Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecewi, Ibrahim (Ibrahim Pecewi) (Ibrahim Pecevi) (Pecuyli Ibrahim Efendi) (1572/1574-1650). Ottoman historian. Born in Pecs, Hungary, he wrote a history which covers the period from the accession of Suleyman II in 1520 to the death of Murad IV in 1640. It is one of the principal sources for Ottoman history, particularly for the period c.1590-1632.
İbrahim Peçevi was a historian (chronicler) of the Ottoman Empire. He was born in Pécs, Hungary, hence his name, Peçevi ("from Pécs"). His mother was of a Sokollu (Sokolović) Bosnian Serb family. The name of his father is unknown.
He was a provincial official in many places and became a historian after his retirement in 1641.
Peçevi Efendi is famous for his two-volume book Tarih-i Peçevi ("Pecevi's History"), a history of the Ottoman Empire and the main reference for the period 1520–1640. The information about older events Peçevi took from previous works and narrations of veterans. His times are described firsthand and from tales of witnesses. In best traditions of Muslim scholars, Peçevi carefully references all quotations. Peçevi also was one of the first Ottoman historians who used European written sources. He makes references to Hungarian historians.
Ibrahim Pecewi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Ibrahim Pecevi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecevi, Ibrahim see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecuyli Ibrahim Efendi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecewi, Ibrahim (Ibrahim Pecewi) (Ibrahim Pecevi) (Pecuyli Ibrahim Efendi) (1572/1574-1650). Ottoman historian. Born in Pecs, Hungary, he wrote a history which covers the period from the accession of Suleyman II in 1520 to the death of Murad IV in 1640. It is one of the principal sources for Ottoman history, particularly for the period c.1590-1632.
İbrahim Peçevi was a historian (chronicler) of the Ottoman Empire. He was born in Pécs, Hungary, hence his name, Peçevi ("from Pécs"). His mother was of a Sokollu (Sokolović) Bosnian Serb family. The name of his father is unknown.
He was a provincial official in many places and became a historian after his retirement in 1641.
Peçevi Efendi is famous for his two-volume book Tarih-i Peçevi ("Pecevi's History"), a history of the Ottoman Empire and the main reference for the period 1520–1640. The information about older events Peçevi took from previous works and narrations of veterans. His times are described firsthand and from tales of witnesses. In best traditions of Muslim scholars, Peçevi carefully references all quotations. Peçevi also was one of the first Ottoman historians who used European written sources. He makes references to Hungarian historians.
Ibrahim Pecewi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Ibrahim Pecevi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecevi, Ibrahim see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Pecuyli Ibrahim Efendi see Pecewi, Ibrahim
Penghulu
Penghulu. Term which means “headman.” The term penghulu is used in Indonesia as the title of a village administrator.
Penghulu. Term which means “headman.” The term penghulu is used in Indonesia as the title of a village administrator.
penglipor lara
penglipor lara (“soother of cares”). Traditional Malay village bard who recites popular tales based on the adventures of a romantic hero. The same phrase is also applied to the stories themselves. The description “folk-romance” is specially apt since these prose tales (often containing short passages of fine poetry) hve for centuries formed the staple literary diet of the Malay villagers, and provide, in some measure, a rural and oral counterpart to the written and more sophisticated hikayat of the Court. Among the best known folk romances are Cheritera Sri Rama, Hikayat Malim Deman, Hikayat Malim Dewa and Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal. Their plots are often loosely based on Indian themes and there are superficial Muslim touches through a sub-stratum of animistic and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs suggests an older source for them. The form of these stories (which are usually sung), the frequent verse interpolations, the relatively undeveloped characters and stock situations -- often described in formulaic stereotyped phrases ( are reminiscent of much other oral literature in many parts of the world, though here the local background from Malaya and Sumatra (whence some of the stories derive) is particularly vivid and characteristic.
soother of cares see penglipor lara
penglipor lara (“soother of cares”). Traditional Malay village bard who recites popular tales based on the adventures of a romantic hero. The same phrase is also applied to the stories themselves. The description “folk-romance” is specially apt since these prose tales (often containing short passages of fine poetry) hve for centuries formed the staple literary diet of the Malay villagers, and provide, in some measure, a rural and oral counterpart to the written and more sophisticated hikayat of the Court. Among the best known folk romances are Cheritera Sri Rama, Hikayat Malim Deman, Hikayat Malim Dewa and Hikayat Anggun Che Tunggal. Their plots are often loosely based on Indian themes and there are superficial Muslim touches through a sub-stratum of animistic and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs suggests an older source for them. The form of these stories (which are usually sung), the frequent verse interpolations, the relatively undeveloped characters and stock situations -- often described in formulaic stereotyped phrases ( are reminiscent of much other oral literature in many parts of the world, though here the local background from Malaya and Sumatra (whence some of the stories derive) is particularly vivid and characteristic.
soother of cares see penglipor lara
People of the Book
People of the Book. See ahl al-kitab.
People of the Book. See ahl al-kitab.
Percham
Percham (literally, “banner”). Second major faction that split from the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1967. Babrak Karmal, the Afghan president following the Soviet invasion in December 1979, belonged to this faction. The Perchamis favored more moderate domestic economic reforms and were closer to the Soviets than was the PDPA. They also had more support among the Tajiks, a Persian speaking ethnic group, and among the urban Pakhtuns. The faction published a weekly newspaper called Percham.
In 1977, Percham united with the other major communist faction, Khalq, to overthrow the government of Daud Beureu’eh. After the coup, the Perchamis were quickly eliminated from positions of power. Some were arrested, while others remained abroad, mostly in Eastern Europe. Khalqis accused Perchamis of plotting a coup against them. With the Soviet invasion, the balance of power was shifted in favor of Percham. The Perchamis came to dominate the government. The sought to expand the base of power of the regime and win the war against the partisans known as the Mujahedin. They established a communist dominated National Fatherland Front, expanding the Communist Party, moderating some of the Khalqi reforms, and establishing several security organizations.
Banner see Percham
Percham (literally, “banner”). Second major faction that split from the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1967. Babrak Karmal, the Afghan president following the Soviet invasion in December 1979, belonged to this faction. The Perchamis favored more moderate domestic economic reforms and were closer to the Soviets than was the PDPA. They also had more support among the Tajiks, a Persian speaking ethnic group, and among the urban Pakhtuns. The faction published a weekly newspaper called Percham.
In 1977, Percham united with the other major communist faction, Khalq, to overthrow the government of Daud Beureu’eh. After the coup, the Perchamis were quickly eliminated from positions of power. Some were arrested, while others remained abroad, mostly in Eastern Europe. Khalqis accused Perchamis of plotting a coup against them. With the Soviet invasion, the balance of power was shifted in favor of Percham. The Perchamis came to dominate the government. The sought to expand the base of power of the regime and win the war against the partisans known as the Mujahedin. They established a communist dominated National Fatherland Front, expanding the Communist Party, moderating some of the Khalqi reforms, and establishing several security organizations.
Banner see Percham
PERKIM
PERKIM (Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia). Acronym for Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia, or All Malaysia Muslim Welfare Association, PERKIM was founded in 1960 by the first prime minister of the newly independent nation, Tunku Abdul Rahman, as a religious and social welfare organization. Much of the original funding was provided by the Tunku’s contacts with elites in the Muslim world, notably Saudi royalty, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and a $12 million gift from Libya.
PERKIM’s principal goal is the promotion of Islam as the national religion, with particular emphasis on the conversion of the non-Malay population, although without pressure or coercion. PERKIM’s character as a non-communal, or ethnic-bridging, religious organization is unique in multi-ethnic Malaysia. It was symbolically affirmed in the beginning by the ethnic identities of ists cofounders, Haji Ibrahim Ma, Tan Sri O. K. Ubaidullah, and Tan Sri Mubin Sheppard, who are Chinese, Indian, and European Muslims, respectively.
Relatively inactive before 1970, PERKIM sprang to public attention during the 1970s following the ethnic and political conflicts of the late 1960s, which resulted in growing ethnic and religious polarization between the Muslim Malays and other groups. The New Economic Policy, enshrining strong affirmative action in favor of Malays, initiated two decades of Malay economic and constitutional assertiveness and tied economic and educational opportunity to Malay ethnic status, of which Islam is an essential cultural attribute. This was also the era of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, locally known as dakwah (in Arabic, da‘wah), whose activities were directed exclusively toward the Malay community.
In this social climate, PERKIM’s distinctiveness lay in its continued attempts to create a multi-ethnic Islamic community and to reduce the perceived threat of a resurgent Islam among non-Malays. To these ends, PERKIM provides a wide range of support and services, including hostel accommodation and religious instruction for new converts and advice on personal problems arising from their conversion. Among its many educational services are preparation for government examinations, vocational courses, a variety of training schemes, and its own non-denominational kindergartens. PERKIM also sponsors clinics and drug rehabilitation schemes, which are important sources of new converts.
The total number of converts to Islam via PERKIM is hard to estimate precisely, partly because of an enthusiastic tendency toward overestimation during the early 1970s, and partly because of a subsequent high rate of recidivism. However, the total number of converts has probably never exceeded 120,000. During the early 1970s, the largest single constituency of converts to Islam via PERKIM consisted of working class urban Chinese, who sought through Islam an assimilatory route to Malay ethnic and legal status, together with jobs and other privileges. For several years, Tunku Abdul Rahman defended the Chinese converts’ rights of access to occupational and other Malay quotas, both in parliament and in the Malay community at large, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. At this point, many Chinese Muslims were designated only as Saudara Bahru (“new brothers in the faith”), but not as Malays, and were relegated to a separate Chinese Muslims’ Association. As a result, the rate of Chinese conversions has declined significantly to a level of less than one hundred annually, and many earlier converts have disappeared from view. More recent converts have tended to be young, male, and single, and to come from assorted Chinese, Indian, Eurasian, and European backgrounds. Many of them are contemplating marriage with a Muslim, although a few still anticipate advantages in doing business with Malays. Finally, in 1979, PERKIM opened a settlement Pusan Pelarian Indochina (Indochina Refugee Center) in coastal Kelantan state specifically for Muslim (Cham) refugees from Cambodia.
The founding chapter and headquarters of PERKIM is the Balai Islam in the capital of Kuala Lumpur, with a further fifty or so branches throughout Malaysia, several of them supported by commercial and shopping complexes. In the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, PERKIM’s branches (USIA and BINA, respectively) have been particularly active among the non-Malay indigenous population, which accounts for another substantial category of recent converts.
PERKIM’s publications include instructional books on Islam and social problems, as well as regular newsletters in three languages -- Suara PERKIM (Malay), Nur Islam (Chinese), and the Islamic Herald (English).
Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia see PERKIM
PERKIM (Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia). Acronym for Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia, or All Malaysia Muslim Welfare Association, PERKIM was founded in 1960 by the first prime minister of the newly independent nation, Tunku Abdul Rahman, as a religious and social welfare organization. Much of the original funding was provided by the Tunku’s contacts with elites in the Muslim world, notably Saudi royalty, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and a $12 million gift from Libya.
PERKIM’s principal goal is the promotion of Islam as the national religion, with particular emphasis on the conversion of the non-Malay population, although without pressure or coercion. PERKIM’s character as a non-communal, or ethnic-bridging, religious organization is unique in multi-ethnic Malaysia. It was symbolically affirmed in the beginning by the ethnic identities of ists cofounders, Haji Ibrahim Ma, Tan Sri O. K. Ubaidullah, and Tan Sri Mubin Sheppard, who are Chinese, Indian, and European Muslims, respectively.
Relatively inactive before 1970, PERKIM sprang to public attention during the 1970s following the ethnic and political conflicts of the late 1960s, which resulted in growing ethnic and religious polarization between the Muslim Malays and other groups. The New Economic Policy, enshrining strong affirmative action in favor of Malays, initiated two decades of Malay economic and constitutional assertiveness and tied economic and educational opportunity to Malay ethnic status, of which Islam is an essential cultural attribute. This was also the era of the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, locally known as dakwah (in Arabic, da‘wah), whose activities were directed exclusively toward the Malay community.
In this social climate, PERKIM’s distinctiveness lay in its continued attempts to create a multi-ethnic Islamic community and to reduce the perceived threat of a resurgent Islam among non-Malays. To these ends, PERKIM provides a wide range of support and services, including hostel accommodation and religious instruction for new converts and advice on personal problems arising from their conversion. Among its many educational services are preparation for government examinations, vocational courses, a variety of training schemes, and its own non-denominational kindergartens. PERKIM also sponsors clinics and drug rehabilitation schemes, which are important sources of new converts.
The total number of converts to Islam via PERKIM is hard to estimate precisely, partly because of an enthusiastic tendency toward overestimation during the early 1970s, and partly because of a subsequent high rate of recidivism. However, the total number of converts has probably never exceeded 120,000. During the early 1970s, the largest single constituency of converts to Islam via PERKIM consisted of working class urban Chinese, who sought through Islam an assimilatory route to Malay ethnic and legal status, together with jobs and other privileges. For several years, Tunku Abdul Rahman defended the Chinese converts’ rights of access to occupational and other Malay quotas, both in parliament and in the Malay community at large, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. At this point, many Chinese Muslims were designated only as Saudara Bahru (“new brothers in the faith”), but not as Malays, and were relegated to a separate Chinese Muslims’ Association. As a result, the rate of Chinese conversions has declined significantly to a level of less than one hundred annually, and many earlier converts have disappeared from view. More recent converts have tended to be young, male, and single, and to come from assorted Chinese, Indian, Eurasian, and European backgrounds. Many of them are contemplating marriage with a Muslim, although a few still anticipate advantages in doing business with Malays. Finally, in 1979, PERKIM opened a settlement Pusan Pelarian Indochina (Indochina Refugee Center) in coastal Kelantan state specifically for Muslim (Cham) refugees from Cambodia.
The founding chapter and headquarters of PERKIM is the Balai Islam in the capital of Kuala Lumpur, with a further fifty or so branches throughout Malaysia, several of them supported by commercial and shopping complexes. In the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, PERKIM’s branches (USIA and BINA, respectively) have been particularly active among the non-Malay indigenous population, which accounts for another substantial category of recent converts.
PERKIM’s publications include instructional books on Islam and social problems, as well as regular newsletters in three languages -- Suara PERKIM (Malay), Nur Islam (Chinese), and the Islamic Herald (English).
Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam SeMalaysia see PERKIM
Persians
Persians (in Arabic, ‘ajam). In Arabic, a term used by the Arabs to denote the Persians. It is parallel to the Greek word barbaroi (i.e., those who have an incomprehensible and obscure way of speaking). To the Arabs, the barbarians were primarily their neighbors -- the Persians. During the whole Umayyad period, the superiority of the Arabs over the conquered ‘ajam was uncontested. The coming to power of the ‘Abbasids brought the victory of the ‘ajam over the ‘arab. The Persians, having obtained political and social supremacy, soon laid claim to the supremacy of their cultural and spiritual values in the so-called Shu‘ubiyya movement. Another term used by the Arabs to denote the Persians is al-Furs.
Because of its unique position as a land bridge of rugged mountains and barren plains between Europe and Asia, the Iranian Plateau exhibits among its inhabitants a degree of ethnic and linguistic diversity unsurpassed by any other area in Southwest Asia. In this heterogeneous culture area encompassing Iran and Afghanistan, the Persian speaking inhabitants known as Farsiwan or Parsiwan comprise nearly fifty percent of the population.
The Islamization of the Persians was even more consequential. Their religion before the advent of Islam was Zoroastrianism, a belief system based on an eternal conflict between the forces of good and evil. As a universal doctrine, it recognized Ahura Mazda as the God of Good and the Divine Light. An estimated 50,000 Zoroastrians known in Iran as Gabres are concentrated in the area of Yazd and Kerman. A much larger number known as Parsees form small, tightly knit economic and political elites in South Asia and East Africa. Today, nearly all Persians are Shi‘a Muslims of the Ithna Ashari denomination.
The Persians were not the earliest inhabitants of Iran. Archaeological investigations near Behshar on the Caspian coast indicate that as early as 10,000 B.C.T. the Iranian Plateau was already settled by a hunting and gathering people who in many ways resembled those of the Upper Paleolithic Europe.
At the beginning of the third millennium B.C.T., a new ethnic element of Indo-European origin appeared. The newcomers probably left their Eurasian plains in southern Russia as a result of population pressure. Archaeological evidence supports the theory that they were pastoralists affected by drought and in search of pasturage. They came in successive waves but split into two sections. The western branch rounded the Black Sea and spearheaded into Asia Minor; the eastern branch consisted mainly of warrior horsemen who went around the Caspian Sea into the plateau, supplanting the indigenous populations.
The beginning of the first millennium B.C.T. marked the arrival of the Iranians (Aryans). Like others of Indo-European origin who came before them, they penetrated the Iranian Plateau in waves lasting several centuries, apparently using the same Caucasus and Transoxiana routes as the earlier invaders. They were pastoralists and, to a lesser extent, agriculturalists.
The Iranians consisted of several tribal groups: Medes, Persians (Parsa), Parthians, Bactrians, Soghdians, Sacians and Scythians. Over the next four centuries, Iranians formed nuclei of power within certain areas and absorbed the cultural influences of existing civilizations. By the first half of the first millennium B.C.T., they were strong enough to overcome all political obstacles and pave the way for the formation of the first world empire.
Between 625 and 585 B.C.T., the Medes developed an impressive civilization centered at Echbatana, the modern Hamadan. They completely destroyed the powere of Assyria and extended their hegemony far into Asia Minor. Persians, who had initially settled to the northwest of Lake Urmia about the eighth century B.C.T., moved farther south and occupied Parsa, the modern province of Fars, from which they receive their ethnic title. This loosely federated tribal group became a more cohesive political unit under the Achaemenian clan. In 553 B.C.T., Cyrus, the ruler of Parsa, overthrew the Median dynasty and consolidated the Medes and Persians into the great Achaemenid Empire.
From the fifth century B.C.T. to the seventh century of the Christian calendar, the social structure of Persian contained rulers, priests, warriors, artisans, scribes and producers, a structure which became progressively more complex and rigid. Towards the end of this period, a small privileged class dominated a growing mass of disfranchised people with few avenues for mobility. This condition, exacerbated by long and costly campaigns against the Eastern Roman Empire, led to an internal decay which prepared the way for the Arab invasion.
The 13 centuries from the Arab invasion of Persia until today have seen a fluctuation in monarchical powers and also a steady Persianization of the heterogeneous society. Politically, Persians were able to maintain their independence from invaders and their dominance over non-Persian minorities within the country. Since 1925 and the beginning of an intense nationalistic period, including the official adoption of the name “Iran,” governments have sought to spread the use of Farsi and to encourage the best in Persian culture.
Persians are a sedentary people found in every part of Iran and western Afghanistan. Their concentration is in and around a number of cities in the interior of the plateau -- Kerman, Shiraz, Yazd, Isfahan, Kashan, Tehran and Herat in Afghanistan. Each city is the economic and political hub of a dozen or more towns. Each town in turn integrates hundreds of villages into a regional economic network.
Ever since the introduction of Shiism as the national religion of Iran in the Safavid period (1501-1722), the ulama as the interpreters and practitioners of Islam have played an increasingly important role in the social and political life of the nation. They have been, at least for the past 100 years, the vanguard of significant protest movements against despotic rulers or policies which compromised the cultural and political integrity of Iran. The success of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), for example, owed much to the ulama supported by the Bazaaris and secular liberals. The subsequent process of secularization of education and judicial system by the Pahlavis gradually undermined the social and moral leadership of the ulama. Nevertheless, they still enjoy the respect and devotion of a sizable segment of the Iranian population.
In the early 1960s the relationship between the bureaucratic state and the ulama entered a new phase when Ayatollah Khomeini began challenging the legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime on grounds that monarchy is incompatible with Islam. The Qur’an and hadith, he stressed, contain all the laws needed for human guidance. It is incumbent upon the ulama to purify Islam and apply its laws. Furthermore, in the absence of the last infallible Imam, who is in occultation, the Islamic jurists must accept the responsibility to govern. Ayatollah Khomeini was imprisoned and then exiled to Iraq. He returned in 1979 to topple the monarchy.
'ajam see Persians
Persians (in Arabic, ‘ajam). In Arabic, a term used by the Arabs to denote the Persians. It is parallel to the Greek word barbaroi (i.e., those who have an incomprehensible and obscure way of speaking). To the Arabs, the barbarians were primarily their neighbors -- the Persians. During the whole Umayyad period, the superiority of the Arabs over the conquered ‘ajam was uncontested. The coming to power of the ‘Abbasids brought the victory of the ‘ajam over the ‘arab. The Persians, having obtained political and social supremacy, soon laid claim to the supremacy of their cultural and spiritual values in the so-called Shu‘ubiyya movement. Another term used by the Arabs to denote the Persians is al-Furs.
Because of its unique position as a land bridge of rugged mountains and barren plains between Europe and Asia, the Iranian Plateau exhibits among its inhabitants a degree of ethnic and linguistic diversity unsurpassed by any other area in Southwest Asia. In this heterogeneous culture area encompassing Iran and Afghanistan, the Persian speaking inhabitants known as Farsiwan or Parsiwan comprise nearly fifty percent of the population.
The Islamization of the Persians was even more consequential. Their religion before the advent of Islam was Zoroastrianism, a belief system based on an eternal conflict between the forces of good and evil. As a universal doctrine, it recognized Ahura Mazda as the God of Good and the Divine Light. An estimated 50,000 Zoroastrians known in Iran as Gabres are concentrated in the area of Yazd and Kerman. A much larger number known as Parsees form small, tightly knit economic and political elites in South Asia and East Africa. Today, nearly all Persians are Shi‘a Muslims of the Ithna Ashari denomination.
The Persians were not the earliest inhabitants of Iran. Archaeological investigations near Behshar on the Caspian coast indicate that as early as 10,000 B.C.T. the Iranian Plateau was already settled by a hunting and gathering people who in many ways resembled those of the Upper Paleolithic Europe.
At the beginning of the third millennium B.C.T., a new ethnic element of Indo-European origin appeared. The newcomers probably left their Eurasian plains in southern Russia as a result of population pressure. Archaeological evidence supports the theory that they were pastoralists affected by drought and in search of pasturage. They came in successive waves but split into two sections. The western branch rounded the Black Sea and spearheaded into Asia Minor; the eastern branch consisted mainly of warrior horsemen who went around the Caspian Sea into the plateau, supplanting the indigenous populations.
The beginning of the first millennium B.C.T. marked the arrival of the Iranians (Aryans). Like others of Indo-European origin who came before them, they penetrated the Iranian Plateau in waves lasting several centuries, apparently using the same Caucasus and Transoxiana routes as the earlier invaders. They were pastoralists and, to a lesser extent, agriculturalists.
The Iranians consisted of several tribal groups: Medes, Persians (Parsa), Parthians, Bactrians, Soghdians, Sacians and Scythians. Over the next four centuries, Iranians formed nuclei of power within certain areas and absorbed the cultural influences of existing civilizations. By the first half of the first millennium B.C.T., they were strong enough to overcome all political obstacles and pave the way for the formation of the first world empire.
Between 625 and 585 B.C.T., the Medes developed an impressive civilization centered at Echbatana, the modern Hamadan. They completely destroyed the powere of Assyria and extended their hegemony far into Asia Minor. Persians, who had initially settled to the northwest of Lake Urmia about the eighth century B.C.T., moved farther south and occupied Parsa, the modern province of Fars, from which they receive their ethnic title. This loosely federated tribal group became a more cohesive political unit under the Achaemenian clan. In 553 B.C.T., Cyrus, the ruler of Parsa, overthrew the Median dynasty and consolidated the Medes and Persians into the great Achaemenid Empire.
From the fifth century B.C.T. to the seventh century of the Christian calendar, the social structure of Persian contained rulers, priests, warriors, artisans, scribes and producers, a structure which became progressively more complex and rigid. Towards the end of this period, a small privileged class dominated a growing mass of disfranchised people with few avenues for mobility. This condition, exacerbated by long and costly campaigns against the Eastern Roman Empire, led to an internal decay which prepared the way for the Arab invasion.
The 13 centuries from the Arab invasion of Persia until today have seen a fluctuation in monarchical powers and also a steady Persianization of the heterogeneous society. Politically, Persians were able to maintain their independence from invaders and their dominance over non-Persian minorities within the country. Since 1925 and the beginning of an intense nationalistic period, including the official adoption of the name “Iran,” governments have sought to spread the use of Farsi and to encourage the best in Persian culture.
Persians are a sedentary people found in every part of Iran and western Afghanistan. Their concentration is in and around a number of cities in the interior of the plateau -- Kerman, Shiraz, Yazd, Isfahan, Kashan, Tehran and Herat in Afghanistan. Each city is the economic and political hub of a dozen or more towns. Each town in turn integrates hundreds of villages into a regional economic network.
Ever since the introduction of Shiism as the national religion of Iran in the Safavid period (1501-1722), the ulama as the interpreters and practitioners of Islam have played an increasingly important role in the social and political life of the nation. They have been, at least for the past 100 years, the vanguard of significant protest movements against despotic rulers or policies which compromised the cultural and political integrity of Iran. The success of the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911), for example, owed much to the ulama supported by the Bazaaris and secular liberals. The subsequent process of secularization of education and judicial system by the Pahlavis gradually undermined the social and moral leadership of the ulama. Nevertheless, they still enjoy the respect and devotion of a sizable segment of the Iranian population.
In the early 1960s the relationship between the bureaucratic state and the ulama entered a new phase when Ayatollah Khomeini began challenging the legitimacy of the Pahlavi regime on grounds that monarchy is incompatible with Islam. The Qur’an and hadith, he stressed, contain all the laws needed for human guidance. It is incumbent upon the ulama to purify Islam and apply its laws. Furthermore, in the absence of the last infallible Imam, who is in occultation, the Islamic jurists must accept the responsibility to govern. Ayatollah Khomeini was imprisoned and then exiled to Iraq. He returned in 1979 to topple the monarchy.
'ajam see Persians
PETA
PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) (“Defenders of the Homeland”). Volunteer army units formed in October 1943 by Japanese authorities on Java and Sumatra. While ostensibly formed to defend the islands against expected Allied invasions, the PETA was also a concession to Indonesian nationalist demands for military training and aided the inculcation of Japanese values in Indonesian youth. Its officers, up to battalion level, were Indonesians, but there was no hierarchial link between battalions independent of the Japanese army. In February 1945, PETA troops at Blitar (East Java) revolted unsuccessfully against the Japanese. PETA officers formed much of the officer corps of the Indonesian army.
PETA was an Indonesian volunteer army established on October 3, 1943 in Indonesia by the occupying Japanese. The Japanese intended PETA to assist their forces oppose a possible invasion by the Allies. By the end of the war, there were a total of 69 battalions (daidan) in Java (around 37,000 men) and Sumatra (approximately 20,000 men). On August 17, 1945, the day after the Indonesian Declaration of Independence, the Japanese ordered the PETA daidan to surrender and hand over their weapons, which most of them did. The Indonesian Republic's newly-declared President, Sukarno, supported the dissolution rather than turn the organization into a national army as he feared allegations of collaboration had he allowed a Japanese-created militia to continue in existence.
Pembela Tanah Air see PETA
Defenders of the Homeland see PETA
PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) (“Defenders of the Homeland”). Volunteer army units formed in October 1943 by Japanese authorities on Java and Sumatra. While ostensibly formed to defend the islands against expected Allied invasions, the PETA was also a concession to Indonesian nationalist demands for military training and aided the inculcation of Japanese values in Indonesian youth. Its officers, up to battalion level, were Indonesians, but there was no hierarchial link between battalions independent of the Japanese army. In February 1945, PETA troops at Blitar (East Java) revolted unsuccessfully against the Japanese. PETA officers formed much of the officer corps of the Indonesian army.
PETA was an Indonesian volunteer army established on October 3, 1943 in Indonesia by the occupying Japanese. The Japanese intended PETA to assist their forces oppose a possible invasion by the Allies. By the end of the war, there were a total of 69 battalions (daidan) in Java (around 37,000 men) and Sumatra (approximately 20,000 men). On August 17, 1945, the day after the Indonesian Declaration of Independence, the Japanese ordered the PETA daidan to surrender and hand over their weapons, which most of them did. The Indonesian Republic's newly-declared President, Sukarno, supported the dissolution rather than turn the organization into a national army as he feared allegations of collaboration had he allowed a Japanese-created militia to continue in existence.
Pembela Tanah Air see PETA
Defenders of the Homeland see PETA
Peuhl
Peuhl. See Fula.
Peuhl. See Fula.
Phalangists
Phalangists. Lebanese Christian political party and militia. The name Phalangists (Phalange and Phalange party are variations of the same term) is both a translation from Arabic and a small distortion, coming from phalanx. The correct name would have been Lebanese Kateeb Social Democratic Party.
In November of 1936, the Phalange party was founded by Pierre Gemayel who was inspired by the Nazi Youth Movement that he had seen in Hitler’s Germany.
In 1949, the discovery of a Syrian plot to merge Lebanon with Syria stirred up anxiety and nationalism in Lebanon, giving the Phalange party many new members. In the 1958 Civil War, the Phalangists supported President Camille Chamoun.
In 1968, the Phalange Party cooperated with the parties of Chamoun and Raymond Edde, and garnered 9 out of the 99 seats in the parliament. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War began. The Phalangists had 20,000 members and their own little army. They were part of the umbrella organization Lebanese Front.
In 1976, the Phalangists supported Syrian intervention in the conflict, as they were losing ground to the Muslim troops. In 1980, the Phalange destroyed the militia of the National Liberal Party of Chamoun, which was another member of the Lebanese Front.
In 1982, the Phalangists cooperated with Israel, in planning an attack on Lebanon. On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon from its southern border, and its forces started advancing north, reaching Beirut in short time. In September, the Phalangists became the strongest party in Lebanon, thanks to the aid of Israel. On September 13, 1982, Bashir Gemayel was killed a few days before he was to be sworn in as president of Lebanon. On September 16, as a way of retaliating for the killing of Gemayel, the Phalange militia received help from the Israeli army to close off the Palestinian quarters of Sabra and Chatila. Then a campaign of killing 2,000 Palestinian civilians over the next three days. This stands as one of the most dramatic moments from the sixteen year long civil war. On September 21, 1982, Bashir’s brother, Amin, also a Phalange member, was elected president.
In 1985, there was a break between the Phalange party and the Lebanese Front, and thereby reducing the Phalange importance. In September 1988, Gemayel stepped down as president, left the country and a weakened party.
In 1992, the Phalange party decided to boycott the general elections, as a protest against the continued presence of Syrian troops in Lebanaon. In December of 1992, the headquarters of the Phalange party were blown up.
The Phalange attracted Christian youths from the mountains northeast of Beirut as well Christian students in Beirut. The politics of the Phalange party was pro-Western, and they opposed any pan-Arabism. The Phalangists have shown an unusual amount of pragmatism in dealing with allies.
In the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, the Phalangists cooperated with Syria, but from 1982 onward Israel became their most important ally. 1982 was also the year that the Phalangists performed the act for which they always will be remembered: the massacre of Sabra and Chatila. This was a retaliation for the murder of their leader Bashir Gemayel, and from this year the Phalange gradually lost its momentum and importance.
During the Lebanese Civil war, many Christian militias were formed who gained support from the north of Lebanon. These militias were staunchly right-wing, nationalist and anti-Palestinian with a majority of their members being Maronite. The Kataeb party was the most powerful of these militias at the time of the Lebanese Civil war. The party later went on to help found the right-wing Lebanese Forces militia in 1977 which played a large role within the Lebanese Civil war.
In September 1982, Bachir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon by the National Assembly. He was assassinated less than a month later in an operation thought to have been arranged by Syrian intelligence and was in turn succeeded by his brother, Amine Gemayel. Bachir was thought to have been radical in his approach, and hinted at possible peace agreements with Israel while trying to expel all Palestinian refugees from Lebanon. In contrast, Amine was thought to have been much more moderate.
On September 16, 1982, Elie Hobeika led the massacre of between 328 and 3,500 Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, while the periphery of the camps were under the control of the Israeli Defense Forces.
After the death of Pierre Gemayel, in 1984, his successors Elie Karame and Amine Gemayel struggled to maintain influence over the actions of the Lebanese Army, which became virtually independent as Muslim recruits deserted and rebelled against the mostly Christian officer ranks. The Kataeb party began to decline, not playing a major role for the remainder of the war.
The party, lacking direction, broke down into several rival factions. Georges Saadeh took control of the Party from 1986 until his death in 1998. He took a moderate position toward the Syrian presence. Mounir Hajj became the president of the party in 1999, followed by a Karim Pakradouni in 2002. Amine Gemayel left Lebanon in 1988 after his mandate had ended, mainly to avoid a clash with Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces and to avoid more Intra-Christian bloodshed. He returned in 2000 to oppose the Syrian role in Lebanon and to back his son's (Pierre's) parliamentary election campaign (which he won). His sons Pierre and Samy, had returned in 1997 and had been working on reorganizing the popular base of the party. However, his return was not welcomed by the established leadership of the party. To distinguish themselves from the official leadership, Gemayel's supporters started referring to themselves as "The Kataeb Base" or "The Kataeb Reform Movement". General consensus amongst Lebanese recognized Gemayel as the legitimate Leader of the party, not because of lineage but because of popular support.
In March 2005, after the Rafik Hariri assassination, the Kataeb took part in an anti-Syrian presence demonstration, commonly known as the Cedar Revolution. It also became a member of the March 14 Alliance, along with the Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanese Forces and other minor parties. The Kataeb won four seats in the June 2005 elections, three representing the Gemayel Leadership (Pierre Gemayel, Solange Gemayel and Antoine Ghanem) and one representing the official leadership of the Party. However, they formed one parliamentary bloc after a reconciliation that took place in 2005. This reconciliation was marketed as a gesture of good will from Pierre Amine Gemayel who deemed it was time to turn the page and give those who were unfaithful to the party principles a second chance. Practically, it was a way for Pakradouni and his men to leave the Party with as little humiliation as possible since the reconciliation deal stipulated the resignation of the entire political bureau after two years. This reconciliation saw Amine come back to the Party as Supreme President of the Party while Pakradouni stayed on as President. Samy Gemayel (Amine's second son) who had formed his own political ideas and identity at the time (much closer in principle and in manner to those of his uncle Bachir) was a very strong opposer of Pakradouni and his Syrian ties and thus was not a fan of this reconciliation. This drew Samy away from the party and prompted him to create a Think-Tank/Research-Center on Federalism named Loubnanouna (Our Lebanon).
In July 2005, the party participated in the Fouad Siniora Government, with Pierre Amine Gemayel as the minister of industry. Pierre played an important role in the reorganization and development of the party. His assassination in November 2006 was a major blow to the party. Syrian intelligence and "Fateh Al Islam" were accused of the assassination. With 14 March Alliance forces, the party supported the Lebanese government against Hezbollah.
In September 2007 another Kataeb member of parliament, Antoine Ghanem was assassinated in a car bombing. Solange Gemayel remained the party's only member of parliament, since Pierre Gemayel's seat was lost to the Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun in a special election in August 2007.
Also, in 2007, Samy Gemayel and (most of) his Loubnanouna companions rejoined the Kataeb, prompting a renaissance in the party. Pierre's martyrdom played a major role in public appeal, coupled with Samy's political ideas and persona.
In the 2009 Global Parliamentary Elections, the Kataeb Party managed to win five seats: One in the Metn Caza, one in the Beirut-Caza, one in Zahle, one in the Aley Caza and another in the Tripoli Caza. The victories in Beirut-1 and Zahle as well as not allowing the opposition's list to win fully in Metn were major upsets to the General Aoun's FPM who is an ally of Iranian-backed Hezbollah. These victories enabled Samy Gemayel, Nadim Gemayel (son of slain President Bachir Gemayel), Elie Marouni, Fady el-Haber and Samer Saade to join Parliament. In the first Government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the Kataeb were assigned the Social Affairs portfolio.
Lebanese Kateeb Social Democratic Party see Phalangists.
Phalangists. Lebanese Christian political party and militia. The name Phalangists (Phalange and Phalange party are variations of the same term) is both a translation from Arabic and a small distortion, coming from phalanx. The correct name would have been Lebanese Kateeb Social Democratic Party.
In November of 1936, the Phalange party was founded by Pierre Gemayel who was inspired by the Nazi Youth Movement that he had seen in Hitler’s Germany.
In 1949, the discovery of a Syrian plot to merge Lebanon with Syria stirred up anxiety and nationalism in Lebanon, giving the Phalange party many new members. In the 1958 Civil War, the Phalangists supported President Camille Chamoun.
In 1968, the Phalange Party cooperated with the parties of Chamoun and Raymond Edde, and garnered 9 out of the 99 seats in the parliament. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War began. The Phalangists had 20,000 members and their own little army. They were part of the umbrella organization Lebanese Front.
In 1976, the Phalangists supported Syrian intervention in the conflict, as they were losing ground to the Muslim troops. In 1980, the Phalange destroyed the militia of the National Liberal Party of Chamoun, which was another member of the Lebanese Front.
In 1982, the Phalangists cooperated with Israel, in planning an attack on Lebanon. On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon from its southern border, and its forces started advancing north, reaching Beirut in short time. In September, the Phalangists became the strongest party in Lebanon, thanks to the aid of Israel. On September 13, 1982, Bashir Gemayel was killed a few days before he was to be sworn in as president of Lebanon. On September 16, as a way of retaliating for the killing of Gemayel, the Phalange militia received help from the Israeli army to close off the Palestinian quarters of Sabra and Chatila. Then a campaign of killing 2,000 Palestinian civilians over the next three days. This stands as one of the most dramatic moments from the sixteen year long civil war. On September 21, 1982, Bashir’s brother, Amin, also a Phalange member, was elected president.
In 1985, there was a break between the Phalange party and the Lebanese Front, and thereby reducing the Phalange importance. In September 1988, Gemayel stepped down as president, left the country and a weakened party.
In 1992, the Phalange party decided to boycott the general elections, as a protest against the continued presence of Syrian troops in Lebanaon. In December of 1992, the headquarters of the Phalange party were blown up.
The Phalange attracted Christian youths from the mountains northeast of Beirut as well Christian students in Beirut. The politics of the Phalange party was pro-Western, and they opposed any pan-Arabism. The Phalangists have shown an unusual amount of pragmatism in dealing with allies.
In the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War, the Phalangists cooperated with Syria, but from 1982 onward Israel became their most important ally. 1982 was also the year that the Phalangists performed the act for which they always will be remembered: the massacre of Sabra and Chatila. This was a retaliation for the murder of their leader Bashir Gemayel, and from this year the Phalange gradually lost its momentum and importance.
During the Lebanese Civil war, many Christian militias were formed who gained support from the north of Lebanon. These militias were staunchly right-wing, nationalist and anti-Palestinian with a majority of their members being Maronite. The Kataeb party was the most powerful of these militias at the time of the Lebanese Civil war. The party later went on to help found the right-wing Lebanese Forces militia in 1977 which played a large role within the Lebanese Civil war.
In September 1982, Bachir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon by the National Assembly. He was assassinated less than a month later in an operation thought to have been arranged by Syrian intelligence and was in turn succeeded by his brother, Amine Gemayel. Bachir was thought to have been radical in his approach, and hinted at possible peace agreements with Israel while trying to expel all Palestinian refugees from Lebanon. In contrast, Amine was thought to have been much more moderate.
On September 16, 1982, Elie Hobeika led the massacre of between 328 and 3,500 Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, while the periphery of the camps were under the control of the Israeli Defense Forces.
After the death of Pierre Gemayel, in 1984, his successors Elie Karame and Amine Gemayel struggled to maintain influence over the actions of the Lebanese Army, which became virtually independent as Muslim recruits deserted and rebelled against the mostly Christian officer ranks. The Kataeb party began to decline, not playing a major role for the remainder of the war.
The party, lacking direction, broke down into several rival factions. Georges Saadeh took control of the Party from 1986 until his death in 1998. He took a moderate position toward the Syrian presence. Mounir Hajj became the president of the party in 1999, followed by a Karim Pakradouni in 2002. Amine Gemayel left Lebanon in 1988 after his mandate had ended, mainly to avoid a clash with Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces and to avoid more Intra-Christian bloodshed. He returned in 2000 to oppose the Syrian role in Lebanon and to back his son's (Pierre's) parliamentary election campaign (which he won). His sons Pierre and Samy, had returned in 1997 and had been working on reorganizing the popular base of the party. However, his return was not welcomed by the established leadership of the party. To distinguish themselves from the official leadership, Gemayel's supporters started referring to themselves as "The Kataeb Base" or "The Kataeb Reform Movement". General consensus amongst Lebanese recognized Gemayel as the legitimate Leader of the party, not because of lineage but because of popular support.
In March 2005, after the Rafik Hariri assassination, the Kataeb took part in an anti-Syrian presence demonstration, commonly known as the Cedar Revolution. It also became a member of the March 14 Alliance, along with the Future Movement, Progressive Socialist Party, Lebanese Forces and other minor parties. The Kataeb won four seats in the June 2005 elections, three representing the Gemayel Leadership (Pierre Gemayel, Solange Gemayel and Antoine Ghanem) and one representing the official leadership of the Party. However, they formed one parliamentary bloc after a reconciliation that took place in 2005. This reconciliation was marketed as a gesture of good will from Pierre Amine Gemayel who deemed it was time to turn the page and give those who were unfaithful to the party principles a second chance. Practically, it was a way for Pakradouni and his men to leave the Party with as little humiliation as possible since the reconciliation deal stipulated the resignation of the entire political bureau after two years. This reconciliation saw Amine come back to the Party as Supreme President of the Party while Pakradouni stayed on as President. Samy Gemayel (Amine's second son) who had formed his own political ideas and identity at the time (much closer in principle and in manner to those of his uncle Bachir) was a very strong opposer of Pakradouni and his Syrian ties and thus was not a fan of this reconciliation. This drew Samy away from the party and prompted him to create a Think-Tank/Research-Center on Federalism named Loubnanouna (Our Lebanon).
In July 2005, the party participated in the Fouad Siniora Government, with Pierre Amine Gemayel as the minister of industry. Pierre played an important role in the reorganization and development of the party. His assassination in November 2006 was a major blow to the party. Syrian intelligence and "Fateh Al Islam" were accused of the assassination. With 14 March Alliance forces, the party supported the Lebanese government against Hezbollah.
In September 2007 another Kataeb member of parliament, Antoine Ghanem was assassinated in a car bombing. Solange Gemayel remained the party's only member of parliament, since Pierre Gemayel's seat was lost to the Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun in a special election in August 2007.
Also, in 2007, Samy Gemayel and (most of) his Loubnanouna companions rejoined the Kataeb, prompting a renaissance in the party. Pierre's martyrdom played a major role in public appeal, coupled with Samy's political ideas and persona.
In the 2009 Global Parliamentary Elections, the Kataeb Party managed to win five seats: One in the Metn Caza, one in the Beirut-Caza, one in Zahle, one in the Aley Caza and another in the Tripoli Caza. The victories in Beirut-1 and Zahle as well as not allowing the opposition's list to win fully in Metn were major upsets to the General Aoun's FPM who is an ally of Iranian-backed Hezbollah. These victories enabled Samy Gemayel, Nadim Gemayel (son of slain President Bachir Gemayel), Elie Marouni, Fady el-Haber and Samer Saade to join Parliament. In the first Government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the Kataeb were assigned the Social Affairs portfolio.
Lebanese Kateeb Social Democratic Party see Phalangists.
Pharaoh
Pharaoh (Fir‘awn) (Fir'aun). Pharaoh is mentioned in the Qur’an and is seen in relation with the Prophet’s own mission, i.e., with the determined rejection of the divine message by the unbelievers who in the end are severely punished, while the believers are saved.
Fir'awn is Arabic for "pharaoh". The Qur'an tells the story of Musa and the Pharaoh also known as Fir'awn.
Fir'awn see Pharaoh
Fir'aun see Pharaoh
Pharaoh (Fir‘awn) (Fir'aun). Pharaoh is mentioned in the Qur’an and is seen in relation with the Prophet’s own mission, i.e., with the determined rejection of the divine message by the unbelievers who in the end are severely punished, while the believers are saved.
Fir'awn is Arabic for "pharaoh". The Qur'an tells the story of Musa and the Pharaoh also known as Fir'awn.
Fir'awn see Pharaoh
Fir'aun see Pharaoh
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