Hizb
Hizb. Term which denotes factions or factionalism in the Qur’an, referring to a state of affairs that should be avoided. The term occurs twice in the Qur’an with positive connotations in the compound term hizaballah (party of God). In modern usage, hizb refers to a political party in a clearly defined manner. This usage is the result of an attempt to find an Arabic word for a European phenomenon.
In 1906, Farah Antun (1874-1922), the Lebanese intellectual who spent most of his life in Egypt and the United States, defined the term in his journal, Al-jami‘ah, as an organized group that is at loggerheads with other organized groups becaue of differences in views and interests. Soon after, in 1907, two parties were formed in Egypt: the Ummah party (Hizb al-Ummah) and the National party (Hizb al-Watani). These were primarily secular nationalist parties, although the latter had a tinge of Pan-Islamism.
There has been a reluctance to accept the concept of political parties in Islamic countries because of the divisiveness which it implies. The first organized group with a clear Islamic ideology – and regarded as the mother of almost all major Islamic organizations – established in Isma‘iliyah in 1928, was called by its founder, Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam‘iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) rather than hizb or political party. Most offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in other Islamic countries also avoided the use of the term hizb. In Sudan and Syria, the groups have called themselves the Muslim Brothers. In Lebanon, a similar organization was named al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group). In Tunisia, the equivalent of the Muslim Brothers called themselves Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement), and later the name was changed to Nahdah (Renaissance). In Algeria, the major organization is called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Islami (Islamic Salvation Front). The recent offshoots of the Jami‘ah al-Islamiyah in the Gaza Strip are Hamas, the Arabic acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War), and they keep the same tradition by not using the term hizb. Similarly, in Pakistan the leading Islamic organization is called Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Assembly).
There has been an increase in the use of the term hizb in Islamic organizations. For instance, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) in Jordan, the Islamic organization Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in Turkey, the Sunni Pashtun-based Hizb-i Islami (the Islamic Party) in Afghanistan, and Hizbullah (Party of God), the Shi‘a militant organization in Lebanon, formed under the influence of the ruling Iranian clergymen. Furthermore, Islamic organizations have been pushed willy-nilly to partake in parliamentary elections. Some elections were free, as in Pakistan in 1993, in which the Jama‘at-i Islami participated and accepted the results, and as in the free elections of 1993 in Jordan, where the Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front) participated. Other elections were basically not free, as in Egypt in 1984 and 1987, where the Muslim Brothers participated, and in Lebanon in 1992, where both the Sunni Islamic Group and the Shi‘a Hizbullah participated.
Although the Islamic political organizations have come a long way from Hasan al-Banna’s condemnation of al-hizbiyah (party politics), a strong ambivalence toward elections and competitive party politics still exists. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a greater acceptance of competition if parties or groups have a particular Islamic ideology, as has been the case in Iran since the revolution of 1979. The most prominent ideologue of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, demonstrated this intolerance toward non-Muslim and secular political parties, which by their nature did not subscribe to his Islamic ideology, by depicting them as the “parties of unbelief and atheism” (“ahzab al-kuf wa-la-ilhad”).
Another reason why political parties in the Islamic countries were not particularly interested in competitive party politics is that most of them had come into being during the struggle for independence from colonial rule. It is not surprising that they tended to concentrate on the unity of the nation rather than on competition among various political organizations. For instance, the mass-based Wafd, which came to being in 1919, was not regarded by its leader Zaghlul (1857-1927) as a hizb. The name used by Zaghlul, and later by his successor Mustafa Al-Nahhas (1879-1965), was the Egyptian Wafd (al-Wafd al-Misri). This emphasis on the anti-colonial struggle made the leaders of these movements shy away from the use of the term hizb, because it might have implied that the national movement was not all-inclusive in its support. Politial organizations formed under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) were called, for instance, al-Ittihad al-Qawmi (National Union), and al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi (Arab Socialist Union), rather than political parties.
The role of predominantly non-Islamic and secular parties in Islamic countries was a manifestation of socio-economic forces, and ethnic and sectarian interests have been very extensive indeed. There was a proliferation of political parties in an open and mostly free political system in Egypt from 1923 to 1952 and in Lebanon from 1943 to 1975. In Turkey, Sudan, and Pakistan, whenever the military is not in power, political parties have played a major role. The future role of political parties in the Islamic countries will undoubtedly be one of paramount importance, as attested by greater political awareness throughout the Islamic world. These developments show clearly that political parties have become an integral part of the political life of Muslims, whether the parties are in power, in opposition in democratic or quasi-democratic polities, in opposition in exile, or as underground parties trying to topple dictators.
Hizb. Term which denotes factions or factionalism in the Qur’an, referring to a state of affairs that should be avoided. The term occurs twice in the Qur’an with positive connotations in the compound term hizaballah (party of God). In modern usage, hizb refers to a political party in a clearly defined manner. This usage is the result of an attempt to find an Arabic word for a European phenomenon.
In 1906, Farah Antun (1874-1922), the Lebanese intellectual who spent most of his life in Egypt and the United States, defined the term in his journal, Al-jami‘ah, as an organized group that is at loggerheads with other organized groups becaue of differences in views and interests. Soon after, in 1907, two parties were formed in Egypt: the Ummah party (Hizb al-Ummah) and the National party (Hizb al-Watani). These were primarily secular nationalist parties, although the latter had a tinge of Pan-Islamism.
There has been a reluctance to accept the concept of political parties in Islamic countries because of the divisiveness which it implies. The first organized group with a clear Islamic ideology – and regarded as the mother of almost all major Islamic organizations – established in Isma‘iliyah in 1928, was called by its founder, Hasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949), the Society of Muslim Brothers (Jam‘iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) rather than hizb or political party. Most offshoots of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in other Islamic countries also avoided the use of the term hizb. In Sudan and Syria, the groups have called themselves the Muslim Brothers. In Lebanon, a similar organization was named al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Group). In Tunisia, the equivalent of the Muslim Brothers called themselves Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement), and later the name was changed to Nahdah (Renaissance). In Algeria, the major organization is called Jabhat al-Inqadh al-Islami (Islamic Salvation Front). The recent offshoots of the Jami‘ah al-Islamiyah in the Gaza Strip are Hamas, the Arabic acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Holy War), and they keep the same tradition by not using the term hizb. Similarly, in Pakistan the leading Islamic organization is called Jama‘at-i Islami (Islamic Assembly).
There has been an increase in the use of the term hizb in Islamic organizations. For instance, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) in Jordan, the Islamic organization Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) in Turkey, the Sunni Pashtun-based Hizb-i Islami (the Islamic Party) in Afghanistan, and Hizbullah (Party of God), the Shi‘a militant organization in Lebanon, formed under the influence of the ruling Iranian clergymen. Furthermore, Islamic organizations have been pushed willy-nilly to partake in parliamentary elections. Some elections were free, as in Pakistan in 1993, in which the Jama‘at-i Islami participated and accepted the results, and as in the free elections of 1993 in Jordan, where the Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami (Islamic Action Front) participated. Other elections were basically not free, as in Egypt in 1984 and 1987, where the Muslim Brothers participated, and in Lebanon in 1992, where both the Sunni Islamic Group and the Shi‘a Hizbullah participated.
Although the Islamic political organizations have come a long way from Hasan al-Banna’s condemnation of al-hizbiyah (party politics), a strong ambivalence toward elections and competitive party politics still exists. Nevertheless, perhaps there is a greater acceptance of competition if parties or groups have a particular Islamic ideology, as has been the case in Iran since the revolution of 1979. The most prominent ideologue of Hizbullah in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, demonstrated this intolerance toward non-Muslim and secular political parties, which by their nature did not subscribe to his Islamic ideology, by depicting them as the “parties of unbelief and atheism” (“ahzab al-kuf wa-la-ilhad”).
Another reason why political parties in the Islamic countries were not particularly interested in competitive party politics is that most of them had come into being during the struggle for independence from colonial rule. It is not surprising that they tended to concentrate on the unity of the nation rather than on competition among various political organizations. For instance, the mass-based Wafd, which came to being in 1919, was not regarded by its leader Zaghlul (1857-1927) as a hizb. The name used by Zaghlul, and later by his successor Mustafa Al-Nahhas (1879-1965), was the Egyptian Wafd (al-Wafd al-Misri). This emphasis on the anti-colonial struggle made the leaders of these movements shy away from the use of the term hizb, because it might have implied that the national movement was not all-inclusive in its support. Politial organizations formed under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) were called, for instance, al-Ittihad al-Qawmi (National Union), and al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki al-‘Arabi (Arab Socialist Union), rather than political parties.
The role of predominantly non-Islamic and secular parties in Islamic countries was a manifestation of socio-economic forces, and ethnic and sectarian interests have been very extensive indeed. There was a proliferation of political parties in an open and mostly free political system in Egypt from 1923 to 1952 and in Lebanon from 1943 to 1975. In Turkey, Sudan, and Pakistan, whenever the military is not in power, political parties have played a major role. The future role of political parties in the Islamic countries will undoubtedly be one of paramount importance, as attested by greater political awareness throughout the Islamic world. These developments show clearly that political parties have become an integral part of the political life of Muslims, whether the parties are in power, in opposition in democratic or quasi-democratic polities, in opposition in exile, or as underground parties trying to topple dictators.
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call Party) (Islamic Dawa Party). One of the three most important activist Shi‘a organizations in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th regime in Iraq, and the oldest among them. The others were the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, founded in Iran in November 1982, and the Organization of Islamic Action, founded in Karbala in the 1960s.
The party (known in short form simply as the Da‘wah) was established in October 1957 in Najaf by the young and ingenious Shi‘a religious authority, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (born in 1933 in Kazimayn, Baghdad, and executed by the Ba‘th in April 1980). Cofounders were a group of junior Shi‘a clergy, some of whom achieved great prominence in later years (chiefly Muhammad Baqir and Mahdi, the two sons of Iraq’s then chief mujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim, as well as two lay intellectuals).
The decision to found a political party (which al-Sadr, using a Qur’anic expression dubbed Hizb Allah, “Party of God”), whose sole purpose would be to call the people of Iraq back to Islam, was the result of the young clergy’s realization that Islam, and in particular, Shi‘a Islam in Iraq was on the decline. Owing to a number of political, social, and economic developments under the monarchy, the number of students of religion in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala had declined steeply and many young Shi‘a were estranged from religion and markedly so, from the religious establishment.
Under the republican regime of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, (July 14, 1958-February 8, 1963), followed by the short-lived Ba‘th regime of 1963 and that of the ‘Arif brothers, ‘Abd al-Salam and ‘Abd al-Rahman (November 18, 1963-July 17, 1968), relations between the Shi‘a establishment of the holy cities and the government were tense, but both sides refrained from drastic action. The regimes tolerated de facto Shi‘a autonomy in the religious educational institutions (al-hawzat al-‘ilmiyah) of Najaf and Karbala, and the latter, for their part, kept their protest against the secularizing Sunni ruling elites within strict limits.
These circumstances permitted the Da‘wah to operate almost without restriction, not only in Najaf but also in Baghdad. (Indeed, the main opposition to its activity came, in those days, from the more conservative circles within the religious university of Najaf, who regarded activity along modern party lines as deviation from tradition. As a result, so as not to compromise his position as a mujtahid, Sadr was eventually forced to sever his organizational ties with the party.) The Da‘wah’s main activity in Baghdad was aimed at winning over young lay Shi‘a intellectuals (a few Sunnis joined the party as well, but they were a small minority), and thus it concentrated its main effort among the students of Baghdad University and young professionals, as well as among high school students. Almost all the recruiting activity within these circles was conducted by lay university students and graduates.
At the same time, the party tried to expand its influence among the Shi ‘a poor in the al-Thawrah slum (later Saddam City) on the outskirts of Baghdad, but this was done, mainly, through party members who were junior clergy. Until the Ba ‘th came to power (and, indeed, even two or three years afterward) this activity was carried out almost openly, with little or no official interference. It involved public prayers, gatherings to celebrate Islamic festivals, Islamic placards, and, for the hard core of activists, classes led by al-Sadr and others in Qur’an interpretation and some advanced Islamic studies. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Da ‘wah expanded its activities to other parts of the Shi‘a world, notably to Lebanon. According to an interview with a senior member in the 1960s, to disguise its activity somewhat, the Da‘wah also called itself the Fatimid Party (al-Hizb al-Fatimi) after Fatimah al-Zahra’, ‘Ali’s wife and the Prophet’s daughter.
In the second half of 1969, the Ba‘th regime, when trying to eliminate the Shi‘a educational autonomy, cracked down in an unprecedented way on the hawzat of Najaf and Karbala. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of relations between the two establishments. The Da‘wah’s activities, too, were severely restricted, and, eventually, it was forced to go underground. This, as well as its own theory of action that dictated a leap into political activity after a few years of purely educational work, drove the party to become progressively more militant. In 1970, the party’s first member was martyred, and in 1974 the regime executed five more senior members. As reported by its own sources, in February 1977 the party was deeply involved in organizing the vast anti-government demonstrations that occurred during a mass pilgrimage to Karbala to commemorate the anniversary of the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.
But the Da‘wah’s main political and guerrilla thrust occurred soon thereafter under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s February 1979 takeover in Iran. The party then engaged in organizing mass Shi‘a anti-Ba‘th demonstrations and armed attacks against Ba‘th party and internal security centers, all in an attempt to topple the regime and replace it with an Iranian style Islamic republic. As a result of the regime’s crackdown, hundreds of party members (including al-Sadr who, by then, no longer belonged officially to the party, but who remained its intellectual mentor) were executed, a few thousand members and supporters were arrested, and most other members fled the country.
Throughout the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) the Da‘wah’s activity was fourfold: (1) it acted inside Iraq, sporadically hitting at Ba‘th targets; (2) it had a small, regular unit that fought on Iran’s side against Iraq; (3) it carried out terrorist activities against pro-Iraqi regimes in the Middle East, chiefly in Kuwait, and against Western targets; and (4) it endeavored to incorporate new members and supporters from among the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in the West and in Iran. At the end of the war, in order to improve its image in the West, the party stopped all armed activities outside of Iraq.
During the Kuwait crisis (August 1990-March 1991) and following it, the party initiated a number of overtures toward Western governments, notably the United States and Britain, as well as toward anti-Ba‘thist, pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, with which they were at loggerheads during the Iraq-Iran War. Another aspect of their growing pragmatism was a claim, voiced by some of the party’s spokesmen (but clearly not by all), to be in favor of Western-style liberal parliamentary democracy. As those spokesmen put it, if the majority in post-Saddam Iraq were to reject their notion of an Islamic republic, the party would accept the majority verdict. It then would continue its educational work designed to persuade the people of the need for such an Islamic rule.
In the era after the Iraq-Iran war some differences within the party between those whose main activity was in Iran and those who lived and worked in the West have been exposed. One major difference concerned the degree to which the party ought to be independent of Iranian dictates, now that the interest of the Iraqi opposition in continuing the struggle and that of the Iranian state in increasing stability were incompatible. Another difference, albeit a less important one, was over the degree of clarity with which the party should express its commitment to democracy. Those members operating in Iran (led by the party’s spokesman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi) have been rather vague about democracy and have been receptive to Iranian policy dictates, whereas some party members who live in the West have inclined toward more independence and democracy.
During the Kuwait crisis, the party suffered from at least one split. The new group, calling itself the Cadres of the Iraqi Islamic Da‘wah Party (Kawadir Hizb al-Da ‘wah al-Islamiyah al-‘Iraqi), emphasized its Iraqi identity and “the independence of the Islamic Iraqi decision-making” of Iranian policy. In addition, it claims that, for more than a decade, the Da‘wah failed to provide a plan of action, and that an urgent need for such a plan existed. It was typical, however, of this closely knit and highly ideological movement that the two factions restrained their argument and refrained from the acrimonious accusations so widespread in political disputes in the Middle East.
The contribution of Da‘wah activists to the anti-Ba‘thist Shi‘a intifadah or uprising of March 1991 is unclear. According to party members’ reports, they were active in encouraging the masses to revolt, but it is clear that most of the uprising was spontaneous. Moreover, there is little doubt that a rival Shi‘a opposition organization, the Tehran based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was more prominent, sending into Iraq many hundreds of its Iran based membership. Whatever the case, the regime’s crackdown that followed weakened the party organization inside Iraq: members who exposed themselves during the revolt were later jailed or executed.
Owing to the requirements of its underground activity, the precise organizational structure of the party was a well-guarded secret. However, its general outlines may still be delineated. At the top of what is described as “a pyramidal structure” stood a collective body of around ten. Its first name was Majlis al-Fuqaha’ (Council of Jurists). In later years, it also included a few laymen, though they were still a small minority. In its contemporary incarnation it is reported as being called al-Qiyadah al-‘Ammah (General Leadership). One level lower is the Council of Leadership (Majlis al-Qiyadah) that consists of a few score of activists. Its more contemporary name was either the General Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-‘Amm), or the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi). This body, which consisted mostly of lay intellectuals who represented their respective territorial branches, directed the day-to-day activity of the party branches. Under it one would find an unknown number of lower levels, ending with the basic unit, the Family (al-Usrah) or the Ring (al-Halaqah).
Inside Iraq, to minimize the danger of exposure, an ordinary member knew only other members of his own basic unit, and only vertical contacts between units were maintained. This structure was strongly influenced by the organizational structures of the Communist and Ba‘th parties. Al-Sadr was the first to acknowledge that any organizational form was legitimate if it could spread “the call” more efficiently, and as long as it was not forbidden by the shari‘a. “The Prophet,” he explained, “had he lived in our age, would have used … the modern and suitable means of communications and spreading of the message.” In Europe, where there was no danger of suppression, the lowest echelon was the local branch, apparently combining all party members in a town.
On the face of it, the position of the Da‘wah publications was ecumenical. The party called for the establishment of a full-fledged Islamic regime in Iraq that would apply the rules of the shari‘a to every walk of life, regardless of differences between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam (and, indeed, the differences between them in terms of substantive law are very small). A more careful reading, however, revealed Shi‘a undertones. For example, there are occasional inferences that once Saddam Hussein and his Ba‘th regime were toppled, Shiism would become the dominant power in Iraq’s political life. Shi‘a youth were called upon to be ready to sacrifice themselves, as did Imam Husayn and most other Shi‘a imams. Although such appeals made it difficult for Sunnis to join the movement, this did not prevent the Da ‘wah from establishing cordial relations with the main (Sunni) Kurdish opposition organizations. Unsurprisingly, however, the party had somewhat uneasy relations with the other main Shi‘a opposition groups, for they were all competing for the allegiance of the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in Iran and Europe.
The party’s ideas were first expressed by al-Sadr in a magazine, Al-adwa’ (The Lights), issued by an activist group of ‘ulama’ in Najaf in the early 1960s. The party’s own first magazine was called Sawt al-da‘wah (Voice of the Da‘wah), and it, too, came out in Najaf in the mid and late 1960s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, its main publications were a weekly issued in Tehran, Al-jihad, and another issued in London, Sawt al-‘Iraq (Voice of Iraq). The cadres issued a weekly magazine called Fajr al-‘Iraq (Iraq’s Dawn).
After the Persian Gulf War, the interests of al-Dawa and the United States became more closely aligned. The efforts of al-Dawa representatives and other opponents of Saddam Hussein led to the founding of the Iraqi National Congress, which relied heavily on United States funding. INC's political platform promised human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq. The Dawa Party itself participated in the congress between 1992 and 1995, withdrawing because of disagreements with Kurdish parties over how Iraq should be governed after Hussein's eventual ouster.
Most leaders of al-Dawa remained in exile in Iran and elsewhere until the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. During this period, some of its factions moved to SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Al-Dawa party, in contrast to the other Shi'a Islamic Iraqi opposition parties, took a stance against the war. Ibrahim Al-Jaffari was personally involved in ensuring that Al-Dawa participated in anti war protests across the United Kingdom in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war. After the invasion, both al-Dawa and SCIRI returned to Iraq. Al-Dawa chose Nasariyah as its base of operations in Iraq.
The political ideology of al-Da'wa was heavily influenced by work done by Baqr al-Sadr who laid out four mandatory principles of governance in his 1975 work, Islamic Political System. These were:
1. Absolute sovereignty belongs to God.
2. Islamic injunctions are the basis of legislation. The legislative authority may enact any law not repugnant to Islam.
3. The people, as vice-regents of Allah, are entrusted with legislative and executive powers.
4. The jurist holding religious authority represents Islam. By confirming legislative and executive actions, he gives them legality.
Upon joining the party, allegiance must be sworn to the party.
A brief chronology Al-Dawa reads as follows:
* 1968-1969 - Al-Dawa founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in response to repression of Shi'i religious academies in Najaf by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime.
* 1974 - Ba'thist revolutionary court arrests and sentences 75 al-Dawa members to death.
* 1975 - Annual pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala - called the Marad al-Ras - is cancelled by the Ba'ath government.
* 1977 February - The Safar Intifada. Al-Dawa organizes Marad al-Ras, in spite of government ban. Event is attacked by police.
* 1979 Iranian Revolution. Al-Dawa creates a military wing, later called Shahid al-Sadr.
* 1980 30 March - Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council retroactively bans al-Dawa; membership was made punishable by death. 96 al-Dawa members are allegedly executed this month.
* 1980 1 April - al-Dawa unsuccessfully attempts to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister at the time.
* 1980 9 April - Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina Sadr bint al-Huda are arrested and executed.
* 1981 Mid-December - Iraqi embassy in Beirut is leveled by a suicide bomber. Iraqi al-Da'wa party claims credit for the attack, citing Iraq's invasion of Iran. Perhaps the first Shi'a suicide bombing, the attack was an "oft-noticed precedent" for the 1983 bombing of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut.
* 1982 - Al-Dawa assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein in Dujail fails. Heavy crack-downs on al-Dawa by Hussein's regime. Many flee to Iran, where it suffers from competition with SCIRI.
* 1983 12 December - In Kuwait, the American and French embassies, Kuwait airport, the main oil refinery in Kuwait, and a residential area for Raytheon employees are bombed. 17 suspects were soon arrested, mostly al-Dawa members, including Jamal Jafaar Mohammed (currently member of Iraq's parliament as a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling coalition). Jamal Jafaar Mohammed escapes from Kuwait before the trial starts and is sentenced to death in absentia in 1984.
* 1987 - Al-Dawa attacks Saddam's motorcade but again fails to kill him.
* 1996 - Attempt made on the life of Saddam's son, Uday. Al-Dawa blamed.
* 2003 - After the Invasion of Iraq al-Dawa returns to Iraq, basing itself in the city of Nasiriya which the party now runs and controls.
* 2005 January - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the January 2005 Elections; Dawa leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari becomes Prime Minister.
* 2005 December - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the December 2005 Elections.
* 2006 - Dawa deputy leader Jawad al-Maliki replaces Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister.
Islamic Call Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Da‘wah see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Fatimid Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
al-Hizb al-Fatimi see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Islamic Dawa Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah (Islamic Call Party) (Islamic Dawa Party). One of the three most important activist Shi‘a organizations in opposition to Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘th regime in Iraq, and the oldest among them. The others were the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, founded in Iran in November 1982, and the Organization of Islamic Action, founded in Karbala in the 1960s.
The party (known in short form simply as the Da‘wah) was established in October 1957 in Najaf by the young and ingenious Shi‘a religious authority, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (born in 1933 in Kazimayn, Baghdad, and executed by the Ba‘th in April 1980). Cofounders were a group of junior Shi‘a clergy, some of whom achieved great prominence in later years (chiefly Muhammad Baqir and Mahdi, the two sons of Iraq’s then chief mujtahid Muhsin al-Hakim, as well as two lay intellectuals).
The decision to found a political party (which al-Sadr, using a Qur’anic expression dubbed Hizb Allah, “Party of God”), whose sole purpose would be to call the people of Iraq back to Islam, was the result of the young clergy’s realization that Islam, and in particular, Shi‘a Islam in Iraq was on the decline. Owing to a number of political, social, and economic developments under the monarchy, the number of students of religion in the two holy cities of Najaf and Karbala had declined steeply and many young Shi‘a were estranged from religion and markedly so, from the religious establishment.
Under the republican regime of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, (July 14, 1958-February 8, 1963), followed by the short-lived Ba‘th regime of 1963 and that of the ‘Arif brothers, ‘Abd al-Salam and ‘Abd al-Rahman (November 18, 1963-July 17, 1968), relations between the Shi‘a establishment of the holy cities and the government were tense, but both sides refrained from drastic action. The regimes tolerated de facto Shi‘a autonomy in the religious educational institutions (al-hawzat al-‘ilmiyah) of Najaf and Karbala, and the latter, for their part, kept their protest against the secularizing Sunni ruling elites within strict limits.
These circumstances permitted the Da‘wah to operate almost without restriction, not only in Najaf but also in Baghdad. (Indeed, the main opposition to its activity came, in those days, from the more conservative circles within the religious university of Najaf, who regarded activity along modern party lines as deviation from tradition. As a result, so as not to compromise his position as a mujtahid, Sadr was eventually forced to sever his organizational ties with the party.) The Da‘wah’s main activity in Baghdad was aimed at winning over young lay Shi‘a intellectuals (a few Sunnis joined the party as well, but they were a small minority), and thus it concentrated its main effort among the students of Baghdad University and young professionals, as well as among high school students. Almost all the recruiting activity within these circles was conducted by lay university students and graduates.
At the same time, the party tried to expand its influence among the Shi ‘a poor in the al-Thawrah slum (later Saddam City) on the outskirts of Baghdad, but this was done, mainly, through party members who were junior clergy. Until the Ba ‘th came to power (and, indeed, even two or three years afterward) this activity was carried out almost openly, with little or no official interference. It involved public prayers, gatherings to celebrate Islamic festivals, Islamic placards, and, for the hard core of activists, classes led by al-Sadr and others in Qur’an interpretation and some advanced Islamic studies. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Da ‘wah expanded its activities to other parts of the Shi‘a world, notably to Lebanon. According to an interview with a senior member in the 1960s, to disguise its activity somewhat, the Da‘wah also called itself the Fatimid Party (al-Hizb al-Fatimi) after Fatimah al-Zahra’, ‘Ali’s wife and the Prophet’s daughter.
In the second half of 1969, the Ba‘th regime, when trying to eliminate the Shi‘a educational autonomy, cracked down in an unprecedented way on the hawzat of Najaf and Karbala. This marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of relations between the two establishments. The Da‘wah’s activities, too, were severely restricted, and, eventually, it was forced to go underground. This, as well as its own theory of action that dictated a leap into political activity after a few years of purely educational work, drove the party to become progressively more militant. In 1970, the party’s first member was martyred, and in 1974 the regime executed five more senior members. As reported by its own sources, in February 1977 the party was deeply involved in organizing the vast anti-government demonstrations that occurred during a mass pilgrimage to Karbala to commemorate the anniversary of the fortieth day after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.
But the Da‘wah’s main political and guerrilla thrust occurred soon thereafter under the influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s February 1979 takeover in Iran. The party then engaged in organizing mass Shi‘a anti-Ba‘th demonstrations and armed attacks against Ba‘th party and internal security centers, all in an attempt to topple the regime and replace it with an Iranian style Islamic republic. As a result of the regime’s crackdown, hundreds of party members (including al-Sadr who, by then, no longer belonged officially to the party, but who remained its intellectual mentor) were executed, a few thousand members and supporters were arrested, and most other members fled the country.
Throughout the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) the Da‘wah’s activity was fourfold: (1) it acted inside Iraq, sporadically hitting at Ba‘th targets; (2) it had a small, regular unit that fought on Iran’s side against Iraq; (3) it carried out terrorist activities against pro-Iraqi regimes in the Middle East, chiefly in Kuwait, and against Western targets; and (4) it endeavored to incorporate new members and supporters from among the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in the West and in Iran. At the end of the war, in order to improve its image in the West, the party stopped all armed activities outside of Iraq.
During the Kuwait crisis (August 1990-March 1991) and following it, the party initiated a number of overtures toward Western governments, notably the United States and Britain, as well as toward anti-Ba‘thist, pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, with which they were at loggerheads during the Iraq-Iran War. Another aspect of their growing pragmatism was a claim, voiced by some of the party’s spokesmen (but clearly not by all), to be in favor of Western-style liberal parliamentary democracy. As those spokesmen put it, if the majority in post-Saddam Iraq were to reject their notion of an Islamic republic, the party would accept the majority verdict. It then would continue its educational work designed to persuade the people of the need for such an Islamic rule.
In the era after the Iraq-Iran war some differences within the party between those whose main activity was in Iran and those who lived and worked in the West have been exposed. One major difference concerned the degree to which the party ought to be independent of Iranian dictates, now that the interest of the Iraqi opposition in continuing the struggle and that of the Iranian state in increasing stability were incompatible. Another difference, albeit a less important one, was over the degree of clarity with which the party should express its commitment to democracy. Those members operating in Iran (led by the party’s spokesman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi) have been rather vague about democracy and have been receptive to Iranian policy dictates, whereas some party members who live in the West have inclined toward more independence and democracy.
During the Kuwait crisis, the party suffered from at least one split. The new group, calling itself the Cadres of the Iraqi Islamic Da‘wah Party (Kawadir Hizb al-Da ‘wah al-Islamiyah al-‘Iraqi), emphasized its Iraqi identity and “the independence of the Islamic Iraqi decision-making” of Iranian policy. In addition, it claims that, for more than a decade, the Da‘wah failed to provide a plan of action, and that an urgent need for such a plan existed. It was typical, however, of this closely knit and highly ideological movement that the two factions restrained their argument and refrained from the acrimonious accusations so widespread in political disputes in the Middle East.
The contribution of Da‘wah activists to the anti-Ba‘thist Shi‘a intifadah or uprising of March 1991 is unclear. According to party members’ reports, they were active in encouraging the masses to revolt, but it is clear that most of the uprising was spontaneous. Moreover, there is little doubt that a rival Shi‘a opposition organization, the Tehran based Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, was more prominent, sending into Iraq many hundreds of its Iran based membership. Whatever the case, the regime’s crackdown that followed weakened the party organization inside Iraq: members who exposed themselves during the revolt were later jailed or executed.
Owing to the requirements of its underground activity, the precise organizational structure of the party was a well-guarded secret. However, its general outlines may still be delineated. At the top of what is described as “a pyramidal structure” stood a collective body of around ten. Its first name was Majlis al-Fuqaha’ (Council of Jurists). In later years, it also included a few laymen, though they were still a small minority. In its contemporary incarnation it is reported as being called al-Qiyadah al-‘Ammah (General Leadership). One level lower is the Council of Leadership (Majlis al-Qiyadah) that consists of a few score of activists. Its more contemporary name was either the General Congress (al-Mu’tamar al-‘Amm), or the Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi). This body, which consisted mostly of lay intellectuals who represented their respective territorial branches, directed the day-to-day activity of the party branches. Under it one would find an unknown number of lower levels, ending with the basic unit, the Family (al-Usrah) or the Ring (al-Halaqah).
Inside Iraq, to minimize the danger of exposure, an ordinary member knew only other members of his own basic unit, and only vertical contacts between units were maintained. This structure was strongly influenced by the organizational structures of the Communist and Ba‘th parties. Al-Sadr was the first to acknowledge that any organizational form was legitimate if it could spread “the call” more efficiently, and as long as it was not forbidden by the shari‘a. “The Prophet,” he explained, “had he lived in our age, would have used … the modern and suitable means of communications and spreading of the message.” In Europe, where there was no danger of suppression, the lowest echelon was the local branch, apparently combining all party members in a town.
On the face of it, the position of the Da‘wah publications was ecumenical. The party called for the establishment of a full-fledged Islamic regime in Iraq that would apply the rules of the shari‘a to every walk of life, regardless of differences between Sunni and Shi‘a Islam (and, indeed, the differences between them in terms of substantive law are very small). A more careful reading, however, revealed Shi‘a undertones. For example, there are occasional inferences that once Saddam Hussein and his Ba‘th regime were toppled, Shiism would become the dominant power in Iraq’s political life. Shi‘a youth were called upon to be ready to sacrifice themselves, as did Imam Husayn and most other Shi‘a imams. Although such appeals made it difficult for Sunnis to join the movement, this did not prevent the Da ‘wah from establishing cordial relations with the main (Sunni) Kurdish opposition organizations. Unsurprisingly, however, the party had somewhat uneasy relations with the other main Shi‘a opposition groups, for they were all competing for the allegiance of the Iraqi Shi‘a expatriates in Iran and Europe.
The party’s ideas were first expressed by al-Sadr in a magazine, Al-adwa’ (The Lights), issued by an activist group of ‘ulama’ in Najaf in the early 1960s. The party’s own first magazine was called Sawt al-da‘wah (Voice of the Da‘wah), and it, too, came out in Najaf in the mid and late 1960s. During most of the 1980s and the early 1990s, its main publications were a weekly issued in Tehran, Al-jihad, and another issued in London, Sawt al-‘Iraq (Voice of Iraq). The cadres issued a weekly magazine called Fajr al-‘Iraq (Iraq’s Dawn).
After the Persian Gulf War, the interests of al-Dawa and the United States became more closely aligned. The efforts of al-Dawa representatives and other opponents of Saddam Hussein led to the founding of the Iraqi National Congress, which relied heavily on United States funding. INC's political platform promised human rights and rule of law within a constitutional, democratic, and pluralistic Iraq. The Dawa Party itself participated in the congress between 1992 and 1995, withdrawing because of disagreements with Kurdish parties over how Iraq should be governed after Hussein's eventual ouster.
Most leaders of al-Dawa remained in exile in Iran and elsewhere until the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. During this period, some of its factions moved to SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Al-Dawa party, in contrast to the other Shi'a Islamic Iraqi opposition parties, took a stance against the war. Ibrahim Al-Jaffari was personally involved in ensuring that Al-Dawa participated in anti war protests across the United Kingdom in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war. After the invasion, both al-Dawa and SCIRI returned to Iraq. Al-Dawa chose Nasariyah as its base of operations in Iraq.
The political ideology of al-Da'wa was heavily influenced by work done by Baqr al-Sadr who laid out four mandatory principles of governance in his 1975 work, Islamic Political System. These were:
1. Absolute sovereignty belongs to God.
2. Islamic injunctions are the basis of legislation. The legislative authority may enact any law not repugnant to Islam.
3. The people, as vice-regents of Allah, are entrusted with legislative and executive powers.
4. The jurist holding religious authority represents Islam. By confirming legislative and executive actions, he gives them legality.
Upon joining the party, allegiance must be sworn to the party.
A brief chronology Al-Dawa reads as follows:
* 1968-1969 - Al-Dawa founded by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in response to repression of Shi'i religious academies in Najaf by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime.
* 1974 - Ba'thist revolutionary court arrests and sentences 75 al-Dawa members to death.
* 1975 - Annual pilgrimage from Najaf to Karbala - called the Marad al-Ras - is cancelled by the Ba'ath government.
* 1977 February - The Safar Intifada. Al-Dawa organizes Marad al-Ras, in spite of government ban. Event is attacked by police.
* 1979 Iranian Revolution. Al-Dawa creates a military wing, later called Shahid al-Sadr.
* 1980 30 March - Ba'athist Revolutionary Command Council retroactively bans al-Dawa; membership was made punishable by death. 96 al-Dawa members are allegedly executed this month.
* 1980 1 April - al-Dawa unsuccessfully attempts to assassinate Tariq Aziz, Foreign Minister at the time.
* 1980 9 April - Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Amina Sadr bint al-Huda are arrested and executed.
* 1981 Mid-December - Iraqi embassy in Beirut is leveled by a suicide bomber. Iraqi al-Da'wa party claims credit for the attack, citing Iraq's invasion of Iran. Perhaps the first Shi'a suicide bombing, the attack was an "oft-noticed precedent" for the 1983 bombing of the American Embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut.
* 1982 - Al-Dawa assassination attempt on Saddam Hussein in Dujail fails. Heavy crack-downs on al-Dawa by Hussein's regime. Many flee to Iran, where it suffers from competition with SCIRI.
* 1983 12 December - In Kuwait, the American and French embassies, Kuwait airport, the main oil refinery in Kuwait, and a residential area for Raytheon employees are bombed. 17 suspects were soon arrested, mostly al-Dawa members, including Jamal Jafaar Mohammed (currently member of Iraq's parliament as a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling coalition). Jamal Jafaar Mohammed escapes from Kuwait before the trial starts and is sentenced to death in absentia in 1984.
* 1987 - Al-Dawa attacks Saddam's motorcade but again fails to kill him.
* 1996 - Attempt made on the life of Saddam's son, Uday. Al-Dawa blamed.
* 2003 - After the Invasion of Iraq al-Dawa returns to Iraq, basing itself in the city of Nasiriya which the party now runs and controls.
* 2005 January - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the January 2005 Elections; Dawa leader Ibrahim al-Jaafari becomes Prime Minister.
* 2005 December - The United Iraqi Alliance, triumphs in the December 2005 Elections.
* 2006 - Dawa deputy leader Jawad al-Maliki replaces Ibrahim al-Jaafari as Prime Minister.
Islamic Call Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Da‘wah see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Fatimid Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
al-Hizb al-Fatimi see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Islamic Dawa Party see Hizb al-Da‘wah al-Islamiyah
Hizballah
Hizballah (Hizb Allah) (Hizbullah) (Hezbollah). Arabic name which literally means “the party of God.” The Hizballah is better known by its Farsi name of Hezbollah.
Hizballah is a radical Shi‘a group formed in 1982 in Lebanon with Hussayn Musawi as its leader. Strongly anti-Western and anti-Israeli, closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran, Hizballah may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the United States Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. Hizballah operated in the Bekaa Valley (Biqaa’ Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It also established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. It received substantial amounts of financial aid, explosives, and diplomatic aid from Iran and Syria.
Hizballah is an umbrella organization where groups like Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice organization, Islamic Jihad for a Free Palestine and Revolutionary Arab Groups are subdivisions. Hizballah had about 5,000 members and received much of its support and training from Iran and Syria. Hizballah demanded that Westerners leave Lebanon and it charged the Christian Lebanese population with crimes against their Muslim compatriots.
Hizballah was formed by members of a faction inside the Lebanese Amal party. However, following the Iranian revolution in 1979 there was a split inside the party. The final split came after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier in 1982. In many cases, the main enemy of Hizballah had been Israel. The struggle of Hizballah is defined as a jihad, -- a holy fight --, and members dying in action became shaded, martyrs, who were guaranteed a place in Paradise.
While Hizballah claimed responsibility for bombing the United States embassy and marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, hijackings, and the taking of Western and Israeli hostages, Hizballah also performed peaceful actions, and was in charge of important social welfare programs for the Lebanese population.
In 1984, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah took control over Hizballah, and the organization became more of an instrument to oppose Israel on political and religious grounds. Hizballah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and Israelis in northern Israel, and was, in turn, attacked by Israel. Neither party came close to neutralizing the other.
On occasion, Iran was able to persuade Hizballah to release hostages in an effort to improve international relations.
Hizb Allah see Hizballah
Hizbullah see Hizballah
Hezbollah see Hizballah
“the party of God” see Hizballah
Hizballah (Hizb Allah) (Hizbullah) (Hezbollah). Arabic name which literally means “the party of God.” The Hizballah is better known by its Farsi name of Hezbollah.
Hizballah is a radical Shi‘a group formed in 1982 in Lebanon with Hussayn Musawi as its leader. Strongly anti-Western and anti-Israeli, closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran, Hizballah may have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran. Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-United States terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the United States Embassy and the United States Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and the United States Embassy annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and is a suspect in the 1994 bombing of the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires. Hizballah operated in the Bekaa Valley (Biqaa’ Valley), the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. It also established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. It received substantial amounts of financial aid, explosives, and diplomatic aid from Iran and Syria.
Hizballah is an umbrella organization where groups like Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice organization, Islamic Jihad for a Free Palestine and Revolutionary Arab Groups are subdivisions. Hizballah had about 5,000 members and received much of its support and training from Iran and Syria. Hizballah demanded that Westerners leave Lebanon and it charged the Christian Lebanese population with crimes against their Muslim compatriots.
Hizballah was formed by members of a faction inside the Lebanese Amal party. However, following the Iranian revolution in 1979 there was a split inside the party. The final split came after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon earlier in 1982. In many cases, the main enemy of Hizballah had been Israel. The struggle of Hizballah is defined as a jihad, -- a holy fight --, and members dying in action became shaded, martyrs, who were guaranteed a place in Paradise.
While Hizballah claimed responsibility for bombing the United States embassy and marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, hijackings, and the taking of Western and Israeli hostages, Hizballah also performed peaceful actions, and was in charge of important social welfare programs for the Lebanese population.
In 1984, Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah took control over Hizballah, and the organization became more of an instrument to oppose Israel on political and religious grounds. Hizballah attacked Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and Israelis in northern Israel, and was, in turn, attacked by Israel. Neither party came close to neutralizing the other.
On occasion, Iran was able to persuade Hizballah to release hostages in an effort to improve international relations.
Hizb Allah see Hizballah
Hizbullah see Hizballah
Hezbollah see Hizballah
“the party of God” see Hizballah
Hizballah in Iran
Hizballah in Iran. The Qur’anic term hizb Allah (mentioned in surahs 5 and 58) refers to the body of Muslim believers who are promised triumph over hizb al-Shaytan (the Devil’s party). Thirteen centuries later, the term was re-employed by Iranian Shi‘a faithful who described their amorphous political organization as “the Party of God” and claimed to emulate the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini. The Hizballah philosophy was summed up nicely in its slogan: “Only one party, the Party of Allah; only one leader, Ruhollah.”
The lineage of Hizballah in Iran can be traced back to a few extreme right wing organizations, such as the Fida’iyan-i Islam, which were active in the 1940s and 1950s. Like their predecessors, Hizballah faithful have adhered to a politicized interpretation of Islam and have not shied away from using violent means to achieve their goals. They entered the Iranian political scene during the 1978-1979 revolutionary upheaval of Iran. Recruited mainly from the ranks of the urban poor, the bazaris, and the lumpenproletariat, the Hizballahis played an important role in organizaing demonstrations and strikes that led to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. Following the victory of the revolution, they served as the unofficial watchdogs and storm troopers of the clerically dominated Islamic Republican Party (established in 1979 and dissolved in 1987). Considering its amorphous nature and non-official status, there is no way one can correctly estimate Hizballah’s numerical strength. However, the fact remains that along with such other (para)military-intelligence apparatuses as the Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Revolutionary Guards), komitehs (revolutionary committees), and SAVAMA (the intelligence service), Hizballah played a crucial role in the consolidation of the new regime.
Often led by the firebrand Hujjat al-Islam Hadi Ghaffari, the Hizballahis were known to employ clubs, chains, knives, and guns to disrupt the rallies of opposition parties, beat their members, and ransack their offices. The Hizballahi ruffians, nicknamed by the opposition as chumaqdars (club wielders), were instrumental in the undoing of President Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr, the closing of the universities, the enforcement of veiling, the suppression of the press, and cowing people into silence. In addition, the Hizballah provided an inexhaustible pool of faithful warriors who enlisted for the war with Iraq. The recruitment of many of these veterans by such organizations as the Basij (youth volunteers), Jihad-i Sazandigi (Reconstruction Crusade), and Pasdaran has so far prevented the actual establishment of a formal party called Hizballah. Quite to the contrary, some Hizballahi squads have now been transformed into the private militias of powerful clerics and have even set on each other’s benefactors.
The Iranian Hizballah was reported to have certain transnational links with like-minded groups in the region, in particular with its namesake in Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah was organized, trained, and financed by the Iranian Pasdarans who were dispatched to Lebanon in 1982. The two groups share certain characteristics, such as a militant interpretation of Shi‘a doctrines, adoration for Ayatollah Khomeini, anti-Zionism, suspicion of Western governments, and propensity to use violence. Furthermore, some of the leading personalities of these two groups are linked through family ties or can boast of having studied with the same mentors at Najaf and Qom theological seminaries. However, while the Hizballah of Lebanon operates as a formal political party, the Iranian Hizballahis for the most part continue to operate as vigilante bands. Nonetheless, in both countries, they have proven themselves forces to be reckoned with.
Hizballah in Iran. The Qur’anic term hizb Allah (mentioned in surahs 5 and 58) refers to the body of Muslim believers who are promised triumph over hizb al-Shaytan (the Devil’s party). Thirteen centuries later, the term was re-employed by Iranian Shi‘a faithful who described their amorphous political organization as “the Party of God” and claimed to emulate the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini. The Hizballah philosophy was summed up nicely in its slogan: “Only one party, the Party of Allah; only one leader, Ruhollah.”
The lineage of Hizballah in Iran can be traced back to a few extreme right wing organizations, such as the Fida’iyan-i Islam, which were active in the 1940s and 1950s. Like their predecessors, Hizballah faithful have adhered to a politicized interpretation of Islam and have not shied away from using violent means to achieve their goals. They entered the Iranian political scene during the 1978-1979 revolutionary upheaval of Iran. Recruited mainly from the ranks of the urban poor, the bazaris, and the lumpenproletariat, the Hizballahis played an important role in organizaing demonstrations and strikes that led to the downfall of the Pahlavi regime. Following the victory of the revolution, they served as the unofficial watchdogs and storm troopers of the clerically dominated Islamic Republican Party (established in 1979 and dissolved in 1987). Considering its amorphous nature and non-official status, there is no way one can correctly estimate Hizballah’s numerical strength. However, the fact remains that along with such other (para)military-intelligence apparatuses as the Sipah-i Pasdaran-i Inqilab-i Islami (Revolutionary Guards), komitehs (revolutionary committees), and SAVAMA (the intelligence service), Hizballah played a crucial role in the consolidation of the new regime.
Often led by the firebrand Hujjat al-Islam Hadi Ghaffari, the Hizballahis were known to employ clubs, chains, knives, and guns to disrupt the rallies of opposition parties, beat their members, and ransack their offices. The Hizballahi ruffians, nicknamed by the opposition as chumaqdars (club wielders), were instrumental in the undoing of President Abol-Hasan Bani Sadr, the closing of the universities, the enforcement of veiling, the suppression of the press, and cowing people into silence. In addition, the Hizballah provided an inexhaustible pool of faithful warriors who enlisted for the war with Iraq. The recruitment of many of these veterans by such organizations as the Basij (youth volunteers), Jihad-i Sazandigi (Reconstruction Crusade), and Pasdaran has so far prevented the actual establishment of a formal party called Hizballah. Quite to the contrary, some Hizballahi squads have now been transformed into the private militias of powerful clerics and have even set on each other’s benefactors.
The Iranian Hizballah was reported to have certain transnational links with like-minded groups in the region, in particular with its namesake in Lebanon. The Lebanese Hizballah was organized, trained, and financed by the Iranian Pasdarans who were dispatched to Lebanon in 1982. The two groups share certain characteristics, such as a militant interpretation of Shi‘a doctrines, adoration for Ayatollah Khomeini, anti-Zionism, suspicion of Western governments, and propensity to use violence. Furthermore, some of the leading personalities of these two groups are linked through family ties or can boast of having studied with the same mentors at Najaf and Qom theological seminaries. However, while the Hizballah of Lebanon operates as a formal political party, the Iranian Hizballahis for the most part continue to operate as vigilante bands. Nonetheless, in both countries, they have proven themselves forces to be reckoned with.
Hizballah in Lebanon
Hizballah in Lebanon. Political and social movement that arose among Lebanon’s Shi‘as in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, Hizballah means the “Party of God,” after the Qur’an (Sura 5:56): “Lo! the Party of God, they are the victorious.” During the 1980s, Hizballah drew on Iranian support to become a major political force in Lebanon and the Middle East. It gained international renown, first for its attacks against the American, French, and Israeli forces deployed in parts of Lebanon, and later for its holding of Western hostages. Hizballah also emerged as the major rival of the established Amal movement for the loyalty of Lebanon’s Shi‘as. Hizballah’s declared objective has been the transformation of Lebanon (and the region) into an Islamic state, a goal it has pursued by diversified means, ranging from acts of violence to participation in parliamentary elections.
The foundations of Hizballah were laid years before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the ties that bound the Shi‘a ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) of Iran and Lebanon. Many of these ‘ulama’ were schooled together in the Shi‘a theological academies in Iraq, especially in the shrine city of Najaf. During the late 1950s and 1960s, these academies became active in formulating an Islamic response to nationalism and secularism. Prominent ‘ulama’ lectured and wrote on Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. In Najaf, the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the exiled Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini both subjected the existing political order to an Islamic critique. Lebanese ‘ulama’ and theological students overheard and joined in these debates.
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the future mentor of Hizballah, was an exemplary product of Najaf’s mix of scholasticism and radicalism. Fadlallah was born and schooled in Najaf, where his father, a scholar from south Lebanon, had come to study. Fadlallah imbibed the ideas then current in Najaf and went to Lebanon in 1966, where he made his Beirut husayniyah (a Shi‘a congregation house) into a center of Islamic activism. Sayyid Musal al-Sadr dominated the Shi‘a scene at the time, and Fadlallah had a modest following. But in the 1970s, Fadlallah received an important reinforcement: Iraqi authorities expelled about a hundred Lebanese theology students as part of a crackdown on Shi‘a activism in the shrine cities. The expelled students became disciples of Fadlallah on their return to Lebanon and later formed the core of Hizballah.
In Iran, the early foundations of Hizballah were laid by members of the Islamic opposition who found refuge in war-torn Lebanon during the 1970s. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took this opposition under its wing and provided the Iranian dissidents with training and forged documents. Graduates of the Palestinian camps included Muhammad Muntaziri, the son of a leading opposition cleric and future founder of the Liberation Movements Department of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimii, future Iranian ambassador to Syria, who was to play a critical role in the creation of Hizballah. Both men arrived in Lebanon from Najar, where they had studied under Khomeini, and both joined Khomeini in Paris in 1978.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Shi‘a traffic between Lebanon and Iran intensified. Fadlallah and his disciples became frequent visitors to Iran, while former Iranian dissidents who had spent time in Lebanon returned as emissaries of the Islamic revolution. Muhammad Muntaziri made the first attempt, in 1979, to send six hundred Iranian volunteers to Lebanon, where they proposed to launch a jihad against Israel. However, the Lebanese government successfully appealed to Syria to block the entry of the volunteers, and most got no further than Damascus. Muntaziri, who accused “liberals” in Iran’s government of failing to support his mission, died in a Tehran bombing in 1981.
The obstacles to an effective partnership between Lebanon’s Shi‘as and Iran lifted only in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the deployment of American and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Syria, although defeated in battle, was determined to drive all other foreign forces out of Lebanon by encouraging popular resistance, especially among the Shi‘as. Many Shi‘as were receptive, believing that Israel and the West planned to restore Maronite privilege by force. When Iran offered to assist in mobilizing the Shi‘as, Syria approved, permitting Iran to send about a thousand Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa (Biqa‘) Valley in eastern Lebanon. There they seized a Lebanese army barracks and turned it into their operational base.
Emboldened by the arrival of the Iranians, Fadlallah and a number of young ‘ulama’ declared jihad against the Western and Israeli presence in Lebanon while pledging their allegiance to Khomeini. Similarly, a faction of the Amal militia led by a former schoolteacher, Husayn al-Musawi, went over to the Revolutionary Guards, accusing the Amal movement of failing to resist Israel’s invasion. Iran’s ambassador to Damascus, ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimi, established a council to govern the new movement. The council included the Iranian ambassador, Lebanese ‘ulama’, and security strongmen responsible for secret operations and the movement’s militia. Later, the council created the post of secretary general, held successively by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. Fadlallah declined all formal office, but his rhetorical genius and seniority assured his moral prestige in the movement.
The movement drew its support from two components of Shi‘a society. It especially appealed to some of the larger Shi‘a clans of the Bekaa Valley, for whom the war in Lebanon had brought prosperity fueled by the expansion of smuggling and hashish and opium cultivation. The leadership of the Amal movement, based on the Shi‘a professional and commercial classes, made insufficient room for this emerging counterelite of the Bekaa Valley. With the encouragement of the Iranian emissaries based in the valley, the clans flocked to Hizballah. Ba‘labakk, capital of the Bekaa Province, practically became an autonomous zone for Hizballah. Its buildings were plastered with posters of Khomeini and draped with Iranian flags.
The message of Hizballah also appealed to the Shi‘a refugees who had been forced by war into the dismal slums of southern Beirut. They included the Shi‘as driven from their homes in the Phalangist assault on Palestinians in eastern Beirut (Nab‘a and Buri Hammud) in 1976 and many more who fled the south following the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. Fadlallah personified their grievance. His ancestral villages in the south (Bint Jubayl and ‘Aynata) had come under Israeli assault, then occupation. He lost his first pulpit in Nab‘a during the Phalangist siege of 1976. These Shi‘a refugees felt a strong sense of identification with the Palestinians and a deep resentment against Israel, the Phalangists, and the West. Many young Shi‘a refugees even joined Palestinian organizations during the 1970s, from which they acquired fighting experience. When Israel forced these organizations from Beirut in 1982, Shi‘a fighters who were left behind joined Hizballah, which promised to continue their struggle.
Hizballah systematically formulated its doctrine in its “open letter” of 1985. “We are proceeding toward a battle with vice at its very roots,” declared the letter, “and the first root of vice is America.” The letter set four objectives for the movement: the termination of all American and French influence in Lebanon; Israel’s complete departure from Lebanon “as a prelude to its final obliteration”; submission of the Lebanese Phalangists to “just rule” and trial for their “crimes”; and granting the people the right to choose their own system of government, “keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam.”
From the outset, Hizballah conducted its struggle on three discrete levels – open, semi-clandestine, and clandestine. Fadlallah and the ‘ulama’ openly preached the message of resistance to Islam’s enemies and fealty to Khomeini in mosques and husaniyah, which became the focal points for public rallies. The Revolutionary Guards trained the semi-clandestine Islamic Resistance, a militia-like formation which attacked Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The Organization of the Islamic Jihad, the clandestine branch of the movement, operated against Western targets. It was reputedly led by ‘Imad Mughniyah, a shadowy Shi‘a figure from south Lebanon and a veteran of Palestinian service, who became the subject of much lore during the 1980s.
The violence of Islamic Jihad catapulted Hizballah to prominence. Assassinations of individual foreigners escalated into massive bombings, some of them done by “self-martyrs,” which destroyed the United States embassy and its annex in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984; the Beirut barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops in two attacks on the same morning in 1983; and command facilities of Israeli forces in the south in 1982 and 1983. Hundreds of foreigners died in these bombings, the most successful of which killed 241 United States marines in their barracks. As a result, the United States and France withdrew their forces from Lebanon; Israel, whose forces also came under attack by the Islamic Resistance, retreated to a narrow “security zone” in the south. In solidarity with Iran, Islamic Jihad also bombed the United States and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983, in an effort to compel Kuwait to abandon its support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Hizballah activists were also responsible for a spate of fatal bombings in Paris in 1986, meant to force France to abandon its policy of supplying Iraq with arms.
Hizballah also conducted operations to free members who had been imprisoned by governments in the Middle East and Europe. These operations included the hijacking of an American airliner in 1985, to secure the freedom of Lebanese Shi‘as held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners in 1984 and 1988, to win freedom for Lebanese Shi‘as held by Kuwait for the bombings there. The hijackers killed passengers in each instance to demonstrate their resolve. In addition, Islamic Jihad and other groups affiliated with Hizballah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon, mostly American, French, British, and German citizens, for the same purpose. Some of these foreigners were traded for American arms needed by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the motive for the wave of abductions remained the release of Hizballah’s imprisoned fighters elsewhere. Only when the hostage holding became a political burden for Iran did it prevail on Hizballah to free the hostages. The last French hostages were freed in 1988; the last American and British hostages in 1991; and the last Germans in 1992.
Although the movement’s ‘ulama’ disavowed all direct knowledge of operations, and occasionally expressed reservations, they harvested the credit (and blame) for Hizballah’s jihad. Their mosques filled to overflowing, and their statements and interviews resonated in the media. However, they themselves became the targets of assassination and abduction. Fadlallah narrowly missed death in a massive car bombing in 1985, which killed eighty persons. Israel abducted a local Hizballah cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, in 1988; and Israeli helicopter gunships killed Hizballah’s secretary general, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and his family, in an attack on his motorcade in 1992.
Hizballah also found that its growing appeal among Lebanon’s Shi‘as made enemies within the existing Amal movement. As Hizballah gained momentum, it sought unimpeded access to the south, so it could promote the struggle against Israel. Amal regarded this as an encroachment on its last strongholds. Beginning in 1988, occasional skirmishes with Amal escalated into civil war. More than one thousand Shi‘a combatants and civilians died in this fighting, which was characterized by atrocities and assassinations. Hizballah usually enjoyed the upper hand in fighting, but Syrian intervention denied it the fruits of victory. The strife ended in late 1990 in an accord mediated by Syria and Iran.
Although Hizballah battled its adversaries, it also cooperated with Iranian aid agencies to fund a wide range of social and economic projects. These included a hospital and pharmacies in Beirut; small textile factories and sheltered workshops to employ families of members and “martyrs”; book allowances and scholarships for students; street paving in Beirut; and the digging of wells and reservoirs in rural areas. Hizballah sponsored a scout movement, summer camps, and a soccer league. The movement published a weekly newspaper and operated an independent radio station. These activities broadened the base of the movement and enhanced its ability to field fighters.
By the end of its first decade, Hizballah had fought and bought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon’s Shi‘as, but the objective of an Islamic Lebanon remained remote. On the basis of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, Syria enforced an end to the civil war, based on a fairer confessional balance. Syria also disarmed the militias and launched a determined drive to build up the authority of a Syrian-backed government in Beirut. In 1991, the governments of Syria and Lebanon sat down with Israel in direct talks to discuss territory, security, and a possible peace.
Hizballah’s place in the new Syrian order remained uncertain. In Beirut and parts of the south, Hizballah surrendered its weapons and turned over positions to the reconstituted Lebanese army. In 1992, Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards evacuated the Lebanese army barracks near Ba‘labakk, which had served as operational headquarters for ten years. Nevertheless, Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance enjoyed an exemption from the general disarming of militias to permit it to continue a guerrilla war of attrition against Israel’s “security zone” in the south. The Islamic Resistance increase its operations, even in the midst of peace talks, and Syria pledged to disarm it only after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
Hizballah also opposed implementation of the Syrian-guaranteed Ta’if Accord, which it denounced as an American plan. Hizballah denounced the first stage of implementation, establishing Muslim-Christian parity in government, for perpetuating confessionalism. Hizballah advocated a straightforward referendum on an Islamic state. In such a state, the Christians would be entitled to protection, not parity. However, Iran prevailed on Hizballah to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the first held in twenty years, despite the fact that the elections still apportioned seats by confession. In the Bekaa Valley, Hizballah swept the Shi’a vote, and the movement made a credible showing in the south, collecting a total of eight parliamentary seats – the largest single block in the fragmented parliament.
In parliament, Hizballah organized as an opposition to the Syrian backed government. It denounced the government’s negotiations with Israel and denied all interest in cabinet positions. In most respects, Hizballah still remained an extra-parliamentary movement – a point emphasized by the deliberate obscurity of the movement’s parliamentary candidates. Hizballah signaled that its actual leaders would remain in the mosques and in the fighting ranks of the Islamic Resistance. But the “Party of God” had moved one reluctant step toward becoming a true hizb (political party) of its followers. It remained to be seen whether Hizballah’s votes would succeed, where its violence had failed, in creating an Islamic Lebanon. {See also Amal; Ayatollah; Maronite Catholics; Nasrallah, Hassan; Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-; Palestine Liberation Organization; Phalangists; Shi'a; and 'Ulama'.}
Hizballah in Lebanon. Political and social movement that arose among Lebanon’s Shi‘as in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran, Hizballah means the “Party of God,” after the Qur’an (Sura 5:56): “Lo! the Party of God, they are the victorious.” During the 1980s, Hizballah drew on Iranian support to become a major political force in Lebanon and the Middle East. It gained international renown, first for its attacks against the American, French, and Israeli forces deployed in parts of Lebanon, and later for its holding of Western hostages. Hizballah also emerged as the major rival of the established Amal movement for the loyalty of Lebanon’s Shi‘as. Hizballah’s declared objective has been the transformation of Lebanon (and the region) into an Islamic state, a goal it has pursued by diversified means, ranging from acts of violence to participation in parliamentary elections.
The foundations of Hizballah were laid years before the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the ties that bound the Shi‘a ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) of Iran and Lebanon. Many of these ‘ulama’ were schooled together in the Shi‘a theological academies in Iraq, especially in the shrine city of Najaf. During the late 1950s and 1960s, these academies became active in formulating an Islamic response to nationalism and secularism. Prominent ‘ulama’ lectured and wrote on Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. In Najaf, the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the exiled Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini both subjected the existing political order to an Islamic critique. Lebanese ‘ulama’ and theological students overheard and joined in these debates.
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the future mentor of Hizballah, was an exemplary product of Najaf’s mix of scholasticism and radicalism. Fadlallah was born and schooled in Najaf, where his father, a scholar from south Lebanon, had come to study. Fadlallah imbibed the ideas then current in Najaf and went to Lebanon in 1966, where he made his Beirut husayniyah (a Shi‘a congregation house) into a center of Islamic activism. Sayyid Musal al-Sadr dominated the Shi‘a scene at the time, and Fadlallah had a modest following. But in the 1970s, Fadlallah received an important reinforcement: Iraqi authorities expelled about a hundred Lebanese theology students as part of a crackdown on Shi‘a activism in the shrine cities. The expelled students became disciples of Fadlallah on their return to Lebanon and later formed the core of Hizballah.
In Iran, the early foundations of Hizballah were laid by members of the Islamic opposition who found refuge in war-torn Lebanon during the 1970s. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took this opposition under its wing and provided the Iranian dissidents with training and forged documents. Graduates of the Palestinian camps included Muhammad Muntaziri, the son of a leading opposition cleric and future founder of the Liberation Movements Department of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimii, future Iranian ambassador to Syria, who was to play a critical role in the creation of Hizballah. Both men arrived in Lebanon from Najar, where they had studied under Khomeini, and both joined Khomeini in Paris in 1978.
After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Shi‘a traffic between Lebanon and Iran intensified. Fadlallah and his disciples became frequent visitors to Iran, while former Iranian dissidents who had spent time in Lebanon returned as emissaries of the Islamic revolution. Muhammad Muntaziri made the first attempt, in 1979, to send six hundred Iranian volunteers to Lebanon, where they proposed to launch a jihad against Israel. However, the Lebanese government successfully appealed to Syria to block the entry of the volunteers, and most got no further than Damascus. Muntaziri, who accused “liberals” in Iran’s government of failing to support his mission, died in a Tehran bombing in 1981.
The obstacles to an effective partnership between Lebanon’s Shi‘as and Iran lifted only in 1982, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the deployment of American and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut. Syria, although defeated in battle, was determined to drive all other foreign forces out of Lebanon by encouraging popular resistance, especially among the Shi‘as. Many Shi‘as were receptive, believing that Israel and the West planned to restore Maronite privilege by force. When Iran offered to assist in mobilizing the Shi‘as, Syria approved, permitting Iran to send about a thousand Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa (Biqa‘) Valley in eastern Lebanon. There they seized a Lebanese army barracks and turned it into their operational base.
Emboldened by the arrival of the Iranians, Fadlallah and a number of young ‘ulama’ declared jihad against the Western and Israeli presence in Lebanon while pledging their allegiance to Khomeini. Similarly, a faction of the Amal militia led by a former schoolteacher, Husayn al-Musawi, went over to the Revolutionary Guards, accusing the Amal movement of failing to resist Israel’s invasion. Iran’s ambassador to Damascus, ‘Ali Akbar Muhtashimi, established a council to govern the new movement. The council included the Iranian ambassador, Lebanese ‘ulama’, and security strongmen responsible for secret operations and the movement’s militia. Later, the council created the post of secretary general, held successively by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. Fadlallah declined all formal office, but his rhetorical genius and seniority assured his moral prestige in the movement.
The movement drew its support from two components of Shi‘a society. It especially appealed to some of the larger Shi‘a clans of the Bekaa Valley, for whom the war in Lebanon had brought prosperity fueled by the expansion of smuggling and hashish and opium cultivation. The leadership of the Amal movement, based on the Shi‘a professional and commercial classes, made insufficient room for this emerging counterelite of the Bekaa Valley. With the encouragement of the Iranian emissaries based in the valley, the clans flocked to Hizballah. Ba‘labakk, capital of the Bekaa Province, practically became an autonomous zone for Hizballah. Its buildings were plastered with posters of Khomeini and draped with Iranian flags.
The message of Hizballah also appealed to the Shi‘a refugees who had been forced by war into the dismal slums of southern Beirut. They included the Shi‘as driven from their homes in the Phalangist assault on Palestinians in eastern Beirut (Nab‘a and Buri Hammud) in 1976 and many more who fled the south following the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982. Fadlallah personified their grievance. His ancestral villages in the south (Bint Jubayl and ‘Aynata) had come under Israeli assault, then occupation. He lost his first pulpit in Nab‘a during the Phalangist siege of 1976. These Shi‘a refugees felt a strong sense of identification with the Palestinians and a deep resentment against Israel, the Phalangists, and the West. Many young Shi‘a refugees even joined Palestinian organizations during the 1970s, from which they acquired fighting experience. When Israel forced these organizations from Beirut in 1982, Shi‘a fighters who were left behind joined Hizballah, which promised to continue their struggle.
Hizballah systematically formulated its doctrine in its “open letter” of 1985. “We are proceeding toward a battle with vice at its very roots,” declared the letter, “and the first root of vice is America.” The letter set four objectives for the movement: the termination of all American and French influence in Lebanon; Israel’s complete departure from Lebanon “as a prelude to its final obliteration”; submission of the Lebanese Phalangists to “just rule” and trial for their “crimes”; and granting the people the right to choose their own system of government, “keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam.”
From the outset, Hizballah conducted its struggle on three discrete levels – open, semi-clandestine, and clandestine. Fadlallah and the ‘ulama’ openly preached the message of resistance to Islam’s enemies and fealty to Khomeini in mosques and husaniyah, which became the focal points for public rallies. The Revolutionary Guards trained the semi-clandestine Islamic Resistance, a militia-like formation which attacked Israeli forces in south Lebanon. The Organization of the Islamic Jihad, the clandestine branch of the movement, operated against Western targets. It was reputedly led by ‘Imad Mughniyah, a shadowy Shi‘a figure from south Lebanon and a veteran of Palestinian service, who became the subject of much lore during the 1980s.
The violence of Islamic Jihad catapulted Hizballah to prominence. Assassinations of individual foreigners escalated into massive bombings, some of them done by “self-martyrs,” which destroyed the United States embassy and its annex in two separate attacks in 1983 and 1984; the Beirut barracks of American and French peacekeeping troops in two attacks on the same morning in 1983; and command facilities of Israeli forces in the south in 1982 and 1983. Hundreds of foreigners died in these bombings, the most successful of which killed 241 United States marines in their barracks. As a result, the United States and France withdrew their forces from Lebanon; Israel, whose forces also came under attack by the Islamic Resistance, retreated to a narrow “security zone” in the south. In solidarity with Iran, Islamic Jihad also bombed the United States and French embassies in Kuwait in 1983, in an effort to compel Kuwait to abandon its support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. Hizballah activists were also responsible for a spate of fatal bombings in Paris in 1986, meant to force France to abandon its policy of supplying Iraq with arms.
Hizballah also conducted operations to free members who had been imprisoned by governments in the Middle East and Europe. These operations included the hijacking of an American airliner in 1985, to secure the freedom of Lebanese Shi‘as held by Israel, and two hijackings of Kuwaiti airliners in 1984 and 1988, to win freedom for Lebanese Shi‘as held by Kuwait for the bombings there. The hijackers killed passengers in each instance to demonstrate their resolve. In addition, Islamic Jihad and other groups affiliated with Hizballah abducted dozens of foreigners in Lebanon, mostly American, French, British, and German citizens, for the same purpose. Some of these foreigners were traded for American arms needed by Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, but the motive for the wave of abductions remained the release of Hizballah’s imprisoned fighters elsewhere. Only when the hostage holding became a political burden for Iran did it prevail on Hizballah to free the hostages. The last French hostages were freed in 1988; the last American and British hostages in 1991; and the last Germans in 1992.
Although the movement’s ‘ulama’ disavowed all direct knowledge of operations, and occasionally expressed reservations, they harvested the credit (and blame) for Hizballah’s jihad. Their mosques filled to overflowing, and their statements and interviews resonated in the media. However, they themselves became the targets of assassination and abduction. Fadlallah narrowly missed death in a massive car bombing in 1985, which killed eighty persons. Israel abducted a local Hizballah cleric, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Ubayd, in 1988; and Israeli helicopter gunships killed Hizballah’s secretary general, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, and his family, in an attack on his motorcade in 1992.
Hizballah also found that its growing appeal among Lebanon’s Shi‘as made enemies within the existing Amal movement. As Hizballah gained momentum, it sought unimpeded access to the south, so it could promote the struggle against Israel. Amal regarded this as an encroachment on its last strongholds. Beginning in 1988, occasional skirmishes with Amal escalated into civil war. More than one thousand Shi‘a combatants and civilians died in this fighting, which was characterized by atrocities and assassinations. Hizballah usually enjoyed the upper hand in fighting, but Syrian intervention denied it the fruits of victory. The strife ended in late 1990 in an accord mediated by Syria and Iran.
Although Hizballah battled its adversaries, it also cooperated with Iranian aid agencies to fund a wide range of social and economic projects. These included a hospital and pharmacies in Beirut; small textile factories and sheltered workshops to employ families of members and “martyrs”; book allowances and scholarships for students; street paving in Beirut; and the digging of wells and reservoirs in rural areas. Hizballah sponsored a scout movement, summer camps, and a soccer league. The movement published a weekly newspaper and operated an independent radio station. These activities broadened the base of the movement and enhanced its ability to field fighters.
By the end of its first decade, Hizballah had fought and bought its way into the hearts of perhaps as many as half of Lebanon’s Shi‘as, but the objective of an Islamic Lebanon remained remote. On the basis of the 1989 Ta’if Accord, Syria enforced an end to the civil war, based on a fairer confessional balance. Syria also disarmed the militias and launched a determined drive to build up the authority of a Syrian-backed government in Beirut. In 1991, the governments of Syria and Lebanon sat down with Israel in direct talks to discuss territory, security, and a possible peace.
Hizballah’s place in the new Syrian order remained uncertain. In Beirut and parts of the south, Hizballah surrendered its weapons and turned over positions to the reconstituted Lebanese army. In 1992, Hizballah and the Revolutionary Guards evacuated the Lebanese army barracks near Ba‘labakk, which had served as operational headquarters for ten years. Nevertheless, Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance enjoyed an exemption from the general disarming of militias to permit it to continue a guerrilla war of attrition against Israel’s “security zone” in the south. The Islamic Resistance increase its operations, even in the midst of peace talks, and Syria pledged to disarm it only after a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
Hizballah also opposed implementation of the Syrian-guaranteed Ta’if Accord, which it denounced as an American plan. Hizballah denounced the first stage of implementation, establishing Muslim-Christian parity in government, for perpetuating confessionalism. Hizballah advocated a straightforward referendum on an Islamic state. In such a state, the Christians would be entitled to protection, not parity. However, Iran prevailed on Hizballah to participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the first held in twenty years, despite the fact that the elections still apportioned seats by confession. In the Bekaa Valley, Hizballah swept the Shi’a vote, and the movement made a credible showing in the south, collecting a total of eight parliamentary seats – the largest single block in the fragmented parliament.
In parliament, Hizballah organized as an opposition to the Syrian backed government. It denounced the government’s negotiations with Israel and denied all interest in cabinet positions. In most respects, Hizballah still remained an extra-parliamentary movement – a point emphasized by the deliberate obscurity of the movement’s parliamentary candidates. Hizballah signaled that its actual leaders would remain in the mosques and in the fighting ranks of the Islamic Resistance. But the “Party of God” had moved one reluctant step toward becoming a true hizb (political party) of its followers. It remained to be seen whether Hizballah’s votes would succeed, where its violence had failed, in creating an Islamic Lebanon. {See also Amal; Ayatollah; Maronite Catholics; Nasrallah, Hassan; Sadr, Muhammad Baqir al-; Palestine Liberation Organization; Phalangists; Shi'a; and 'Ulama'.}
Hizb al-Nahdah
Hizb al-Nahdah. Formerly called al-Ittijah al-Islami (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique [MTI]), a political movement that, in 1988, adopted the name Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party). Hizb al-Nahdah was the principal representative of Islamist thought and political expression in contemporary Tunisia. The movement’s relations with the government have from the outset been contentious, but it has survived successive waves of repression. It is thought to have the diffuse support of as much as one-third of the Tunisian population.
The contemporary Islamist movement traces its roots to the Qur’anic Preservation Society (QPS), a cultural association founded in 1970 in reaction to modernist reforms promulgated in the 1960s, and to the Pakistan based Da‘wah (The Call), which spread across the Maghrib in the early 1970s “calling” Muslims to return to the faith. Out of this group emerged a nexus of activists who were satisfied with neither the cultural critique of the QPS nor the more personal approach of the Da‘wah, but who focused rather on the role of Islam in society and openly preached reform (tajdid). As these sentiments sorted themselves out in the 1970s, young men with beards and women in the chador-like hijab (veil) became a common sight in Tunis and other cities. By 1979, one group identifying itself as “progressive Islamists” and concentrating on the renewal of Islamic thought (ijtihad) had split off to pursue essentially intellectual matters. The energies of those who sought political action coalesced around Rashid Ghannoushi (Rashid al-Ghannushi) and Abdelfatah Mourou. Ghannoushi had recently returned from Syria, and Mourou, a jurist, had been studying at the Zaytunah Mosque in Tunis. At a press conference in 1981, they announced the formation of the MTI, which officially called for the reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single party politics, and a return to the “fundamental principles of Islam” through a purging of what was viewed as well-entrenched “social decadence.” Further, MTI representatives announced that they were seeking recognition as a political party according to guidelines established by the government in the preceding autumn. That request was denied, and less than two months later most of the MTI’s leaders were imprisoned.
Despite this repression – or perhaps because of it – the MTI survived and even gained strength in the early 1980s. The MTI found allies in other Tunisian opposition forces, including the Movement of Democratic Socialists and the new Tunisian League of Human Rights, and its discourse took on egalitarian and republican overtones. Under pressure, the Tunisian government released MTI leadrs in 1984, and, in a symbolic gesture, the government outlawed the hijab. As the MTI’s condemnatory rhetoric once again gathered steam, in spring 1987 the government intensified its efforts to eradicate the movement, arresting more than three thousand of its alleged supporters. The party’s leaders were tried en masse before the State Security Court in August for ill-defined capital crimes, and several were sentenced to death in absentia.
The specter of politically motivated executions and uncontrollable social response created a backdrop for the coup instigated by Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali a few months later. Islamists were the primary beneficiaries of the liberalizing policies introduced by the new regime. Prisons were emptied, a multi-party system was embraced, and the franchise was restored to those who had previously been imprisoned. The atmosphere of détente raised hopes among Islamists that they would be allowed to participate in the political system. To comply with new rules prohibiting parties from capitalizing on religious sentiments, the MTI changed its name.
The renamed Hizb al-Nahdah reached a turning point in relations with the new regime in April 1989. Without legal recognition, Islamists were prevented from participating openly in Tunisia’s first contested legislative elections, but the independent slates they fielded nevertheless garnered fourteen percent of the popular vote (thirty percent in certain Tunis suburbs) and sent shock waves through the government. Al-Nahbah’s pending request for recognition was denied, educational reforms aimed at curtailing Islamist influence were implemented, and the movement’s leaders were taken in for questioning. Tensions were exacerbated by the Gulf War, which fanned flames of anti-Western sentiment. The death of one Islamist student, shot by government militia during a demonstration, sparked protests that inspired a new wave of arrests and further restrictions. An assault by Islamists on an office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in February 1991, which killed one guard and injured another, heightened the political confrontation. Al-Nahdah’s formal responsibility for that attack was never made clear, but together with the discovery in subsequent months of two alleged plots to overthrow the government, the event fueled a campaign of repression that resulted in more than eight thousand arrests. In 1992, 279 al-Nahdah members were tried before military tribunals; leaders in the government’s custody were sentenced to life in prison.
It is unclear how much al-Nahdah was affected by the far-reaching efforts to stifle it. However, its leadership did change. In 1993, Rashid Ghannoushi was still formally recognized as the head of al-Nahdah (although since 1989 he had been in self-imposed exile), but Mourou formally dissociated himself from the unauthorized party in 1991 following the attack on the RCD office. A new cadre of leaders emerged, and the government claimed to have uncovered a covert military wing. Meanwhile, El fajr, the al-Nahdah publication that was to have illuminated its thought, was silenced.
Concerted pressures in the early 1990s made al-Nahdah less visible. In particular, many young women ceased to wear the symbolic hijab. There was evidence that the Islamist movement continued to enjoy popular support – perhaps more than ever in the wake of disappointment with the Ben Ali government. A membership once described as young and chiefly comprised of students became aged, without obvious attrition. Students, particularly those in religious and technical institutes, continue to supply recruits, but the Islamist message of social and political resistance and reform resonated in the humanities and social sciences. The movement held particular appeal for sectors of society that have felt relatively disenfranchised by the modernist regime, and economic pressures only increased those sentiments. Parents and others of an older generation were commonly identified as sympathizers, and the movement was supported from abroad by a broad network of Tunisian students. It remained the most significant opposition group in contemporary Tunisia. {See also Ben Ali and Ghannushi, Rashid al-.}
Renaissance Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Nahda, also Hizb Ennahda; French: Parti de la Renaissance) is an un-authorized Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia.
Originally known as Islamic Action, the party changed its name to Movement of the Islamic Tendency, and then in 1989 Hizb al-Nahda.[1] Although traditionally shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, starting in the 1980s they began to be described as moderate Islamist. They advocated democracy and a "Tunisian" form of Islamism which recognized political pluralism. They also discussed a "dialogue" with the West. These statements should not be misconstrued as they reject Western notions of liberal democracy and believe in an essentially Islamic constitution. Critics charge that one of their main leaders, named Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had a history of violence yet in courts he was accused by the ruling party of organizing a non authorized political party. Others say he supports any form multi-party democracy that offers a minimum of freedom for his party and followers.
Al Nahda a party published the banned newspaper Al-Fajr. The editor of Al Fajr, Hamadi Jebali, was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment in 1992 for membership of the un-authorized organisation and for "aggression with the intention of changing the nature of the state". Al Nahda members were allowed to stand in the 1989 elections but the movement was banned in 1991. The Arabic language television station El Zeitouna is believed to be connected with Al Nahda.
[edit] References
Renaissance Party see Hizb al-Nahdah.
Hizb al-Nahdah. Formerly called al-Ittijah al-Islami (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique [MTI]), a political movement that, in 1988, adopted the name Hizb al-Nahdah (Renaissance Party). Hizb al-Nahdah was the principal representative of Islamist thought and political expression in contemporary Tunisia. The movement’s relations with the government have from the outset been contentious, but it has survived successive waves of repression. It is thought to have the diffuse support of as much as one-third of the Tunisian population.
The contemporary Islamist movement traces its roots to the Qur’anic Preservation Society (QPS), a cultural association founded in 1970 in reaction to modernist reforms promulgated in the 1960s, and to the Pakistan based Da‘wah (The Call), which spread across the Maghrib in the early 1970s “calling” Muslims to return to the faith. Out of this group emerged a nexus of activists who were satisfied with neither the cultural critique of the QPS nor the more personal approach of the Da‘wah, but who focused rather on the role of Islam in society and openly preached reform (tajdid). As these sentiments sorted themselves out in the 1970s, young men with beards and women in the chador-like hijab (veil) became a common sight in Tunis and other cities. By 1979, one group identifying itself as “progressive Islamists” and concentrating on the renewal of Islamic thought (ijtihad) had split off to pursue essentially intellectual matters. The energies of those who sought political action coalesced around Rashid Ghannoushi (Rashid al-Ghannushi) and Abdelfatah Mourou. Ghannoushi had recently returned from Syria, and Mourou, a jurist, had been studying at the Zaytunah Mosque in Tunis. At a press conference in 1981, they announced the formation of the MTI, which officially called for the reconstruction of economic life on a more equitable basis, the end of single party politics, and a return to the “fundamental principles of Islam” through a purging of what was viewed as well-entrenched “social decadence.” Further, MTI representatives announced that they were seeking recognition as a political party according to guidelines established by the government in the preceding autumn. That request was denied, and less than two months later most of the MTI’s leaders were imprisoned.
Despite this repression – or perhaps because of it – the MTI survived and even gained strength in the early 1980s. The MTI found allies in other Tunisian opposition forces, including the Movement of Democratic Socialists and the new Tunisian League of Human Rights, and its discourse took on egalitarian and republican overtones. Under pressure, the Tunisian government released MTI leadrs in 1984, and, in a symbolic gesture, the government outlawed the hijab. As the MTI’s condemnatory rhetoric once again gathered steam, in spring 1987 the government intensified its efforts to eradicate the movement, arresting more than three thousand of its alleged supporters. The party’s leaders were tried en masse before the State Security Court in August for ill-defined capital crimes, and several were sentenced to death in absentia.
The specter of politically motivated executions and uncontrollable social response created a backdrop for the coup instigated by Prime Minister Zine el Abidine Ben Ali a few months later. Islamists were the primary beneficiaries of the liberalizing policies introduced by the new regime. Prisons were emptied, a multi-party system was embraced, and the franchise was restored to those who had previously been imprisoned. The atmosphere of détente raised hopes among Islamists that they would be allowed to participate in the political system. To comply with new rules prohibiting parties from capitalizing on religious sentiments, the MTI changed its name.
The renamed Hizb al-Nahdah reached a turning point in relations with the new regime in April 1989. Without legal recognition, Islamists were prevented from participating openly in Tunisia’s first contested legislative elections, but the independent slates they fielded nevertheless garnered fourteen percent of the popular vote (thirty percent in certain Tunis suburbs) and sent shock waves through the government. Al-Nahbah’s pending request for recognition was denied, educational reforms aimed at curtailing Islamist influence were implemented, and the movement’s leaders were taken in for questioning. Tensions were exacerbated by the Gulf War, which fanned flames of anti-Western sentiment. The death of one Islamist student, shot by government militia during a demonstration, sparked protests that inspired a new wave of arrests and further restrictions. An assault by Islamists on an office of the ruling Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in February 1991, which killed one guard and injured another, heightened the political confrontation. Al-Nahdah’s formal responsibility for that attack was never made clear, but together with the discovery in subsequent months of two alleged plots to overthrow the government, the event fueled a campaign of repression that resulted in more than eight thousand arrests. In 1992, 279 al-Nahdah members were tried before military tribunals; leaders in the government’s custody were sentenced to life in prison.
It is unclear how much al-Nahdah was affected by the far-reaching efforts to stifle it. However, its leadership did change. In 1993, Rashid Ghannoushi was still formally recognized as the head of al-Nahdah (although since 1989 he had been in self-imposed exile), but Mourou formally dissociated himself from the unauthorized party in 1991 following the attack on the RCD office. A new cadre of leaders emerged, and the government claimed to have uncovered a covert military wing. Meanwhile, El fajr, the al-Nahdah publication that was to have illuminated its thought, was silenced.
Concerted pressures in the early 1990s made al-Nahdah less visible. In particular, many young women ceased to wear the symbolic hijab. There was evidence that the Islamist movement continued to enjoy popular support – perhaps more than ever in the wake of disappointment with the Ben Ali government. A membership once described as young and chiefly comprised of students became aged, without obvious attrition. Students, particularly those in religious and technical institutes, continue to supply recruits, but the Islamist message of social and political resistance and reform resonated in the humanities and social sciences. The movement held particular appeal for sectors of society that have felt relatively disenfranchised by the modernist regime, and economic pressures only increased those sentiments. Parents and others of an older generation were commonly identified as sympathizers, and the movement was supported from abroad by a broad network of Tunisian students. It remained the most significant opposition group in contemporary Tunisia. {See also Ben Ali and Ghannushi, Rashid al-.}
Renaissance Party (Arabic: Hizb al-Nahda, also Hizb Ennahda; French: Parti de la Renaissance) is an un-authorized Islamist opposition political party in Tunisia.
Originally known as Islamic Action, the party changed its name to Movement of the Islamic Tendency, and then in 1989 Hizb al-Nahda.[1] Although traditionally shaped by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb and Maududi, starting in the 1980s they began to be described as moderate Islamist. They advocated democracy and a "Tunisian" form of Islamism which recognized political pluralism. They also discussed a "dialogue" with the West. These statements should not be misconstrued as they reject Western notions of liberal democracy and believe in an essentially Islamic constitution. Critics charge that one of their main leaders, named Rashid Al-Ghannushi, had a history of violence yet in courts he was accused by the ruling party of organizing a non authorized political party. Others say he supports any form multi-party democracy that offers a minimum of freedom for his party and followers.
Al Nahda a party published the banned newspaper Al-Fajr. The editor of Al Fajr, Hamadi Jebali, was sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment in 1992 for membership of the un-authorized organisation and for "aggression with the intention of changing the nature of the state". Al Nahda members were allowed to stand in the 1989 elections but the movement was banned in 1991. The Arabic language television station El Zeitouna is believed to be connected with Al Nahda.
[edit] References
Renaissance Party see Hizb al-Nahdah.
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami. Established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an al-Azhar graduate and religious school teacher and judge from Ijzim in northern Palestine, and a group of colleagues who had separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) declared itself to be a political party with Islam as its ideology and the revival of the Islamic nation – purged of the vestiges of colonialism and restored to an Islamic way of life – as its goal. The party sought to achieve this goal by creating a single Islamic state, erected on the ruins of existing regimes, which would implement Islam and export it throughout the world. Although the party never obtained official sanction, it enjoyed modest successes in Jordan and the West Bank until the suppression of the opposition in 1957. It indoctrinated recruits; disseminated its ideas through leaflets, lectures, and sermons; and contested parliamentary elections. The party early established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq. Although the ascendancy of Nasserism hindered its effort to gain popular support, the early 1960s witnessed its growing confidence, which culminated in two attempts at a coup d’etat in Amman in 1968 and 1969. Each of these coup attempts was coordinated with simultaneous arrangements in Damascus and Baghdad. Other such plots emerged in Baghdad (1972), Cairo (1974), and Damascus (1976).
The party construed the Islamic resurgence as evidence of society’s reception of its ideas. After the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, its optimism grew, based on the belief that the insincerity of political movements and regimes in the region had been exposed and that public opinion had appreciated the correctness of the party’s understanding of Islam and its radical approach to change. Rigid adherence to its ideology made it unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic groups, and its confrontational approach brought it universal proscription. In spite of the isolation and marginalization consequent upon this, its members were active in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa (especially Tunisia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and parts of Europe, including Britain, France, Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
Activities were coordinated and prioritized throughout the Arab-Islamic region, reflecting the party’s well-organized, highly-disciplined, and overwhelmingly centralized structure. Membership was typical of modern mass parties, but the Hizb al-Tahrir exhibited totalitarian features, including a preoccupation with maintaining ideological homogeneity: To this end the leadership adopted ideological material, which became binding on members. Secondary school and university students and recent graduates constitute a significant proportion of new members. Conceptions of authority and leadership within the party derived from the Islamic tradition: executive power and authority were vested in a specific individual at each level of organization, but consultation (shura) also operated. In addition, the influence of quasi-fascist ideas was discernible.
Alongside its avowedly political nature, the party was distinguished by a consistent system of thought and a coherent political program. Central to the former was an attempt to construe Islam as an ideology superior to socialism and capitalism. This ideology was comprised of two parts: a rational doctrine that shapes Muslim thought and conduct and a system for ordering all aspects of Muslim life. The latter, which issued from the doctrine, is the shari‘a. The party urges Muslims to practice ijtihad in its ongoing elaboration. It excludes all forms of consensus (ijma‘), except that of the Prophet’s companions, as a source of jurisprudence and rejects the rational effective cause (‘illah) as a basis for analogical deduction. It also rejects the principles of general interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah), applying discretion in deriving legal rules (al-istihsan) and in acquiring good and repelling evil (jalb al-masalih; dar‘ al-mafasid). This stance effectively minimizes the role of reason in juridic elaboration and suspends mechanisms designed to serve the community’s immediate interests and to take account of its changing circumstances.
The party considers the implementation of the shari‘a as the lynchpin in the restoration of an Islamic way of life and the state as a sine qua non for achieving this aim. It upholds the classical model of the caliphate as the only authentic form of Islamic government, which it seeks to restore with its traditional accompanying institutions. To this end, it has drafted a constitution detailing the political, economic, and social systems of the proposed state. This document vests executive and legislative powers in an elected caliph, in whom most functions of state are centralized. Citizens are encouraged to exercise their right to call the state to account through a political opposition based on the Islamic ideology and expressed through a system of party plurality. Although involvement in politics is construed as a collective religious duty (fard al-kifayah), shura is not held to be a pillar of Islamic government. The party emphasizes the distinction between shura and democracy and holds that democracy is not compatible with Islam. It also denounces nationalism as a creation of unbelief.
The party’s program evidences an attempt to employ the constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize adopting modes of political organization and mobilization characteristic of the emergent modern, secular political parties contemporary with it in the Arab East. The heart of this program is the endeavor to replace erroneous concepts, prevalent in Muslim societies due to both their decline and the legacies of colonialism, with the party ideology. The objective is to create an extensive fifth column that will support the revolutionary state, which is to be established through a coup d’etat executed by the party and selected power groups that have been won over to its cause. It also aims to politicize the Islamic ummah, and to expose conspiracies hatched against it by the West. Its perceived role is confined to political and intellectual spheres: it expressly refuses to involve itself in social, religious, or educational projects.
The party’s major publications include Al-takattul al-hizbi (The Party Formation), Al-shakhsiyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Way of Life), Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic Order), Mafahim hizb al-tahrir (Concepts of the Islamic Liberation Party), Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam (The System of Government in Islam), Nazarat siyasiyah li-Hizb al-Tahrir (Political Reflections of the Islamic Liberation Party), and Kayfa hudimat al-khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed).
Islamic Liberation Party see Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami. Established in Jerusalem in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1977), an al-Azhar graduate and religious school teacher and judge from Ijzim in northern Palestine, and a group of colleagues who had separated from the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party) declared itself to be a political party with Islam as its ideology and the revival of the Islamic nation – purged of the vestiges of colonialism and restored to an Islamic way of life – as its goal. The party sought to achieve this goal by creating a single Islamic state, erected on the ruins of existing regimes, which would implement Islam and export it throughout the world. Although the party never obtained official sanction, it enjoyed modest successes in Jordan and the West Bank until the suppression of the opposition in 1957. It indoctrinated recruits; disseminated its ideas through leaflets, lectures, and sermons; and contested parliamentary elections. The party early established branches in Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq. Although the ascendancy of Nasserism hindered its effort to gain popular support, the early 1960s witnessed its growing confidence, which culminated in two attempts at a coup d’etat in Amman in 1968 and 1969. Each of these coup attempts was coordinated with simultaneous arrangements in Damascus and Baghdad. Other such plots emerged in Baghdad (1972), Cairo (1974), and Damascus (1976).
The party construed the Islamic resurgence as evidence of society’s reception of its ideas. After the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991, its optimism grew, based on the belief that the insincerity of political movements and regimes in the region had been exposed and that public opinion had appreciated the correctness of the party’s understanding of Islam and its radical approach to change. Rigid adherence to its ideology made it unwilling to cooperate with other Islamic groups, and its confrontational approach brought it universal proscription. In spite of the isolation and marginalization consequent upon this, its members were active in Jordan, Syria, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Lebanon, North Africa (especially Tunisia), Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and parts of Europe, including Britain, France, Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia.
Activities were coordinated and prioritized throughout the Arab-Islamic region, reflecting the party’s well-organized, highly-disciplined, and overwhelmingly centralized structure. Membership was typical of modern mass parties, but the Hizb al-Tahrir exhibited totalitarian features, including a preoccupation with maintaining ideological homogeneity: To this end the leadership adopted ideological material, which became binding on members. Secondary school and university students and recent graduates constitute a significant proportion of new members. Conceptions of authority and leadership within the party derived from the Islamic tradition: executive power and authority were vested in a specific individual at each level of organization, but consultation (shura) also operated. In addition, the influence of quasi-fascist ideas was discernible.
Alongside its avowedly political nature, the party was distinguished by a consistent system of thought and a coherent political program. Central to the former was an attempt to construe Islam as an ideology superior to socialism and capitalism. This ideology was comprised of two parts: a rational doctrine that shapes Muslim thought and conduct and a system for ordering all aspects of Muslim life. The latter, which issued from the doctrine, is the shari‘a. The party urges Muslims to practice ijtihad in its ongoing elaboration. It excludes all forms of consensus (ijma‘), except that of the Prophet’s companions, as a source of jurisprudence and rejects the rational effective cause (‘illah) as a basis for analogical deduction. It also rejects the principles of general interest (al-maslahah al-mursalah), applying discretion in deriving legal rules (al-istihsan) and in acquiring good and repelling evil (jalb al-masalih; dar‘ al-mafasid). This stance effectively minimizes the role of reason in juridic elaboration and suspends mechanisms designed to serve the community’s immediate interests and to take account of its changing circumstances.
The party considers the implementation of the shari‘a as the lynchpin in the restoration of an Islamic way of life and the state as a sine qua non for achieving this aim. It upholds the classical model of the caliphate as the only authentic form of Islamic government, which it seeks to restore with its traditional accompanying institutions. To this end, it has drafted a constitution detailing the political, economic, and social systems of the proposed state. This document vests executive and legislative powers in an elected caliph, in whom most functions of state are centralized. Citizens are encouraged to exercise their right to call the state to account through a political opposition based on the Islamic ideology and expressed through a system of party plurality. Although involvement in politics is construed as a collective religious duty (fard al-kifayah), shura is not held to be a pillar of Islamic government. The party emphasizes the distinction between shura and democracy and holds that democracy is not compatible with Islam. It also denounces nationalism as a creation of unbelief.
The party’s program evidences an attempt to employ the constructs of traditional Islamic discourse to legitimize adopting modes of political organization and mobilization characteristic of the emergent modern, secular political parties contemporary with it in the Arab East. The heart of this program is the endeavor to replace erroneous concepts, prevalent in Muslim societies due to both their decline and the legacies of colonialism, with the party ideology. The objective is to create an extensive fifth column that will support the revolutionary state, which is to be established through a coup d’etat executed by the party and selected power groups that have been won over to its cause. It also aims to politicize the Islamic ummah, and to expose conspiracies hatched against it by the West. Its perceived role is confined to political and intellectual spheres: it expressly refuses to involve itself in social, religious, or educational projects.
The party’s major publications include Al-takattul al-hizbi (The Party Formation), Al-shakhsiyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Way of Life), Nizam al-Islam (The Islamic Order), Mafahim hizb al-tahrir (Concepts of the Islamic Liberation Party), Nizam al-hukm fi al-Islam (The System of Government in Islam), Nazarat siyasiyah li-Hizb al-Tahrir (Political Reflections of the Islamic Liberation Party), and Kayfa hudimat al-khilafah (How the Caliphate was Destroyed).
Islamic Liberation Party see Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan. Name shared by two political parties that from 1978 until 1992 fought against the Marxist government of Afghanistan. The better known and more influential of these parties was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the other by Maulavi Yunus Khales. Both leaders were Pushtuns (Hekmatyar from northern Kunduz Province, and Khales from eastern Ningrahar Province), and their parties had their strongest bases of support in Pushtun regions of the country.
The origins of Hizb-I Islami can be traced to the efforts of a group of students at Kabul University who formed the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulmun) in 1969. Initially an informal study group that was introduced to modern Islamic political ideology (particularly that of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, (or Muslim Brotherhood) by professors who had studied in Egypt, the Muslim Youth began active political organizing and recruitment in response to the increasingly strident efforts of Marxist parties to expand their base within the student population during the early 1970s. The Muslim Youth was also concerned with the rapid secularization of Afghan society and the pro-Soviet direction of government policy, and its leaders railed against perceived corruption within the royal family and the traditional ‘ulama’. In its first years, the Muslim Youth Organization was primarily involved in campus politics, but a series of violent confrontations between Muslim and Marxist students led to the first arrests of Muslim Youth leaders in 1972.
In response to the July 1973 coup d’etat of Muhammad Da’u, an avowed leftist, the Muslim Youth joined forces with other covert Muslim political parties to overthrow the new government. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and led to further arrests and the flight of many of the top Muslim Youth leaders to Pakistan, where they continued their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. In July 1975, guerrillas associated with the Organization of Muslim Youth initiated an operation intended to combine a military coup d’etat in Kabul with rural insurrections in various provinces. The military coup never materialized, however, and the uprisings were unsuccessful, in large part because of the absence of popular support.
Hizb-i Islami Afghanistan. Name shared by two political parties that from 1978 until 1992 fought against the Marxist government of Afghanistan. The better known and more influential of these parties was headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the other by Maulavi Yunus Khales. Both leaders were Pushtuns (Hekmatyar from northern Kunduz Province, and Khales from eastern Ningrahar Province), and their parties had their strongest bases of support in Pushtun regions of the country.
The origins of Hizb-I Islami can be traced to the efforts of a group of students at Kabul University who formed the Organization of Muslim Youth (Sazman-i Javanan-i Musulmun) in 1969. Initially an informal study group that was introduced to modern Islamic political ideology (particularly that of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, (or Muslim Brotherhood) by professors who had studied in Egypt, the Muslim Youth began active political organizing and recruitment in response to the increasingly strident efforts of Marxist parties to expand their base within the student population during the early 1970s. The Muslim Youth was also concerned with the rapid secularization of Afghan society and the pro-Soviet direction of government policy, and its leaders railed against perceived corruption within the royal family and the traditional ‘ulama’. In its first years, the Muslim Youth Organization was primarily involved in campus politics, but a series of violent confrontations between Muslim and Marxist students led to the first arrests of Muslim Youth leaders in 1972.
In response to the July 1973 coup d’etat of Muhammad Da’u, an avowed leftist, the Muslim Youth joined forces with other covert Muslim political parties to overthrow the new government. These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and led to further arrests and the flight of many of the top Muslim Youth leaders to Pakistan, where they continued their efforts to overthrow the Afghan government. In July 1975, guerrillas associated with the Organization of Muslim Youth initiated an operation intended to combine a military coup d’etat in Kabul with rural insurrections in various provinces. The military coup never materialized, however, and the uprisings were unsuccessful, in large part because of the absence of popular support.
Hizbu’llah
Hizbu’llah. Indonesian Islamic guerrilla organization that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1950. Hizbu’llah along with Sabili’llah formed part of Masjumi, an Islamic party. Hizbu’llah (“Allah’s forces”), founded in December 1944, was intended to become a reserve corps in the war against the Allies and was open to youths between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. Its first chairman was Zainul Arifin and its first vice-chairman Moh Roemn. In August 1945, it had about five hundred trained members. Only after the declaration of Indonesian indepedence did the Hizbu’llah become one of Indonesia’s largest irregular guerrilla organizations.
Hizbu’llah. Indonesian Islamic guerrilla organization that fought the Dutch between 1945 and 1950. Hizbu’llah along with Sabili’llah formed part of Masjumi, an Islamic party. Hizbu’llah (“Allah’s forces”), founded in December 1944, was intended to become a reserve corps in the war against the Allies and was open to youths between seventeen and twenty-five years of age. Its first chairman was Zainul Arifin and its first vice-chairman Moh Roemn. In August 1945, it had about five hundred trained members. Only after the declaration of Indonesian indepedence did the Hizbu’llah become one of Indonesia’s largest irregular guerrilla organizations.
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