Hmad u-Musa
Hmad u-Musa (Sidi Hmad u-Musa) (c. 1460-1563). Great saint of southern Morocco and a patron saint of Sus. His tomb in Tazerwalt is an object of veneration.
Sidi Hmad u-Musa see Hmad u-Musa
Hmad u-Musa (Sidi Hmad u-Musa) (c. 1460-1563). Great saint of southern Morocco and a patron saint of Sus. His tomb in Tazerwalt is an object of veneration.
Sidi Hmad u-Musa see Hmad u-Musa
Hostages
Hostages (raha'in). Seizing, detaining, and threatening to injure a person in order to secure compliance with a condition or demand from a third party is the act of hostage taking. Before the advent of the modern regime of international law, belligerents often took hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransoms, bills, or treaties. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Hague Protocols I and II prohibited the taking of hostages in international and internal armed conflicts. The 1979 United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages imposed a duty to either prosecute or extradite hostage takers, but this convention has been ratified by only a few nations. Nevertheless, in contemporary times, hostage taking probably violates customary international law.
The Arabic term for hostages, raha’in, means persons held as security. Like most medieval legal systems, classical Islamic law permitted the exchange of hostages to ensure compliance with a treaty. However, Islamic law considered such hostages inviolable and prohibited killing them even if the enemy violated the treaty or killed their Muslim hostages. On the outbreak of hostilities Muslim forces were commanded to safely return the hostages to their country. Furthermore, Islamic law prohibited Muslim forces from using enemy personnel or civilians as human shields in an armed conflict. Muslim jurists disagreed, however, on whether Muslim forces should attack if the enemy uses Muslim prisoners.
There is some obscurity as to the distinction between prisoners of war and hostages. In classical Islamic law, muqallah (combatants) could be prisoners of war. Muslim jurists disagreed on whether a prisoner of war could be ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, killed, or freed. Other than combatants, any non-Muslim who does not have aman (safe conduct) or who is a national of a territory without a peace treaty with Muslims could be placed into captivity. In the opinion of most jurists aman can be granted by any Muslim. Additionally, if the non-Muslim wrongly, but reasonably, believes that he or she enjoys safe conduct, then he or she cannot be made a captive. Under no circumstances could a captive be used to make demands on a third party, hence, no captive could be used as a hostage.
Classical Islamic law was developed over a long span of time, primarily from the eighth to twelfth centuries, in response to specific historical circumstances. Additionally, classical Islamic law is represented by a variety of Sunni and Shi‘a schools of thought that often reached different conclusions on many issues. Consequently, Islamic law leaves a rich and diverse legacy to its modern adherents. From this complex legacy an argument for or against hostage taking can be constructed, since both positions are supported by certain historical practices.
Since independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of most Muslim states have ratified the Geneva Conventions and have observed the prohibition against the taking of hostages. Only a few Muslim states, however, have ratified the Hostages Convention. Hostage taking has continued to be an issue in the Middle East because of the fact that guerrilla groups or national liberation movements, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, have used the taking of hostages as a means to secure compliance with their political demands. Typically, these groups have claimed that their captives are prisoners of war, but international law does not permit the endangering of the life of a captive in order to make demands on a third party.
In the 1980s, the taking of hostages became a subject of debate among Shi‘a scholars when several pro-Iranian groups seized hostages in Lebanon. Some Shi‘a leaders, such as Husayn al-Musawi, justified the taking of hostages in 1987 as a practical necessity. Interestingly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) used the same logic in 1986 to defend the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979 and in Lebanon. Others, such as the Lebanese Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council, and Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a senior Lebanese Shi‘a cleric, have condemned hostage taking as un-Islamic and illegal. In 1992-1993 the Western hostages held in Lebanon were released, and the issue, for the time being, has fallen out of public discourse. Significantly, whether among proponents or opponents, serious discussions of the legality of hostage taking under Islamic law are very rare. Ultimately, hostage taking in the Middle East is motivated by political consideration and has little to do with any set of religious or legal injunctions.
raha’in see Hostages
Hostages (raha'in). Seizing, detaining, and threatening to injure a person in order to secure compliance with a condition or demand from a third party is the act of hostage taking. Before the advent of the modern regime of international law, belligerents often took hostages to secure compliance with requisitions, contributions, ransoms, bills, or treaties. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Hague Protocols I and II prohibited the taking of hostages in international and internal armed conflicts. The 1979 United Nations International Convention against the Taking of Hostages imposed a duty to either prosecute or extradite hostage takers, but this convention has been ratified by only a few nations. Nevertheless, in contemporary times, hostage taking probably violates customary international law.
The Arabic term for hostages, raha’in, means persons held as security. Like most medieval legal systems, classical Islamic law permitted the exchange of hostages to ensure compliance with a treaty. However, Islamic law considered such hostages inviolable and prohibited killing them even if the enemy violated the treaty or killed their Muslim hostages. On the outbreak of hostilities Muslim forces were commanded to safely return the hostages to their country. Furthermore, Islamic law prohibited Muslim forces from using enemy personnel or civilians as human shields in an armed conflict. Muslim jurists disagreed, however, on whether Muslim forces should attack if the enemy uses Muslim prisoners.
There is some obscurity as to the distinction between prisoners of war and hostages. In classical Islamic law, muqallah (combatants) could be prisoners of war. Muslim jurists disagreed on whether a prisoner of war could be ransomed, exchanged for Muslim prisoners, killed, or freed. Other than combatants, any non-Muslim who does not have aman (safe conduct) or who is a national of a territory without a peace treaty with Muslims could be placed into captivity. In the opinion of most jurists aman can be granted by any Muslim. Additionally, if the non-Muslim wrongly, but reasonably, believes that he or she enjoys safe conduct, then he or she cannot be made a captive. Under no circumstances could a captive be used to make demands on a third party, hence, no captive could be used as a hostage.
Classical Islamic law was developed over a long span of time, primarily from the eighth to twelfth centuries, in response to specific historical circumstances. Additionally, classical Islamic law is represented by a variety of Sunni and Shi‘a schools of thought that often reached different conclusions on many issues. Consequently, Islamic law leaves a rich and diverse legacy to its modern adherents. From this complex legacy an argument for or against hostage taking can be constructed, since both positions are supported by certain historical practices.
Since independence, in the 1950s and 1960s, the governments of most Muslim states have ratified the Geneva Conventions and have observed the prohibition against the taking of hostages. Only a few Muslim states, however, have ratified the Hostages Convention. Hostage taking has continued to be an issue in the Middle East because of the fact that guerrilla groups or national liberation movements, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, have used the taking of hostages as a means to secure compliance with their political demands. Typically, these groups have claimed that their captives are prisoners of war, but international law does not permit the endangering of the life of a captive in order to make demands on a third party.
In the 1980s, the taking of hostages became a subject of debate among Shi‘a scholars when several pro-Iranian groups seized hostages in Lebanon. Some Shi‘a leaders, such as Husayn al-Musawi, justified the taking of hostages in 1987 as a practical necessity. Interestingly, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) used the same logic in 1986 to defend the taking of hostages in Iran in 1979 and in Lebanon. Others, such as the Lebanese Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, deputy chairman of the Higher Islamic Shi‘a Council, and Ayatollah Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, a senior Lebanese Shi‘a cleric, have condemned hostage taking as un-Islamic and illegal. In 1992-1993 the Western hostages held in Lebanon were released, and the issue, for the time being, has fallen out of public discourse. Significantly, whether among proponents or opponents, serious discussions of the legality of hostage taking under Islamic law are very rare. Ultimately, hostage taking in the Middle East is motivated by political consideration and has little to do with any set of religious or legal injunctions.
raha’in see Hostages
Houris
Houris (in Arabic, in singular form, hur; in plural form, huriyah). The term is used in the Qur’an for the virgins of Paradise promised to the Believers. In Islam, a houri is one of the beautiful maidens who dwell in Paradise and reward true believers with the sensual pleasure of their companionship after death. The houris are perennially young and pure, although they have the power to conceive and bear children at the will of the faithful. Muslim theologians of modern times, offended by the unabashedly sensual picture of Paradise that the concept of the houris affords, have endeavored to place an allegorical interpretation upon them.
hur see Houris
huriyah see Houris
Houris (in Arabic, in singular form, hur; in plural form, huriyah). The term is used in the Qur’an for the virgins of Paradise promised to the Believers. In Islam, a houri is one of the beautiful maidens who dwell in Paradise and reward true believers with the sensual pleasure of their companionship after death. The houris are perennially young and pure, although they have the power to conceive and bear children at the will of the faithful. Muslim theologians of modern times, offended by the unabashedly sensual picture of Paradise that the concept of the houris affords, have endeavored to place an allegorical interpretation upon them.
hur see Houris
huriyah see Houris
Hrawi
Hrawi (Elias Hrawi) (September 4, 1926 - July 7, 2006). President of Lebanon (r.1989-1998). Hrawi was born into a landowning Maronite Christian family in Hawch Al-Umara, near the Zahle region. He was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, from which he graduated with a commerce degree. A successful farmer and businessman, he started a vegetable export business, dealing with major Swiss companies. He also headed the Beqaa sugarbeet cooperative. When his export business was destroyed by the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990, he switched his line of business to oil importing.
In 1972, Hrawi followed his brothers George and Joseph and became a parliamentary deputy, and in 1980, he was appointed Minister for Public Works. From 1980 to 1982, he served in the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works under President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. He concentrated on building bridges and highways to link all parts of the country.
On November 24, 1989 Hrawi was elected president of Lebanon with ninety percent of the votes from the parliament. A native of the Beqaa valley, Hrawi was ther first president to come from outside of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon. He was elected two days after the assassination of Rene Moawad, who had held office for just seventeen days.
His first challenge was to face Michel Aoun, the “temporary” prime minister, who would not bow to his presidency. He also started working for closer ties between Syria and Lebanon.
In August 1990, Hrawi was central in securing support for the forthcoming negotiations for the National Reconciliation Charter to be held in At Ta’if, as well as fighting Aoun. This campaign proved successful, as Aoun’s territory was reduced to one-third. Hrawi signed into law amendments to the Constitution that formalized the Taif Agreement reforms, giving a greater measure of power and influence to Lebanon's Muslim community. In October of 1990, together with his Syrian allies, Hrawi was able to defeat Aoun for good. This victory, on October 13, forced Aoun to surrender and marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War. This allowed Hrawi to create Greater Beirut, which was to be totally under government control.
On May 22, 1991, Hrawi signed the Treaty of fraternity, co-ordination and co-operation with Syria, in which Lebanon promised not to allow its territory to be used against Syria's interests. In 1992, in the general elections, Hrawi’s supporters gained more seats, making his power more effective.
In 1995, Hrawi had his presidency prolonged for an additional three years following a change in the constitution by the National Assembly.
In 1998, Hrawi stepped down as president, and was succeeded by Emile Lahoud.
As Hrawi’s Zahle region was under Syrian control through most of the civil war, he developed good relations with Damascus. This came to be central both to his rise to success, which was aided by Syria, and the direction of his politics through his nine years of presidency. Hrawi was the man in the driver seat when Lebanon achieved peace. However, his pro-Syrian politics did provoke many Lebanese nationalists.
The Lebanese people were divided in their opinion of Hrawi. Many appreciated his decisiveness in acting against the feuding militias and ending the civil war that had been tearing the country apart for fifteen years. He was also respected for his long-held conviction that national loyalty should take precedence over sectarian interests, and for promoting peaceful coexistence among Lebanon's religious factions. Some tried to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Others, however, accused him of inconsistency for disarming all Christian and most Muslim militias -- but not Hezbollah, a Shi'a fundamentalist militia. His critics also point out that he was very supportive of Syrian interests and charge that the cooperation treaty that he signed effectively turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony. He was also criticized by some for having the Constitution amended to extend his term of office by three years.
With his wife, Mouna Jammal, Hrawi had three sons and two daughters. He died of cancer at the American University Hospital in Beirut on July 7, 2006.
Elias Hrawi see Hrawi
Hrawi (Elias Hrawi) (September 4, 1926 - July 7, 2006). President of Lebanon (r.1989-1998). Hrawi was born into a landowning Maronite Christian family in Hawch Al-Umara, near the Zahle region. He was educated at Saint Joseph University in Beirut, Lebanon, from which he graduated with a commerce degree. A successful farmer and businessman, he started a vegetable export business, dealing with major Swiss companies. He also headed the Beqaa sugarbeet cooperative. When his export business was destroyed by the civil war that raged from 1975 to 1990, he switched his line of business to oil importing.
In 1972, Hrawi followed his brothers George and Joseph and became a parliamentary deputy, and in 1980, he was appointed Minister for Public Works. From 1980 to 1982, he served in the Cabinet as Minister of Public Works under President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan. He concentrated on building bridges and highways to link all parts of the country.
On November 24, 1989 Hrawi was elected president of Lebanon with ninety percent of the votes from the parliament. A native of the Beqaa valley, Hrawi was ther first president to come from outside of the Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon. He was elected two days after the assassination of Rene Moawad, who had held office for just seventeen days.
His first challenge was to face Michel Aoun, the “temporary” prime minister, who would not bow to his presidency. He also started working for closer ties between Syria and Lebanon.
In August 1990, Hrawi was central in securing support for the forthcoming negotiations for the National Reconciliation Charter to be held in At Ta’if, as well as fighting Aoun. This campaign proved successful, as Aoun’s territory was reduced to one-third. Hrawi signed into law amendments to the Constitution that formalized the Taif Agreement reforms, giving a greater measure of power and influence to Lebanon's Muslim community. In October of 1990, together with his Syrian allies, Hrawi was able to defeat Aoun for good. This victory, on October 13, forced Aoun to surrender and marked the end of the Lebanese Civil War. This allowed Hrawi to create Greater Beirut, which was to be totally under government control.
On May 22, 1991, Hrawi signed the Treaty of fraternity, co-ordination and co-operation with Syria, in which Lebanon promised not to allow its territory to be used against Syria's interests. In 1992, in the general elections, Hrawi’s supporters gained more seats, making his power more effective.
In 1995, Hrawi had his presidency prolonged for an additional three years following a change in the constitution by the National Assembly.
In 1998, Hrawi stepped down as president, and was succeeded by Emile Lahoud.
As Hrawi’s Zahle region was under Syrian control through most of the civil war, he developed good relations with Damascus. This came to be central both to his rise to success, which was aided by Syria, and the direction of his politics through his nine years of presidency. Hrawi was the man in the driver seat when Lebanon achieved peace. However, his pro-Syrian politics did provoke many Lebanese nationalists.
The Lebanese people were divided in their opinion of Hrawi. Many appreciated his decisiveness in acting against the feuding militias and ending the civil war that had been tearing the country apart for fifteen years. He was also respected for his long-held conviction that national loyalty should take precedence over sectarian interests, and for promoting peaceful coexistence among Lebanon's religious factions. Some tried to nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Others, however, accused him of inconsistency for disarming all Christian and most Muslim militias -- but not Hezbollah, a Shi'a fundamentalist militia. His critics also point out that he was very supportive of Syrian interests and charge that the cooperation treaty that he signed effectively turned Lebanon into a Syrian colony. He was also criticized by some for having the Constitution amended to extend his term of office by three years.
With his wife, Mouna Jammal, Hrawi had three sons and two daughters. He died of cancer at the American University Hospital in Beirut on July 7, 2006.
Elias Hrawi see Hrawi
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