Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al- (Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya) (al-jamā aħ al-'islāmiyyaħ -- Arabic for "the Islamic Group") (Gamaat Islamiya) (al Jamaat al Islamiya) (El Gama'a El Islamiyya) (GI). A broad range of Islamic organizations in Egypt use the name al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah (Islamic Groups). These groups operate primarily through independent mosques and student unions on university campuses and appeal primarily to Egyptian youths. There does not appear to be any single leadership uniting the various groups; rather, they represent the general trend in Egyptian society toward Islamic resurgence. However, since the mid-1980s an increasing number of clashes have occurred in Upper Egypt between government forces and more politically militant groups acting under the banner of al-Jama ‘at al-Islamiyah. The self-proclaimed leader of these groups is Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman (Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman), a blind preacher from al-Fayyum who lived in exile in the United States in the early 1990s.
The use of the term al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah originated in the early 1970s under the new government of President Anwar Sadat. Sadat released members of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood) who had been imprisoned under President Gamal Abdel Nasser and officially permitted new Islamic organizations to form under the umbrella of al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah. This move to reconstruct the conservative religious sectors of society was an early sign of Sadat’s intention to shift Egypt’s political course. Through the 1970s, as Sadat developed his plans to restructure the Egyptian political economy, these Islamic groups served as an important counter-balance to the old Nasserist constituency and other groups further to the left. While the regime reduced government programs and encouraged general privatization, the number of private (ahli) mosques in the country doubled in one decade from twenty thousand to forty thousand.
These private mosques and the many Islamic organizations associated with them began to play an important role in large urban areas, including Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez in Lower Egypt. Continued rural migration to these cities, combined with the government’s restructuring policy, exacerbated social and economic tensions and led to a growing sense of urban alienation. While the government reduced its social welfare programs, the activities of al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah provided a social safety net at private mosques, with centers for food and clothing distribution as well as for the study of the Qur’an. These mosques also had new independent sources of funding in the form of private remittances from members’ relatives who migrated to work in the Arab Gulf countries during the oil-boom years. An additional factor affecting the growth of the movement was the expansion of the country’s university system, especially in Upper Egypt where new campuses were founded in the 1970s in al-Minya, al-Fayyum, Sohag, Qina, and Aswan. Students at these schools and the older university in Asyut organized unions and fraternities under the name of al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah.
By the late 1970s, as Sadat faced growing opposition at home for signing the Camp David peace treaty with Israel, there were a number of independent religious leaders associated with al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah who became very popular for their outspoken criticism of the Sadat regime. Prominent among these were Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahallawi at Qa’id Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria and Shaykh Hafiz Salamah of al-Shuhada’ Mosque in Suez and al-Nur Mosque in Cairo. Just before his assassination in 1981, Sadat made public attacks on both Shaykh Mahallawi and Shaykh Salamah. Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman was also critical of the regime and was later charged with having links to the Jihad group that carried out Sadat’s assassination, but was not found guilty. In the government crackdown on public opposition both before and after Sadat’s assassination, each of these religious leaders experienced state censorship and imprisonment.
It is difficult to generalize about the ideology, practices, and aims of the various al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah organizations. In general, they advocate stronger Islamic rule and oppose non-Islamic practices in Egyptian society. They call for the adoption of shari‘a, the Islamic legal code, as the official law of the state, and they oppose attempts by the government to control and supervise the work of mosques and religious groups through the shaykh of al-Azhar and the Ministry of Awqaf. More than other al-Jama‘at leaders, Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman denounced the official religious institutions of the state and was even critical of entry by moderates in the Ikhwan into electoral party politics. After the Iranian revolution, Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman identified closely with its Islamic government and urged his followers to confront the Egyptian government directly for its non-Islamic practices.
The Egyptian government and official media attempted to link Shaykh Omar with the clandestine and subversive Jihad group, but he always denied the connection. The main difference between his activities and those of Jihad is that he openly sought to mobilize popular resistance to the government through his public preaching and the organizing of large conferences in cities along the Nile River. By the summer of 1988, there were an increasing number of clashes in al-Fayyum, al-Minya, and other cities in Asyut province between the local police and his followers as they left mosques after the Friday sermons. Cities and universities throughout the area experienced increasing repression by the state as the government closed mosques, disrupted student union elections, and banned all activities under the name al-Jama‘at al-Islamiyah. As tensions rose there were reports of house-to-house police searches, mass arrests in the thousands, and an increasing number of killings in many cities of Upper Egypt. In 1988 and 1989, Shaykh Omar was arrested and detained on at least two occasions. During his imprisonment, his followers staged large protests that led to further confrontations with the police. There were also demonstrations of support reported in the Cairo suburbs of Imbabah and ‘Ayn Shams, indicating his broad following and the shared identity of al-Jama‘at organizations around Egypt. As the clashes between the government and al-Jama‘at continued, Shaykh Omar left the country, reportedly first to Afghanistan and Pakistan and then to the United States.
Following Shaykh Omar’s exile the level of conflict between al-Jama‘at followers and the government increased, with military troops, armored cars, and helicopters deployed to several cities. The nature of the confrontation also assumed three new forms. First, the political assassinations of People’s Assembly speaker Rif‘at al-Mahjub in October 1990 and of liberal author
Faraj Fawdah in June 1992, were blamed on al-Jama‘at and were said to have been ordered by Shaykh Omar. Attacks on prominent officials continued, such as the attempted assassination of Prime Minister ‘Atif Sidqi, in November 1993. Second, in 1991, violent sectarian clashes between Muslims and Christians erupted in several cities of Upper Egypt, notably Dayrut. The government claimed these were instigated by members of al-Jama‘at, but they mainly resulted from old social rivalries. Third, by late 1992, extremist elements in al-Jama‘at claimed responsibility for at least two attacks on foreign tourists visiting pharaonic monuments in Upper Egypt. The government claimed the al-Jama‘at were pursuing a new strategy to disrupt the tourist trade and thus damage the national economy. These attacks on foreign tourists continued into 1993.
In the summer of 1992, the government passed a strict new anti-terrorism law limiting al-Jama‘at’s activities, and in the fall it announced that all mosques and prayer leaders would be put under state control. In August 1992, the government claimed to have arrested twenty-five leaders of al-Jama‘at, including two foreign citizens – a Sudanese and a Jordanian – at an organizational meeting in Alexandria. The government always maintained that al-Jama‘at is foreign-inspired, primarily by Iranians and Sudanese, and it now claimed to have exposed this international connection. Despite these arrests, however, al-Jama‘at would remain a significant factor in Egyptian society. It had wide appeal among the youth and university students and appears to have established popular roots in several parts of the country.
The 1990s saw Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya engage in an extended campaign of violence, from the murders and attempted murders of prominent writers and intellectuals, to the repeated targeting of tourists and foreigners. This did serious damage to the largest sector of Egypt's economy and in turn to the government, but it also devastated the livelihoods of many of the people on whom the group depends for support.
Victims of campaign against the Egyptian state from 1992-1997 totaled more than 1200 and included the head of the counter-terrorism police (Major General Raouf Khayrat), a speaker of parliamentary (Rifaat al-Mahgoub), dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over 100 Egyptian police.
The 1991 killing of the group's leader, Ala Mohieddin, presumably by security forces, led Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya to murder Egypt's speaker of parliament in retaliation. In June 1995, working together with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group staged a carefully planned attempt on the life of president Mubarak, lead by Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda and commander of the military branch of the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Mubarak escaped unharmed and retaliated with a massive and ruthless crackdown on the members of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and their families in Egypt.
Taalat Fouad Qassem was arrested in Croatia in 1995.
By 1997, the movement had become paralyzed. 20,000 Islamists were in custody in Egypt and thousands more had been cut down by the security forces. In July of that year, Islamist lawyer Montassir al-Zayyat brokered a deal between the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian government, called the Nonviolence Initiative, whereby the movement formally renounced violence. The next year the government released 2,000 members of the Islamic Group. After the initiative was declared Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman also gave his approval from his prison cell in the United States, though he later withdrew it.
The initiative divided the Islamic Group between members in Egypt who supported it and those in exile who wanted the attacks to continue. Leading the opposition was EIJ leader Ayman Zawahiri who termed it "surrender" in angry letters to the London newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
Zawahiri enlisted Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of Islamic Groups and its military leader, Rifai Ahmed Taha, both exiles in Afghanistan with him, to sabotage the initiative with a massive terrorism attack that would provoke the government into repression. So on November 17, 1997 Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's killing campaign climaxed with an attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut (Deir el-Bahri) in Luxor, in which a band of six men dressed in police uniforms machine-gunned and hacked to death with knives 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians. The killing went on for 45 minutes, until the floors streamed with blood. The dead included a five-year-old British child and four Japanese couples on their honeymoons. Altogether 71 people were killed. The attack stunned Egyptian society, devastated the tourist industry for a number of years, and consequently sapped a large segment of popular support for violent Islamism in Egypt.
The revulsion of Egyptians and rejection of jihadi terrorism was so complete, the attack's supporters backpedaled. The day after the attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, despite the evidence of the systematic nature of the slaughter. Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman blamed Israelis for the killings, and Zawahiri maintained the Egyptian police had done it.
When Rifai Taha signed the al-Qaeda fatwa "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" to kill Crusaders and Jews on behalf of the Islamic Group, he was forced to withdraw his name from the fatwa, lamely explaining to fellow members ... than he had only been asked over the telephone to "join in a statement of support for the Iraqi people."
The major attacks by Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya include:
* June 8, 1992 – assassination of Farag Foda.
* June 26, 1995 – attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
* October 20, 1995 – Car bomb attack on police station in Rijeka, Croatia
* April 28, 1996 – Europa Hotel shooting, Cairo. killing of 18 Greek tourists mistaken for Jews.
* November 17, 1997 – Luxor massacre at Deir el-Bahri, Luxor, Egypt. 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians killed.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was also responsible for a spate of tourist shootings (trains and cruise ships sprayed with bullets) in middle and upper Egypt during the early 1990s. As a result of those attacks, cruise ships ceased sailing between Cairo and Luxor for several years.
After spending more than two decades in prison and after intense debates and discussions with Al-Azhar scholars, most of the leaders of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya have written several books renouncing their ideology of violence and some of them went as far as calling ex-Egyptian president Sadat, whom they assassinated, a martyr.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya renounced bloodshed in 2003, and in September 2003 Egypt freed more than 1,000 members, citing what Interior Minister Habib el-Adli called the group's stated "commitment to rejecting violence."
Harsh repressive measures by the Egyptian government and the unpopularity of the killing of foreign tourists reduced the group's profile but the movement retained popular support among Egyptian Islamists who disapproved of the secular nature of Egypt's society and the peace treaty with Israel.
In April 2006 the Egyptian government released approximately 1200 members, including a founder, Najeh Ibrahim, from prison.
Islamic Groups see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
al-jamā aħ al-'islāmiyyaħ see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
Gamaat Islamiya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
al Jamaat al Islamiya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
El Gama'a El Islamiyya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
In the summer of 1992, the government passed a strict new anti-terrorism law limiting al-Jama‘at’s activities, and in the fall it announced that all mosques and prayer leaders would be put under state control. In August 1992, the government claimed to have arrested twenty-five leaders of al-Jama‘at, including two foreign citizens – a Sudanese and a Jordanian – at an organizational meeting in Alexandria. The government always maintained that al-Jama‘at is foreign-inspired, primarily by Iranians and Sudanese, and it now claimed to have exposed this international connection. Despite these arrests, however, al-Jama‘at would remain a significant factor in Egyptian society. It had wide appeal among the youth and university students and appears to have established popular roots in several parts of the country.
The 1990s saw Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya engage in an extended campaign of violence, from the murders and attempted murders of prominent writers and intellectuals, to the repeated targeting of tourists and foreigners. This did serious damage to the largest sector of Egypt's economy and in turn to the government, but it also devastated the livelihoods of many of the people on whom the group depends for support.
Victims of campaign against the Egyptian state from 1992-1997 totaled more than 1200 and included the head of the counter-terrorism police (Major General Raouf Khayrat), a speaker of parliamentary (Rifaat al-Mahgoub), dozens of European tourists and Egyptian bystanders, and over 100 Egyptian police.
The 1991 killing of the group's leader, Ala Mohieddin, presumably by security forces, led Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya to murder Egypt's speaker of parliament in retaliation. In June 1995, working together with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the group staged a carefully planned attempt on the life of president Mubarak, lead by Mustafa Hamza, a senior Egyptian member of the Al-Qaeda and commander of the military branch of the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Mubarak escaped unharmed and retaliated with a massive and ruthless crackdown on the members of Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and their families in Egypt.
Taalat Fouad Qassem was arrested in Croatia in 1995.
By 1997, the movement had become paralyzed. 20,000 Islamists were in custody in Egypt and thousands more had been cut down by the security forces. In July of that year, Islamist lawyer Montassir al-Zayyat brokered a deal between the Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian government, called the Nonviolence Initiative, whereby the movement formally renounced violence. The next year the government released 2,000 members of the Islamic Group. After the initiative was declared Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman also gave his approval from his prison cell in the United States, though he later withdrew it.
The initiative divided the Islamic Group between members in Egypt who supported it and those in exile who wanted the attacks to continue. Leading the opposition was EIJ leader Ayman Zawahiri who termed it "surrender" in angry letters to the London newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat.
Zawahiri enlisted Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of Islamic Groups and its military leader, Rifai Ahmed Taha, both exiles in Afghanistan with him, to sabotage the initiative with a massive terrorism attack that would provoke the government into repression. So on November 17, 1997 Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya's killing campaign climaxed with an attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut (Deir el-Bahri) in Luxor, in which a band of six men dressed in police uniforms machine-gunned and hacked to death with knives 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians. The killing went on for 45 minutes, until the floors streamed with blood. The dead included a five-year-old British child and four Japanese couples on their honeymoons. Altogether 71 people were killed. The attack stunned Egyptian society, devastated the tourist industry for a number of years, and consequently sapped a large segment of popular support for violent Islamism in Egypt.
The revulsion of Egyptians and rejection of jihadi terrorism was so complete, the attack's supporters backpedaled. The day after the attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, despite the evidence of the systematic nature of the slaughter. Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman blamed Israelis for the killings, and Zawahiri maintained the Egyptian police had done it.
When Rifai Taha signed the al-Qaeda fatwa "International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" to kill Crusaders and Jews on behalf of the Islamic Group, he was forced to withdraw his name from the fatwa, lamely explaining to fellow members ... than he had only been asked over the telephone to "join in a statement of support for the Iraqi people."
The major attacks by Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya include:
* June 8, 1992 – assassination of Farag Foda.
* June 26, 1995 – attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
* October 20, 1995 – Car bomb attack on police station in Rijeka, Croatia
* April 28, 1996 – Europa Hotel shooting, Cairo. killing of 18 Greek tourists mistaken for Jews.
* November 17, 1997 – Luxor massacre at Deir el-Bahri, Luxor, Egypt. 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians killed.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was also responsible for a spate of tourist shootings (trains and cruise ships sprayed with bullets) in middle and upper Egypt during the early 1990s. As a result of those attacks, cruise ships ceased sailing between Cairo and Luxor for several years.
After spending more than two decades in prison and after intense debates and discussions with Al-Azhar scholars, most of the leaders of Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya have written several books renouncing their ideology of violence and some of them went as far as calling ex-Egyptian president Sadat, whom they assassinated, a martyr.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya renounced bloodshed in 2003, and in September 2003 Egypt freed more than 1,000 members, citing what Interior Minister Habib el-Adli called the group's stated "commitment to rejecting violence."
Harsh repressive measures by the Egyptian government and the unpopularity of the killing of foreign tourists reduced the group's profile but the movement retained popular support among Egyptian Islamists who disapproved of the secular nature of Egypt's society and the peace treaty with Israel.
In April 2006 the Egyptian government released approximately 1200 members, including a founder, Najeh Ibrahim, from prison.
Islamic Groups see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
al-jamā aħ al-'islāmiyyaħ see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
Gamaat Islamiya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
al Jamaat al Islamiya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
El Gama'a El Islamiyya see Jama‘at al-Islamiyah, al-
Jamal, Ahmad
Ahmad Jamal, (b. Frederick Russell Jones, July 2, 1930, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania - d. April 16, 2023, Ashley Falls, Massachusetts), was an American jazz pianist known for his rendition of But Not For Me, was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on July 2, 1930.
Ahmad Jamal began playing piano at the age of three, when his uncle Lawrence challenged him to duplicate what he was doing on the piano. Jamal began formal piano training at the age of seven with Mary Cardwell Dawson, whom he describes as greatly influencing him. His Pittsburgh roots remained an important part of his identity ("Pittsburgh meant everything to me and it still does," he said in 2001) and it was there that he was immersed in the influence of jazz artists such as Earl Hines, Billy Strayhorn, Mary Lou Williams, and Erroll Garner. Jamal also studied with pianist James Miller and began playing piano professionally at the age of fourteen, at which point he was recognized as a "coming great" by the pianist Art Tatum.
Born to Baptist parents in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Jamal did not discover Islam until his early 20s. While touring in Detroit (where there was a sizable Muslim community in the 1940s and 1950s), Jamal became interested in Islam and Islamic culture. He converted to Islam and changed his name to Ahmad Jamal in 1950. In an interview with The New York Times a few years later, Jamal said his decision to change his name stemmed from a desire to "re-establish my original name." In 1986, Jamal sued critic Leonard Feather for using his former name in a publication.
After the recording of the best-selling album But Not For Me, Jamal's music grew in popularity throughout the 1950s. In 1959, he took a tour of North Africa to explore investment options in Africa. Jamal, who was twenty-nine at the time, said he had a curiosity about the homeland of his ancestors, highly influenced by his conversion to the Muslim faith. He also said his religion had brought him peace of mind about his race, which accounted for his "growth in the field of music that has proved very lucrative for me."
Upon his return to the United States after a tour of North Africa, the financial success of Live at the Pershing: But Not For Me allowed Jamal to open a restaurant and club called The Alhambra in Chicago. In 1962, The Three Strings disbanded and Jamal moved to New York City, where, at the age of 32, he took a three-year hiatus from his musical career.
In 1964, Jamal resumed touring and recording, this time with the bassist Jamil Nasser and recorded a new album, Extensions, in 1965. Jamal and Nasser continued to play and record together from 1964 to 1972. He also joined forces with Vernel Fournier (again, but only for about a year) and drummer Frank Gant (1966–76), among others. He continued to play throughout the 1970s and 1980s, mostly in trios with piano, bass and drums, but he occasionally expanded the group to include guitar. One of his most long-standing gigs was as the band for the New Year's Eve celebrations at Blues Alley in Washington, D. C., from 1979 through the 1990s. Until 1970, he played acoustic piano exclusively. The final album on which he played acoustic piano in the regular sequence was The Awakening. In the 1970s, Jamal played electric piano as well. It was rumored that the Rhodes piano was a gift from someone in Switzerland.
In 1985, Jamal agreed to do an interview and recording session with his fellow jazz pianist, Marian McPartland on her NPR show Piano Jazz. Jamal, who said he rarely plays "But Not For Me" due to its popularity since his 1958 recording, played an improvised version of the tune – though only after noting that he has moved on to making ninety percent of his repertoire his own compositions. He said that when he grew in popularity from the Live at the Pershing album, he was severely criticized afterwards for not playing any of his own compositions.
In 1994, Mr. Jamal received the American Jazz Masters fellowship award from the National Endowment for the Arts. The same year he was named a Duke Ellington Fellow at Yale University, where he performed commissioned works with the Assai String Quartet.
In 2007 the French Government inducted Mr. Jamal into the prestigious Order of the Arts and Letters by French Culture Minister Renaud Donnedieu de Vabres, naming him Officier de l’Ordre des Arts et des Lettres.
Mr. Jamal’s previous recording A Quiet Time (Dreyfus Records), released in January 2010, was the number #1 CD on jazz radio for the year 2010 and continues to soar. Also this year the French Jazz Academy has voted "The Complete Ahmad Jamal Trio Argo Sessions 1956-1962" released by Mosaïc "Best reissue of the year with outstanding research work". His music remains, youthful, fresh, imaginative and always influential.
In December of 2011 Mr. Jamal was recognized in DownBeat’s 76th Reader’s Poll Hall of Fame, and in 2017, Jamal received the Grammy Lifetime Achievement Award from The Recording Academy.
On April 16, 2023, Jamal died from complications of prostate cancer at his home in Ashley Falls, Massachusetts. He was 92.
Jamal Qarshi
Jamal Qarshi (b. c. 1230). Scholar and administrator in Turkestan during the Mongol era. He composed a Persian commentary on the lexicon of Abu Nasr al-Jawhari, adding to it an important historical and biographical supplement.
Qarshi, Jamal see Jamal Qarshi
Jamal Qarshi (b. c. 1230). Scholar and administrator in Turkestan during the Mongol era. He composed a Persian commentary on the lexicon of Abu Nasr al-Jawhari, adding to it an important historical and biographical supplement.
Qarshi, Jamal see Jamal Qarshi
Jamat-i-Islami
Jamat-i-Islami. (Jamaat-e-Islami) (Jamaat-i-Islami) ("Islamic Party") (Islamic Society) (JI). Islamist religious and political party in Pakistan.. Reformist movement founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu’l A’la Maududi in response to the Muslim League’s “Pakistan Resolution” of the previous year. Maududi and his followers opposed the idea of Pakistan on the grounds that it would not be a genuine Islamic state but a secular nation controlled by europeanized pseudo-Muslims. The League’s Pakistan, they argued, would only serve to encourage Hindu nationalism and anti-Islamic bigotry. The Jamat-i-Islami called on Muslims to practice the faith as defined by Maududi and thus strictly and slowly convert non-Muslims by their example.
After the partition in 1947, Maududi left India reluctantly. Once in Pakistan, he and the Jamat became the government’s most persistent and best organized critics. Intolerant of the Ahmadiyya (followers of Mirza Ahmed who claimed to be a prophet in the line of Muhammad), the Jamat was banned and Maududi was imprisoned after being blamed for the 1953 riots against that sect. The Jamat managed a comeback, however. Although small, it was highly visible, and the sponsorship of an islamicization campaign by Zia al-Haq made certain elements of the Jamat program the official policy of the government.
The Indian branch of the Jamat-i-Islami reconstituted itself in 1948 with Maulana Abul Lais Islahi as its leader. Although little direct contact occurred between the branches, the program of the Indian Jamat-i-Islami continues to stress political quietism and religious purity. It devotes itself to such issues as religious education and relief for Muslim victims of riots, and actually supports the idea of a truly secular state.
Although a religious party, the Jamaʿat did not remain apart from political activity in Pakistan. Maudūdī had opposed an independent Pakistan but, yielding to political reality, he focused his, and the party’s, attention on Pakistan in 1947 until his retirement in 1972. In 1953, the Jamaʿat led a violent campaign against the Ahmadiyya sect that led to 2,000 deaths. For much of the next two decades, the party remained the voice of the ʿulamāʾ and was active in opposition politics although it did support the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. After the overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, the Jamaʿat supported General Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program but opposed his effort to ban student unions. More recently, members of the Jamaʿat supported Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. They were active in electoral politics and sponsored legislation in the senate, both efforts having met with mixed success. The Jamaʿat remained active in its efforts to reform society according to Islamic law and took part in anti-government demonstrations before the fall of the Benazir Bhutto government in 1996.
Jamaat-e-Islami see Jamat-i-Islami.
Jamaat-i-Islami see Jamat-i-Islami.
"Islamic Party" see Jamat-i-Islami.
Islamic Society see Jamat-i-Islami.
JI see Jamat-i-Islami.
Jamat-i-Islami. (Jamaat-e-Islami) (Jamaat-i-Islami) ("Islamic Party") (Islamic Society) (JI). Islamist religious and political party in Pakistan.. Reformist movement founded in 1941 by Maulana Abu’l A’la Maududi in response to the Muslim League’s “Pakistan Resolution” of the previous year. Maududi and his followers opposed the idea of Pakistan on the grounds that it would not be a genuine Islamic state but a secular nation controlled by europeanized pseudo-Muslims. The League’s Pakistan, they argued, would only serve to encourage Hindu nationalism and anti-Islamic bigotry. The Jamat-i-Islami called on Muslims to practice the faith as defined by Maududi and thus strictly and slowly convert non-Muslims by their example.
After the partition in 1947, Maududi left India reluctantly. Once in Pakistan, he and the Jamat became the government’s most persistent and best organized critics. Intolerant of the Ahmadiyya (followers of Mirza Ahmed who claimed to be a prophet in the line of Muhammad), the Jamat was banned and Maududi was imprisoned after being blamed for the 1953 riots against that sect. The Jamat managed a comeback, however. Although small, it was highly visible, and the sponsorship of an islamicization campaign by Zia al-Haq made certain elements of the Jamat program the official policy of the government.
The Indian branch of the Jamat-i-Islami reconstituted itself in 1948 with Maulana Abul Lais Islahi as its leader. Although little direct contact occurred between the branches, the program of the Indian Jamat-i-Islami continues to stress political quietism and religious purity. It devotes itself to such issues as religious education and relief for Muslim victims of riots, and actually supports the idea of a truly secular state.
Although a religious party, the Jamaʿat did not remain apart from political activity in Pakistan. Maudūdī had opposed an independent Pakistan but, yielding to political reality, he focused his, and the party’s, attention on Pakistan in 1947 until his retirement in 1972. In 1953, the Jamaʿat led a violent campaign against the Ahmadiyya sect that led to 2,000 deaths. For much of the next two decades, the party remained the voice of the ʿulamāʾ and was active in opposition politics although it did support the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. After the overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, the Jamaʿat supported General Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program but opposed his effort to ban student unions. More recently, members of the Jamaʿat supported Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. They were active in electoral politics and sponsored legislation in the senate, both efforts having met with mixed success. The Jamaʿat remained active in its efforts to reform society according to Islamic law and took part in anti-government demonstrations before the fall of the Benazir Bhutto government in 1996.
Jamaat-e-Islami see Jamat-i-Islami.
Jamaat-i-Islami see Jamat-i-Islami.
"Islamic Party" see Jamat-i-Islami.
Islamic Society see Jamat-i-Islami.
JI see Jamat-i-Islami.
Jami
Jami (Mawlana Nur al-Din Jami) (Nur al-Din Abu al-Barakat Abd al-Rahman Jami) (Nur al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami) (Nur ad-Din Abd ar-Rahman Jami) (August 18, 1414–November 19, 1492). Persian poet and mystic. The depth and variety of his knowledge, and his perfect mastery of language and style, also had great influence on Turkish literature.
Jami is considered by many to be the last great classical poet of Iran. He was born in Jam (hence his pen name Jami, a town in Khurasan, but spent most of his life in Herat (in present day Afghanistan), where his family had moved when he was still a boy. Jami received his formal education in the Nizamiyya school of Herat and later in Samarkand, then a prominent center of learning. Apart from a tour of the towns in Khurasan and a pilgrimage to Hejaz, during which he also visited Damascus, he hardly left Herat. He enjoyed the high esteem of princes and kings. The Ottoman sultan corresponded with him and tried to persuade him to go to Anatolia. He belonged to the Naqshbandi order of Sufis. Jami died in Herat at the age of eighty-one and was buried next to his spiritual mentor Sa’d al-Din Kashghari.
Among Jami's numerous works are his Diwan (in three parts), Haft awrang (Haft Awrang), Nafahat al-ons (Nafahat al-Uns) (an important biographical dictionary of Sufi shaikhs), and Baharistan, a collection of sayings and anecdotes in imitation of Sa’di’s Gulistan.
Nur al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami is known as the last great figure of the Golden Age of Persian literature. After studying for a theological career at Samarkand and Herat, Jami embraced the mystical life, but without lapsing into heterodoxy. Winning the patronage and friendship of Sultan Hussein Bayqara, the Timurid ruler of Herat, Jami was appointed professor of a college founded expressly for him and for Hussein’s adviser Nawa’i.
Jami enjoyed great fame and authority as an exponent of the mystical “way;” as a teacher; and as a prolific writer in verse and prose. Jami’s most famous work is the Haft Awrang -- the “Seven Thrones.” The Haft Awrang is a set of seven long poems modelled on the “Quintet” of Nizami.
Jami’s prose works are generally written in a direct and unaffected style. The best known of Jami’s prose works are Nafahat al-Uns (“Breaths of Friendship”); Baharistan (“Land of Spring”); and Lawa’ih (“Effulgences”). Nafahat al-Uns contains the biographies of six hundred saints; Baharistan is a sophisticated imitation of the Gulistan of Sadi; and Lawa’ih is a treatise on mysticism.
Mawlana Nur al-Din Jami see Jami
Nur al-Din Abu al-Barakat Abd al-Rahman Jami see Jami
Nur al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman Jami see Jami
Nur ad-Din Abd ar-Rahman Jami see Jami
Jami (Mawlana Nur al-Din Jami) (Nur al-Din Abu al-Barakat Abd al-Rahman Jami) (Nur al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami) (Nur ad-Din Abd ar-Rahman Jami) (August 18, 1414–November 19, 1492). Persian poet and mystic. The depth and variety of his knowledge, and his perfect mastery of language and style, also had great influence on Turkish literature.
Jami is considered by many to be the last great classical poet of Iran. He was born in Jam (hence his pen name Jami, a town in Khurasan, but spent most of his life in Herat (in present day Afghanistan), where his family had moved when he was still a boy. Jami received his formal education in the Nizamiyya school of Herat and later in Samarkand, then a prominent center of learning. Apart from a tour of the towns in Khurasan and a pilgrimage to Hejaz, during which he also visited Damascus, he hardly left Herat. He enjoyed the high esteem of princes and kings. The Ottoman sultan corresponded with him and tried to persuade him to go to Anatolia. He belonged to the Naqshbandi order of Sufis. Jami died in Herat at the age of eighty-one and was buried next to his spiritual mentor Sa’d al-Din Kashghari.
Among Jami's numerous works are his Diwan (in three parts), Haft awrang (Haft Awrang), Nafahat al-ons (Nafahat al-Uns) (an important biographical dictionary of Sufi shaikhs), and Baharistan, a collection of sayings and anecdotes in imitation of Sa’di’s Gulistan.
Nur al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman Jami is known as the last great figure of the Golden Age of Persian literature. After studying for a theological career at Samarkand and Herat, Jami embraced the mystical life, but without lapsing into heterodoxy. Winning the patronage and friendship of Sultan Hussein Bayqara, the Timurid ruler of Herat, Jami was appointed professor of a college founded expressly for him and for Hussein’s adviser Nawa’i.
Jami enjoyed great fame and authority as an exponent of the mystical “way;” as a teacher; and as a prolific writer in verse and prose. Jami’s most famous work is the Haft Awrang -- the “Seven Thrones.” The Haft Awrang is a set of seven long poems modelled on the “Quintet” of Nizami.
Jami’s prose works are generally written in a direct and unaffected style. The best known of Jami’s prose works are Nafahat al-Uns (“Breaths of Friendship”); Baharistan (“Land of Spring”); and Lawa’ih (“Effulgences”). Nafahat al-Uns contains the biographies of six hundred saints; Baharistan is a sophisticated imitation of the Gulistan of Sadi; and Lawa’ih is a treatise on mysticism.
Mawlana Nur al-Din Jami see Jami
Nur al-Din Abu al-Barakat Abd al-Rahman Jami see Jami
Nur al-Din 'Abd al-Rahman Jami see Jami
Nur ad-Din Abd ar-Rahman Jami see Jami
Jamil ibn ‘Abd Allah al-‘Udhri
Jamil ibn ‘Abd Allah al-‘Udhri (660-701). Arab poet. He died for love of his tribeswoman Buthayna. In literary tradition, he is considered the most famous representative of the ‘Udhri school of poetry, with its chaste and idealized form of love.
'Udhri, Jamil ibn 'Abd Allah al- see Jamil ibn ‘Abd Allah al-‘Udhri
Jamil ibn ‘Abd Allah al-‘Udhri (660-701). Arab poet. He died for love of his tribeswoman Buthayna. In literary tradition, he is considered the most famous representative of the ‘Udhri school of poetry, with its chaste and idealized form of love.
'Udhri, Jamil ibn 'Abd Allah al- see Jamil ibn ‘Abd Allah al-‘Udhri
Jamil Nakhla al-Mudawwar
Jamil Nakhla al-Mudawwar (1862-1907). Arab journalist and writer. He acquired fame with a work on early ‘Abbasid times.
Mudawwar, Jamil Nakhla al- see Jamil Nakhla al-Mudawwar
Jamil Nakhla al-Mudawwar (1862-1907). Arab journalist and writer. He acquired fame with a work on early ‘Abbasid times.
Mudawwar, Jamil Nakhla al- see Jamil Nakhla al-Mudawwar
Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin
Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin (Young Men's Muslim Association) (Y.M.M.A.). Pan-Islamic Egyptian political association founded in 1927 in Cairo, the Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin was apparently modeled in part on the YMCA and is often referred to as the Young Men’s Muslim Association, the Y.M.M.A. It was created in the midst of the social and political turmoil of Egypt following the nationalist revolution of 1919 and was one of a large number of societies and associations, of a variety of political stripes, formed in Egypt in that period. No doubt the most important of these groups was the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) under the leadership of Hasan al-Banna’. Al-Banna’ played an active role in the creation of the Y.M.M.A. and is said to have related the group’s founding to an increasing dissatisfaction among younger Egyptian activists seeking a central role for Islamic ideals in political and social life with a perceived unwillingness of the religious hierarchy of al-Azhar to address contemporary issues. Despite his support for the Y.M.M.A., al-Banna’ never devoted his full attention to the group. Al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 took place outside the headquarters of the Y.M.M.A.
Among those involved in the creation of the Y.M.M.A. and in the formulation of its initial policies and activities were ‘Abd al-Hamid Bey Sa‘id, at the time a leading nationalist and member of the Egyptian parliament; Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, a bookseller and editor of Majallat al-fath, a weekly publication promoting Islamic views that is often associated with the Salafiyah movement; and Yahya Ahmad al-Dardiri, who served as editor and a frequent contributor to the official publication of the Y.M.M.A. Al-Dardiri also published a history of the organization entitled Al-tariq ("The Way"). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Y.M.M.A. set out rather quickly to establish branches in other areas of the Middle East, chiefly in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Branches were established in Jerusalem, Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa by the end of 1928 and in Baghdad and Basra by 1929.
The group was established initially as a social, cultural, and religious organization seeking to appeal directly to Egypt’s youth. Its headquarters was the center of literary and educational gatherings, and its members were encouraged to set a moral example for their peers. Perhaps inevitably the leaders of the Y.M.M.A. joined in the many political debates of their day. In writings and lectures, al-Dardiri and other spokesmen for the group addressed grievances related to the presence of a large non-Muslim population in Egypt and its influence on Islamic life; they attacked Jewish immigration into Palestine and the activities of Zionist organizations; and they criticized French colonization of Algeria and Morocco.
Young Men's Muslim Association see Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin
Y.M.M.A. see Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin
Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin (Young Men's Muslim Association) (Y.M.M.A.). Pan-Islamic Egyptian political association founded in 1927 in Cairo, the Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin was apparently modeled in part on the YMCA and is often referred to as the Young Men’s Muslim Association, the Y.M.M.A. It was created in the midst of the social and political turmoil of Egypt following the nationalist revolution of 1919 and was one of a large number of societies and associations, of a variety of political stripes, formed in Egypt in that period. No doubt the most important of these groups was the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) under the leadership of Hasan al-Banna’. Al-Banna’ played an active role in the creation of the Y.M.M.A. and is said to have related the group’s founding to an increasing dissatisfaction among younger Egyptian activists seeking a central role for Islamic ideals in political and social life with a perceived unwillingness of the religious hierarchy of al-Azhar to address contemporary issues. Despite his support for the Y.M.M.A., al-Banna’ never devoted his full attention to the group. Al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 took place outside the headquarters of the Y.M.M.A.
Among those involved in the creation of the Y.M.M.A. and in the formulation of its initial policies and activities were ‘Abd al-Hamid Bey Sa‘id, at the time a leading nationalist and member of the Egyptian parliament; Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, a bookseller and editor of Majallat al-fath, a weekly publication promoting Islamic views that is often associated with the Salafiyah movement; and Yahya Ahmad al-Dardiri, who served as editor and a frequent contributor to the official publication of the Y.M.M.A. Al-Dardiri also published a history of the organization entitled Al-tariq ("The Way"). Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Y.M.M.A. set out rather quickly to establish branches in other areas of the Middle East, chiefly in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. Branches were established in Jerusalem, Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa by the end of 1928 and in Baghdad and Basra by 1929.
The group was established initially as a social, cultural, and religious organization seeking to appeal directly to Egypt’s youth. Its headquarters was the center of literary and educational gatherings, and its members were encouraged to set a moral example for their peers. Perhaps inevitably the leaders of the Y.M.M.A. joined in the many political debates of their day. In writings and lectures, al-Dardiri and other spokesmen for the group addressed grievances related to the presence of a large non-Muslim population in Egypt and its influence on Islamic life; they attacked Jewish immigration into Palestine and the activities of Zionist organizations; and they criticized French colonization of Algeria and Morocco.
Young Men's Muslim Association see Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin
Y.M.M.A. see Jam‘iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind (Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind) (Organization of Indian Scholars) . Organization of Muslim religious scholars of India. The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind (Association of the ‘Ulama’ of India) was established in November 1919 when numerous ‘ulama’ from all parts of India came to participate in the Khilafat Movement conference in New Delhi. The organization came into being when Indians of all religious affiliations were united in the anti-British struggle. Mohandas Gandhi embraced the cause of the Ottoman caliphate, and most Muslim leaders participated in the non-cooperation movement with the Indian National Congress. The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind maintained its pro-Congress attitude throughout
the struggle for independence and stood at the head of those Indian Muslims who supported the idea of a united India and opposed the Pakistan movement. (Some of its members, however, seceded in 1946 and established the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam, which supported Pakistan.) Many of the members were associated with the Dar al-‘Ulum of Deoband. Since its establishment in 1919, the association has held annual conferences in which the ‘ulama’ have expressed their views on the central issues of the day.
The main contribution of the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind to Indo-Muslim thought is the theory of “composite nationalism” (muttahida qawmiyat). This theory, which was elaborated in speeches and writings of the Jam‘iya leadership and particularly in the works of its longtime president (Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), served as an alternative to the “two nations theory” (do qawmi nazariyat) of the Muslim League, which formed the ideological basis of the Pakistan movement. According to the theory of “composite nationalism,” nations can be created by various factors, such as religion, race, homeland, language, or color. In this analysis, a “nation” (qawm) is not an exclusive category: a person can belong simultaneously to several “nations” created by different characteristics. In modern times, the most important nation-building factor has been the homeland; the Muslims of India therefore belong to the same nation as other Indians, and India constitutes a nation despite its religious diversity. Nevertheless, according to the religious criterion, Muslims continue to belong to the Muslim qawm.
The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind thus accepted the idea of territorial nationalism. This is a novel idea in Islamic thought, and the ‘ulama’ devoted considerable intellectual effort to provide it with Islamic legitimacy. The classical Islamic precedent repeatedly used for this purpose is the Covenant of Medina (‘ahd al-ummah), the document that the Prophet is said to have issued in order to regulate the relationship between the Emigrants (muhajirun), the Helpers (ansar), and the Jews in Medina after the Hijra. One of its sections states that “the Jews of ‘Awf are one community with the believers; the Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs.” The ‘ulama’ concluded from this passage that the Prophet himself agreed to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the same nation with Muslims. The history of Mughal India is also seen as vindicating the composite nationalism theory. The Mughal period knew no communalism (firqah variyat, firqah parasti). All Indians were treated equally by the rulers. Although the Muslims who established the Mughal empire came from outside India, once they settled there they became an inextricable part of Indian nationhood (Hindustani qawmiyat). Communalism emerged in India only as a result of British policies.
The practical political conclusion from this interpretation of Muslim and Indo-Muslim history was the demand that Muslims cooperate with the Indian National Congress in order to expel the British from India and to achieve independence for the country. The ‘ulama’ envisaged that in an independent and united India, achieved with Muslim cooperation, the Muslims would have significant influence, their family law and religious institutions would be maintained, and governments with a Muslim majority would be established in several provinces. On the basis of these expectations, they appealed to Muslims not to join the Muslim League, even declaring membership in it a sin. The ‘ulama’ were convinced that the Western-educated element so prominent in the League’s leadership would never be able or willing to establish an Islamic state compatible with the traditional religious ideal of the ‘ulama’. They also maintained that the establishment of Pakistan would not solve the communal problem because many millions of Muslims would remain in the Indian part of the sub-continent and would live in an atmosphere of hate generated by the partition. On the other hand, the establishment of a strong and unified India, in which the Muslims would be an influential and significant minority, would benefit not only the Muslims of the subcontinent but also the Muslims of the rest of the world.
The views of the Jam‘iya did not prevail during the struggle for independence, and in 1947 the subcontinent was partitioned between India and Pakistan. In independent India, the Jam‘iya acquired increased importance in the new political structure. In contradistinction to the Muslim League and other organizations that supported the creation of Pakistan, the Jam‘iya possessed impeccable credentials of opposition to partition and was a natural candidate to represent Indian Muslims. Shortly after independence, the ‘ulama’ called upon Indian Muslims to declare their unswerving loyalty to India. Several of the ideas adopted by the ‘ulama’ after partition were rather bold from the vantage point of traditional Islam. They accepted the idea of a composite Indian culture. They severed all ties with Jam‘iya branches in the territories now incorporated in Pakistan, even though this was a country established in the name of Islam and inhabited mostly by Muslims. They supported Indian policies even on issues that were sensitive from the Muslim point of view, such as Kashmir and Hyderabad.
The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind is a rare, and possibly unique, case of an association of traditional Muslim religious scholars who have willingly bestowed legitimacy upon the policies of a non-Muslim and professedly secular government, born out of conflict with the generally acknowledged leadership of the Muslim community.
Association of the 'Ulama' of India see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Society of the 'Ulama' of India see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Society of Indian 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Organization of Indian Scholars see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
The main contribution of the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind to Indo-Muslim thought is the theory of “composite nationalism” (muttahida qawmiyat). This theory, which was elaborated in speeches and writings of the Jam‘iya leadership and particularly in the works of its longtime president (Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), served as an alternative to the “two nations theory” (do qawmi nazariyat) of the Muslim League, which formed the ideological basis of the Pakistan movement. According to the theory of “composite nationalism,” nations can be created by various factors, such as religion, race, homeland, language, or color. In this analysis, a “nation” (qawm) is not an exclusive category: a person can belong simultaneously to several “nations” created by different characteristics. In modern times, the most important nation-building factor has been the homeland; the Muslims of India therefore belong to the same nation as other Indians, and India constitutes a nation despite its religious diversity. Nevertheless, according to the religious criterion, Muslims continue to belong to the Muslim qawm.
The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind thus accepted the idea of territorial nationalism. This is a novel idea in Islamic thought, and the ‘ulama’ devoted considerable intellectual effort to provide it with Islamic legitimacy. The classical Islamic precedent repeatedly used for this purpose is the Covenant of Medina (‘ahd al-ummah), the document that the Prophet is said to have issued in order to regulate the relationship between the Emigrants (muhajirun), the Helpers (ansar), and the Jews in Medina after the Hijra. One of its sections states that “the Jews of ‘Awf are one community with the believers; the Jews have their religion and the Muslims theirs.” The ‘ulama’ concluded from this passage that the Prophet himself agreed to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the same nation with Muslims. The history of Mughal India is also seen as vindicating the composite nationalism theory. The Mughal period knew no communalism (firqah variyat, firqah parasti). All Indians were treated equally by the rulers. Although the Muslims who established the Mughal empire came from outside India, once they settled there they became an inextricable part of Indian nationhood (Hindustani qawmiyat). Communalism emerged in India only as a result of British policies.
The practical political conclusion from this interpretation of Muslim and Indo-Muslim history was the demand that Muslims cooperate with the Indian National Congress in order to expel the British from India and to achieve independence for the country. The ‘ulama’ envisaged that in an independent and united India, achieved with Muslim cooperation, the Muslims would have significant influence, their family law and religious institutions would be maintained, and governments with a Muslim majority would be established in several provinces. On the basis of these expectations, they appealed to Muslims not to join the Muslim League, even declaring membership in it a sin. The ‘ulama’ were convinced that the Western-educated element so prominent in the League’s leadership would never be able or willing to establish an Islamic state compatible with the traditional religious ideal of the ‘ulama’. They also maintained that the establishment of Pakistan would not solve the communal problem because many millions of Muslims would remain in the Indian part of the sub-continent and would live in an atmosphere of hate generated by the partition. On the other hand, the establishment of a strong and unified India, in which the Muslims would be an influential and significant minority, would benefit not only the Muslims of the subcontinent but also the Muslims of the rest of the world.
The views of the Jam‘iya did not prevail during the struggle for independence, and in 1947 the subcontinent was partitioned between India and Pakistan. In independent India, the Jam‘iya acquired increased importance in the new political structure. In contradistinction to the Muslim League and other organizations that supported the creation of Pakistan, the Jam‘iya possessed impeccable credentials of opposition to partition and was a natural candidate to represent Indian Muslims. Shortly after independence, the ‘ulama’ called upon Indian Muslims to declare their unswerving loyalty to India. Several of the ideas adopted by the ‘ulama’ after partition were rather bold from the vantage point of traditional Islam. They accepted the idea of a composite Indian culture. They severed all ties with Jam‘iya branches in the territories now incorporated in Pakistan, even though this was a country established in the name of Islam and inhabited mostly by Muslims. They supported Indian policies even on issues that were sensitive from the Muslim point of view, such as Kashmir and Hyderabad.
The Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind is a rare, and possibly unique, case of an association of traditional Muslim religious scholars who have willingly bestowed legitimacy upon the policies of a non-Muslim and professedly secular government, born out of conflict with the generally acknowledged leadership of the Muslim community.
Association of the 'Ulama' of India see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Society of the 'Ulama' of India see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Society of Indian 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Organization of Indian Scholars see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam (JUI) (Society of Muslim ‘Ulama’) (Association of Muslim 'Ulama'). Organization can be traced to the Deoband movement in pre-partition India and to the ‘ulama’ who constituted the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian ‘Ulama’). Such ‘ulama’ have been typically characterized as “Indian nationalists,” because during the latter days of British India they were unalterably opposed to British imperialism, supported the aims and policies of the Indian National Congress, and opposed the Muslim League’s struggle for an independent Pakistan. Consequently, following the partition of the sub-continent in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, the political significance of the JUI was limited, and its leadership was held suspect by successive Pakistani regimes that condemned the JUI’s role in the independence struggle as anti-Pakistan. Indeed, until the late 1960s, the JUI remained almost wholly a religious organization with little if any political significance.
This situation changed during the so-called “Disturbances” of 1968-1969 that led ultimately to the resignation of General Muhammad Ayub Khan and to the holding of general elections in 1970. During the ferment of 1969 the JUI split into two factions – a Karachi based faction under the leadership of Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi (later named Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan, Thanvi Group), and a larger and far more politically active faction led by Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Ghaus Hazarvi and based in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The latter faction (the Mufti-Hazarvi Group, hereafter (JUI) actively participated in the 1970 general elections as a populist-oriented party, appealing to activist Islamic sentiment. The JUI’s program called for the establishment of an Islamic constitution in accordance with the recommendations of the Board of ‘Ulama’ as presented to the Basic Principles Committee of 1954, which had called for the adoption of the shari‘a as the basis of Pakistan’s constitutional structure. The JUI also called for the end of “capitalist exploitation” and for the establishment of a program of Islamic social welfare including free education, health care, and the introduction of minimum-wage legislation.
The combination of such populist rhetoric, the prestige of the ‘ulama’, and the JUI’s effective control of relevant mosques led to success at the polls. In the 1970 general election, the JUI swept the electoral districts of southern NWFP and entered into a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP) to form provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. The subsequent naming of Maulana Mufti Mahmud as chief minister of the NWFP (1971-1973) marked the first and only time in Pakistan’s history that an Islam-based party has headed a provincial government.
During Mufti Mahmud’s short-lived tenure his government managed to introduce three laws designed to promote Islam in the province. The first established prohibition of alcohol; the second introduced an Islamic law of pre-emption (i.e., regarding inheritance of land); and the third mandated the enforced observance of the Ramadan fast. These laws have remained on the books in NWFP and have significantly influenced the course of the islamization process in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. The JUI-NAP government of NWFP resigned in early 1973 in protest over Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s perceived persecution of NAP leaders. In the 1977 general elections, the JUI allied itself with the anti-Bhutto coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance. Subsequently the party cooperated, at times reluctantly, with the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and it tacitly supported the IJM (Islamic Democratic Alliance) government of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1992). The JUI maintained a small but loyal and enthusiastic following in the southern region of NWFP and the Pathan-majority areas of Baluchistan. In the 1988 and 1990 general elections it gained seven and six seats respectively in the National Assembly.
During the 1990s, under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, son of the late Mufti Mahmud, the JUI became increasingly associated with Islamic orthodoxy. In their religious views JUI members were often criticized by their opponents as “uncompromisingly rigid,” insisting on the strict enforcement of the shari‘a as interpreted by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, it is often charged that the JUI is anti-Shi‘a. The JUI did support Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, but it joined the TNFJ (Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariyah, the most prominent Pakistani Shi‘a group) in its condemnation of the United States’ role in the Gulf War. Also, JUI ‘ulama’ are often characterized as opposed to innovation in matters Islamic and as favoring a strict social and moral code, especially with respect to gender relations. Indeed, JUI ‘ulama’ often draw the ire of Pakistan’s feminist organizations.
Politically, the JUI has been at the forefront of the attempt to implement far-reaching Islamic reforms. This is evidenced by the formulation and introduction in 1985, by the JUI Senators Maulana Sami‘ul Haqq and Qazi ‘Abdullatif, of the so-called “Shariat Bill.” The JUI version of this bill proposed that the shari‘a wholly replace Pakistan’s secular constitution. ‘Ulama’ associated with the JUI were also very active in proposing petitions before the Federal Shariat Court calling for significant changes in Pakistan’s social and moral practices to bring them more into keeping with Islamic norms. Generally, JUI members were displeased with what they viewed as the slow pace of Islamic reform under President Zia, and they were even less pleased with successor regimes.
The 1993 general election proved disappointing to the JUI. The party contested the election under the banner of the newly created Islami Jumhuri Mahaz (Islamic Democratic Association, IJM) and entered into an “electoral arrangement” with the Pakistan People’s Party. However, even after intensive electoral campaigning, the IJM was only able to gain 2.3 percent of the popular vote and four seats. Despite such electoral disappointment, the JUI remains a potent social and political force in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Indeed, the party has deepened its populist image and style. But more important, it maintained its control over the largest number of mosques and madrasahs in Pakistan and, therefore, maintained the strongest base among the madrasah student body in the state.
JUI see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Society of Muslim 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Association of Muslim 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam (JUI) (Society of Muslim ‘Ulama’) (Association of Muslim 'Ulama'). Organization can be traced to the Deoband movement in pre-partition India and to the ‘ulama’ who constituted the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama-i Hind (Society of Indian ‘Ulama’). Such ‘ulama’ have been typically characterized as “Indian nationalists,” because during the latter days of British India they were unalterably opposed to British imperialism, supported the aims and policies of the Indian National Congress, and opposed the Muslim League’s struggle for an independent Pakistan. Consequently, following the partition of the sub-continent in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan, the political significance of the JUI was limited, and its leadership was held suspect by successive Pakistani regimes that condemned the JUI’s role in the independence struggle as anti-Pakistan. Indeed, until the late 1960s, the JUI remained almost wholly a religious organization with little if any political significance.
This situation changed during the so-called “Disturbances” of 1968-1969 that led ultimately to the resignation of General Muhammad Ayub Khan and to the holding of general elections in 1970. During the ferment of 1969 the JUI split into two factions – a Karachi based faction under the leadership of Maulana Ihtishamul Haqq Thanvi (later named Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan, Thanvi Group), and a larger and far more politically active faction led by Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Ghaus Hazarvi and based in North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The latter faction (the Mufti-Hazarvi Group, hereafter (JUI) actively participated in the 1970 general elections as a populist-oriented party, appealing to activist Islamic sentiment. The JUI’s program called for the establishment of an Islamic constitution in accordance with the recommendations of the Board of ‘Ulama’ as presented to the Basic Principles Committee of 1954, which had called for the adoption of the shari‘a as the basis of Pakistan’s constitutional structure. The JUI also called for the end of “capitalist exploitation” and for the establishment of a program of Islamic social welfare including free education, health care, and the introduction of minimum-wage legislation.
The combination of such populist rhetoric, the prestige of the ‘ulama’, and the JUI’s effective control of relevant mosques led to success at the polls. In the 1970 general election, the JUI swept the electoral districts of southern NWFP and entered into a coalition with the National Awami Party (NAP) to form provincial governments in NWFP and Baluchistan. The subsequent naming of Maulana Mufti Mahmud as chief minister of the NWFP (1971-1973) marked the first and only time in Pakistan’s history that an Islam-based party has headed a provincial government.
During Mufti Mahmud’s short-lived tenure his government managed to introduce three laws designed to promote Islam in the province. The first established prohibition of alcohol; the second introduced an Islamic law of pre-emption (i.e., regarding inheritance of land); and the third mandated the enforced observance of the Ramadan fast. These laws have remained on the books in NWFP and have significantly influenced the course of the islamization process in Pakistan during the 1980s and 1990s. The JUI-NAP government of NWFP resigned in early 1973 in protest over Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto’s perceived persecution of NAP leaders. In the 1977 general elections, the JUI allied itself with the anti-Bhutto coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance. Subsequently the party cooperated, at times reluctantly, with the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), and it tacitly supported the IJM (Islamic Democratic Alliance) government of Nawaz Sharif (1990-1992). The JUI maintained a small but loyal and enthusiastic following in the southern region of NWFP and the Pathan-majority areas of Baluchistan. In the 1988 and 1990 general elections it gained seven and six seats respectively in the National Assembly.
During the 1990s, under the leadership of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, son of the late Mufti Mahmud, the JUI became increasingly associated with Islamic orthodoxy. In their religious views JUI members were often criticized by their opponents as “uncompromisingly rigid,” insisting on the strict enforcement of the shari‘a as interpreted by the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. In addition, it is often charged that the JUI is anti-Shi‘a. The JUI did support Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, but it joined the TNFJ (Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja‘fariyah, the most prominent Pakistani Shi‘a group) in its condemnation of the United States’ role in the Gulf War. Also, JUI ‘ulama’ are often characterized as opposed to innovation in matters Islamic and as favoring a strict social and moral code, especially with respect to gender relations. Indeed, JUI ‘ulama’ often draw the ire of Pakistan’s feminist organizations.
Politically, the JUI has been at the forefront of the attempt to implement far-reaching Islamic reforms. This is evidenced by the formulation and introduction in 1985, by the JUI Senators Maulana Sami‘ul Haqq and Qazi ‘Abdullatif, of the so-called “Shariat Bill.” The JUI version of this bill proposed that the shari‘a wholly replace Pakistan’s secular constitution. ‘Ulama’ associated with the JUI were also very active in proposing petitions before the Federal Shariat Court calling for significant changes in Pakistan’s social and moral practices to bring them more into keeping with Islamic norms. Generally, JUI members were displeased with what they viewed as the slow pace of Islamic reform under President Zia, and they were even less pleased with successor regimes.
The 1993 general election proved disappointing to the JUI. The party contested the election under the banner of the newly created Islami Jumhuri Mahaz (Islamic Democratic Association, IJM) and entered into an “electoral arrangement” with the Pakistan People’s Party. However, even after intensive electoral campaigning, the IJM was only able to gain 2.3 percent of the popular vote and four seats. Despite such electoral disappointment, the JUI remains a potent social and political force in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Indeed, the party has deepened its populist image and style. But more important, it maintained its control over the largest number of mosques and madrasahs in Pakistan and, therefore, maintained the strongest base among the madrasah student body in the state.
JUI see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Society of Muslim 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Association of Muslim 'Ulama' see Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan
Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan. The party of Pakistan’s Barelwi ‘ulama’, the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan was formed in Karachi in 1948 at the behest of Mawlanas ‘Abdulhamid Bada’uni, Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Qadiri, and ‘Allamah Ahmad Sa‘id Kazimi. After the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam, the Jam'iyatul 'Ulama'-i Pakistan has been the largest ‘ulama’ party of Pakistan. The Jam‘iyat follows the Barelwi school of Islamic thought, also known as the ahl-I sunnat wa jama‘at (“people of the custom and community”), a term that reflects their claim to represent the true faith. The Barelwis trace their origin to the teachings of Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921), a scion of a notable ‘ulama’ family of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh, who had strong ties to the Qadiriyah Sufi order. The Barelwis, unlike other ‘ulama’ groups of the period or the Islamic movements that surfaced later, were not interested in promoting a puritanical interpretation of orthodoxy. Instead, they emerged to counter the impact of the Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith traditions, both of which had sought to cleanse Islamic practices of cultural accretions and Sufism. The Barelwis adhered to the Hanafi school of law but aimed to preserve the place of Sufism and the popular customs associated with it in the life and thought of Indian Muslims. The Barelwis also accord the ‘ulama’ and Sufi pirs a central role as community leaders, vested with authority to intercede with God on behalf of the faithful.
By the turn of the century, the Barelwi school had developed a strong following in northern India, relating popular Sufi practices to an orthodox reading of Islam. In Punjab too, where the Qadiriyah order has traditionally wielded much power, the Barelwis found a base, especially after the founding of the Darul Hizb-i Ahnaf (Congregation of the Hanafi Parties) in Lahore in the 1920s. They had little influence in the other four provinces that after 1947 became Pakistan – East Bengal, Sind, and the predominantly Deobandi North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Throughout the struggle for partition, the Barelwis supported the Muslim League and were especially effective in bolstering the League’s position in Punjab. In 1946, this support was formalized when Barelwi ‘ulama’ from across India congregated in Benares to endorse Pakistan openly and to provide it with religious legitimacy.
Given this background, many Barelwis migrated to Pakistan in 1947, establishing a base in Sind among the refugee (muhajir) community. With a following in rural Punjab and urban Sind, Barelwis emerged as an important national force on the religious scene, second only to the Deobandis. The rivalry between the two for power and prominence, and the Barelwis’ desire to defend their flock from challenges by the Deobandis, soon led to the creation of a Barelwi ‘ulama’ party.
The Pakistani Deobandis broke away from the pro-Congress Deobandi Party, Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Hind, to support the Muslim League and the demand for partition. In 1945, they formed the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam with envy and concern, especially as Islam came to dominate national political discourse. Against this background in 1948, the Barelwi ‘ulama’ formed the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Pakistan. The Jam‘iyat was initially an ‘ulama’ forum designed to voice the interests of Barelwis. It had no plans for direct political activity. Between 1947 and 1958, the Jam‘iyat actively participated in the debates among various Islamic parties and the government over the nature of the state of Pakistan and the necessity of an Islamic constitution for the country. Beyond this, it did not envisage a role for itself in national politics.
By the late 1960s, however, the Jam‘iyat had become fully embroiled in politics under the force of three factors. The first was the increasing prominence of the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam and other Islamic parties such as the Jama‘at-i Islami in the religious and political arenas from 1958 onward. It must be remembered that the Barelwis had emerged in the first place to check the growth of puritanical interpretations of orthodoxy. Thus, it was not unexpected that the Jam‘iyat would mobilize its resources to offset the influence of Jam‘iyat ‘Ulama’-i Islam and the Jama‘at-i Islami. The Jam‘iyat challenged
the Jama‘at-i Islami in forty-two constituencies in the national elections of 1970, defeating their opponents in several contests and dividing the religious vote in others to the advantage of secular parties. The rivalry between the two also stemmed from the fact that both had courted the Muhajir (refugee) community of Sind since 1947.
Second, the Jam‘iyat was made aware of the power and potential of Islam in the political arena by revivalist groups in general, and the Jama ‘at-i Islami in particular. The Jam‘iyat was not immune to the attraction of political power. Moreover, it did not wish to leave the growing religious vote to be dominated by revivalist parties or the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam. The decision to participate in the national elections of 1970, the first for the Jam‘iyat, was taken after the Jama‘at-i Islami flaunted the electoral potential of Islamic symbolisms by introducing its campaign with the Yaum-i Shaukat-i Islam (Day of Islam’s Glory), which was held throughout Pakistan in May 1970.
Third, the Jam‘iyat became interested in politics in response to the challenge of the secularist regime (1958-1969) of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan to the place of Islam in Pakistani society. The Ayub regime sought to roll back the gains made by the religious parties during the preceding decade, proposed a modernist view of Islam with the aim of depoliticizing the Islamic parties, and finally sought to extend the power of the state into the domain of the ‘ulama’. The Jam‘iyat was opposed to Ayub’s modernist agenda but was especially perturbed by the government’s appropriation of religious endowments and takeover of the management of religious shrines. Both actions affected Barelwis and their allies in the Sufi establishment directly. The Jam‘iyat was also opposed to the government’s attempts to seize control of its mosques. In response to Ayub Khan’s policies, the Jam‘iyat became more directly involved in politics in the 1960s to protect the Barelwis’ interests. By the mid-1960s, under the leadership of Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani, the Jam‘iyat became a vociferous actor in the political arena. It now included lay members and leaders and addressed issues of national concern. In 1970, for instance, it launched a strong campaign to counter Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
Following the secession of Bangladesh and the rise of the populist Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto to power, the Jam‘iyat, along with other Islamic parties, became even more actively involved in politics. The secularist and left-of-center politics of the Bhutto government allowed the Islamic parties to assume the leadership of the opposition. The Jam‘iyat coordinated its activities closely with those of other Islamic parties in the anti-government Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement, which undermined the Bhutto regime. In fact, Nurani was chosen by the movement to succeed Bhutto as prime minister. Later the Jam‘iyat also lent support to the military regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who took over the reins of power in 1977.
True to its founding ideals, the Jam‘iyat was also the first Islamic party to distance itself from the Zia regime and its puritanical view of Islam. The party was not, however, able to escape the impact of the increasingly strict adherence to orthodoxy that swept across Pakistan in the 1980s. By the end of that decade, elements within the Jam‘iyat had moved close to the doctrinal positions of Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam and the Jama‘at-i Islami. More significantly, the party suffered as a consequence of its direct involvement in politics. Clashes over policy decisions after 1969 divided the Jam‘iyat into factions. One faction led by Nurani decided to stay away from the Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI or Islamic Democratic Alliance), which was formed by the pro-Zia parties to challenge Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, and instead allied itself with an offshoot of Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam to form the Islamic Democratic Front. The other faction under the leadership of Mawlana ‘Abdussattar Niyazi decided to remain with IJI.
After 1986, the Jam‘iyat, like other Islamic parties, lost much of its support because of the proliferation of self-styled Sunni parties throughout Pakistan, and because of the meteoric rise of the ethnic party Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM or Muhajir National Movement) in the urban centers of Sind. In the 1970 elections, the party received 8.2 percent of the popular vote and won seven seats in the National Assembly, but in the 1990 elections its share of the vote had fallen to 1.47 percent, winning only four seats. Despite this setback, the party continues to operate as an important force on the religious scene and wields significant power in the political arena from its stronghold in rural Punjab. Also, during the 1990s, the party’s student wing, Anjuman-i Tulaba-i Islam (Association of Islamic Students), established in the 1980s, came to control numerous campuses in Punjab.
Second, the Jam‘iyat was made aware of the power and potential of Islam in the political arena by revivalist groups in general, and the Jama ‘at-i Islami in particular. The Jam‘iyat was not immune to the attraction of political power. Moreover, it did not wish to leave the growing religious vote to be dominated by revivalist parties or the Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam. The decision to participate in the national elections of 1970, the first for the Jam‘iyat, was taken after the Jama‘at-i Islami flaunted the electoral potential of Islamic symbolisms by introducing its campaign with the Yaum-i Shaukat-i Islam (Day of Islam’s Glory), which was held throughout Pakistan in May 1970.
Third, the Jam‘iyat became interested in politics in response to the challenge of the secularist regime (1958-1969) of Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan to the place of Islam in Pakistani society. The Ayub regime sought to roll back the gains made by the religious parties during the preceding decade, proposed a modernist view of Islam with the aim of depoliticizing the Islamic parties, and finally sought to extend the power of the state into the domain of the ‘ulama’. The Jam‘iyat was opposed to Ayub’s modernist agenda but was especially perturbed by the government’s appropriation of religious endowments and takeover of the management of religious shrines. Both actions affected Barelwis and their allies in the Sufi establishment directly. The Jam‘iyat was also opposed to the government’s attempts to seize control of its mosques. In response to Ayub Khan’s policies, the Jam‘iyat became more directly involved in politics in the 1960s to protect the Barelwis’ interests. By the mid-1960s, under the leadership of Mawlana Shah Ahmad Nurani, the Jam‘iyat became a vociferous actor in the political arena. It now included lay members and leaders and addressed issues of national concern. In 1970, for instance, it launched a strong campaign to counter Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
Following the secession of Bangladesh and the rise of the populist Zulfiqar ‘Ali Bhutto to power, the Jam‘iyat, along with other Islamic parties, became even more actively involved in politics. The secularist and left-of-center politics of the Bhutto government allowed the Islamic parties to assume the leadership of the opposition. The Jam‘iyat coordinated its activities closely with those of other Islamic parties in the anti-government Nizam-i Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement, which undermined the Bhutto regime. In fact, Nurani was chosen by the movement to succeed Bhutto as prime minister. Later the Jam‘iyat also lent support to the military regime of General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who took over the reins of power in 1977.
True to its founding ideals, the Jam‘iyat was also the first Islamic party to distance itself from the Zia regime and its puritanical view of Islam. The party was not, however, able to escape the impact of the increasingly strict adherence to orthodoxy that swept across Pakistan in the 1980s. By the end of that decade, elements within the Jam‘iyat had moved close to the doctrinal positions of Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam and the Jama‘at-i Islami. More significantly, the party suffered as a consequence of its direct involvement in politics. Clashes over policy decisions after 1969 divided the Jam‘iyat into factions. One faction led by Nurani decided to stay away from the Islami Jumhuri Ittihad (IJI or Islamic Democratic Alliance), which was formed by the pro-Zia parties to challenge Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, and instead allied itself with an offshoot of Jam‘iyatul ‘Ulama’-i Islam to form the Islamic Democratic Front. The other faction under the leadership of Mawlana ‘Abdussattar Niyazi decided to remain with IJI.
After 1986, the Jam‘iyat, like other Islamic parties, lost much of its support because of the proliferation of self-styled Sunni parties throughout Pakistan, and because of the meteoric rise of the ethnic party Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM or Muhajir National Movement) in the urban centers of Sind. In the 1970 elections, the party received 8.2 percent of the popular vote and won seven seats in the National Assembly, but in the 1990 elections its share of the vote had fallen to 1.47 percent, winning only four seats. Despite this setback, the party continues to operate as an important force on the religious scene and wields significant power in the political arena from its stronghold in rural Punjab. Also, during the 1990s, the party’s student wing, Anjuman-i Tulaba-i Islam (Association of Islamic Students), established in the 1980s, came to control numerous campuses in Punjab.
Jamshid
Jamshid (Jam) (Jamshed). Iranian hero who has remained alive in popular and literary tradition, from Indo-Iranian times until the present day.
Jamshīd is a mythological figure of Greater Iranian culture and tradition. In tradition and folklore, Jamshid is described as having been the fourth and greatest king of the epigraphically unattested Pishdadian dynasty (before Kayanian dynasty). This role is already alluded to in Zoroastrian scripture, where the figure appears as Avestan language Yima(-Kshaeta) "(radiant) Yima," and from which the name 'Jamshid' then derives.
Jam see Jamshid
Jamshed see Jamshid
Yimar-Kshaeta see Jamshid
"radiant" Yima see Jamshid
Jamshid (Jam) (Jamshed). Iranian hero who has remained alive in popular and literary tradition, from Indo-Iranian times until the present day.
Jamshīd is a mythological figure of Greater Iranian culture and tradition. In tradition and folklore, Jamshid is described as having been the fourth and greatest king of the epigraphically unattested Pishdadian dynasty (before Kayanian dynasty). This role is already alluded to in Zoroastrian scripture, where the figure appears as Avestan language Yima(-Kshaeta) "(radiant) Yima," and from which the name 'Jamshid' then derives.
Jam see Jamshid
Jamshed see Jamshid
Yimar-Kshaeta see Jamshid
"radiant" Yima see Jamshid
Janab Shihab al-Din
Janab Shihab al-Din (Cenap Sehabettin) (Cenap Sahabettin) (1870-1934). Turkish poet and writer. He made a remarkable contribution to the modern school of Turkish poetry.
The works of Janab Shihab al-Din include:
Poetry
* Tâmât(1887) Tâmât (1887)
* Seçme Şiirleri (1934, ölümünden sonra) And Selected Poems (1934, posthumous)
* Bütün Şiirleri (1984, ölümünden sonra) All Poems (1984, posthumous)
* ˜Terâne-i Mehtap' ~ Chant-i Mehtap '
Theater
* Körebe (1917) Blind man's buff (1917)
* Küçük Beyler Family Guys
* Yalan Lie
Prose
* Hac Yolunda (1909) Pilgrimage in Road (1909)
* Evrak-ı Eyyam (1915) Document-ı Eyyam (1915)
* Afak-ı Irak (1917) Bark-ı Iraq (1917)
* Avrupa Mektupları (1919) Letters of Europe (1919)
* Nesr-i Harp, Nesr-i Sulh ve Tiryaki Sözleri (1918) Nesr-i Harp, Magistrates and Tiryaki lyrics Nesr-i (1918)
* Vilyam Şekispiyer(1932) Vilyam Şekispiyer (1932)
Din, Janab Shihab al- see Janab Shihab al-Din
Cenap Sehabettin see Janab Shihab al-Din
Sehabettin, Cenap see Janab Shihab al-Din
Cenap Sahabettin see Janab Shihab al-Din
Sahabettin, Cenap see Janab Shihab al-Din
Janab Shihab al-Din (Cenap Sehabettin) (Cenap Sahabettin) (1870-1934). Turkish poet and writer. He made a remarkable contribution to the modern school of Turkish poetry.
The works of Janab Shihab al-Din include:
Poetry
* Tâmât(1887) Tâmât (1887)
* Seçme Şiirleri (1934, ölümünden sonra) And Selected Poems (1934, posthumous)
* Bütün Şiirleri (1984, ölümünden sonra) All Poems (1984, posthumous)
* ˜Terâne-i Mehtap' ~ Chant-i Mehtap '
Theater
* Körebe (1917) Blind man's buff (1917)
* Küçük Beyler Family Guys
* Yalan Lie
Prose
* Hac Yolunda (1909) Pilgrimage in Road (1909)
* Evrak-ı Eyyam (1915) Document-ı Eyyam (1915)
* Afak-ı Irak (1917) Bark-ı Iraq (1917)
* Avrupa Mektupları (1919) Letters of Europe (1919)
* Nesr-i Harp, Nesr-i Sulh ve Tiryaki Sözleri (1918) Nesr-i Harp, Magistrates and Tiryaki lyrics Nesr-i (1918)
* Vilyam Şekispiyer(1932) Vilyam Şekispiyer (1932)
Din, Janab Shihab al- see Janab Shihab al-Din
Cenap Sehabettin see Janab Shihab al-Din
Sehabettin, Cenap see Janab Shihab al-Din
Cenap Sahabettin see Janab Shihab al-Din
Sahabettin, Cenap see Janab Shihab al-Din
Janadi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Janadi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Janadi) (d. 1332). Shafi‘i jurist and historian from Yemen. He is the author of a biographical dictionary of the learned men of Yemen, preceded by a political history from the time of the Prophet to 1323.
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Janadi see Janadi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Janadi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Janadi) (d. 1332). Shafi‘i jurist and historian from Yemen. He is the author of a biographical dictionary of the learned men of Yemen, preceded by a political history from the time of the Prophet to 1323.
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Janadi see Janadi, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Jandarli
Jandarli. Name of an Ottoman family of statesmen, prominent from around 1350 to 1500.
Jandarli. Name of an Ottoman family of statesmen, prominent from around 1350 to 1500.
Janids
Janids. Also known as the Astrakhanids, the Janids formed the Uzbek dynasty of the khans of Bukhara (r. 1599-1785). These descendants of the Golden Horde were driven out of the khanate of Astrakhan into Transoxiana by the Russians in 1554. Baqi Muhammad (r. 1599-1605) succeeded in deposing his cousin, the last Shaybanid in 1599, and seized power in part of the khanate (the area of Bukhara, Samarkand, Ferghana, and Balkh) consolidated under Imam Quli (1610-1642). In 1732, the Janids had to accept the secession of the khanate of Kokand and in 1752 the loss of further territories. Following the rule of Abd al-Faiz (1707-1747), there ensued a large scale loss of power. Having been ousted from their position (1753-1758), they were under a regent from 1758, and finally subject to the related Mangits, who deposed them in 1785. Under the Janids, Bukhara was one of the centers of Sunni orthodoxy, which played a leading role in defensive struggles against Shi‘a Persia.
Astrakhanids see Janids.
Janids. Also known as the Astrakhanids, the Janids formed the Uzbek dynasty of the khans of Bukhara (r. 1599-1785). These descendants of the Golden Horde were driven out of the khanate of Astrakhan into Transoxiana by the Russians in 1554. Baqi Muhammad (r. 1599-1605) succeeded in deposing his cousin, the last Shaybanid in 1599, and seized power in part of the khanate (the area of Bukhara, Samarkand, Ferghana, and Balkh) consolidated under Imam Quli (1610-1642). In 1732, the Janids had to accept the secession of the khanate of Kokand and in 1752 the loss of further territories. Following the rule of Abd al-Faiz (1707-1747), there ensued a large scale loss of power. Having been ousted from their position (1753-1758), they were under a regent from 1758, and finally subject to the related Mangits, who deposed them in 1785. Under the Janids, Bukhara was one of the centers of Sunni orthodoxy, which played a leading role in defensive struggles against Shi‘a Persia.
Astrakhanids see Janids.
Janikli Hajji ‘Ali Pasha
Janikli Hajji ‘Ali Pasha (1720-1785). Ottoman soldier and founder of a Derebey family. In 1776, he presented a memorandum to the government on the reforms that were needed in the Empire.
Janikli Hajji ‘Ali Pasha (1720-1785). Ottoman soldier and founder of a Derebey family. In 1776, he presented a memorandum to the government on the reforms that were needed in the Empire.
Janissaries
Janissaries (Yeni-ceri). Christian conscript foot soldiers in the Ottoman army who converted to Islam and who were trained to use firearms. The term janissary is taken from the Turkish phrase yeni-ceri -- a phrase which literally means “new troops” or “new army.” The janissaries comprised the elite regiments of the Ottoman regime. They played an important role in Ottoman politics from the time of the assassination of Sultan ‘Uthman II in 1622. The corps was abolished by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826.
Janissaries comprised the standing Ottoman army, first organized by Bey (also erroneously called Sultan) Murad I in the late 14th century of the Christian calendar. As a unit of the army, the janissaries lasted until 1826, -- a span of about 450 years.
The term janissaries is derived from the Turkish term, yeniceri. Yeniceri means new troops, indicating exactly what they were in the beginning -- an alternative to the old regular army.
The janissaries became famous for their military skills, but also because they were staffed by youths conscripted from Christian families in the Balkans. After the conscription they were defined as the property of the sultan, and virtually all of them converted to Islam.
The janissaries were subject to strict rules, limiting their freedom and demanding higher moral standards than usual in the society. In the first couple of centuries, they were forced to celibacy, but this would later change. The janissaries were not allowed to grow beards, which were the sign of a free man.
The need for the bey/sultan to form the janissary corps, came from the fragility of an army put together by freemen from many different tribes from areas often wide apart. Their allegiance was normally to their own tribal leaders, leaders that often were tempted to oppose the power of the sultan, and to find allies among the main enemies of the Ottoman empire.
At first, the Janissaries were comprised of war prisoners. However, from the 1420’s young men were taken from their homes at an early age, and contact with their old communities were cut. This system was called devshirme. They were even denied contact with the normal society in the areas where they were stationed. Through their training, they were taught to put their allegiance to the bey/sultan. At least, so was the intention. Additionally, despite strict rules, they enjoyed high living standards and a social status which intended to give logic and force to their loyalty.
Over time, the Janissaries were so successful that they grew into one of the most powerful institutions in the empire. They could exercise this strength to influence the policy and to defend their own interests. From the 17th century and onward, the Janissaries staged many palace coups to exercise this power. But this would eventually be the main reason for their downfall – their strength made them dangerous to the sultan, and when the final battle over power came, the Janissaries lost, and all troops were killed or banished.
Other reasons for the sultan to want to remove the Janissaries were that they had grown into a large number, up from 20,000 in 1574 to 135,000 in their last year of 1826. This was expensive and, in addition, the Janissaries had found their own (unacceptable) way of financing their military activities as well as their high living standard: they performed various trades and were more and more in contact with the society. They were truly a state within the state.
A brief history of the Janissaries is as follows:
In the 1380s, Bey Murad I formed the first devshirme system, from which the Janissary army could be formed.
In the fifteenth century, the Janissaries grew into becoming a powerful political force within the Ottoman state.
In the sixteenth century, it had become standard for Janissary troops to marry, and they even managed to get the privilege that their sons should be allowed to enter their army, even if these were born Muslims.
During the seventeenth century, more and more, the Janissary troops engaged in palace coups. This involvement would continue right until their end. Also during this time, the traditional devshirme system of conscription was abandoned, and the Janissaries had many free men applying, among them many from Muslim families too.
In 1648, Janissary troops discharged and killed sultan Ibrahim I.
In the 1820s, the Janissaries failed to crush the Greek fight for independence. By this, they proved that they were no longer the near infallible army as they had been before.
In June of 1826, the Janissary corps found out that the sultan was forming new European style armies, and revolts ensued. Sultan Murad II declared war on them, and it ended with cannons shooting at the Janissary barracks, killing most of the troops. Many of the survivors were executed, others were banished.
Yeni-ceri see Janissaries
New Troops see Janissaries
New Army see Janissaries
Janissaries (Yeni-ceri). Christian conscript foot soldiers in the Ottoman army who converted to Islam and who were trained to use firearms. The term janissary is taken from the Turkish phrase yeni-ceri -- a phrase which literally means “new troops” or “new army.” The janissaries comprised the elite regiments of the Ottoman regime. They played an important role in Ottoman politics from the time of the assassination of Sultan ‘Uthman II in 1622. The corps was abolished by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826.
Janissaries comprised the standing Ottoman army, first organized by Bey (also erroneously called Sultan) Murad I in the late 14th century of the Christian calendar. As a unit of the army, the janissaries lasted until 1826, -- a span of about 450 years.
The term janissaries is derived from the Turkish term, yeniceri. Yeniceri means new troops, indicating exactly what they were in the beginning -- an alternative to the old regular army.
The janissaries became famous for their military skills, but also because they were staffed by youths conscripted from Christian families in the Balkans. After the conscription they were defined as the property of the sultan, and virtually all of them converted to Islam.
The janissaries were subject to strict rules, limiting their freedom and demanding higher moral standards than usual in the society. In the first couple of centuries, they were forced to celibacy, but this would later change. The janissaries were not allowed to grow beards, which were the sign of a free man.
The need for the bey/sultan to form the janissary corps, came from the fragility of an army put together by freemen from many different tribes from areas often wide apart. Their allegiance was normally to their own tribal leaders, leaders that often were tempted to oppose the power of the sultan, and to find allies among the main enemies of the Ottoman empire.
At first, the Janissaries were comprised of war prisoners. However, from the 1420’s young men were taken from their homes at an early age, and contact with their old communities were cut. This system was called devshirme. They were even denied contact with the normal society in the areas where they were stationed. Through their training, they were taught to put their allegiance to the bey/sultan. At least, so was the intention. Additionally, despite strict rules, they enjoyed high living standards and a social status which intended to give logic and force to their loyalty.
Over time, the Janissaries were so successful that they grew into one of the most powerful institutions in the empire. They could exercise this strength to influence the policy and to defend their own interests. From the 17th century and onward, the Janissaries staged many palace coups to exercise this power. But this would eventually be the main reason for their downfall – their strength made them dangerous to the sultan, and when the final battle over power came, the Janissaries lost, and all troops were killed or banished.
Other reasons for the sultan to want to remove the Janissaries were that they had grown into a large number, up from 20,000 in 1574 to 135,000 in their last year of 1826. This was expensive and, in addition, the Janissaries had found their own (unacceptable) way of financing their military activities as well as their high living standard: they performed various trades and were more and more in contact with the society. They were truly a state within the state.
A brief history of the Janissaries is as follows:
In the 1380s, Bey Murad I formed the first devshirme system, from which the Janissary army could be formed.
In the fifteenth century, the Janissaries grew into becoming a powerful political force within the Ottoman state.
In the sixteenth century, it had become standard for Janissary troops to marry, and they even managed to get the privilege that their sons should be allowed to enter their army, even if these were born Muslims.
During the seventeenth century, more and more, the Janissary troops engaged in palace coups. This involvement would continue right until their end. Also during this time, the traditional devshirme system of conscription was abandoned, and the Janissaries had many free men applying, among them many from Muslim families too.
In 1648, Janissary troops discharged and killed sultan Ibrahim I.
In the 1820s, the Janissaries failed to crush the Greek fight for independence. By this, they proved that they were no longer the near infallible army as they had been before.
In June of 1826, the Janissary corps found out that the sultan was forming new European style armies, and revolts ensued. Sultan Murad II declared war on them, and it ended with cannons shooting at the Janissary barracks, killing most of the troops. Many of the survivors were executed, others were banished.
Yeni-ceri see Janissaries
New Troops see Janissaries
New Army see Janissaries
Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al-
Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al- (Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi) (Abū-Tāhir Sulaymān Al-Jannābī) (906-944) . Founder of the Carmathian state of Bahrain. For several years, he was the terror of the pilgrims in Mecca and of the inhabitants of lower Iraq. In 930, he spent eight days pillaging and massacring in Mecca and took away the Black Stone.
Abū-Tāhir Sulaymān Al-Jannābī was the ruler of the Qarmatian (Carmathian) state in Bahrain and Eastern Arabia, who in 930 led the sacking of Mecca.
The son of ‘Abu Sa’id al-Jannabi, the founder of the Qarmatian state, Abu Tahir became leader of the state in 923. He immediately began an expansionist phase raiding Basra that year, followed by Kufa in 927, defeating an Abbasid army in the process, and then threatening Baghdad in 928 before pillaging much of Iraq when he could not gain entry to the city.
In 930, he led the Qarmatians’ most notorious attack when he pillaged Mecca and desecrated Islam’s most sacred sites. Unable to gain entry to the city initially, Abu Tahir called upon the right of all Muslims to enter the city and gave his oath that he came in peace. Once inside the city walls the Qarmatian army set about massacring the pilgrims, taunting them with verses of the Koran as they did so. The bodies of the pilgrims were left to rot in the streets or thrown down the Well of Zamzam. The Kaaba was looted, with Abu Tahir taking personal possession of the Black Stone and bringing it back to Al-Hasa.
The attack on Mecca symbolized the Qarmatians’ break with the Islamic world – it was believed to have been aimed to prompt the appearance of the Mahdi who would bring about the final cycle of the world and end the era of Islam.
Abu Tahir thought that he had identified the Mahdi as a young Persian prisoner by the name of Abu'1-Fadl al- Isfahani, from Isfahan who claimed to be the descendant of the Persian kings, brought back to Bahrain from the Qarmatians' raid into Iraq in 928. In 931, Abu Tahir turned over the state to the Mahdi-Caliph who instituted the worship of fire and the burning of religious books during an eighty day rule, which culminated in the Mahdi ordering the execution of members of Bahrain’s notable families including those of Abu Tahir’s family. Fearing for his own life, Abu Tahir announced that he had been wrong and denounced the Madhi as ‘false’. Begging forgiveness from the other notables, Abu Tahir had the Mahdi executed.
Abu Tahir resumed the reigns of the Qarmatian state and again began attacks on pilgrims crossing Arabia. Attempts by the Abbasids and Fatimids to persuade him to return the Black Stone were
rejected.
Abu Tahir rejected and ridiculed belief in Muhammad and Islam in saying: In this world, three individuals have corrupted mankind: a shepherd, a physician and a camel-driver. And this camel-driver was the worst pickpocket, the worst prestidigitator of the three. These ideas were subsequently transmitted to Emperor Frederick II by Ibn Rushd.
Abu Tahir died of smallpox in 944 and was succeeded by his three surviving brothers.
Abu Sa'id al-Jannabi see Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al-
Abū-Tāhir Sulaymān Al-Jannābī see Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al-
Abu Tahir rejected and ridiculed belief in Muhammad and Islam in saying: In this world, three individuals have corrupted mankind: a shepherd, a physician and a camel-driver. And this camel-driver was the worst pickpocket, the worst prestidigitator of the three. These ideas were subsequently transmitted to Emperor Frederick II by Ibn Rushd.
Abu Tahir died of smallpox in 944 and was succeeded by his three surviving brothers.
Abu Sa'id al-Jannabi see Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al-
Abū-Tāhir Sulaymān Al-Jannābī see Jannabi, Abu Sa‘id al-
Japheth
Japheth (Yafith) (Yafet) (Iapheth) (Iafeth) (Iapetus) (Yafes). The Biblical figure is not mentioned in the Qur’an, but Qur’an exegesis and legend are familiar with the sons of Noah.
Japheth was one of the sons of Noah in the Hebrew Bible. In Arabic citations, his name is normally given as Yafeth bin Nuh (Japheth son of Noah).
Yafith see Japheth
Yafet see Japheth
Iapheth see Japheth
Iafeth see Japheth
Iapetus see Japheth
Yafes see Japheth
Japheth (Yafith) (Yafet) (Iapheth) (Iafeth) (Iapetus) (Yafes). The Biblical figure is not mentioned in the Qur’an, but Qur’an exegesis and legend are familiar with the sons of Noah.
Japheth was one of the sons of Noah in the Hebrew Bible. In Arabic citations, his name is normally given as Yafeth bin Nuh (Japheth son of Noah).
Yafith see Japheth
Yafet see Japheth
Iapheth see Japheth
Iafeth see Japheth
Iapetus see Japheth
Yafes see Japheth
Jaqmaq
Jaqmaq (Caqmaq). Mameluke sultan of Egypt (r.1439-1453). He made peace with the Knights of Saint John on Rhodes, and was on good terms with all Muslim rulers, including the Ottoman sultan. He was a frugal and pious man, liberal to the learned, although Christians and Jews were harassed with strictly enforced petty regulations.
Caqmaq see Jaqmaq
Jaqmaq (Caqmaq). Mameluke sultan of Egypt (r.1439-1453). He made peace with the Knights of Saint John on Rhodes, and was on good terms with all Muslim rulers, including the Ottoman sultan. He was a frugal and pious man, liberal to the learned, although Christians and Jews were harassed with strictly enforced petty regulations.
Caqmaq see Jaqmaq
Jarir ibn ‘Atiyya
Jarir ibn ‘Atiyya (Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi) (ca. 650 – ca. 728) (d. 728). One of the most important satirical poets of the Umayyad period. Around 683, he began his famous forty-year-long dispute with al-Farazdak.
Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi was an Arab poet and satirist. He was born during the reign of the caliph Othman, and was a member of the tribe Kulaib, a part of the Banu Tamim. He was a native of al-Yamamah, but also spent time in Damascus at the court of the Umayyad caliphs.
Little is known of his early life, but he succeeded in winning the favor of Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef, the governor of Iraq. Already famous for his verse, he became more widely known by his feud with rival poets Farazdaq and Akhtal. Later he went to Damascus and visited the court of the caliph Abd al-Malik and that of his successor, Al-Walid I. From neither of these did he receive a warm welcome. He was, however, more successful with Umar II, and was the only poet received by the pious caliph.
His verse, like that of his contemporaries, is largely satire and eulogy.
Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi see Jarir ibn ‘Atiyya
Jarir ibn ‘Atiyya (Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi) (ca. 650 – ca. 728) (d. 728). One of the most important satirical poets of the Umayyad period. Around 683, he began his famous forty-year-long dispute with al-Farazdak.
Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi was an Arab poet and satirist. He was born during the reign of the caliph Othman, and was a member of the tribe Kulaib, a part of the Banu Tamim. He was a native of al-Yamamah, but also spent time in Damascus at the court of the Umayyad caliphs.
Little is known of his early life, but he succeeded in winning the favor of Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef, the governor of Iraq. Already famous for his verse, he became more widely known by his feud with rival poets Farazdaq and Akhtal. Later he went to Damascus and visited the court of the caliph Abd al-Malik and that of his successor, Al-Walid I. From neither of these did he receive a warm welcome. He was, however, more successful with Umar II, and was the only poet received by the pious caliph.
His verse, like that of his contemporaries, is largely satire and eulogy.
Jarir ibn `Atiyah al-Khatfi see Jarir ibn ‘Atiyya
Jariya ibn Qudama
Jariya ibn Qudama (d. after 661). Companion of the Prophet and a staunch supporter of the latter’s son-in-law, ‘Ali.
Jariya ibn Qudama (d. after 661). Companion of the Prophet and a staunch supporter of the latter’s son-in-law, ‘Ali.
Jarrahids
Jarrahids (Banu’l-Jarrah). Family of Yemeni origin which settled in Palestine and attained some importance in the tenth and eleventh centuries by following a policy of vacillation between the Fatimids and the Byzantines.
Banu'l-Jarrah see Jarrahids
Jarrahids (Banu’l-Jarrah). Family of Yemeni origin which settled in Palestine and attained some importance in the tenth and eleventh centuries by following a policy of vacillation between the Fatimids and the Byzantines.
Banu'l-Jarrah see Jarrahids
Jat
Jat (Jatt) (Zutt). More than thirty million Jat live in the Indian subcontinent. They are not a homogeneous ethno-linguistic group, rather, they are immersed in several ethnic groups in which they retain an identity, often based upon occupation and heritage. They speak the language and usually share the religion of the people among whom they live. About one out every three Jat is a Muslim.
Most historians agree that the Jat arrived in the Indian subcontinent as invaders and migrants from Central Asia during the great migrations two or three thousand years ago. However, unlike other invaders such as the Rajput, the Jat did not establish ruling dynasties. By language and appearance they were presumably Indo-Iranian who in the course of time mixed with other waves of invaders and older Indian inhabitants, especially in the Punjab and Sind. However, while the word “Jat” lives on today, it no longer means what it did in the past.
Early historical records indicate that while the ancient Indians and Persians called the people Jat, the Arabs called them Zutt. In Persia and the Arab world, “Jat” and “Zutt” became synonymous with “Indian,” regardless of the ethnic origin of the Indians involved.
The Persian poet Firdausi reports that the Sasanian king, Bahram Gur (420-438) invited 10,000 musicians from India to embellish one of the national festivities. The Arab historian, Hamza al-Isfahani, called them Zutt. Bahram was so pleased with their musical performances that he wanted them to stay on. He granted them land, oxen and grain. However, as they were minstrels and not peasants, they ate the oxen and grain and let the land lie barren. The enraged Bahram Gur expelled them from his country. The Jat turned west and south and remained what they had been, minstrels. These are said to be the first known ancestors of the European Gypsies.
At the same time Bahram Gur was being entertained by the Zutt minstrels, Jat divisions were fighting in the Persian army. They were much valued for their fighting qualities and were accepted without regard to their caste or ethnic origin.
As long as a strong Persian empire defended its northern and eastern boundaries, invaders from Central Asia were forced to press wave after wave into northwestern India. The inhabitants, including the Jat, gave way to them, some retiring westward into southern Persia and Mesopotamia, some southward. In regions along the Indus River that were not irrigated by its canal systems, only cattle breeders could exist, and among these were the Jat. Buffalo breeders were the most successful emigrants from Sind to the west. Their animals, although slow in walking, were excellent swimmers. They could keep swimming for days, forming themselves into a kind of raft by placing the head of one on the neck of the next animal. The exact route of migration is not known, but somehow they went along the Arabian seacoast. Arab historians, who called them “Zutt,” claim that these Jat came from Sind and not from the Punjab that this fact can be proved by the races of their domesticated buffalo. The domesticate buffalo are the same in Iraq and Sind, whereas Punjabi buffalo have different characteristics.
The Zutt of Iraq, who lived in the marshes for the benefit of their animals, made trouble for the pre- and post-Islamic Arabs. Reports exist of fights and deportations, of revolts and emigrations. It is likely that they reached Egypt, the lands around the Black Sea, and in the end, Europe. To all these countries they introduced the water buffalo directly or indirectly.
With the spreading of Islam, the westward movement of the Zutt or Jat came to an end. The soldierly Jat, who were still defending the Persian kingdom, were the first to encounter the Arabian armies. In a second line stood those Jat who were guarding the border of the Indian kingdoms. In Sind, kings Rai and Chach, with the help of the Jat, were reconverting the population to Brahmanism. They were opposed by the then ruling Buddhist chiefs, who were also helped by the Jat. But Brahmans and Buddhists alike had to give way to the Islamic Arabs. In 711, Arab armies invaded and conquered Sind. Arab and Persian historians report about the first encounters between the Arab conquerors and the Jat. The Jat who were followers of the Brahmans but who had come to an agreement with the Arabs, were treated benevolently. However, if they remained followers of Brahmanism, they were treated severely and degraded in every possible way. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Sind and India were called indiscriminately Zutt or Jat by the Arabs much in the generic sense of calling the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent, “Indian.”
The inter-Islamic controversies during the first centuries after Muhammad had as one consequence the settling down of a group of temporarily powerful heretics, the Qarmatians, in Sind from the Indus delta up to Multan. They came mainly by sea from Bahrain, where a colony of seafaring Sindhis or Jat had made a good living as traders. (Colonies of such Sindhi traders were plentiful along the coast of the Persian Gulf and of East Africa.) It seems that the whole population of Sind became confessors of the Qarmatian creed, following the example of the then ruling Sumra. Later on the Kalhoras (1736-1778) revived some of their heretic thoughts and practices. It is said that even today Sindhi pirs show lingerings of the Qarmatian doctrines.
It was to convert the Qarmatians that the Ghaznavids and Ghorids invaded India. Under the pretext of having orders from the caliph to reconvert the people to the true faith, they conquered part of the Punjab and Sind down to Multan. Again the inhabitants of the Punjab and Multan were called generically Jat, and very soon they were displaying their fighting spirit. Mahmud of Ghazni incorporated the Jat into his army and sent them west to fight against his enemies, who were partly of Turkish extraction, as was Mahmud himself.
From this time onward the main historical events did not happen in the west-east direction but in the north-south. The Jat outside the Indian subcontinent lost their importance. After the twelfth century their name is mentioned only occasionally.
The last invasion of special importance to the Jat were the Baluch, who descended from the mountains west of Sind. They were slowly driven from their old habitats near Kerman to the east and southeast. In the eleventh centuries they began their descent into the Kachhi plain in small unobtrusive groups. In the following centuries their number increased. They had first no intention of conquering Sind, although their social organization, the tuman, was a fighting confederation. They gained political importance when Sindhi rulers asked for their military help. In this respect they were first mentioned in the fifteenth century as auxiliary forces to the Langah ruler of Multan. When in the seventeenth century the dynasty of the Kalhora declined, the Talpur-Baluch came to political power, and Baluch, after 1786, were the dominate group of Lower and Upper Sind.
In the tuman confederations of the Baluch were strong elements of Jat who had emigrated from the Indus plain to the region of Kalat and the Sulaiman range to avoid the raiding groups of the Ghaznavids, Ghorids, and Mughals. Like the Baluch themselves they had a preference for raising camels. They became the “Jatt,” the camel drivers of the Baluch. This is the reason why the word “Jatt” in Lower Sind is synonymous with “camel driver.” A Baluch Jatt could be anything by birth, such as Jokhia, Sumra or Samma (ethnic groups). At the same time, the peasants of Sind were still to a great part Jat by birth. To a Baluch, who despised all sedentary people tilling the land, Jat became a generic name for all small farmers and tenants, which they used contemptuously. To distinguish themselves from these suppresssed and despised Jat, the camel-rearing and camel-driving Jat called themselves Jat-Bauch or Mir-Jat, the camel drivers of the Baluchi Mirs.
Zutt see Jat
Gypsies see Jat
Jatt see Jat
Camel Drivers see Jat
Jat (Jatt) (Zutt). More than thirty million Jat live in the Indian subcontinent. They are not a homogeneous ethno-linguistic group, rather, they are immersed in several ethnic groups in which they retain an identity, often based upon occupation and heritage. They speak the language and usually share the religion of the people among whom they live. About one out every three Jat is a Muslim.
Most historians agree that the Jat arrived in the Indian subcontinent as invaders and migrants from Central Asia during the great migrations two or three thousand years ago. However, unlike other invaders such as the Rajput, the Jat did not establish ruling dynasties. By language and appearance they were presumably Indo-Iranian who in the course of time mixed with other waves of invaders and older Indian inhabitants, especially in the Punjab and Sind. However, while the word “Jat” lives on today, it no longer means what it did in the past.
Early historical records indicate that while the ancient Indians and Persians called the people Jat, the Arabs called them Zutt. In Persia and the Arab world, “Jat” and “Zutt” became synonymous with “Indian,” regardless of the ethnic origin of the Indians involved.
The Persian poet Firdausi reports that the Sasanian king, Bahram Gur (420-438) invited 10,000 musicians from India to embellish one of the national festivities. The Arab historian, Hamza al-Isfahani, called them Zutt. Bahram was so pleased with their musical performances that he wanted them to stay on. He granted them land, oxen and grain. However, as they were minstrels and not peasants, they ate the oxen and grain and let the land lie barren. The enraged Bahram Gur expelled them from his country. The Jat turned west and south and remained what they had been, minstrels. These are said to be the first known ancestors of the European Gypsies.
At the same time Bahram Gur was being entertained by the Zutt minstrels, Jat divisions were fighting in the Persian army. They were much valued for their fighting qualities and were accepted without regard to their caste or ethnic origin.
As long as a strong Persian empire defended its northern and eastern boundaries, invaders from Central Asia were forced to press wave after wave into northwestern India. The inhabitants, including the Jat, gave way to them, some retiring westward into southern Persia and Mesopotamia, some southward. In regions along the Indus River that were not irrigated by its canal systems, only cattle breeders could exist, and among these were the Jat. Buffalo breeders were the most successful emigrants from Sind to the west. Their animals, although slow in walking, were excellent swimmers. They could keep swimming for days, forming themselves into a kind of raft by placing the head of one on the neck of the next animal. The exact route of migration is not known, but somehow they went along the Arabian seacoast. Arab historians, who called them “Zutt,” claim that these Jat came from Sind and not from the Punjab that this fact can be proved by the races of their domesticated buffalo. The domesticate buffalo are the same in Iraq and Sind, whereas Punjabi buffalo have different characteristics.
The Zutt of Iraq, who lived in the marshes for the benefit of their animals, made trouble for the pre- and post-Islamic Arabs. Reports exist of fights and deportations, of revolts and emigrations. It is likely that they reached Egypt, the lands around the Black Sea, and in the end, Europe. To all these countries they introduced the water buffalo directly or indirectly.
With the spreading of Islam, the westward movement of the Zutt or Jat came to an end. The soldierly Jat, who were still defending the Persian kingdom, were the first to encounter the Arabian armies. In a second line stood those Jat who were guarding the border of the Indian kingdoms. In Sind, kings Rai and Chach, with the help of the Jat, were reconverting the population to Brahmanism. They were opposed by the then ruling Buddhist chiefs, who were also helped by the Jat. But Brahmans and Buddhists alike had to give way to the Islamic Arabs. In 711, Arab armies invaded and conquered Sind. Arab and Persian historians report about the first encounters between the Arab conquerors and the Jat. The Jat who were followers of the Brahmans but who had come to an agreement with the Arabs, were treated benevolently. However, if they remained followers of Brahmanism, they were treated severely and degraded in every possible way. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Sind and India were called indiscriminately Zutt or Jat by the Arabs much in the generic sense of calling the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent, “Indian.”
The inter-Islamic controversies during the first centuries after Muhammad had as one consequence the settling down of a group of temporarily powerful heretics, the Qarmatians, in Sind from the Indus delta up to Multan. They came mainly by sea from Bahrain, where a colony of seafaring Sindhis or Jat had made a good living as traders. (Colonies of such Sindhi traders were plentiful along the coast of the Persian Gulf and of East Africa.) It seems that the whole population of Sind became confessors of the Qarmatian creed, following the example of the then ruling Sumra. Later on the Kalhoras (1736-1778) revived some of their heretic thoughts and practices. It is said that even today Sindhi pirs show lingerings of the Qarmatian doctrines.
It was to convert the Qarmatians that the Ghaznavids and Ghorids invaded India. Under the pretext of having orders from the caliph to reconvert the people to the true faith, they conquered part of the Punjab and Sind down to Multan. Again the inhabitants of the Punjab and Multan were called generically Jat, and very soon they were displaying their fighting spirit. Mahmud of Ghazni incorporated the Jat into his army and sent them west to fight against his enemies, who were partly of Turkish extraction, as was Mahmud himself.
From this time onward the main historical events did not happen in the west-east direction but in the north-south. The Jat outside the Indian subcontinent lost their importance. After the twelfth century their name is mentioned only occasionally.
The last invasion of special importance to the Jat were the Baluch, who descended from the mountains west of Sind. They were slowly driven from their old habitats near Kerman to the east and southeast. In the eleventh centuries they began their descent into the Kachhi plain in small unobtrusive groups. In the following centuries their number increased. They had first no intention of conquering Sind, although their social organization, the tuman, was a fighting confederation. They gained political importance when Sindhi rulers asked for their military help. In this respect they were first mentioned in the fifteenth century as auxiliary forces to the Langah ruler of Multan. When in the seventeenth century the dynasty of the Kalhora declined, the Talpur-Baluch came to political power, and Baluch, after 1786, were the dominate group of Lower and Upper Sind.
In the tuman confederations of the Baluch were strong elements of Jat who had emigrated from the Indus plain to the region of Kalat and the Sulaiman range to avoid the raiding groups of the Ghaznavids, Ghorids, and Mughals. Like the Baluch themselves they had a preference for raising camels. They became the “Jatt,” the camel drivers of the Baluch. This is the reason why the word “Jatt” in Lower Sind is synonymous with “camel driver.” A Baluch Jatt could be anything by birth, such as Jokhia, Sumra or Samma (ethnic groups). At the same time, the peasants of Sind were still to a great part Jat by birth. To a Baluch, who despised all sedentary people tilling the land, Jat became a generic name for all small farmers and tenants, which they used contemptuously. To distinguish themselves from these suppresssed and despised Jat, the camel-rearing and camel-driving Jat called themselves Jat-Bauch or Mir-Jat, the camel drivers of the Baluchi Mirs.
Zutt see Jat
Gypsies see Jat
Jatt see Jat
Camel Drivers see Jat
Javanese
Javanese. The Javanese, the world’s third largest Muslim ethnic group (after Arabs and Bengalis), occupy the central and eastern part of the island of Java, the fifth largest island of the island nation of Indonesia. They call themselves Weng Jawa or Tiyang Jawi in polite speech. The Indonesian term is Orang Jawa. They form the largest ethnic group of the extremely plural population of the Indonesian republic, itself the nation with the world’s largest Muslim population.
Nearly all Javanese, about 90 percent, are Muslim. The remaining 10 percent are Roman Catholic, Protestant Christians, Buddhists or recent converts in south central Java to Hinduism.
In the earliest stages of conversion to Islam in the thirteenth century, the commercial aristocracy in the port towns of northern Java had also adopted many elements of mysticism that seem to have characterized south Indian Islam. As mysticism had long played an important role in the Hindu-Buddhist Javanese religion during the pre-Islamic period, it stimulated the easy acceptance of Islam among the Javanese. More orthodox Sunni teachings of the Shafi school of law were acquired at a later period of Javanese pilgrims on their return from Mecca.
During the fifteenth century, Islam penetrated into the interior regions of east and central Java through the zealous activities of Muslim missionaries who became holy men (wali) in Javanese folklore. In the inland regions, where pre-Islamic Hindu and Buddhist Javanese cultural and religious traditions were strongest, the influence of Islam was less strong, and the religion was modified into a typically Javanese kind of Islam, combining Hindu-Buddhist Javanese religious concepts with Muslim beliefs. The Javanese themselves continued to call this Javanese version of Islam the Agami Jawi or Kejawen, or sometimes in a degrading manner, Islam Abangan (Red Muslims). The Javanese make a clear distinction between people who adhere to the Kejawen religion and those who practice the more puritan kind of Islam, who are called Santri Muslims.
In the early twentieth century, a Javanese, K. H. A. Dahlan (b. 1868), brought Islamic reformist ideas to Indonesia. Under the influence of the Islamic modernist, Muhammad Abduh of Al Azhar University in Cairo, Dahlan founded the Indonesian reform movement, the Muhammadiya, in 1912 in central Java. This later became a nationwide movement working actively in education, social welfare and religious reform. Attacking not only Kejawen syncretism but also Santri scholasticism and mysticism, the Muhammadiya became a threat to rural religious leaders who consequently reacted by forming a counter-organization, the Nahdatul Ulema (Union of Muslim Scholars) in 1926 in east Java. This organization also developed into an Indonesian nationwide organization, especially after independence in 1950, when it became a strong Indonesian political party which represented orthodox Islamic ideology.
Javanese. The Javanese, the world’s third largest Muslim ethnic group (after Arabs and Bengalis), occupy the central and eastern part of the island of Java, the fifth largest island of the island nation of Indonesia. They call themselves Weng Jawa or Tiyang Jawi in polite speech. The Indonesian term is Orang Jawa. They form the largest ethnic group of the extremely plural population of the Indonesian republic, itself the nation with the world’s largest Muslim population.
Nearly all Javanese, about 90 percent, are Muslim. The remaining 10 percent are Roman Catholic, Protestant Christians, Buddhists or recent converts in south central Java to Hinduism.
In the earliest stages of conversion to Islam in the thirteenth century, the commercial aristocracy in the port towns of northern Java had also adopted many elements of mysticism that seem to have characterized south Indian Islam. As mysticism had long played an important role in the Hindu-Buddhist Javanese religion during the pre-Islamic period, it stimulated the easy acceptance of Islam among the Javanese. More orthodox Sunni teachings of the Shafi school of law were acquired at a later period of Javanese pilgrims on their return from Mecca.
During the fifteenth century, Islam penetrated into the interior regions of east and central Java through the zealous activities of Muslim missionaries who became holy men (wali) in Javanese folklore. In the inland regions, where pre-Islamic Hindu and Buddhist Javanese cultural and religious traditions were strongest, the influence of Islam was less strong, and the religion was modified into a typically Javanese kind of Islam, combining Hindu-Buddhist Javanese religious concepts with Muslim beliefs. The Javanese themselves continued to call this Javanese version of Islam the Agami Jawi or Kejawen, or sometimes in a degrading manner, Islam Abangan (Red Muslims). The Javanese make a clear distinction between people who adhere to the Kejawen religion and those who practice the more puritan kind of Islam, who are called Santri Muslims.
In the early twentieth century, a Javanese, K. H. A. Dahlan (b. 1868), brought Islamic reformist ideas to Indonesia. Under the influence of the Islamic modernist, Muhammad Abduh of Al Azhar University in Cairo, Dahlan founded the Indonesian reform movement, the Muhammadiya, in 1912 in central Java. This later became a nationwide movement working actively in education, social welfare and religious reform. Attacking not only Kejawen syncretism but also Santri scholasticism and mysticism, the Muhammadiya became a threat to rural religious leaders who consequently reacted by forming a counter-organization, the Nahdatul Ulema (Union of Muslim Scholars) in 1926 in east Java. This organization also developed into an Indonesian nationwide organization, especially after independence in 1950, when it became a strong Indonesian political party which represented orthodox Islamic ideology.
Jawaliqi, al-
Jawaliqi, al- (Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi (1073–1144/1145). Arab philologist and calligrapher from Baghdad. His works played a part in raising the cultural level in the Arabic language from the depths to which it had fallen in the Saljuq period.
Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi, an Arab grammarian, was born at Baghdad, where he studied philology under Tibrizi and became famous for his handwriting. In his later years, he acted as imam to the caliph Moqtafi. His chief work is the Kitab al-Mu'Arab, or Explanation of Foreign Words used in Arabic.
Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi see Jawaliqi, al-
Jawaliqi, al- (Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi (1073–1144/1145). Arab philologist and calligrapher from Baghdad. His works played a part in raising the cultural level in the Arabic language from the depths to which it had fallen in the Saljuq period.
Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi, an Arab grammarian, was born at Baghdad, where he studied philology under Tibrizi and became famous for his handwriting. In his later years, he acted as imam to the caliph Moqtafi. His chief work is the Kitab al-Mu'Arab, or Explanation of Foreign Words used in Arabic.
Abu Mansur Mauhub al-Jawaliqi see Jawaliqi, al-
Jawan, Mirza Kazim ‘Ali
Jawan, Mirza Kazim ‘Ali (Mirza Kazim ‘Ali Jawan) (d. c. 1815). One of the pioneers of Urdu prose literature.
Mirza Kazim 'Ali Jawan see Jawan, Mirza Kazim ‘Ali
Jawan, Mirza Kazim ‘Ali (Mirza Kazim ‘Ali Jawan) (d. c. 1815). One of the pioneers of Urdu prose literature.
Mirza Kazim 'Ali Jawan see Jawan, Mirza Kazim ‘Ali
Jawara, Dauda Kairaba
Jawara, Dauda Kairaba (Dauda Kairaba Jawara) (b. 1924). Prime minister of the Gambia (1962-1970) and President from 1970 to 1994.
Raised by his Mandingo parents in Bathurst, Dauda Kairaba Jawara received a missionary education and then continued his studies in Ghana and in Glasgow (Scotland), where he qualified as a veterinarian in 1953. Jawara returned home the next year and, by 1958, had become the chief veterinary officer. In 1958, Jawara became a Christian and changed his first name to David.
In the late 1950s, Gambian nationalist political activity was limited to the Bathurst area. Jawara changed that in 1959 when he joined the Protectorate People’s Society and converted it into a political party. The next year, in the Gambia’s first universal suffrage elections, Jawara won a seat in the legislature and became minister of education. Although his party had done better than the Bathurst-oriented group in the elections, he faced opposition from some Protectorate chiefs, and as a result the colonial authorities chose his rival Pierre Sarr N’Jie as chief minister the next year. Jawara resigned his ministry in protest.
In the elections of 1962, however, Jawara’s party won a majority and he became chief minister (later prime minister). In 1965, Jawara led the Gambia to independence within the British Commonwealth. At that time, he reconverted to Islam and changed his name from David to Dauda.
In 1970, the Gambia became a republic, with Jawara as president. The Gambia under Jawara was a rather democratic nation compared to contemporary African nations.
During the 1970s, severe economic problems and charges of governmental corruption led to the formation of two Marxist opposition parties. When a military commander was assassinated in 1980 Jawara banned these parties and asked Senegal for military assistance.
The following year a group of civilians attempted a coup while Jawara was in London attending the wedding of Prince Charles to Lady Diana Spencer. The Senegalese again came to Jawara's aid. After easily winning re-election in 1982 Jawara brought the Gambia into a loose federation with Senegal, with a long-term goal of political unity.
On July 22, 1994, a second coup attempt led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was successful and Jawara was forced into exile until 2002. In 2002, Jawara returned to the Gambia as an elder statesman.but was forbidden from taking part in politics for the rest of his life,
Dauda Kairaba Jawara see Jawara, Dauda Kairaba
Jawara, Dauda Kairaba (Dauda Kairaba Jawara) (b. 1924). Prime minister of the Gambia (1962-1970) and President from 1970 to 1994.
Raised by his Mandingo parents in Bathurst, Dauda Kairaba Jawara received a missionary education and then continued his studies in Ghana and in Glasgow (Scotland), where he qualified as a veterinarian in 1953. Jawara returned home the next year and, by 1958, had become the chief veterinary officer. In 1958, Jawara became a Christian and changed his first name to David.
In the late 1950s, Gambian nationalist political activity was limited to the Bathurst area. Jawara changed that in 1959 when he joined the Protectorate People’s Society and converted it into a political party. The next year, in the Gambia’s first universal suffrage elections, Jawara won a seat in the legislature and became minister of education. Although his party had done better than the Bathurst-oriented group in the elections, he faced opposition from some Protectorate chiefs, and as a result the colonial authorities chose his rival Pierre Sarr N’Jie as chief minister the next year. Jawara resigned his ministry in protest.
In the elections of 1962, however, Jawara’s party won a majority and he became chief minister (later prime minister). In 1965, Jawara led the Gambia to independence within the British Commonwealth. At that time, he reconverted to Islam and changed his name from David to Dauda.
In 1970, the Gambia became a republic, with Jawara as president. The Gambia under Jawara was a rather democratic nation compared to contemporary African nations.
During the 1970s, severe economic problems and charges of governmental corruption led to the formation of two Marxist opposition parties. When a military commander was assassinated in 1980 Jawara banned these parties and asked Senegal for military assistance.
The following year a group of civilians attempted a coup while Jawara was in London attending the wedding of Prince Charles to Lady Diana Spencer. The Senegalese again came to Jawara's aid. After easily winning re-election in 1982 Jawara brought the Gambia into a loose federation with Senegal, with a long-term goal of political unity.
On July 22, 1994, a second coup attempt led by Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh was successful and Jawara was forced into exile until 2002. In 2002, Jawara returned to the Gambia as an elder statesman.but was forbidden from taking part in politics for the rest of his life,
Dauda Kairaba Jawara see Jawara, Dauda Kairaba
Jawdhar
Jawdhar. Eunuch and slave who played an important part under the first Fatimid caliphs. His biography, compiled by his private secretary al-Mansur, is historically important for the collection of documents it contains.
Jawdhar. Eunuch and slave who played an important part under the first Fatimid caliphs. His biography, compiled by his private secretary al-Mansur, is historically important for the collection of documents it contains.
Jawhar, Abu Nasr al-
Jawhar, Abu Nasr al- (Abu Nasr al-Jawhar) (d. 1002). Arabic lexicographer of Turkish origin. He made linguistic investigations among the Arabs of the desert and seems to have been the last lexicographer of fame to maintain that tradition. His reputation is based on his dictionary, commonly known as al-Sihah.
Abu Nasr al-Jawhar see Jawhar, Abu Nasr al-
Jawhar, Abu Nasr al- (Abu Nasr al-Jawhar) (d. 1002). Arabic lexicographer of Turkish origin. He made linguistic investigations among the Arabs of the desert and seems to have been the last lexicographer of fame to maintain that tradition. His reputation is based on his dictionary, commonly known as al-Sihah.
Abu Nasr al-Jawhar see Jawhar, Abu Nasr al-
Jawhar Aftabaci
Jawhar Aftabaci. Author of valuable memoirs of the reign of the Mughal Emperor Humayun during the sixteenth century.
Aftabaci, Jawhar see Jawhar Aftabaci.
Jawhar Aftabaci. Author of valuable memoirs of the reign of the Mughal Emperor Humayun during the sixteenth century.
Aftabaci, Jawhar see Jawhar Aftabaci.
Jawhar al-Siqilli
Jawhar al-Siqilli
(Gawhar al-Siqilli) (Gawhar the Sicilian) (Gawhar as-Siqilli al-Rumi) (al-Rumi) (The Roman) (born c. 928/930-992). Arab general who conquered Egypt for the Fatimids in 969. He was a general and administrator for the fourth Fatimid Caliph al-Mu‘izz li-Din Allah. He entered al-Fustat in 969, built a new town -- Cairo -- to house his troops and laid the first stone of the al-Azhar mosque in 970.
Gawhar al-Siqilli (Gawhar the Sicilian) was the most important military leader in Fatimid history. He led the conquest of North Africa and then of Egypt, founded the city of Cairo and the great al-Azhar mosque.
Gawhar was a Sicilian Mameluke of Greek ethnicity. His family originated from the Emirate of Sicily (hence the epithet, the Sicilian), and came as a slave to North Africa. He was sent to the Caliph Ismail al-Mansur on account of his intelligence and cunning. Under his son al-Muizz (953-975), he gained his freedom and became his personal secretary. Soon he was Vizir and the highest-ranking military commander of the Fatimids. In this role, he resumed the expansion of the Fatimids and, together with the Zirids, conquered Fez in Northern Morocco, and pushed towards the Atlantic. Only the strongholds of Ceuta and Tangier could be retained by the Umayyads of Córdoba.
After the Western borders had been secured, Gawhar as-Siqilli pushed towards Egypt and occupied the land around the Nile from the Ikhshidids after a siege at Giza. The conquest was prepared by a treaty with the Vizir of the Ikhshidids (by which Sunnis would be guaranteed freedom of religion), so the Fatimids encountered little resistance. Afterwards Gawhar ruled Egypt until 972 as viceroy.
In this capacity Gawhar founded the city of Cairo on 969 north of Fostat, to serve as the new residence of the Fatimid Caliphs, and the al-Azhar mosque on 970. Although Palestine was occupied after the conquest of Egypt, Syria could not be overcome, following a defeat at the hands of the Carmathians at Damascus. However, when the Carmathians overran Egypt, Gawhar was able to defeat them north of Cairo on December 22, 970, although the struggle continued until 974. To secure the southern border of Egypt, a legation was sent to the Christian land of Nubia.
After the establishment of the residence at Cairo, Gawhar fell into disfavor with al-Muizz. Under his successor al-Aziz (975-996) however, in whose accession to the throne Gawhar played an important role, he was rehabilitated. He was regent again until 979, but was finally stripped of power after a campaign against Syria was once again defeated near Damascus. Gawhar died on February 1, 992.
Siqilli, Jawhar al- see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar al-Siqilli see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar the Sicilian see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar as-Siqilli al-Rumi see Jawhar al-Siqilli
al-Rumi see Jawhar al-Siqilli
The Roman see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar al-Siqilli (Gawhar the Sicilian) was the most important military leader in Fatimid history. He led the conquest of North Africa and then of Egypt, founded the city of Cairo and the great al-Azhar mosque.
Gawhar was a Sicilian Mameluke of Greek ethnicity. His family originated from the Emirate of Sicily (hence the epithet, the Sicilian), and came as a slave to North Africa. He was sent to the Caliph Ismail al-Mansur on account of his intelligence and cunning. Under his son al-Muizz (953-975), he gained his freedom and became his personal secretary. Soon he was Vizir and the highest-ranking military commander of the Fatimids. In this role, he resumed the expansion of the Fatimids and, together with the Zirids, conquered Fez in Northern Morocco, and pushed towards the Atlantic. Only the strongholds of Ceuta and Tangier could be retained by the Umayyads of Córdoba.
After the Western borders had been secured, Gawhar as-Siqilli pushed towards Egypt and occupied the land around the Nile from the Ikhshidids after a siege at Giza. The conquest was prepared by a treaty with the Vizir of the Ikhshidids (by which Sunnis would be guaranteed freedom of religion), so the Fatimids encountered little resistance. Afterwards Gawhar ruled Egypt until 972 as viceroy.
In this capacity Gawhar founded the city of Cairo on 969 north of Fostat, to serve as the new residence of the Fatimid Caliphs, and the al-Azhar mosque on 970. Although Palestine was occupied after the conquest of Egypt, Syria could not be overcome, following a defeat at the hands of the Carmathians at Damascus. However, when the Carmathians overran Egypt, Gawhar was able to defeat them north of Cairo on December 22, 970, although the struggle continued until 974. To secure the southern border of Egypt, a legation was sent to the Christian land of Nubia.
After the establishment of the residence at Cairo, Gawhar fell into disfavor with al-Muizz. Under his successor al-Aziz (975-996) however, in whose accession to the throne Gawhar played an important role, he was rehabilitated. He was regent again until 979, but was finally stripped of power after a campaign against Syria was once again defeated near Damascus. Gawhar died on February 1, 992.
Siqilli, Jawhar al- see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar al-Siqilli see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar the Sicilian see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Gawhar as-Siqilli al-Rumi see Jawhar al-Siqilli
al-Rumi see Jawhar al-Siqilli
The Roman see Jawhar al-Siqilli
Jawhari, Tantawi
Jawhari, Tantawi (Tantawi Jawhari) (1862-1940). Modernist Egyptian theologian. He was the official Egyptian candidate for a Nobel Prize in 1939.
Tantawi Jawhari see Jawhari, Tantawi
Jawhari, Tantawi (Tantawi Jawhari) (1862-1940). Modernist Egyptian theologian. He was the official Egyptian candidate for a Nobel Prize in 1939.
Tantawi Jawhari see Jawhari, Tantawi
Jawi
Jawi (in plural form, Jawa). Name used in Mecca to denote the Muslims from southeast Asia.
Jawa see Jawi
Jawi (in plural form, Jawa). Name used in Mecca to denote the Muslims from southeast Asia.
Jawa see Jawi
Jawid, Mehmed
Jawid, Mehmed (Mehmed Jawid) (1875-1926). Young Turk economist and statesman. A member of the Ittihad we Teraqqi Jem”iyyeti and several times minister of finance, he was arrested following the 1926 assassination attempt of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and hanged.
Mehmed Jawid see Jawid, Mehmed
Jawid, Mehmed (Mehmed Jawid) (1875-1926). Young Turk economist and statesman. A member of the Ittihad we Teraqqi Jem”iyyeti and several times minister of finance, he was arrested following the 1926 assassination attempt of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and hanged.
Mehmed Jawid see Jawid, Mehmed
Jayn
Jayn (Jain). Community of followers of Mahavira, called the Jina, in Gujarat. The personal beliefs and habits of the Mughal Emperor Akbar I seem to have been much influenced by the Jayn leaders.
Jainism is an ancient religion of India, also now found in other countries around the world, that prescribes a path of peace and non-violence towards all living beings. Its philosophy and practice rely mainly on self-effort in progressing the soul on the spiritual ladder to divine consciousness. Any soul which has conquered its own inner enemies and achieved the state of supreme being is called jina (Conqueror or Victor). Jainism is often referred to as Jain Dharma or Shraman Dharma or the religion of Nirgantha by ancient texts.
Jain see Jayn
Jayn (Jain). Community of followers of Mahavira, called the Jina, in Gujarat. The personal beliefs and habits of the Mughal Emperor Akbar I seem to have been much influenced by the Jayn leaders.
Jainism is an ancient religion of India, also now found in other countries around the world, that prescribes a path of peace and non-violence towards all living beings. Its philosophy and practice rely mainly on self-effort in progressing the soul on the spiritual ladder to divine consciousness. Any soul which has conquered its own inner enemies and achieved the state of supreme being is called jina (Conqueror or Victor). Jainism is often referred to as Jain Dharma or Shraman Dharma or the religion of Nirgantha by ancient texts.
Jain see Jayn
Jazari, Badi’ al-Zaman al-
Jazari, Badi’ al-Zaman al- (Badi’ al-Zaman al-Jazari). Twelfth century engineer of al-Jazira. His reputation rests upon his Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices.
Badi' al-Zaman al-Jazari see Jazari, Badi’ al-Zaman al-
Jazari, Badi’ al-Zaman al- (Badi’ al-Zaman al-Jazari). Twelfth century engineer of al-Jazira. His reputation rests upon his Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices.
Badi' al-Zaman al-Jazari see Jazari, Badi’ al-Zaman al-
Jazari, Shams al-Din al-
Jazari, Shams al-Din al- (1260-1338). Arab historian from Damascus. He owes his fame to his historical work commonly known as The History of al-Jazari, of which only the last volume is preserved.
Shams al-Din al-Jazari see Jazari, Shams al-Din al-
Jazari, Shams al-Din al- (1260-1338). Arab historian from Damascus. He owes his fame to his historical work commonly known as The History of al-Jazari, of which only the last volume is preserved.
Shams al-Din al-Jazari see Jazari, Shams al-Din al-
Jazari, Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al-
Jazari, Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al- (Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al-Jazari) (d. 1301). Composer of Sessions. He was a native of Jazirat ibn ‘Umar and imitated the Session of al-Hariri.
Shams al-Milla wa'l-Din al-Jazari see Jazari, Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al-
Jazari, Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al- (Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al-Jazari) (d. 1301). Composer of Sessions. He was a native of Jazirat ibn ‘Umar and imitated the Session of al-Hariri.
Shams al-Milla wa'l-Din al-Jazari see Jazari, Shams al-Milla wa’l-Din al-
Jazuli, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Jazuli, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Jazuli) (d. 1465). Sufi from Morocco. He wrote a well known collection of prayers for the Prophet.
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Jazuli see Jazuli, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Jazuli, Abu ‘Abd Allah al- (Abu ‘Abd Allah al-Jazuli) (d. 1465). Sufi from Morocco. He wrote a well known collection of prayers for the Prophet.
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Jazuli see Jazuli, Abu ‘Abd Allah al-
Jazuli, Abu Musa al-
Jazuli, Abu Musa al- (Abu Musa al-Jazuli) (d. 1209). Grammarian from Morocco who was known for his introduction to the study of Arabic grammar.
Abu Musa al-Jazuli see Jazuli, Abu Musa al-
Jazuli, Abu Musa al- (Abu Musa al-Jazuli) (d. 1209). Grammarian from Morocco who was known for his introduction to the study of Arabic grammar.
Abu Musa al-Jazuli see Jazuli, Abu Musa al-
Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al- (Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha) (Ahmed al-Jazzar) (Jezzar Pasha) (b. 1720/1722, in Stolac in Bosnia - d. 1804 in Acre, Damascus Wiliyah). Dominant political figure of his time in southern Syria. He set up a regime of remarkable stability, based on fear.
Ahmed al-Jazzar (Jezzar Pasha) was the ruler of Acre and the Galilee from 1775 until his death.
Jezzar Pasha, a Mameluke of Ali Bey, obtained the pashalik of Sidon and set up his capital in Acre. He earned the nickname "the Butcher" for his cruelty and extortion of his subjects. He is reputed to have walked around with a mobile gallows in case anyone displeased him.
Jezzar Pasha is best known for defending Acre against Napoleon Bonaparte during the siege of Acre in 1799. After Napoleon's capture of Egypt, then an Ottoman territory, the French army attempted to invade Syria and Palestine. Although the French captured El Arish and Jaffa, and won every battle they fought against the Ottomans on an open field, they were unable to breach the fortifications of Acre. Their army was weakened by disease and cut off from re-supply. Though both Napoleon and Jezzar requested assistance from the Shihab leader, Bashir, ruler of much of Lebanon, Bashir remained neutral. After several months of attacks, Napoleon was forced to withdraw and his bid to conquer Egypt and the East failed.
With the help of his chief financial adviser, Haim Farhi, a Damascus Jew, Jezzar Pasha embarked on a major building program in Acre that included fortifying the city walls, refurbishing the aqueduct that brought spring water from nearby Kabri, and building a large Turkish bath. One of the most important landmarks built by Jezzar Pasha was the mosque that bears his name, a massive building in the Turkish style. Built over a Crusader church, the al-Jezzar Mosque incorporates columns brought from Roman and Byzantine ruins in Caesarea and Tyre, and included a school for Islamic religious studies, later used as a religious court. Al-Jezzar and his adopted son and successor Suleiman Pasha, were buried in the courtyard.
Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Ahmed al-Jazzar see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Jezzar Pasha see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
"The Butcher" see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al- (Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha) (Ahmed al-Jazzar) (Jezzar Pasha) (b. 1720/1722, in Stolac in Bosnia - d. 1804 in Acre, Damascus Wiliyah). Dominant political figure of his time in southern Syria. He set up a regime of remarkable stability, based on fear.
Ahmed al-Jazzar (Jezzar Pasha) was the ruler of Acre and the Galilee from 1775 until his death.
Jezzar Pasha, a Mameluke of Ali Bey, obtained the pashalik of Sidon and set up his capital in Acre. He earned the nickname "the Butcher" for his cruelty and extortion of his subjects. He is reputed to have walked around with a mobile gallows in case anyone displeased him.
Jezzar Pasha is best known for defending Acre against Napoleon Bonaparte during the siege of Acre in 1799. After Napoleon's capture of Egypt, then an Ottoman territory, the French army attempted to invade Syria and Palestine. Although the French captured El Arish and Jaffa, and won every battle they fought against the Ottomans on an open field, they were unable to breach the fortifications of Acre. Their army was weakened by disease and cut off from re-supply. Though both Napoleon and Jezzar requested assistance from the Shihab leader, Bashir, ruler of much of Lebanon, Bashir remained neutral. After several months of attacks, Napoleon was forced to withdraw and his bid to conquer Egypt and the East failed.
With the help of his chief financial adviser, Haim Farhi, a Damascus Jew, Jezzar Pasha embarked on a major building program in Acre that included fortifying the city walls, refurbishing the aqueduct that brought spring water from nearby Kabri, and building a large Turkish bath. One of the most important landmarks built by Jezzar Pasha was the mosque that bears his name, a massive building in the Turkish style. Built over a Crusader church, the al-Jezzar Mosque incorporates columns brought from Roman and Byzantine ruins in Caesarea and Tyre, and included a school for Islamic religious studies, later used as a religious court. Al-Jezzar and his adopted son and successor Suleiman Pasha, were buried in the courtyard.
Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Ahmed al-Jazzar see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
Jezzar Pasha see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
"The Butcher" see Jazzar Pasha, Ahmad al-
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