a Secretary-General. It had a representative on the PLO Executive Committee, but he boycotted sessions of the PLO EC. During much of the 1970s, as-Sai'qa's representatives in the PLO EC held the prestigious and sensitive post as Head of the Military Department, which reflected the military importance of the movement in these years.
Syrian backing in the 1970s gave as-Sa'iqa a military weight far greater than its political influence, which had always been small. During the Lebanese civil war, as-Sa'iqa was often the second largest Palestinian faction in fighting strength, after Yassir Arafat's Fatah movement.
Under the name Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution - possibly the name of the armed wing of as-Sa'iqa - the organization committed a number of international terrorist attacks. Among these are the 1979 takeover of the Egyptian embassy in Ankara, Turkey and a kidnapping of Jews emigrating by train through Austria from the Soviet Union to Israel. After the early 1990s, the organization did not commit any known attacks, and was not listed on the United States State Department's List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
As-Sa'iqa's political agenda is identical to that of Ba'thist Syria, i.e. Arab socialist, nationalist and strongly committed to Pan-Arab doctrine. While this reflects its Ba'thist program, it also used Pan-Arabism as a means of supporting the primacy of its sponsor, Syria, over the Arafat-led PLO's claim to exclusive representation of the Palestinian people. Thus, it rejected "Palestinization" of the conflict with Israel, insisting on the necessary involvement of the greater Arab nation. This occasionally went to extremes, with as-Sa'iqa leaders denying the existence of a separate Palestinian people within the wider Arab nation.
The group generally took a hard line stance (reflecting that of Syria) on issues such as the recognition of Israel, the Oslo Accords, and other questions of Palestinian goals and political orientation. It was a member of the 1974 Rejectionist Front, despite supporting the Ten Point Program that initially caused the PLO/Rejectionist Front split.
Saika see Sa’iqa
As-Sa'iqa see Sa’iqa
Al-Saika see Sa’iqa
Saeqa see Sa’iqa
Lightning see Sa’iqa
Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War see Sa’iqa
Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk
Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk (Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk Sajah) (Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed). Prophetess and soothsayer of the seventh century. She is said to have joined the forces of the prophet Musaylima ibn Habib and to have married him.
Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed was from the tribe of Taghlib. She was an Arab Christian protected first by her tribe then caused a split within Banu Tamim and finally defended by Banu Hanifa. After the death of Muhammad, Sajah declared that she was a prophetess. Before claiming to be a prophetess, Sajah had a reputation as a soothsayer. Thereafter, 4,000 people gathered around her to march on Medina. Others were forced to join her against Medina. However, her planned attack on Medina was called off after she learned of Khalid ibn al-Walid’s army defeating Tulaiha al-Asadi (another self-proclaimed prophet). Thereafter, she sought cooperation with Musaylimah to oppose the threat of Khalid. A mutual understanding was initially reached with Musaylimah. Sajah later married Musaylimah and accepted his self-declared prophethood. Khalid then crushed the remaining rebellious elements around Sajah, and then moved on to crush Musaylimah. After the Battle of Yamama where Musaylimah was killed, Sajah turned to Islam.
Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk Sajah see Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk
Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed see Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk
Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk (Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk Sajah) (Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed). Prophetess and soothsayer of the seventh century. She is said to have joined the forces of the prophet Musaylima ibn Habib and to have married him.
Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed was from the tribe of Taghlib. She was an Arab Christian protected first by her tribe then caused a split within Banu Tamim and finally defended by Banu Hanifa. After the death of Muhammad, Sajah declared that she was a prophetess. Before claiming to be a prophetess, Sajah had a reputation as a soothsayer. Thereafter, 4,000 people gathered around her to march on Medina. Others were forced to join her against Medina. However, her planned attack on Medina was called off after she learned of Khalid ibn al-Walid’s army defeating Tulaiha al-Asadi (another self-proclaimed prophet). Thereafter, she sought cooperation with Musaylimah to oppose the threat of Khalid. A mutual understanding was initially reached with Musaylimah. Sajah later married Musaylimah and accepted his self-declared prophethood. Khalid then crushed the remaining rebellious elements around Sajah, and then moved on to crush Musaylimah. After the Battle of Yamama where Musaylimah was killed, Sajah turned to Islam.
Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk Sajah see Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk
Sajah bint al-Harith ibn Suaeed see Sajah, Umm Sadir bint Aws ibn Hikk
Sajawandi, Abu’l-Fadl al-
Sajawandi, Abu’l-Fadl al- (Abu’l-Fadl al-Sajawandi) (d. c. 1164). “Reader” of the Qur’an. He is mainly known by his work on the recitation of the Qur’an.
Abu’l-Fadl al-Sajawandi see Sajawandi, Abu’l-Fadl al-
Sajawandi, Abu’l-Fadl al- (Abu’l-Fadl al-Sajawandi) (d. c. 1164). “Reader” of the Qur’an. He is mainly known by his work on the recitation of the Qur’an.
Abu’l-Fadl al-Sajawandi see Sajawandi, Abu’l-Fadl al-
Sajawandi, Siraj al-Din al-
Sajawandi, Siraj al-Din al- (Siraj al-Din al-Sajawandi). Hanafi jurist of the thirteenth century. His work on the law of inheritance is regarded as the principal work in this field.
Sajawandi, Siraj al-Din al- (Siraj al-Din al-Sajawandi). Hanafi jurist of the thirteenth century. His work on the law of inheritance is regarded as the principal work in this field.
Sajids
Sajids. Name of a family which ruled in Azerbaijan under the nominal suzerainty of the ‘Abbasid caliph at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century. It took its name from the founder of the dynasty, Abu’l-Saj (d. 879) and comprised five rulers.
The Sajid dynasty was an Islamic dynasty that ruled the Iranian region of Azerbaijan from 889-890 until 929.
The Sajids originated from the Central Asian province of Ushrusana and were of Sogdian's descent. Muhammad ibn Abi'l-Saj Diwdad the son of Diwdad, the first Sajid ruler of Azerbaijan, was appointed as its ruler in 889 or 890. Muhammad's father Abi'l-Saj Devdad had fought under the Ushrusanan prince Afshin Khaydar during the latter's final campaign against the rebel Babak Khorramdin in Azerbaijan, and later served the caliphs. Toward the end of the 9th century, as the central authority of the Abbasid Caliphate weakened, Muhammad was able to form a virtually independent state. Much of the Sajids' energies were spent in attempting to take control of neighboring Armenia. The dynasty ended with the death of Abu'l-Musafir al-Fath in 929.
The Sajid rulers were:
* Abdu Ubaydullah Muhammad Ibn Abi'l-Saj (Muhammad ibn Abi'l-Saj Diwdad) (899-901)
* Abul Musafir Devdad Ibn Muhammad (901)
* Yusuf Ibn Abi'l-Saj (901-919)
o Subuk (919-922) (a servant of the Sajids and a temporary care-taker)
* Yusuf (restored) (922-928)
* Fath ibn Muhammad ibn Abi 'l Saj (Abu'l-Musafir al-Fath) (928-929)
Sajids. Name of a family which ruled in Azerbaijan under the nominal suzerainty of the ‘Abbasid caliph at the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century. It took its name from the founder of the dynasty, Abu’l-Saj (d. 879) and comprised five rulers.
The Sajid dynasty was an Islamic dynasty that ruled the Iranian region of Azerbaijan from 889-890 until 929.
The Sajids originated from the Central Asian province of Ushrusana and were of Sogdian's descent. Muhammad ibn Abi'l-Saj Diwdad the son of Diwdad, the first Sajid ruler of Azerbaijan, was appointed as its ruler in 889 or 890. Muhammad's father Abi'l-Saj Devdad had fought under the Ushrusanan prince Afshin Khaydar during the latter's final campaign against the rebel Babak Khorramdin in Azerbaijan, and later served the caliphs. Toward the end of the 9th century, as the central authority of the Abbasid Caliphate weakened, Muhammad was able to form a virtually independent state. Much of the Sajids' energies were spent in attempting to take control of neighboring Armenia. The dynasty ended with the death of Abu'l-Musafir al-Fath in 929.
The Sajid rulers were:
* Abdu Ubaydullah Muhammad Ibn Abi'l-Saj (Muhammad ibn Abi'l-Saj Diwdad) (899-901)
* Abul Musafir Devdad Ibn Muhammad (901)
* Yusuf Ibn Abi'l-Saj (901-919)
o Subuk (919-922) (a servant of the Sajids and a temporary care-taker)
* Yusuf (restored) (922-928)
* Fath ibn Muhammad ibn Abi 'l Saj (Abu'l-Musafir al-Fath) (928-929)
sajjada nishin
sajjada nishin. Term which means “one who sits on the prayer carpet.” The term sajjada nishin was applied to the successor to the leadership of a khanaqa or the custodian of a Sufi shrine.
sajjada nishin. Term which means “one who sits on the prayer carpet.” The term sajjada nishin was applied to the successor to the leadership of a khanaqa or the custodian of a Sufi shrine.
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