Arabi
Arabi. African slave, probably a Muslim, who in 1757 and 1761 led several insurrections against colonists in Dutch Guiana. By the Treaty of Auca, he was granted the right to found a republic on the condition that he give no further asylum to African fugitives.
Arabi. African slave, probably a Muslim, who in 1757 and 1761 led several insurrections against colonists in Dutch Guiana. By the Treaty of Auca, he was granted the right to found a republic on the condition that he give no further asylum to African fugitives.
Arab League
Arab League. Organization of independent Arab countries, together with Palestine. All these states have Arabic as their dominating language, a prerequisite for membership. The full name of the organization is League of Arab States, and it aims at strengthening each country as well as all Arab countries together.
The Arab League (Arabic: al-Jāmiʻa al-ʻArabiyya), officially called the League of Arab States (Arabic: Jāmiʻat ad-Duwal al-ʻArabiyya), is a regional organization of Arab states in Southwest Asia, and North and Northeast Africa. It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 with six members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen joined as a member on May 5, 1945. The Arab League currently has 22 members. The main goal of the league is to "draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries."
Until the mid-twentieth century, the Arabs of modern times were under foreign domination, mainly Ottoman, British, and French. Their first opportunity to regain their independence and unity came when the Hashemite sharif, Husayn ibn ‘Ali, ruler of the Hijaz (d. 1931) launched the famous Arab revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman Empire, which at the time dominated most of the Arab East. Although Britain promised Husayn its support in his quest for Arab unity, the British had secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement a month earlier with France, dividing the Arab East between the two countries.
The Arab revolt accelerated Arab demands for independence and unity. Sharif Husayn’s sons, particularly Emir Faysal of Iraq (d. 1933) and Emir ‘Abd Allah (Abdullah) of Jordan (d. 1951), joined several Arab Muslim groups in pressuring London for Arab independence and unity. The British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, responded to Arab pressure by declaring to the House of Commons in May 1941 Britain’s support for the Arabs in achieving their unity through an institution that looked after their interests and tightened their ties. Emir ‘Abd Allah, who opposed the partitioning of Syria in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was the first Arab leader to endorse Eden’s statement. Iraq envisaged an “Arab League” that would include Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, but owing to Egyptian, Saudi, and Syrian opposition and British hesitation, the Hashemite endeavors were unsuccessful.
Britain tilted toward Egypt, the center for British activities in the region. Egypt was also viewed as a bridge between Christian Western Europe and the Arab Muslims. Throughout 1943 and 1944, Egyptian leaders discussed with officials and representatives from Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine the Arab proposals for some form of union. These officials consented to an Egyptian proposal for the establishment of an Arab League. Representatives of the Arab states met in September 1944 in Alexandria, Egypt, and eventually agreed on a structure in which member states would retain their sovereignty, and resolutions would be binding on all member states only when voting was unanimous. Majority decisions would be binding only on those states that accepted them. The league would strive to achieve cooperation among the Arab states and to maintain their independence and sovereignty.
Arab representatives met in Cairo and signed the Pact of the League of Arab States on March 22, 1945. This day is considered to be the birthdate of the Arab League. The founding members were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Transjordan.
The Arab League comprises six major bodies: the League Council, the supreme body of the organization composed of the representatives of the member states; Permanent Commissions, which include the important Political Committee; the General-Secretariat, comprising the Secretary-General, assistants, and other officials; the Common Defense Council; the Social and Economic Council; and the Specialized Arab Organizations. The goals of these bodies have been extensive, including encouraging close cooperation of the member states in political, security, economic, communications, cultural, social and financial matters.
The provisions of the pact outlawed the use of force for the settlement of disputes between member states, and the league is responsible for dealing with any dispute that may arise between members. Any threatened state has the right to request the league’s council to take the necessary steps to repel aggression.
There have been a number of achievements, particularly through the specialized organs of the league. In the area of social and economic welfare numerous agreements have been signed between member states, including joint ventures like the Arab Potash Company, the Arab Maritime Companies, the Arab Satellite Communications Organization, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. The last two institutions have extended considerable financial assistance for social and economic development in the Arab world, especially in the poorer states. Other specialized organizations prepare studies and present recommendations to help member states in solving their social and economic problems. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa extends financial assistance to several African Muslim states. In the area of cultural cooperation, the specialized Arab Organization for Science, Culture, and Education has organized numerous educational conferences and publishes extensive studies on science and education.
The league has also played an important role in political issues at the regional and international levels, as in championing the Palestinian cause. It continuously raises Arab and Islamic issues in international conferences such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Conference, and summits of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The league has contributed to solving inter-Arab conflicts and helps in strengthening Arab relations with foreign states such as those of Europe, Africa, and Latin America. To facilitate its work outside the Arab countries, the league has opened more than twenty offices around the world.
Nevertheless, the league has been viewed by several Arab states as an instrument of Egyptian foreign policy. To counter Egypt’s domination of the league, Saudi Arabia, supported by other Arab and Muslim states, founded the Muslim World League (1962), followed by the Islamic Pact (1965) and the OIC. In 1979, when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, Arab leaders met in March in Baghdad, expelled Egypt from the league, moved the league’s headquarters to Tunis, and appointed a Tunisian as the new secretary-general.
Soon after the Baghdad summit Iraq found itself at war with Iran (1980-1988), which contributed more to Arab divisions and rivalries and further weakened the league. Several Arab leaders, notably King Hussein of Jordan and King Hasan of Morocco, attempted to “re-establish” Arab solidarity. King Hussein was instrumental in the return of Egypt to the Arab League during the Arab summit of 1987 in Amman. Several Arab summits were organized by the league between 1988 and 1990, resulting in the return of the league to Cairo, although a “second center” remains in Tunis. The newfound solidarity was shattered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The league was divided as never before; the Tunisian secretary-general resigned his post, and an Egyptian was appointed in his place.
It is often said that the league is a mirror of Arab politics. Today more than ever, wataniyah and iqlimiyah (local and regional nationalism) rather than qawmiyah ‘arabiyah (Pan-Arabism) are the main driving forces in Arab politics. This portends a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Arab League in the near future.
The original goals of the Arab League were to gain independence for Arab states, as well as to stop Jewish immigration to Palestine, and hinder the establishment of a Jewish state. The notion of an Arab League began in 1942 when the British began promoting the idea of unity of the Arab world, in an attempt to make the Arabs allies during the war against Germany. A brief history of the Arab League reads as follows:
From September 1944 to October 1944, official representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Palestine met in Alexandria, Egypt, and agreed to form the League of Arab States.
On March 22, 1945, a new meeting in Cairo ratified the Pact of the League of Arab States, thereby giving birth to the Arab League.
In 1950, the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty (JDECT) was signed. The JDECT attempted to protect the member states from Israel.
In 1953, Libya became a member, followed by Sudan (in 1956); Morocco and Tunisia (in 1958); Kuwait (in 1961); Algeria (in 1962); South Yemen (in 1967); Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (in 1971); Mauritania (in 1973); Somalia and Palestine (in 1974); Djibouti (1977); the united Yemen (in 1990); and the Comoros (in 1993).
In 1958, the Arab League was recognized by the United Nations, and became the United Nations’ organization for education, science and culture in the Arab region.
In 1964, the first Arab League summit took place in Cairo, and the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) was established.
In 1976, at the 8th Summit in Cairo, the Arab League dispatched an Arab peacekeeping force to Lebanon.
In 1979, Egypt was suspended from the League, following its peace agreement with Israel. Additionally, the headquarters were moved from Egypt to Tunis, Tunisia.
In 1989, Egypt was readmitted into the League, and the headquarters were relocated back to Cairo.
In 1990, 12 out of the then 20 Arab League states condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The headquarters of the Arab League are in Cairo, Egypt. Its supreme organ is the council, where all member states are represented, and they each have one vote, independent of their respective number of inhabitants. Decisions in the council are binding only for those countries voting in favor of it. The council meets twice a year, in March and September, where the heads of state participate. The council can meet for special sessions if two or more member states request it. The organization is led by a secretary general who is elected by at least two-thirds of the votes in the council. The entire organization is divided into 14 departments. The Arab League is also the headquarters of 17 Arab trade unions.
The Arab League launched several programs to promote politics, economy, culture and social safety in the Arab world. Among other things, this involved structuring of the school curricula in schools in the Arab countries as well as preserving Arabic manuscripts. However, there was also much translation into Arabic and reproduction of foreign works. The Arab League helped fight crime in Arab countries, like drug trafficking. It also worked on improving the work situation for laborers, as well as the social situation for women, alongside promoting welfare of children. The Arab League was instrumental in creating an Arab postal union and a union for wireless communication and telecommunication. The League was also active in settling some disputes between Arab states, as well as limiting conflicts, especially in Lebanon. Since 1950, the League has had a joint defense program.
Through institutions such as the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) and the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League's Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), the Arab League facilitates political, economic, cultural, scientific and social programs designed to promote the interests of the Arab world. It has served as a forum for the member states to coordinate their policy positions, to deliberate on matters of common concern, to settle some Arab disputes, and to limit conflicts such as the 1958 Lebanon crisis. The League has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of many landmark documents promoting economic integration. One example is the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter which sets out the principles for economic activities in the region.
Each member state has one vote in the League Council, while decisions are binding only for those states that have voted for them. The aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members, and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third parties. Furthermore, the signing of an agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation on April 13, 1950 committed the signatories to coordination of military defense measures.
The Arab league has played an important role in shaping school curricula, advancing the role of women in the Arab societies, promoting child welfare, encouraging youth and sports programs, preserving Arab cultural heritage, and fostering cultural exchanges between the member states.[citation needed] Literacy campaigns have been launched, intellectual works reproduced, and modern technical terminology is translated for the use within member states. The league encourages measures against crime and drug abuse, and deals with labor issues—particularly among the emigrant Arab workforce.
The Arab League was founded in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan from 1946), and Yemen. There was a continual increase in membership during the second half of the 20th century, with additional 15 Arab states and 4 observers being admitted.
Egypt's membership was suspended in 1979 after it signed the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty, and the League's headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis. In 1987, Arab countries restored diplomatic relations with Egypt and the country was readmitted to the league in 1989 while the league's headquarters moved back to Cairo. In September 2006, Venezuela was accepted as an observer, and India in 2007.
Four countries are observer states — a status that entitles them to express their opinion and give advice but denies them voting rights.
The current members and observers of the Arab League are listed below along with their admission dates.
Egypt, March 22, 1945
Iraq, March 22, 1945
Jordan, March 22, 1945
Lebanon, March 22, 1945
Saudi Arabia, March 22, 1945
Syria, March 22, 1945
Yemen, May 5, 1945
Sudan, January 19, 1956
Libya, March 28, 1956
Moroccod, October 1, 1958
Tunisia, October 1, 1958
Kuwait, July 20, 1961
Algeria, August 16, 1962
Bahrain, September 11, 1971
Qatar, September 11, 1971
Oman, September 29, 1971
United Arab Emirates, December 6, 1971
Mauritania, November 26, 1973
Somalia, February 14, 1974
Palestinee, September 9, 1976
Djibouti, September 4, 1977
Comoros, November 20, 1993
Eritrea, observer since 2003
Brazil, observer since 2003
Venezuela, observer since 2006
India, observer since 2007
The area of the voting members of the Arab League covers around 14 million km2 and straddles two continents: Western Asia as well as Northern and Northeastern Africa. The area consists of large arid deserts, namely the Sahara. Nevertheless, it also contains several very fertile lands, such as the Nile Valley, the High Atlas Mountains, and the Fertile Crescent which stretches from Iraq over Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. The area comprises also deep forests in southern Arabia and southern Sudan as well as the major parts of the world's longest river—the Nile.
The Charter of the Arab League endorsed the principle of an Arab homeland while respecting the sovereignty of the individual member states. The internal regulations of the Council of the League and the committees were agreed in October 1951. Those of the Secretariat-General were agreed in May 1953.
Since then, governance of the Arab League has been based on the duality of supra-national institutions and the sovereignty of the member states. Preservation of individual statehood derived its strengths from the natural preference of ruling elites to maintain their power and independence in decision making. Moreover, the fear of the richer that the poorer may share their wealth in the name of Arab nationalism, the feuds among Arab rulers, and the influence of external powers that might oppose Arab unity can be seen as obstacles towards a deeper integration of the league.
Mindful of their previous announcements in support of the Arabs of Palestine the framers of the Pact were determined to include them within the league from its inauguration. This was done by means of an annex that declared:
“ Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a system of government for her. Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned de jure than the independence of any of the other Arab States. [...] Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence ”
At the Cairo Summit of 1964, the Arab League initiated the creation of an organization representing the Palestinian people. The first Palestinian National Council convened in East Jerusalem on May 29, 1964. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded during this meeting on June 2, 1964.
At the Beirut Summit on March 28, 2002 the league adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, a Saudi-inspired peace plan for the Arab–Israeli conflict. The initiative offered full normalization of the relations with Israel. In exchange, Israel was demanded to withdraw from all occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.
The Peace Initiative was again endorsed at 2007 in the Riyadh Summit. In July 2007, the Arab League sent a mission, consisting of the Jordanian and Egyptian foreign ministers, to Israel to promote the initiative. The mission was lukewarmly received by Israel.
The Arab League is a culturally and ethnically diverse association of 22 member states, although a vast majority of the league consist of Arab people. As of January 1, 2007, about 314,000,000 people live in the states of the Arab League.
The Arab League resembles the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and the African Union, in that it has primarily political aims. However, membership in the league is based on culture rather than geographical location. In this respect, the Arab League resembles organizations such as the Latin Union or the Caribbean Community.
The Arab League differs notably from the European Union, in that it has not achieved a significant degree of regional integration and the organization itself has no direct relations with the citizens of its member states. However, the Arab League is based on principles that support and promote a unified Arab nationalism and a common position among Arabic states on various issues.
Secretaries General of the Arab League have been:
Abdul Rahman Azzam 1945 to 1952
Abdul Khalek Hassouna 1952 to 1972
Mahmoud Riad 1972 to 1979
Chedli Klibi 1979 to 1990
Assad al-Assad 1990 to 1991
Ahmad Esmat Abd al Meguid 1991 to 2001
Amr Moussa 2001 to date
League of Arab States see Arab League.
al-Jāmiʻa al-ʻArabiyya see Arab League.
Jāmiʻat ad-Duwal al-ʻArabiyya see Arab League.
Arab League. Organization of independent Arab countries, together with Palestine. All these states have Arabic as their dominating language, a prerequisite for membership. The full name of the organization is League of Arab States, and it aims at strengthening each country as well as all Arab countries together.
The Arab League (Arabic: al-Jāmiʻa al-ʻArabiyya), officially called the League of Arab States (Arabic: Jāmiʻat ad-Duwal al-ʻArabiyya), is a regional organization of Arab states in Southwest Asia, and North and Northeast Africa. It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 with six members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen joined as a member on May 5, 1945. The Arab League currently has 22 members. The main goal of the league is to "draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries."
Until the mid-twentieth century, the Arabs of modern times were under foreign domination, mainly Ottoman, British, and French. Their first opportunity to regain their independence and unity came when the Hashemite sharif, Husayn ibn ‘Ali, ruler of the Hijaz (d. 1931) launched the famous Arab revolt in 1916 against the Ottoman Empire, which at the time dominated most of the Arab East. Although Britain promised Husayn its support in his quest for Arab unity, the British had secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement a month earlier with France, dividing the Arab East between the two countries.
The Arab revolt accelerated Arab demands for independence and unity. Sharif Husayn’s sons, particularly Emir Faysal of Iraq (d. 1933) and Emir ‘Abd Allah (Abdullah) of Jordan (d. 1951), joined several Arab Muslim groups in pressuring London for Arab independence and unity. The British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, responded to Arab pressure by declaring to the House of Commons in May 1941 Britain’s support for the Arabs in achieving their unity through an institution that looked after their interests and tightened their ties. Emir ‘Abd Allah, who opposed the partitioning of Syria in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was the first Arab leader to endorse Eden’s statement. Iraq envisaged an “Arab League” that would include Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, but owing to Egyptian, Saudi, and Syrian opposition and British hesitation, the Hashemite endeavors were unsuccessful.
Britain tilted toward Egypt, the center for British activities in the region. Egypt was also viewed as a bridge between Christian Western Europe and the Arab Muslims. Throughout 1943 and 1944, Egyptian leaders discussed with officials and representatives from Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine the Arab proposals for some form of union. These officials consented to an Egyptian proposal for the establishment of an Arab League. Representatives of the Arab states met in September 1944 in Alexandria, Egypt, and eventually agreed on a structure in which member states would retain their sovereignty, and resolutions would be binding on all member states only when voting was unanimous. Majority decisions would be binding only on those states that accepted them. The league would strive to achieve cooperation among the Arab states and to maintain their independence and sovereignty.
Arab representatives met in Cairo and signed the Pact of the League of Arab States on March 22, 1945. This day is considered to be the birthdate of the Arab League. The founding members were Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Transjordan.
The Arab League comprises six major bodies: the League Council, the supreme body of the organization composed of the representatives of the member states; Permanent Commissions, which include the important Political Committee; the General-Secretariat, comprising the Secretary-General, assistants, and other officials; the Common Defense Council; the Social and Economic Council; and the Specialized Arab Organizations. The goals of these bodies have been extensive, including encouraging close cooperation of the member states in political, security, economic, communications, cultural, social and financial matters.
The provisions of the pact outlawed the use of force for the settlement of disputes between member states, and the league is responsible for dealing with any dispute that may arise between members. Any threatened state has the right to request the league’s council to take the necessary steps to repel aggression.
There have been a number of achievements, particularly through the specialized organs of the league. In the area of social and economic welfare numerous agreements have been signed between member states, including joint ventures like the Arab Potash Company, the Arab Maritime Companies, the Arab Satellite Communications Organization, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. The last two institutions have extended considerable financial assistance for social and economic development in the Arab world, especially in the poorer states. Other specialized organizations prepare studies and present recommendations to help member states in solving their social and economic problems. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa extends financial assistance to several African Muslim states. In the area of cultural cooperation, the specialized Arab Organization for Science, Culture, and Education has organized numerous educational conferences and publishes extensive studies on science and education.
The league has also played an important role in political issues at the regional and international levels, as in championing the Palestinian cause. It continuously raises Arab and Islamic issues in international conferences such as the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Conference, and summits of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The league has contributed to solving inter-Arab conflicts and helps in strengthening Arab relations with foreign states such as those of Europe, Africa, and Latin America. To facilitate its work outside the Arab countries, the league has opened more than twenty offices around the world.
Nevertheless, the league has been viewed by several Arab states as an instrument of Egyptian foreign policy. To counter Egypt’s domination of the league, Saudi Arabia, supported by other Arab and Muslim states, founded the Muslim World League (1962), followed by the Islamic Pact (1965) and the OIC. In 1979, when Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, Arab leaders met in March in Baghdad, expelled Egypt from the league, moved the league’s headquarters to Tunis, and appointed a Tunisian as the new secretary-general.
Soon after the Baghdad summit Iraq found itself at war with Iran (1980-1988), which contributed more to Arab divisions and rivalries and further weakened the league. Several Arab leaders, notably King Hussein of Jordan and King Hasan of Morocco, attempted to “re-establish” Arab solidarity. King Hussein was instrumental in the return of Egypt to the Arab League during the Arab summit of 1987 in Amman. Several Arab summits were organized by the league between 1988 and 1990, resulting in the return of the league to Cairo, although a “second center” remains in Tunis. The newfound solidarity was shattered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The league was divided as never before; the Tunisian secretary-general resigned his post, and an Egyptian was appointed in his place.
It is often said that the league is a mirror of Arab politics. Today more than ever, wataniyah and iqlimiyah (local and regional nationalism) rather than qawmiyah ‘arabiyah (Pan-Arabism) are the main driving forces in Arab politics. This portends a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Arab League in the near future.
The original goals of the Arab League were to gain independence for Arab states, as well as to stop Jewish immigration to Palestine, and hinder the establishment of a Jewish state. The notion of an Arab League began in 1942 when the British began promoting the idea of unity of the Arab world, in an attempt to make the Arabs allies during the war against Germany. A brief history of the Arab League reads as follows:
From September 1944 to October 1944, official representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Palestine met in Alexandria, Egypt, and agreed to form the League of Arab States.
On March 22, 1945, a new meeting in Cairo ratified the Pact of the League of Arab States, thereby giving birth to the Arab League.
In 1950, the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty (JDECT) was signed. The JDECT attempted to protect the member states from Israel.
In 1953, Libya became a member, followed by Sudan (in 1956); Morocco and Tunisia (in 1958); Kuwait (in 1961); Algeria (in 1962); South Yemen (in 1967); Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (in 1971); Mauritania (in 1973); Somalia and Palestine (in 1974); Djibouti (1977); the united Yemen (in 1990); and the Comoros (in 1993).
In 1958, the Arab League was recognized by the United Nations, and became the United Nations’ organization for education, science and culture in the Arab region.
In 1964, the first Arab League summit took place in Cairo, and the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) was established.
In 1976, at the 8th Summit in Cairo, the Arab League dispatched an Arab peacekeeping force to Lebanon.
In 1979, Egypt was suspended from the League, following its peace agreement with Israel. Additionally, the headquarters were moved from Egypt to Tunis, Tunisia.
In 1989, Egypt was readmitted into the League, and the headquarters were relocated back to Cairo.
In 1990, 12 out of the then 20 Arab League states condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The headquarters of the Arab League are in Cairo, Egypt. Its supreme organ is the council, where all member states are represented, and they each have one vote, independent of their respective number of inhabitants. Decisions in the council are binding only for those countries voting in favor of it. The council meets twice a year, in March and September, where the heads of state participate. The council can meet for special sessions if two or more member states request it. The organization is led by a secretary general who is elected by at least two-thirds of the votes in the council. The entire organization is divided into 14 departments. The Arab League is also the headquarters of 17 Arab trade unions.
The Arab League launched several programs to promote politics, economy, culture and social safety in the Arab world. Among other things, this involved structuring of the school curricula in schools in the Arab countries as well as preserving Arabic manuscripts. However, there was also much translation into Arabic and reproduction of foreign works. The Arab League helped fight crime in Arab countries, like drug trafficking. It also worked on improving the work situation for laborers, as well as the social situation for women, alongside promoting welfare of children. The Arab League was instrumental in creating an Arab postal union and a union for wireless communication and telecommunication. The League was also active in settling some disputes between Arab states, as well as limiting conflicts, especially in Lebanon. Since 1950, the League has had a joint defense program.
Through institutions such as the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALESCO) and the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League's Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), the Arab League facilitates political, economic, cultural, scientific and social programs designed to promote the interests of the Arab world. It has served as a forum for the member states to coordinate their policy positions, to deliberate on matters of common concern, to settle some Arab disputes, and to limit conflicts such as the 1958 Lebanon crisis. The League has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of many landmark documents promoting economic integration. One example is the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter which sets out the principles for economic activities in the region.
Each member state has one vote in the League Council, while decisions are binding only for those states that have voted for them. The aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members, and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third parties. Furthermore, the signing of an agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation on April 13, 1950 committed the signatories to coordination of military defense measures.
The Arab league has played an important role in shaping school curricula, advancing the role of women in the Arab societies, promoting child welfare, encouraging youth and sports programs, preserving Arab cultural heritage, and fostering cultural exchanges between the member states.[citation needed] Literacy campaigns have been launched, intellectual works reproduced, and modern technical terminology is translated for the use within member states. The league encourages measures against crime and drug abuse, and deals with labor issues—particularly among the emigrant Arab workforce.
The Arab League was founded in Cairo in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan (Jordan from 1946), and Yemen. There was a continual increase in membership during the second half of the 20th century, with additional 15 Arab states and 4 observers being admitted.
Egypt's membership was suspended in 1979 after it signed the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty, and the League's headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis. In 1987, Arab countries restored diplomatic relations with Egypt and the country was readmitted to the league in 1989 while the league's headquarters moved back to Cairo. In September 2006, Venezuela was accepted as an observer, and India in 2007.
Four countries are observer states — a status that entitles them to express their opinion and give advice but denies them voting rights.
The current members and observers of the Arab League are listed below along with their admission dates.
Egypt, March 22, 1945
Iraq, March 22, 1945
Jordan, March 22, 1945
Lebanon, March 22, 1945
Saudi Arabia, March 22, 1945
Syria, March 22, 1945
Yemen, May 5, 1945
Sudan, January 19, 1956
Libya, March 28, 1956
Moroccod, October 1, 1958
Tunisia, October 1, 1958
Kuwait, July 20, 1961
Algeria, August 16, 1962
Bahrain, September 11, 1971
Qatar, September 11, 1971
Oman, September 29, 1971
United Arab Emirates, December 6, 1971
Mauritania, November 26, 1973
Somalia, February 14, 1974
Palestinee, September 9, 1976
Djibouti, September 4, 1977
Comoros, November 20, 1993
Eritrea, observer since 2003
Brazil, observer since 2003
Venezuela, observer since 2006
India, observer since 2007
The area of the voting members of the Arab League covers around 14 million km2 and straddles two continents: Western Asia as well as Northern and Northeastern Africa. The area consists of large arid deserts, namely the Sahara. Nevertheless, it also contains several very fertile lands, such as the Nile Valley, the High Atlas Mountains, and the Fertile Crescent which stretches from Iraq over Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. The area comprises also deep forests in southern Arabia and southern Sudan as well as the major parts of the world's longest river—the Nile.
The Charter of the Arab League endorsed the principle of an Arab homeland while respecting the sovereignty of the individual member states. The internal regulations of the Council of the League and the committees were agreed in October 1951. Those of the Secretariat-General were agreed in May 1953.
Since then, governance of the Arab League has been based on the duality of supra-national institutions and the sovereignty of the member states. Preservation of individual statehood derived its strengths from the natural preference of ruling elites to maintain their power and independence in decision making. Moreover, the fear of the richer that the poorer may share their wealth in the name of Arab nationalism, the feuds among Arab rulers, and the influence of external powers that might oppose Arab unity can be seen as obstacles towards a deeper integration of the league.
Mindful of their previous announcements in support of the Arabs of Palestine the framers of the Pact were determined to include them within the league from its inauguration. This was done by means of an annex that declared:
“ Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a system of government for her. Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned de jure than the independence of any of the other Arab States. [...] Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence ”
At the Cairo Summit of 1964, the Arab League initiated the creation of an organization representing the Palestinian people. The first Palestinian National Council convened in East Jerusalem on May 29, 1964. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was founded during this meeting on June 2, 1964.
At the Beirut Summit on March 28, 2002 the league adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, a Saudi-inspired peace plan for the Arab–Israeli conflict. The initiative offered full normalization of the relations with Israel. In exchange, Israel was demanded to withdraw from all occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, to recognize an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital, as well as a "just solution" for the Palestinian refugees.
The Peace Initiative was again endorsed at 2007 in the Riyadh Summit. In July 2007, the Arab League sent a mission, consisting of the Jordanian and Egyptian foreign ministers, to Israel to promote the initiative. The mission was lukewarmly received by Israel.
The Arab League is a culturally and ethnically diverse association of 22 member states, although a vast majority of the league consist of Arab people. As of January 1, 2007, about 314,000,000 people live in the states of the Arab League.
The Arab League resembles the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe, and the African Union, in that it has primarily political aims. However, membership in the league is based on culture rather than geographical location. In this respect, the Arab League resembles organizations such as the Latin Union or the Caribbean Community.
The Arab League differs notably from the European Union, in that it has not achieved a significant degree of regional integration and the organization itself has no direct relations with the citizens of its member states. However, the Arab League is based on principles that support and promote a unified Arab nationalism and a common position among Arabic states on various issues.
Secretaries General of the Arab League have been:
Abdul Rahman Azzam 1945 to 1952
Abdul Khalek Hassouna 1952 to 1972
Mahmoud Riad 1972 to 1979
Chedli Klibi 1979 to 1990
Assad al-Assad 1990 to 1991
Ahmad Esmat Abd al Meguid 1991 to 2001
Amr Moussa 2001 to date
League of Arab States see Arab League.
al-Jāmiʻa al-ʻArabiyya see Arab League.
Jāmiʻat ad-Duwal al-ʻArabiyya see Arab League.
Arab Nationalists
Arab Nationalists. Advocates of Arab nationalism. Like other strands of third-world nationalism, qawmiyah ‘arabiyah or Arab nationalism cannot be understood apart from its anti-colonial ethos and its glorification of the collectivity’s origins and history in the face of Western dominance. These general components of nationalist doctrine raise, however, important issues in the case of Arab nationalism. For instance, can anti-colonial movements based on Islamic reformism (like those of al-Afghani or 'Abduh) or regional empire builders (Egypt’s nineteenth century ruler Muhammad ‘Ali and his son Ibrahim) be considered precursors of the doctrine? Some have looked even further back to emphasize the role of eighteenth century Salafiyah Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism that preached a pure, “uncontaminated” Islam.
Arab nationalism (Arabic: al-qawmiyya al-`arabiyya) is a nationalist ideology which rose to prominence amongst Arabs from the early 20th century onwards.[1] Its central premise is that the peoples and countries of the Arab World, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea, constitute one nation and are bound together by their common linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage.[2] One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end, or at least the minimization, of direct Western influence in the Arab World, and the removal of those Arab governments considered to be dependent upon acquiescence to Western interests to the detriment of their people. Pan-Arabism is a related concept, which not only asserts the singularity of the "Arab Nation", but calls for the creation of a single Arab state. Thus, whilst all Pan-Arabists are Arab nationalists, not all Arab nationalists are Pan-Arabists.
Arab nationalism as a political movement is essentially a twentieth century product. Its bases and components may, however, originate with the presence of the Arabic language itself or with the Arabs’ social, intellectual, and political culture. Arab nationalism has been centered on “Arabness” and hence on the important question “Who is an Arab?” At present, there is consensus around the view of Sati‘ al-Husri (1882-1962) that Arabs are identified by their language, having Arabic as their mother tongue and consciously identifying with it. Indeed, al-Husri defined nationalism as love of the nation and organic identification with it, and the bases of such a national collectivity are language and common history. To these bases, some have added common traditions and interests as well as common culture shaped by the same environment. In its most modern form (with Nasser, the Ba‘th, or Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi), Arab nationalism aims at the political reunification of all Arabic speaking states from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, and their transformation from a Kulturnation into a Staatnation -- from a cultural entity into a political one.
The interplay between the doctrine’s cultural and political phases attracts attention to the sequences in its evolution, for the movement acquired its present form only gradually. Its vicissitudes were a function of various factors: intervention of external powers in the region; defining events or political upheavals that shook the area; the type of leadership at the head of the movement; and its competition with two other foci of people’s loyalty – the territorial state and Pan-Islamism. The movement’s evolution may be divided into four phases.
Ottomanism and Islamic solidarity were challenged by modernizing forces at the empire’s center and by the province’s demand for Arab distinctiveness. Though interest in Western science and technology united the Young Turks and many Arabs, the drive of the Committee of Union and Progress for turkification alienated the Arabs and accelerated their demand for autonomy. Cultural clubs – organized by Lebanese Christians in collaboration with American missionaries – proliferated (al-Yaziji, 1819-1871; al-Shidyaq, 1805-1887). When the Syrian Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) pleaded for girls’ education or the Egyptian Rifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) emphasized watan (fatherland), they constituted secularist challenges to the Islamic establishment of the Turkish caliph. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1848-1902) tried to find a compromise and suggested in his Umm al-Qura the return of the caliphate to its originators, the Arabs. The first Arab nationalist conference, limited to Asian Arabs, was held in Paris in 1913. World War I marked the beginning of an explicitly political phase. Sharif Husayn and his sons, in collaboration with Britain and France and with the active help of T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), revolted against the empire to establish a single Arab kingdom in its Arab provinces.
Rather than forming a unified Arab kingdom, however, the Arab provinces were divided between France and Britain according to the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. In November 1917, as well, Lord Balfour promised Palestine as a national home for the Jews. Directed against European domination (rather than as before against Muslim authority), the basic We/They dichotomy of nationalism facilitated the movement’s politicization. African Arabs were still excluded. Given the predominantly hereditary leadership at the time and the increasing imposition of European type administrative divisions, Arab nationalism was locally rather than regionally oriented. Pan-Arab writings such as al-Husri’s, with their secularist orientation and objective of a unified Arab state, compensated for this localism.
Increasingly dominated by a new middle class (military or otherwise), this period was dense with major political events including the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, which, with its exclusive Arab membership, institutionalized the Arab/non-Arab distinction in the region. In addition, the disastrous end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war made Palestine a core issue in inter-Arab politics and in the Arabs’ relations with outside powers. Moreover, disillusioned young officers soon toppled corrupt civilian regimes (three coups in Syria alone in 1949) and came to be the region’s new leaders as Gamal Abdel Nasser did after the 1952 Egyptian coup. Nasserist charisma, whether or not in alliance with the Ba ‘th, aimed at the establishment of a unified Arab state, non-aligned and with its own development model of Arab socialism. This “third road” policy represented a consensus among different nationalist forces, from revolutionary Algeria to opposition forces in the Gulf.
Another, more activist conceptualization, distinct from that of Michel ‘Aflaq and the Ba‘th establishment, was also in the making. Its reading of unification experiences in history resulted in the distinction between secondary and primary determinants. Secondary determinants such as language and history are necessary but not sufficient, whereas primary determinants are both necessary and sufficient. The latter include a base-region or pole of attraction (e.g., Egypt), and a transnational charismatic leadership (e.g., Nasser), and an external threat (e.g., Israel and Western encroachment.). Unity between Egypt and Syria, which produced the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961, seemed to confirm this theory. However, its dissolution of the union and the failure of unity negotiations in 1963, which also included the Ba‘thist Iraqis, cast doubt on the theory’s immediate applicability. A protracted civil war in Yemen following Imam Badr’s overthrow, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia championing opposite camps, deepened Arab divisions. Regionally, opposition intensified between radical Arab nationalism and a conservative Pan-Islamic strategy that emphasized the convening of Islamic conferences promoted by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. In this context, the region was shaken to its roots in 1967 by the third Arab-Israeli war. The magnitude of the Arab defeat restructured regional leadership, culminating in the decline of revisionist forces and the rise of the oil-producing powers. The Khartoum Arab Summit of August 1967 sealed the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen and resulted in Egyptian dependency on oil-state subsidies.
Influential leadership bases shifted from thawrah (revolution) to tharwah (wealth), from ideologists and officers to rich royalty and “wealthy merchants who flitted between East and West, between royal palaces and the offices of oil companies (examples are Kamal Adham, Mahdi al-Tajir, and Adnan Khashoggi).” The public was more tempted by the riches of the oil fields than by the hardships of the battlefields.
Neither the 1969 coup of the young and fiery al-Qaddafi nor the revolutionary but stateless Palestinians could stop the decline of the radical pole. Quantitative indicators confirm this. By 1979, fifty-five percent of the capital of inter-Arab economic joint ventures was contributed by oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Libya. The country that contributes the most capital is usually the host country for the project’s headquarters; thus the oil states were becoming the locale of an increasing number of new Arab organizations. In 1970, Cairo was host to twenty-nine, or sixty-five percent, of these organizations, Iraq hosted none, and Saudi Arabia only one. Eight years later, Baghdad had become the locale for twelve organizations, thereby occupying the second place after Egypt. Saudi Arabia was in third place with eight organizations. In addition, fewer Arab League meetings were held in Egypt and more in the oil states. The proportion of meetings held in Cairo decreased from 70.5 percent in 1977 to 42.2 percent in 1978. Egypt’s share in the Arab League budget also dropped; it was above 40 percent until the late 1950s but declined until 1978 – the year the Arab League moved to Tunis – when it was only 13.7 percent, equivalent to that of Kuwait.
It might be supposed that the movement of migrant labor from densely populated Egypt or the West Bank to the Gulf, and the transfer of capital in the form of remittances and investments in the opposite direction, would promote Arab integration. Economic activities, however, are usually pragmatic and hence may serve to dampen and subordinate the revolutionary ethos, promoting stability rather than revolutionary change. Nasser’s death in 1970 amid the ashes of the Jordanian-Palestinian civil war concretized the change by eliminating one of the postulated primary determinants of political unification – charismatic leadership. Egyptian rapprochement with Israel, culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords, seemed to take away the second primary determinant, the existence of a threat. This rise of independent diplomacy concerning one of the most sacred causes of the Pan-Arab ideal confirmed – if the need existed – the primacy of raison d’etat over raison de la nation. Moreover, hindsight tells us, it presaged the integration of Israel as a member of the regional system. This diluted Arab regional exclusiveness and promoted an enlarged Middle East. Ironically, the radical pole was engaged from quite a different direction in an equally diluting process when, in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Syria, Libya, and Algeria sided with non-Arab revolutionary Islamic Iran against Arab Iraq. Harassed on two fronts by territorial raison d’etat and revolutionary Islamism, Arab nationalism was wounded but not dead. Its troubles reflected both its own weakness as a political program and the disappearance of the simple world of heroic politics and categorical formulas.
To acquire control over a complex situation, Arabs tried subregional groupings: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in the early 1980s; the Union du Maghreb Arabe (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania); and the Arab Cooperation Council (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen) in the late 1980s. This was a way of escaping the double bind of nation versus state and replacing it with a sequential logic. But this strategy (with the exception of the GCC) did not survive the political upheaval of the second Gulf War following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In its discourse, Iraq appealed to the opposition of many Arabs to artificial colonial frontiers and the division of the Arab nation, and to their demand for a fairer re-distribution of Arab wealth between haves and have nots. Though tempted, many Arabs also mistrusted Saddam Hussein’s cynical exploitation of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Arabs both at the state level and in the transnational civil society were seriously divided and traumatized, with the Arab League (now back in Cairo) paralyzed and foreign troops stationed around their holy places in Saudi Arabia poised to decide the issue for them.
By invoking a jihad against the presence of foreign troops in the area of the Muslim holy places, Iraqi strategy was to show that Arab nationalism and revolutionary Islam could be united in their opposition to the status quo and to outside powers. In fact, the two movements are overlapping rather than identical, hence their occasional mutual tension. Nevertheless, increased dialogue between the representatives of the two is an increasingly problematic proposition with implications not just in a regional context but now on a global scale.
Arab nationalist thinkers
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Michel Aflaq
George Antonius
Shakib Arslan
Zaki al-Arsuzi
Ma'an Bashour
George Habash
Sati' al-Husri
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi
Amin al-Rihani
Constantin Zureiq
Prominent Arab nationalist heads of state
Hafiz al-Assad
Ahmed Ben Bella
Saddam Hussein
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Muammar al-Gaddafi
Shukri al-Quwatli
Arab Nationalists. Advocates of Arab nationalism. Like other strands of third-world nationalism, qawmiyah ‘arabiyah or Arab nationalism cannot be understood apart from its anti-colonial ethos and its glorification of the collectivity’s origins and history in the face of Western dominance. These general components of nationalist doctrine raise, however, important issues in the case of Arab nationalism. For instance, can anti-colonial movements based on Islamic reformism (like those of al-Afghani or 'Abduh) or regional empire builders (Egypt’s nineteenth century ruler Muhammad ‘Ali and his son Ibrahim) be considered precursors of the doctrine? Some have looked even further back to emphasize the role of eighteenth century Salafiyah Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism that preached a pure, “uncontaminated” Islam.
Arab nationalism (Arabic: al-qawmiyya al-`arabiyya) is a nationalist ideology which rose to prominence amongst Arabs from the early 20th century onwards.[1] Its central premise is that the peoples and countries of the Arab World, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea, constitute one nation and are bound together by their common linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage.[2] One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end, or at least the minimization, of direct Western influence in the Arab World, and the removal of those Arab governments considered to be dependent upon acquiescence to Western interests to the detriment of their people. Pan-Arabism is a related concept, which not only asserts the singularity of the "Arab Nation", but calls for the creation of a single Arab state. Thus, whilst all Pan-Arabists are Arab nationalists, not all Arab nationalists are Pan-Arabists.
Arab nationalism as a political movement is essentially a twentieth century product. Its bases and components may, however, originate with the presence of the Arabic language itself or with the Arabs’ social, intellectual, and political culture. Arab nationalism has been centered on “Arabness” and hence on the important question “Who is an Arab?” At present, there is consensus around the view of Sati‘ al-Husri (1882-1962) that Arabs are identified by their language, having Arabic as their mother tongue and consciously identifying with it. Indeed, al-Husri defined nationalism as love of the nation and organic identification with it, and the bases of such a national collectivity are language and common history. To these bases, some have added common traditions and interests as well as common culture shaped by the same environment. In its most modern form (with Nasser, the Ba‘th, or Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi), Arab nationalism aims at the political reunification of all Arabic speaking states from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean, and their transformation from a Kulturnation into a Staatnation -- from a cultural entity into a political one.
The interplay between the doctrine’s cultural and political phases attracts attention to the sequences in its evolution, for the movement acquired its present form only gradually. Its vicissitudes were a function of various factors: intervention of external powers in the region; defining events or political upheavals that shook the area; the type of leadership at the head of the movement; and its competition with two other foci of people’s loyalty – the territorial state and Pan-Islamism. The movement’s evolution may be divided into four phases.
Ottomanism and Islamic solidarity were challenged by modernizing forces at the empire’s center and by the province’s demand for Arab distinctiveness. Though interest in Western science and technology united the Young Turks and many Arabs, the drive of the Committee of Union and Progress for turkification alienated the Arabs and accelerated their demand for autonomy. Cultural clubs – organized by Lebanese Christians in collaboration with American missionaries – proliferated (al-Yaziji, 1819-1871; al-Shidyaq, 1805-1887). When the Syrian Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) pleaded for girls’ education or the Egyptian Rifa‘ah Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) emphasized watan (fatherland), they constituted secularist challenges to the Islamic establishment of the Turkish caliph. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1848-1902) tried to find a compromise and suggested in his Umm al-Qura the return of the caliphate to its originators, the Arabs. The first Arab nationalist conference, limited to Asian Arabs, was held in Paris in 1913. World War I marked the beginning of an explicitly political phase. Sharif Husayn and his sons, in collaboration with Britain and France and with the active help of T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), revolted against the empire to establish a single Arab kingdom in its Arab provinces.
Rather than forming a unified Arab kingdom, however, the Arab provinces were divided between France and Britain according to the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. In November 1917, as well, Lord Balfour promised Palestine as a national home for the Jews. Directed against European domination (rather than as before against Muslim authority), the basic We/They dichotomy of nationalism facilitated the movement’s politicization. African Arabs were still excluded. Given the predominantly hereditary leadership at the time and the increasing imposition of European type administrative divisions, Arab nationalism was locally rather than regionally oriented. Pan-Arab writings such as al-Husri’s, with their secularist orientation and objective of a unified Arab state, compensated for this localism.
Increasingly dominated by a new middle class (military or otherwise), this period was dense with major political events including the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, which, with its exclusive Arab membership, institutionalized the Arab/non-Arab distinction in the region. In addition, the disastrous end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war made Palestine a core issue in inter-Arab politics and in the Arabs’ relations with outside powers. Moreover, disillusioned young officers soon toppled corrupt civilian regimes (three coups in Syria alone in 1949) and came to be the region’s new leaders as Gamal Abdel Nasser did after the 1952 Egyptian coup. Nasserist charisma, whether or not in alliance with the Ba ‘th, aimed at the establishment of a unified Arab state, non-aligned and with its own development model of Arab socialism. This “third road” policy represented a consensus among different nationalist forces, from revolutionary Algeria to opposition forces in the Gulf.
Another, more activist conceptualization, distinct from that of Michel ‘Aflaq and the Ba‘th establishment, was also in the making. Its reading of unification experiences in history resulted in the distinction between secondary and primary determinants. Secondary determinants such as language and history are necessary but not sufficient, whereas primary determinants are both necessary and sufficient. The latter include a base-region or pole of attraction (e.g., Egypt), and a transnational charismatic leadership (e.g., Nasser), and an external threat (e.g., Israel and Western encroachment.). Unity between Egypt and Syria, which produced the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 1961, seemed to confirm this theory. However, its dissolution of the union and the failure of unity negotiations in 1963, which also included the Ba‘thist Iraqis, cast doubt on the theory’s immediate applicability. A protracted civil war in Yemen following Imam Badr’s overthrow, with Egypt and Saudi Arabia championing opposite camps, deepened Arab divisions. Regionally, opposition intensified between radical Arab nationalism and a conservative Pan-Islamic strategy that emphasized the convening of Islamic conferences promoted by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. In this context, the region was shaken to its roots in 1967 by the third Arab-Israeli war. The magnitude of the Arab defeat restructured regional leadership, culminating in the decline of revisionist forces and the rise of the oil-producing powers. The Khartoum Arab Summit of August 1967 sealed the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen and resulted in Egyptian dependency on oil-state subsidies.
Influential leadership bases shifted from thawrah (revolution) to tharwah (wealth), from ideologists and officers to rich royalty and “wealthy merchants who flitted between East and West, between royal palaces and the offices of oil companies (examples are Kamal Adham, Mahdi al-Tajir, and Adnan Khashoggi).” The public was more tempted by the riches of the oil fields than by the hardships of the battlefields.
Neither the 1969 coup of the young and fiery al-Qaddafi nor the revolutionary but stateless Palestinians could stop the decline of the radical pole. Quantitative indicators confirm this. By 1979, fifty-five percent of the capital of inter-Arab economic joint ventures was contributed by oil-rich Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Libya. The country that contributes the most capital is usually the host country for the project’s headquarters; thus the oil states were becoming the locale of an increasing number of new Arab organizations. In 1970, Cairo was host to twenty-nine, or sixty-five percent, of these organizations, Iraq hosted none, and Saudi Arabia only one. Eight years later, Baghdad had become the locale for twelve organizations, thereby occupying the second place after Egypt. Saudi Arabia was in third place with eight organizations. In addition, fewer Arab League meetings were held in Egypt and more in the oil states. The proportion of meetings held in Cairo decreased from 70.5 percent in 1977 to 42.2 percent in 1978. Egypt’s share in the Arab League budget also dropped; it was above 40 percent until the late 1950s but declined until 1978 – the year the Arab League moved to Tunis – when it was only 13.7 percent, equivalent to that of Kuwait.
It might be supposed that the movement of migrant labor from densely populated Egypt or the West Bank to the Gulf, and the transfer of capital in the form of remittances and investments in the opposite direction, would promote Arab integration. Economic activities, however, are usually pragmatic and hence may serve to dampen and subordinate the revolutionary ethos, promoting stability rather than revolutionary change. Nasser’s death in 1970 amid the ashes of the Jordanian-Palestinian civil war concretized the change by eliminating one of the postulated primary determinants of political unification – charismatic leadership. Egyptian rapprochement with Israel, culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords, seemed to take away the second primary determinant, the existence of a threat. This rise of independent diplomacy concerning one of the most sacred causes of the Pan-Arab ideal confirmed – if the need existed – the primacy of raison d’etat over raison de la nation. Moreover, hindsight tells us, it presaged the integration of Israel as a member of the regional system. This diluted Arab regional exclusiveness and promoted an enlarged Middle East. Ironically, the radical pole was engaged from quite a different direction in an equally diluting process when, in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Syria, Libya, and Algeria sided with non-Arab revolutionary Islamic Iran against Arab Iraq. Harassed on two fronts by territorial raison d’etat and revolutionary Islamism, Arab nationalism was wounded but not dead. Its troubles reflected both its own weakness as a political program and the disappearance of the simple world of heroic politics and categorical formulas.
To acquire control over a complex situation, Arabs tried subregional groupings: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman in the early 1980s; the Union du Maghreb Arabe (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania); and the Arab Cooperation Council (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen) in the late 1980s. This was a way of escaping the double bind of nation versus state and replacing it with a sequential logic. But this strategy (with the exception of the GCC) did not survive the political upheaval of the second Gulf War following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. In its discourse, Iraq appealed to the opposition of many Arabs to artificial colonial frontiers and the division of the Arab nation, and to their demand for a fairer re-distribution of Arab wealth between haves and have nots. Though tempted, many Arabs also mistrusted Saddam Hussein’s cynical exploitation of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism. Arabs both at the state level and in the transnational civil society were seriously divided and traumatized, with the Arab League (now back in Cairo) paralyzed and foreign troops stationed around their holy places in Saudi Arabia poised to decide the issue for them.
By invoking a jihad against the presence of foreign troops in the area of the Muslim holy places, Iraqi strategy was to show that Arab nationalism and revolutionary Islam could be united in their opposition to the status quo and to outside powers. In fact, the two movements are overlapping rather than identical, hence their occasional mutual tension. Nevertheless, increased dialogue between the representatives of the two is an increasingly problematic proposition with implications not just in a regional context but now on a global scale.
Arab nationalist thinkers
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Michel Aflaq
George Antonius
Shakib Arslan
Zaki al-Arsuzi
Ma'an Bashour
George Habash
Sati' al-Husri
Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi
Amin al-Rihani
Constantin Zureiq
Prominent Arab nationalist heads of state
Hafiz al-Assad
Ahmed Ben Bella
Saddam Hussein
Gamal Abdel Nasser
Muammar al-Gaddafi
Shukri al-Quwatli
Arabs
Arabs. The term "Arab" is applied to those people who are of Arab origin, regardless whether they are/were Muslims or non-Muslims. "Muslim" is used to refer to the people who adhere to the Muslim religion, which includes Arabs and non-Arabs, such as those people from Iran, Pakistan or Indonesia for example.
Forming the majority population of fifteen nations, Arabs represent the largest, most diverse and most politically influential Muslim ethnic group in the world. Their involvement with the non-Muslim world, whether through oil or politics, is profound. Their influence within the Muslim world is deep and broad. Arabic is the sixth most widely spoken language in the world as a mother tongue, but it is spoken by more than three-quarters of a billion people as a religious language. The Prophet Muhammad, who established Islam, was an Arab.
An Arab (Arabic: ʿarabi) is a person who identifies as such on ethnic, linguistic or cultural grounds. The plural form, Arabs (al-ʿarab), refers to the ethnocultural group at large. Though the Arabic language is older, Arabic culture was first spread in the Middle East beginning in the 2nd century as culturally Arab Christians such as the Ghassanids, Lakhmids and Banu Judham began migrating into the Syrian Desert and the Levant. The Arabic language gained greater prominence with the rise of Islam in the 7th century CE as the language of the Qur'an, and Arabic language and culture were more widely disseminated as a result of early Islamic expansion.
"Arabs" is the name given to the ancient and present-day inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula and often applied to the peoples closely allied to them in ancestry, language, religion, and culture. At the beginning of the twenty-first century of the Christian calendar, there were about 250 million Arabs living mainly in 22 countries. They constitute the overwhelming majority of the population in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, and the nations of North Africa. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, about 4 million Arabs lived in Europe while 2 million lived in the Americas.
The Arabic heartland is Hijaz (now western Saudi Arabia) and also Yemen. The people living here around 620 were living in an area of major movements of people, with trade performed along the caravan routes, which had Mecca in Hijaz as one of the central towns. People were coming from Africa, from Mesopotamia, from Phoenicia, from Egypt, and there is notable that even before Muhammad the Arabs were a multi-racial people, primarily because of intermarriages and indiscriminate relationships.
Up through history, wherever Arab culture has taken hold, a mixture of people, and the domination of the Arabic language and culture, has made the number of people calling themselves Arabs increase dramatically. Often the indigenous population seems to have disappeared. When reading historical works, one is compelled to ask, where did the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Mesopotamians go? The answer is they started to speak Arabic, and began calling themselves Arabs. The whole process took centuries in most regions, but in areas close to Hijaz, more of the “original” Arabs seem to have immigrated, and this has speeded up the Arabization process.
The Arabic language is the main symbol of cultural unity among these people, but the religion of Islam provides another common bond for the majority of Arabs. Language and religion are united in the Qur’an, the sacred scripture of Islam.
Arabia was the site of a flourishing civilization long before the Christian era and long before the advent of Muhammad. The Arabs themselves first appear in the light of history in 854 B.C.T., during the reign of the Assyrian king Salmanassar III as camel breeders and traders. Numerous Persian rulers relied on Arab vassals to provide buffer states on their western borders or encouraged the settlement of Arab tribesmen in frontier areas as a counterbalance to other troublesome tribal groups. The heyday of Arab political and cultural influence in Persia and Central Asia, however, was undoubtedly the early Islamic period (seventh to ninth century of the Christian calendar).
In the centuries following the death (632) of the prophet Muhammad, Arab influence spread throughout Southwest Asia, to parts of Europe (particularly Sicily and Spain), to Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa, to the sub-continent of India, and to Madagascar and the Malay Archipelago. The cultural and scientific contributions of the Arabs to Western civilization during the Middle Ages was highly significant, especially in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and philosophy.
Arab unity has been a central motive in Arab politics from the first days of Islam. This unity has only been fulfilled in the first century, before the world of Islam was divided into kingdoms and states.
During the past two centuries of rapid world change, hundreds of years of cultural unity have been disrupted, and the Arabs, led by the people of Egypt and Morocco, have moved more and more into separate national traditions. In some countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, minority communities of Arabs retain only language, religion and histories of their migrations to their present locations.
In modern times, Arab unity was a central political inducement in the time following independence of the different Arab states, that is in the 1950s and the 1960s. The only viable example of Arab unity was the United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt, Syria and Yemen, from 1958 to 1961. In this union Egypt was too dominant, and the two other countries felt they had to leave. Today, the concept of Arab unity on the level of political leaders has lost its credibility, as the leaders will rarely agree upon who should give up his position as president or king. However, in the Arabs' hearts, Arab unity is strongly felt.
Islamism has many elements of Arab unity, through its emphasis on the Arab language (through the Qur’an) as a response to the dominance of Western cultures and Western political systems. Islamism has been deemed by non-Arabs as another way of imposing Arab language and culture on them, and Islamism has had to change its shape to catch on in these societies (Iran’s Islamism has major differences from the Arab Islamism, since almost all Iranians are not Arabs).
The Islamic religion, which originated in the western Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, predominates in most Arab nations. Forms of both major divisions of Islam -- the Sunni and the various Shi‘ite sects -- can be found in the Arab countries. Almost everywhere nationalism, which emerged in the late 19th century, is an important force that sometimes uses the Islamic religious tradition as an ideological tool to justify the power of the ruling class.
Dozens of large cities and hundreds of towns reflect the pronounced urban character of the Arab world. In most of the countries, about forty percent of the people are urban dwellers. All Arab nations suffer from conspicuous economic inequalities, especially the concentration of wealth and power in a ruling elite. Most are also undergoing severe urbanization stresses as the failing rural economies drive poverty-stricken landless peasants to the cities. The growth of modern cities through rural migration has caused serious problems in these urban centers, including employment, housing shortages, and the proliferation of vast slums.
Most Arab countries have substantial agricultural, village-based populations. In the villages, the land, the family, and religion are still the main influences on attitudes and behavior. The traditional prosperous village cultures were altered and largely destroyed throughout the region during the late 18th and 19th centuries of the Christian calendar by European penetration and colonization. In most countries, peasant farming on a subsistence level is pervasive.
Until the mid-19th century, vast semi-desert areas in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula were exploited by nomadic tribes. The camel-breeding Bedouins were well known as warriors and controllers of the caravan routes. Other pastoral tribes specialized in sheep and goat husbandry. In present-day Sudan, the Somali Republic, and Djibouti, pastoral economies operating on subsistence levels remain the only means of survival for many poverty-stricken Arab groups. {See also Bedouin; Muhammad; Shi'a; Sunni.}
"Arab" is defined independently of religious identity, and pre-dates the rise of Islam, with historically attested Arab Christian kingdoms and Arab Jews. The earliest documented use of the word "Arab" as defining a group of people dates from the 9th century B.C.T. Islamized but non-Arabized peoples, and therefore the majority of the world's Muslims, do not form part of the Arab World but comprise what is the geographically larger and diverse Muslim World.
The Arab League at its formation in 1946 defined Arab as "a person whose language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, who is in sympathy with the aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples".
During the Muslim conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, the Arabs forged an Arab Empire (under the Rashidun and Umayyads, and later the Abbasids) whose borders touched southern France in the west, China in the east, Asia Minor in the north, and the Sudan in the south. This was one of the largest land empires in history. In much of this area, the Arabs spread Islam and the Arabic language (the language of the Qur'an) through conversion and cultural assimilation. Many groups became known as "Arabs" through this process of Arabization rather than through descent. Thus, over time, the term Arab came to carry a broader meaning than the original ethnic term: cultural Arab vs. ethnic Arab. Arab nationalism declares that Arabs are united in a shared history, culture and language. A related ideology, Pan-Arabism, calls for all Arab lands to be united as one state. Arab nationalism has often competed for existence with regional nationalism in the Middle East.
Early Semitic peoples from the Ancient Near East, such as the Arameans, Akkadians and Canaanites, built civilizations in Mesopotamia and the Levant; genetically, they often interlapped and mixed. Slowly, however, they lost their political domination of the Near East due to internal turmoil and attacks by non-Semitic peoples. Although the Semites eventually lost political control of the Middle East to the Persian Empire, the Aramaic language remained the lingua franca of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Aramaic itself was replaced by Greek as the Middle East's prestige language following the conquest of Alexander the Great.
The first written attestation of the ethnonym "Arab" occurs in an Assyrian inscription of 853 B.C.T, where Shalmaneser III lists a King Gindibu of mâtu arbâi (Arab land) as among the people he defeated at the Battle of Karkar. Some of the names given in these texts are Aramaic, while others are the first attestations of Proto-Arabic dialects. In fact several different ethnonyms are found in Assyrian texts that are conventionally translated "Arab": Arabi, Arubu, Aribi and Urbi. The Hebrew Bible occasionally refers to Arvi peoples (or variants thereof), translated as "Arab" or "Arabian." The scope of the term at that early stage is unclear, but it seems to have referred to various desert-dwelling Semitic tribes in the Syrian Desert and Arabia.
Proto-Arabic, or Ancient North Arabian, texts give a clearer picture of the Arabs' emergence. The earliest are written in variants of epigraphic south Arabian musnad script, including the 8th century B.C.T. Hasaean inscriptions of eastern Saudi Arabia, the 6th century B.C.Et. Lihyanite texts of southeastern Saudi Arabia and the Thamudic texts found throughout Arabia and the Sinai (not in reality connected with Thamud).
The Nabataeans were nomadic newcomers who moved into territory vacated by the Edomites -- Semites who settled the region centuries before them. Their early inscriptions were in Aramaic, but gradually switched to Arabic, and since they had writing, it was they who made the first inscriptions in Arabic. The Nabataean Alphabet was adopted by Arabs to the south, and evolved into modern Arabic script around the 4th century. This is attested by Safaitic inscriptions (beginning in the 1st century B.C,T.) and the many Arabic personal names in Nabataean inscriptions. From about the 2nd century B.C.T., a few inscriptions from Qaryat al-Faw (near Sulayyil) reveal a dialect which is no longer considered "proto-Arabic", but pre-classical Arabic.
Greeks and Romans referred to all the nomadic population of the desert in the Near East as Arabi. The Romans called Yemen "Arabia Felix". The Romans called the vassal nomadic states within the Roman Empire "Arabia Petraea" after the city of Petra, and called unconquered deserts bordering the empire to the south and east Arabia Magna.
The Lakhmids settled the mid Tigris region around their capital Al-hira they ended up allying with the Sassanid against the Ghassanids and the Byzantine Empire. The Lakhmids contested control of the Central Arabian tribes with the Kindites with the Lakhmids eventually destroying Kinda in 540 C.C. after the fall of their main ally Himyar. The Sassanids dissolved the Lakhmid kingdom in 602 C.C.
The Kindites migrated from Yemen along with the Ghassanids and Lakhmids, but were turned back in Bahrain by the Abdul Qais Rabi'a tribe. They returned to Yemen and allied themselves with the Himyarites who installed them as a vassal kingdom that ruled Central Arbia from Qaryah dhat Kahl (the present-day Qaryat al-Faw) in Central Arabia. They ruled much of the Northern/Central Arabian peninsula until the fall of the Himyarites in 525 C.C..
Muslims of Medina referred to the nomadic tribes of the deserts as the A'raab, and considered themselves sedentary, but were aware of their close racial bonds. The term "A'raab' mirrors the term Assyrians used to describe the closely related nomads they defeated in Syria.
The Qur'an does not use the word ʿarab, only the nisba adjective ʿarabiy. The Qur'an calls itself ʿarabiy, "Arabic", and Mubin, "clear". The two qualities are connected for example in ayat 43.2-3, "By the clear Book: We have made it an Arabic recitation in order that you may understand". The Qur'an became regarded as the prime example of the al-ʿarabiyya, the language of the Arabs. The term ʾiʿrāb has the same root and refers to a particularly clear and correct mode of speech. The plural noun ʾaʿrāb refers to the Bedouin tribes of the desert who resisted Muhammad, for example in ayat 9.97, alʾaʿrābu ʾašaddu kufrān wa nifāqān "the Bedouin are the worst in disbelief and hypocrisy".
Based on this, in early Islamic terminology, ʿarabiy referred to the language, and ʾaʿrāb to the Arab Bedouins, carrying a negative connotation due to the Qur'anic verdict just cited. But after the Islamic conquest of the 8th century, the language of the nomadic Arabs became regarded as the most pure by the grammarians following Abi Ishaq, and the term kalam al-ʿArab, "language of the Arabs", denoted the uncontaminated language of the Bedouins.
The arrival of Islam united many tribes in Arabia, who then moved northwards to conquer the Levant and Iraq. In 661, and throughout the Caliphate's rule by the Ummayad dynasty, Damascus was established as the Muslim capital. In these newly acquired territories, Arabs comprised the ruling military elite and as such, enjoyed special privileges. They were proud of their Arab ancestry and sponsored the poetry and culture of pre-Islamic Arabia whilst diffusing with Levantine and Iraqi culture. They established garrison towns at Ramla, ar-Raqqah, Basra, Kufa, Mosul and Samarra, all of which developed into major cities.
Caliph Abd al-Malik established Arabic as the Caliphate's official language in 686. This reform greatly influenced the conquered non-Arab peoples and fueled the Arabization of the region. However, the Arabs' higher status among non-Arab Muslim converts and the latter's obligation to pay heavy taxes caused resentment. Caliph Umar II strove to resolve the conflict when he came to power in 717. He rectified the situation, demanding that all Muslims be treated as equals, but his intended reforms did not take effect as he died after only three years of rule. At that time, discontent with the Umayyads swept the region and an uprising occurred in which the Abbasids came to power and moved the capital to Baghdad. The Abbasids were also Arabs (descendants of Muhammad's uncle Abbas), but unlike the Ummayads, they had the support of non-Arab Islamic groups. Through the adoption of the Arabic language and Islam, the Levantine and Iraqi populations became Arabized.
The Phoenicians and later the Carthaginians dominated North African and Iberian shores for more than eight centuries until they were suppressed by the Romans and the later Vandal invasion. Inland, the nomadic Berbers allied with Arab Muslims in invading Spain. The Arabs mainly settled the old Phoenician and Carthagenian towns, while the Berbers remained dominant inland. Inland north Africa remained partly Arab until the 11th century, whereas the Iberian Peninsula, particularly its southern part, remained heavily Arab, until the expulsion of the Moriscos in the 17th century.
Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddima distinguishes between sedentary Muslims who used to be nomadic Arabs and the Bedouin nomadic Arabs of the desert. He used the term "formerly-nomadic" Arabs and refers to sedentary Muslims by the region or city they lived in, as in Egyptians, Spaniards and Yemenis. The Christians of Italy and the Crusaders preferred the term Saracens for all the Arabs and Muslims of that time. The Christians of Iberia used the term Moor to describe all the Arabs and Muslims of that time.
In 1728, a Russian officer described a group of Sunni Arab nomads who populated the Caspian shores of Mughan (in present-day Azerbaijan) and spoke a mixed Turkic-Arabic language. It is believed that these groups migrated to the Caucasus in the 16th century. The 1888 edition of Encyclopædia Britannica also mentioned a certain number of Arabs populating the Baku Governorate of the Russian Empire. They retained an Arabic dialect at least into the mid-19th century, but since then have assimilated with the neighbouring Azeris and Tats. Today in Azerbaijan alone, there are nearly 30 settlements still holding the name Arab (e.g. Arabgadim, Arabojaghy, Arab-Yengija, etc.).
From the time of the Arab conquest of the Caucasus, continuous small-scale Arab migration from various parts of the Arabic-speaking world was observed in Dagestan influencing and shaping the culture of the local peoples. Up until the mid-20th century, there were still individuals in Dagestan who claimed Arabic to be their native language, with the majority of them living in the village of Darvag to the north-west of Derbent. The latest of these accounts dates to the 1930s. Most Arab communities in southern Dagestan underwent linguistic Turkicisation, thus nowadays Darvag is a majority-Azeri village.
Today many people in Central Asia identify as Arabs. Most Arabs of Central Asia are fully integrated into local populations, and sometimes call themselves the same as locals (e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks) but they use special titles to show their Arabic origin such as Sayyid, Khoja or Siddiqui.
Arab Muslims are generally Sunni, Shia, Ismaili and Druze. The self-identified Arab Christians generally follow Eastern Churches such as the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches and the Maronite church. The Greek Catholic churches and Maronite church are under the Pope of Rome, and a part of the larger worldwide Catholic Church.
Before the coming of Islam, most Arabs followed a religion with a number of deities, including Hubal, Wadd, Allāt, Manat, and Uzza. A few individuals, the hanifs, had apparently rejected polytheism in favor of monotheism unaffiliated with any particular religion. Some tribes had converted to Christianity or Judaism. The most prominent Arab Christian kingdoms were the Ghassanid and Lakhmid kingdoms. When the Himyarite king converted to Judaism in the late 4th century, the elites of the other prominent Arab kingdom, the Kindites, being Himyirite vassals, apparently also converted (at least partly). With the expansion of Islam, polytheistic Arabs were rapidly Islamized, and polytheistic traditions gradually disappeared.
Today, Sunni Islam dominates in most areas, overwhelmingly so in North Africa. Shia Islam is dominant in southern Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Substantial Shi'a populations exist in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, northern Syria, the al-Batinah region in Oman, and in northern Yemen. The Druze community, concentrated in the Levant, follow a faith that was originally an offshoot of Ismaili Shia Islam, and are also Arab.
Christians make up 5.5% of the population of the Near East. In Lebanon they number about 39% of the population although not all Lebanese Christians identify as Arabs. In Syria, Christians make up 16% of the population. In Palestine, before the creation of Israel estimates ranged as high as 25%, but is now 3.8% due largely to the 1948 Palestinian exodus. In the West Bank and in Gaza, Arab Christians make up 8% and 0.8% of the populations, respectively. In Israel, Arab Christians constitute 1.7% (roughly 9% of the Palestinian Arab population). Arab Christians make up 6% of the population of Jordan. Most North and South American Arabs are Christian, as are about half of Arabs in Australia who come particularly from Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.
Jews from Arab countries – mainly Mizrahi Jews and Yemenite Jews – are today usually not categorised as Arab. However, before the anti-Jewish actions of the 1930s and 1940s, overall Iraqi Jews viewed themselves as Arabs of the Jewish faith, rather than as a separate race or nationality. Prior to the emergence of the term Mizrahi, the term "Arab Jews" was sometimes used to describe Jews of the Arab world. The term is rarely used today. The few remaining Jews in the Arab countries reside mostly in Morocco and Tunisia. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, following the creation of the state of Israel, most of these Jews left or were expelled from their countries of birth and are now mostly concentrated in Israel. Some immigrated to France, where they form the largest Jewish community, outnumbering European Jews, but relatively few to the United States.
Arabs. The term "Arab" is applied to those people who are of Arab origin, regardless whether they are/were Muslims or non-Muslims. "Muslim" is used to refer to the people who adhere to the Muslim religion, which includes Arabs and non-Arabs, such as those people from Iran, Pakistan or Indonesia for example.
Forming the majority population of fifteen nations, Arabs represent the largest, most diverse and most politically influential Muslim ethnic group in the world. Their involvement with the non-Muslim world, whether through oil or politics, is profound. Their influence within the Muslim world is deep and broad. Arabic is the sixth most widely spoken language in the world as a mother tongue, but it is spoken by more than three-quarters of a billion people as a religious language. The Prophet Muhammad, who established Islam, was an Arab.
An Arab (Arabic: ʿarabi) is a person who identifies as such on ethnic, linguistic or cultural grounds. The plural form, Arabs (al-ʿarab), refers to the ethnocultural group at large. Though the Arabic language is older, Arabic culture was first spread in the Middle East beginning in the 2nd century as culturally Arab Christians such as the Ghassanids, Lakhmids and Banu Judham began migrating into the Syrian Desert and the Levant. The Arabic language gained greater prominence with the rise of Islam in the 7th century CE as the language of the Qur'an, and Arabic language and culture were more widely disseminated as a result of early Islamic expansion.
"Arabs" is the name given to the ancient and present-day inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula and often applied to the peoples closely allied to them in ancestry, language, religion, and culture. At the beginning of the twenty-first century of the Christian calendar, there were about 250 million Arabs living mainly in 22 countries. They constitute the overwhelming majority of the population in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, and the nations of North Africa. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, about 4 million Arabs lived in Europe while 2 million lived in the Americas.
The Arabic heartland is Hijaz (now western Saudi Arabia) and also Yemen. The people living here around 620 were living in an area of major movements of people, with trade performed along the caravan routes, which had Mecca in Hijaz as one of the central towns. People were coming from Africa, from Mesopotamia, from Phoenicia, from Egypt, and there is notable that even before Muhammad the Arabs were a multi-racial people, primarily because of intermarriages and indiscriminate relationships.
Up through history, wherever Arab culture has taken hold, a mixture of people, and the domination of the Arabic language and culture, has made the number of people calling themselves Arabs increase dramatically. Often the indigenous population seems to have disappeared. When reading historical works, one is compelled to ask, where did the Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Mesopotamians go? The answer is they started to speak Arabic, and began calling themselves Arabs. The whole process took centuries in most regions, but in areas close to Hijaz, more of the “original” Arabs seem to have immigrated, and this has speeded up the Arabization process.
The Arabic language is the main symbol of cultural unity among these people, but the religion of Islam provides another common bond for the majority of Arabs. Language and religion are united in the Qur’an, the sacred scripture of Islam.
Arabia was the site of a flourishing civilization long before the Christian era and long before the advent of Muhammad. The Arabs themselves first appear in the light of history in 854 B.C.T., during the reign of the Assyrian king Salmanassar III as camel breeders and traders. Numerous Persian rulers relied on Arab vassals to provide buffer states on their western borders or encouraged the settlement of Arab tribesmen in frontier areas as a counterbalance to other troublesome tribal groups. The heyday of Arab political and cultural influence in Persia and Central Asia, however, was undoubtedly the early Islamic period (seventh to ninth century of the Christian calendar).
In the centuries following the death (632) of the prophet Muhammad, Arab influence spread throughout Southwest Asia, to parts of Europe (particularly Sicily and Spain), to Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa, to the sub-continent of India, and to Madagascar and the Malay Archipelago. The cultural and scientific contributions of the Arabs to Western civilization during the Middle Ages was highly significant, especially in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and philosophy.
Arab unity has been a central motive in Arab politics from the first days of Islam. This unity has only been fulfilled in the first century, before the world of Islam was divided into kingdoms and states.
During the past two centuries of rapid world change, hundreds of years of cultural unity have been disrupted, and the Arabs, led by the people of Egypt and Morocco, have moved more and more into separate national traditions. In some countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Indonesia, minority communities of Arabs retain only language, religion and histories of their migrations to their present locations.
In modern times, Arab unity was a central political inducement in the time following independence of the different Arab states, that is in the 1950s and the 1960s. The only viable example of Arab unity was the United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt, Syria and Yemen, from 1958 to 1961. In this union Egypt was too dominant, and the two other countries felt they had to leave. Today, the concept of Arab unity on the level of political leaders has lost its credibility, as the leaders will rarely agree upon who should give up his position as president or king. However, in the Arabs' hearts, Arab unity is strongly felt.
Islamism has many elements of Arab unity, through its emphasis on the Arab language (through the Qur’an) as a response to the dominance of Western cultures and Western political systems. Islamism has been deemed by non-Arabs as another way of imposing Arab language and culture on them, and Islamism has had to change its shape to catch on in these societies (Iran’s Islamism has major differences from the Arab Islamism, since almost all Iranians are not Arabs).
The Islamic religion, which originated in the western Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century, predominates in most Arab nations. Forms of both major divisions of Islam -- the Sunni and the various Shi‘ite sects -- can be found in the Arab countries. Almost everywhere nationalism, which emerged in the late 19th century, is an important force that sometimes uses the Islamic religious tradition as an ideological tool to justify the power of the ruling class.
Dozens of large cities and hundreds of towns reflect the pronounced urban character of the Arab world. In most of the countries, about forty percent of the people are urban dwellers. All Arab nations suffer from conspicuous economic inequalities, especially the concentration of wealth and power in a ruling elite. Most are also undergoing severe urbanization stresses as the failing rural economies drive poverty-stricken landless peasants to the cities. The growth of modern cities through rural migration has caused serious problems in these urban centers, including employment, housing shortages, and the proliferation of vast slums.
Most Arab countries have substantial agricultural, village-based populations. In the villages, the land, the family, and religion are still the main influences on attitudes and behavior. The traditional prosperous village cultures were altered and largely destroyed throughout the region during the late 18th and 19th centuries of the Christian calendar by European penetration and colonization. In most countries, peasant farming on a subsistence level is pervasive.
Until the mid-19th century, vast semi-desert areas in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula were exploited by nomadic tribes. The camel-breeding Bedouins were well known as warriors and controllers of the caravan routes. Other pastoral tribes specialized in sheep and goat husbandry. In present-day Sudan, the Somali Republic, and Djibouti, pastoral economies operating on subsistence levels remain the only means of survival for many poverty-stricken Arab groups. {See also Bedouin; Muhammad; Shi'a; Sunni.}
"Arab" is defined independently of religious identity, and pre-dates the rise of Islam, with historically attested Arab Christian kingdoms and Arab Jews. The earliest documented use of the word "Arab" as defining a group of people dates from the 9th century B.C.T. Islamized but non-Arabized peoples, and therefore the majority of the world's Muslims, do not form part of the Arab World but comprise what is the geographically larger and diverse Muslim World.
The Arab League at its formation in 1946 defined Arab as "a person whose language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, who is in sympathy with the aspirations of the Arabic speaking peoples".
During the Muslim conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, the Arabs forged an Arab Empire (under the Rashidun and Umayyads, and later the Abbasids) whose borders touched southern France in the west, China in the east, Asia Minor in the north, and the Sudan in the south. This was one of the largest land empires in history. In much of this area, the Arabs spread Islam and the Arabic language (the language of the Qur'an) through conversion and cultural assimilation. Many groups became known as "Arabs" through this process of Arabization rather than through descent. Thus, over time, the term Arab came to carry a broader meaning than the original ethnic term: cultural Arab vs. ethnic Arab. Arab nationalism declares that Arabs are united in a shared history, culture and language. A related ideology, Pan-Arabism, calls for all Arab lands to be united as one state. Arab nationalism has often competed for existence with regional nationalism in the Middle East.
Early Semitic peoples from the Ancient Near East, such as the Arameans, Akkadians and Canaanites, built civilizations in Mesopotamia and the Levant; genetically, they often interlapped and mixed. Slowly, however, they lost their political domination of the Near East due to internal turmoil and attacks by non-Semitic peoples. Although the Semites eventually lost political control of the Middle East to the Persian Empire, the Aramaic language remained the lingua franca of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Aramaic itself was replaced by Greek as the Middle East's prestige language following the conquest of Alexander the Great.
The first written attestation of the ethnonym "Arab" occurs in an Assyrian inscription of 853 B.C.T, where Shalmaneser III lists a King Gindibu of mâtu arbâi (Arab land) as among the people he defeated at the Battle of Karkar. Some of the names given in these texts are Aramaic, while others are the first attestations of Proto-Arabic dialects. In fact several different ethnonyms are found in Assyrian texts that are conventionally translated "Arab": Arabi, Arubu, Aribi and Urbi. The Hebrew Bible occasionally refers to Arvi peoples (or variants thereof), translated as "Arab" or "Arabian." The scope of the term at that early stage is unclear, but it seems to have referred to various desert-dwelling Semitic tribes in the Syrian Desert and Arabia.
Proto-Arabic, or Ancient North Arabian, texts give a clearer picture of the Arabs' emergence. The earliest are written in variants of epigraphic south Arabian musnad script, including the 8th century B.C.T. Hasaean inscriptions of eastern Saudi Arabia, the 6th century B.C.Et. Lihyanite texts of southeastern Saudi Arabia and the Thamudic texts found throughout Arabia and the Sinai (not in reality connected with Thamud).
The Nabataeans were nomadic newcomers who moved into territory vacated by the Edomites -- Semites who settled the region centuries before them. Their early inscriptions were in Aramaic, but gradually switched to Arabic, and since they had writing, it was they who made the first inscriptions in Arabic. The Nabataean Alphabet was adopted by Arabs to the south, and evolved into modern Arabic script around the 4th century. This is attested by Safaitic inscriptions (beginning in the 1st century B.C,T.) and the many Arabic personal names in Nabataean inscriptions. From about the 2nd century B.C.T., a few inscriptions from Qaryat al-Faw (near Sulayyil) reveal a dialect which is no longer considered "proto-Arabic", but pre-classical Arabic.
Greeks and Romans referred to all the nomadic population of the desert in the Near East as Arabi. The Romans called Yemen "Arabia Felix". The Romans called the vassal nomadic states within the Roman Empire "Arabia Petraea" after the city of Petra, and called unconquered deserts bordering the empire to the south and east Arabia Magna.
The Lakhmids settled the mid Tigris region around their capital Al-hira they ended up allying with the Sassanid against the Ghassanids and the Byzantine Empire. The Lakhmids contested control of the Central Arabian tribes with the Kindites with the Lakhmids eventually destroying Kinda in 540 C.C. after the fall of their main ally Himyar. The Sassanids dissolved the Lakhmid kingdom in 602 C.C.
The Kindites migrated from Yemen along with the Ghassanids and Lakhmids, but were turned back in Bahrain by the Abdul Qais Rabi'a tribe. They returned to Yemen and allied themselves with the Himyarites who installed them as a vassal kingdom that ruled Central Arbia from Qaryah dhat Kahl (the present-day Qaryat al-Faw) in Central Arabia. They ruled much of the Northern/Central Arabian peninsula until the fall of the Himyarites in 525 C.C..
Muslims of Medina referred to the nomadic tribes of the deserts as the A'raab, and considered themselves sedentary, but were aware of their close racial bonds. The term "A'raab' mirrors the term Assyrians used to describe the closely related nomads they defeated in Syria.
The Qur'an does not use the word ʿarab, only the nisba adjective ʿarabiy. The Qur'an calls itself ʿarabiy, "Arabic", and Mubin, "clear". The two qualities are connected for example in ayat 43.2-3, "By the clear Book: We have made it an Arabic recitation in order that you may understand". The Qur'an became regarded as the prime example of the al-ʿarabiyya, the language of the Arabs. The term ʾiʿrāb has the same root and refers to a particularly clear and correct mode of speech. The plural noun ʾaʿrāb refers to the Bedouin tribes of the desert who resisted Muhammad, for example in ayat 9.97, alʾaʿrābu ʾašaddu kufrān wa nifāqān "the Bedouin are the worst in disbelief and hypocrisy".
Based on this, in early Islamic terminology, ʿarabiy referred to the language, and ʾaʿrāb to the Arab Bedouins, carrying a negative connotation due to the Qur'anic verdict just cited. But after the Islamic conquest of the 8th century, the language of the nomadic Arabs became regarded as the most pure by the grammarians following Abi Ishaq, and the term kalam al-ʿArab, "language of the Arabs", denoted the uncontaminated language of the Bedouins.
The arrival of Islam united many tribes in Arabia, who then moved northwards to conquer the Levant and Iraq. In 661, and throughout the Caliphate's rule by the Ummayad dynasty, Damascus was established as the Muslim capital. In these newly acquired territories, Arabs comprised the ruling military elite and as such, enjoyed special privileges. They were proud of their Arab ancestry and sponsored the poetry and culture of pre-Islamic Arabia whilst diffusing with Levantine and Iraqi culture. They established garrison towns at Ramla, ar-Raqqah, Basra, Kufa, Mosul and Samarra, all of which developed into major cities.
Caliph Abd al-Malik established Arabic as the Caliphate's official language in 686. This reform greatly influenced the conquered non-Arab peoples and fueled the Arabization of the region. However, the Arabs' higher status among non-Arab Muslim converts and the latter's obligation to pay heavy taxes caused resentment. Caliph Umar II strove to resolve the conflict when he came to power in 717. He rectified the situation, demanding that all Muslims be treated as equals, but his intended reforms did not take effect as he died after only three years of rule. At that time, discontent with the Umayyads swept the region and an uprising occurred in which the Abbasids came to power and moved the capital to Baghdad. The Abbasids were also Arabs (descendants of Muhammad's uncle Abbas), but unlike the Ummayads, they had the support of non-Arab Islamic groups. Through the adoption of the Arabic language and Islam, the Levantine and Iraqi populations became Arabized.
The Phoenicians and later the Carthaginians dominated North African and Iberian shores for more than eight centuries until they were suppressed by the Romans and the later Vandal invasion. Inland, the nomadic Berbers allied with Arab Muslims in invading Spain. The Arabs mainly settled the old Phoenician and Carthagenian towns, while the Berbers remained dominant inland. Inland north Africa remained partly Arab until the 11th century, whereas the Iberian Peninsula, particularly its southern part, remained heavily Arab, until the expulsion of the Moriscos in the 17th century.
Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddima distinguishes between sedentary Muslims who used to be nomadic Arabs and the Bedouin nomadic Arabs of the desert. He used the term "formerly-nomadic" Arabs and refers to sedentary Muslims by the region or city they lived in, as in Egyptians, Spaniards and Yemenis. The Christians of Italy and the Crusaders preferred the term Saracens for all the Arabs and Muslims of that time. The Christians of Iberia used the term Moor to describe all the Arabs and Muslims of that time.
In 1728, a Russian officer described a group of Sunni Arab nomads who populated the Caspian shores of Mughan (in present-day Azerbaijan) and spoke a mixed Turkic-Arabic language. It is believed that these groups migrated to the Caucasus in the 16th century. The 1888 edition of Encyclopædia Britannica also mentioned a certain number of Arabs populating the Baku Governorate of the Russian Empire. They retained an Arabic dialect at least into the mid-19th century, but since then have assimilated with the neighbouring Azeris and Tats. Today in Azerbaijan alone, there are nearly 30 settlements still holding the name Arab (e.g. Arabgadim, Arabojaghy, Arab-Yengija, etc.).
From the time of the Arab conquest of the Caucasus, continuous small-scale Arab migration from various parts of the Arabic-speaking world was observed in Dagestan influencing and shaping the culture of the local peoples. Up until the mid-20th century, there were still individuals in Dagestan who claimed Arabic to be their native language, with the majority of them living in the village of Darvag to the north-west of Derbent. The latest of these accounts dates to the 1930s. Most Arab communities in southern Dagestan underwent linguistic Turkicisation, thus nowadays Darvag is a majority-Azeri village.
Today many people in Central Asia identify as Arabs. Most Arabs of Central Asia are fully integrated into local populations, and sometimes call themselves the same as locals (e.g. Tajiks, Uzbeks) but they use special titles to show their Arabic origin such as Sayyid, Khoja or Siddiqui.
Arab Muslims are generally Sunni, Shia, Ismaili and Druze. The self-identified Arab Christians generally follow Eastern Churches such as the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches and the Maronite church. The Greek Catholic churches and Maronite church are under the Pope of Rome, and a part of the larger worldwide Catholic Church.
Before the coming of Islam, most Arabs followed a religion with a number of deities, including Hubal, Wadd, Allāt, Manat, and Uzza. A few individuals, the hanifs, had apparently rejected polytheism in favor of monotheism unaffiliated with any particular religion. Some tribes had converted to Christianity or Judaism. The most prominent Arab Christian kingdoms were the Ghassanid and Lakhmid kingdoms. When the Himyarite king converted to Judaism in the late 4th century, the elites of the other prominent Arab kingdom, the Kindites, being Himyirite vassals, apparently also converted (at least partly). With the expansion of Islam, polytheistic Arabs were rapidly Islamized, and polytheistic traditions gradually disappeared.
Today, Sunni Islam dominates in most areas, overwhelmingly so in North Africa. Shia Islam is dominant in southern Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Substantial Shi'a populations exist in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, northern Syria, the al-Batinah region in Oman, and in northern Yemen. The Druze community, concentrated in the Levant, follow a faith that was originally an offshoot of Ismaili Shia Islam, and are also Arab.
Christians make up 5.5% of the population of the Near East. In Lebanon they number about 39% of the population although not all Lebanese Christians identify as Arabs. In Syria, Christians make up 16% of the population. In Palestine, before the creation of Israel estimates ranged as high as 25%, but is now 3.8% due largely to the 1948 Palestinian exodus. In the West Bank and in Gaza, Arab Christians make up 8% and 0.8% of the populations, respectively. In Israel, Arab Christians constitute 1.7% (roughly 9% of the Palestinian Arab population). Arab Christians make up 6% of the population of Jordan. Most North and South American Arabs are Christian, as are about half of Arabs in Australia who come particularly from Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinian territories.
Jews from Arab countries – mainly Mizrahi Jews and Yemenite Jews – are today usually not categorised as Arab. However, before the anti-Jewish actions of the 1930s and 1940s, overall Iraqi Jews viewed themselves as Arabs of the Jewish faith, rather than as a separate race or nationality. Prior to the emergence of the term Mizrahi, the term "Arab Jews" was sometimes used to describe Jews of the Arab world. The term is rarely used today. The few remaining Jews in the Arab countries reside mostly in Morocco and Tunisia. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s, following the creation of the state of Israel, most of these Jews left or were expelled from their countries of birth and are now mostly concentrated in Israel. Some immigrated to France, where they form the largest Jewish community, outnumbering European Jews, but relatively few to the United States.
Arabs, Chadian
Arabs, Chadian. The centuries long movement of Arabs westward across Africa brought them into contact with innumerable ethnic groups, nearly all of whom they converted to Islam. Some were absorbed and “became” Arab, such as the Egyptians. Others resisted “Arabization,” such as the Berbers. A dynamic confrontation occurred -- and continues to occur -- among the dozens of small ethnic groups along the southern reaches of the Sahel, where central Africa begins. In western Sudan, southern Chad, northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria, Arab influence is considerable.
Chadian Arabs see Arabs, Chadian.
Arabs, Chadian. The centuries long movement of Arabs westward across Africa brought them into contact with innumerable ethnic groups, nearly all of whom they converted to Islam. Some were absorbed and “became” Arab, such as the Egyptians. Others resisted “Arabization,” such as the Berbers. A dynamic confrontation occurred -- and continues to occur -- among the dozens of small ethnic groups along the southern reaches of the Sahel, where central Africa begins. In western Sudan, southern Chad, northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria, Arab influence is considerable.
Chadian Arabs see Arabs, Chadian.
Arab Socialists
Arab Socialists. Advocates of Arab socialism. The notion of Arab socialism was never articulated precisely, but it can be taken as representing the economic and social aspirations of Nasserism and Ba‘thism, the state ideologies of Egypt in the late 1950s and 1960s and of Iraq and Syria from the 1960s until the early or mid-1980s. During the years following World War II, a widespread consensus developed among the educated middle classes and among the largely unofficial opposition in each of these states to the effect that the country’s most urgent needs were national independence and economic development, and that the state was the natural vehicle to carry out the necessary transformations. After the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, this notion became an important part of the political discourse of the various successor regimes.
In practice, the word socialism is something of a misnomer in the sense that neither a socialist revolution nor exclusive state ownership of the means of production was envisaged. The post-revolutionary economies of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria might have had some superficial similarities with the command economies of the contemporary eastern European states, but it was no accident that all three countries continued to maintain substantial and indeed often buoyant private sectors. Thus the “socialism” in Arab socialism is best understood as state-sponsored economic development.
Apart from the various land reforms of the 1950s (1952 in Egypt, 1958 in Iraq and Syria) and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, it was not until the early 1960s that the nationalization of large private and foreign owned companies took place, and the governments of all three states began to act more determinedly to bring the various sectors of the economy under state control. More stringent land reforms were introduced, and banking, insurance, foreign trade, and large industrial enterprises were all nationalized. This took place in Iraq under ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif in 1964. In spite of its socialist rhetoric, the Ba‘th’s only further step in this direction after 1968 – admittedly a particularly crucial one – was the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its various subsidiaries in 1972. In fact, the considerable enhancement of Iraqi state power which the oil nationalization facilitated was only the most extreme example of what would turn out to be one of the salient features of Arab socialism, namely, that the concentration of economic power in the hands of a largely unaccountable political authority facilitated the emergence of increasingly repressive and dictatorial state structures.
Alongside this economic dirigisme came a very considerable expansion in social, welfare, health, and educational services. Naturally, the quality of provision varied considerably both between and within states and was generally much better and more comprehensive in the larger cities than in the countryside, but, at least in theory, free education, for example, was available from primary school through university for every child. At the same time, most basic foodstuffs were either or both subsidized or made available in exchange for coupons from special government establishments, and there were also government stores selling such items as clothing, footwear, and furniture at subsidized prices.
Insofar as it had ideological underpinnings, the notion of Arab socialism was probably most clearly articulated in some of the writings of Michel ‘Aflaq, one of the founders and principal ideologues of Ba‘thism. It is important to stress, however, that ‘Aflaq formulated his ideas in the 1950s and did not significantly modify them when Ba‘th parties came to power in Syria and Iraq in the 1960s. It is also important to note that, although socialism is the third member of the Ba‘thist trinity (unity, freedom, socialism), it was far less important to ‘Aflaq, and the object of much less of his attention, than either (Arab) unity or (Arab) nationalism. Article 26 of the party constitution says: “The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a socialist party. It believes that the economic wealth of the fatherland belongs to the nation.” Article 34 reads: “Property and inheritance are two natural rights. They are protected within the limits of national interest.” The only other reference to socialism in the Ba‘th Party constitution is the expression of the belief that “socialism is a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself,” and that it “constitutes the ideal social order which will allow the Arab people to realize its possibilities.” There is no exposition of the meaning of these assertions, although it is clear from ‘Aflaq’s other writings, and also from the Nasserist version of Arab nationalism, that socialism is essentially non-Marxist and in fact anti-Marxist, in that it stresses the primacy of ethnic and national identity and rejects the notion of antagonistic social classes. Once the Arabs are liberated and united, it is asserted, class conflict will somehow melt away.
In general, some of the vogue enjoyed by Arab socialism and Islamic socialism probably reflected a need to incorporate some of the more unexceptionable aspects of socialist ideology (the extension of state power as an expression of the transfer of power to the people, the introduction of comprehensive social reform and welfare measures) into the nationalist and Islamic religious discourse of the time. Naturally, such a synthesis produces its own contradictions, such as the co-existence of the notion of the sanctity of private property with the notion of equality and equality of opportunity. It is clear, however, from the writings and speeches of Arab nationalists and the Muslim Brothers in the 1950s that invocations of socialism were necessary for both groups to assert their progressive credentials and intentions; the aspiration of social justice, together with the sense that the state was the appropriate vehicle to spearhead social and economic development, was almost universally shared at the time. It was also the case that the Arab communists had their own much more precise and elaborate version of socialism. Arab socialism and Islamic socialism, because of their allegedly “home-grown” nature, could thus be useful weapons in blunting or deflecting the appeal of communism at the time of its greatest popularity in the Middle East, which coincided with the height of the Cold War.
Arab Socialists. Advocates of Arab socialism. The notion of Arab socialism was never articulated precisely, but it can be taken as representing the economic and social aspirations of Nasserism and Ba‘thism, the state ideologies of Egypt in the late 1950s and 1960s and of Iraq and Syria from the 1960s until the early or mid-1980s. During the years following World War II, a widespread consensus developed among the educated middle classes and among the largely unofficial opposition in each of these states to the effect that the country’s most urgent needs were national independence and economic development, and that the state was the natural vehicle to carry out the necessary transformations. After the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s, this notion became an important part of the political discourse of the various successor regimes.
In practice, the word socialism is something of a misnomer in the sense that neither a socialist revolution nor exclusive state ownership of the means of production was envisaged. The post-revolutionary economies of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria might have had some superficial similarities with the command economies of the contemporary eastern European states, but it was no accident that all three countries continued to maintain substantial and indeed often buoyant private sectors. Thus the “socialism” in Arab socialism is best understood as state-sponsored economic development.
Apart from the various land reforms of the 1950s (1952 in Egypt, 1958 in Iraq and Syria) and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, it was not until the early 1960s that the nationalization of large private and foreign owned companies took place, and the governments of all three states began to act more determinedly to bring the various sectors of the economy under state control. More stringent land reforms were introduced, and banking, insurance, foreign trade, and large industrial enterprises were all nationalized. This took place in Iraq under ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif in 1964. In spite of its socialist rhetoric, the Ba‘th’s only further step in this direction after 1968 – admittedly a particularly crucial one – was the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its various subsidiaries in 1972. In fact, the considerable enhancement of Iraqi state power which the oil nationalization facilitated was only the most extreme example of what would turn out to be one of the salient features of Arab socialism, namely, that the concentration of economic power in the hands of a largely unaccountable political authority facilitated the emergence of increasingly repressive and dictatorial state structures.
Alongside this economic dirigisme came a very considerable expansion in social, welfare, health, and educational services. Naturally, the quality of provision varied considerably both between and within states and was generally much better and more comprehensive in the larger cities than in the countryside, but, at least in theory, free education, for example, was available from primary school through university for every child. At the same time, most basic foodstuffs were either or both subsidized or made available in exchange for coupons from special government establishments, and there were also government stores selling such items as clothing, footwear, and furniture at subsidized prices.
Insofar as it had ideological underpinnings, the notion of Arab socialism was probably most clearly articulated in some of the writings of Michel ‘Aflaq, one of the founders and principal ideologues of Ba‘thism. It is important to stress, however, that ‘Aflaq formulated his ideas in the 1950s and did not significantly modify them when Ba‘th parties came to power in Syria and Iraq in the 1960s. It is also important to note that, although socialism is the third member of the Ba‘thist trinity (unity, freedom, socialism), it was far less important to ‘Aflaq, and the object of much less of his attention, than either (Arab) unity or (Arab) nationalism. Article 26 of the party constitution says: “The Party of the Arab Ba‘th is a socialist party. It believes that the economic wealth of the fatherland belongs to the nation.” Article 34 reads: “Property and inheritance are two natural rights. They are protected within the limits of national interest.” The only other reference to socialism in the Ba‘th Party constitution is the expression of the belief that “socialism is a necessity which emanates from the depth of Arab nationalism itself,” and that it “constitutes the ideal social order which will allow the Arab people to realize its possibilities.” There is no exposition of the meaning of these assertions, although it is clear from ‘Aflaq’s other writings, and also from the Nasserist version of Arab nationalism, that socialism is essentially non-Marxist and in fact anti-Marxist, in that it stresses the primacy of ethnic and national identity and rejects the notion of antagonistic social classes. Once the Arabs are liberated and united, it is asserted, class conflict will somehow melt away.
In general, some of the vogue enjoyed by Arab socialism and Islamic socialism probably reflected a need to incorporate some of the more unexceptionable aspects of socialist ideology (the extension of state power as an expression of the transfer of power to the people, the introduction of comprehensive social reform and welfare measures) into the nationalist and Islamic religious discourse of the time. Naturally, such a synthesis produces its own contradictions, such as the co-existence of the notion of the sanctity of private property with the notion of equality and equality of opportunity. It is clear, however, from the writings and speeches of Arab nationalists and the Muslim Brothers in the 1950s that invocations of socialism were necessary for both groups to assert their progressive credentials and intentions; the aspiration of social justice, together with the sense that the state was the appropriate vehicle to spearhead social and economic development, was almost universally shared at the time. It was also the case that the Arab communists had their own much more precise and elaborate version of socialism. Arab socialism and Islamic socialism, because of their allegedly “home-grown” nature, could thus be useful weapons in blunting or deflecting the appeal of communism at the time of its greatest popularity in the Middle East, which coincided with the height of the Cold War.
Arafat, Yasir
Arafat, Yasir (Yasir Arafat) (Yassir Arafat) (August 24, 1929-November 11, 2004). Palestinian Arab nationalist who became the President of Palestine.
Mohammed Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini, popularly known as Yasser Arafat or by his kunya Abu Ammar, was a Palestinian leader. He was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the Palestinian National Authority, and leader of the Fatah political party, which he founded in 1959. Arafat spent much of his life fighting against Israel in the name of Palestinian self-determination. Originally opposed to Israel's existence, he modified his position in 1988 when he accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242.
Born in Jerusalem (other sources say Cairo, Egypt or Gaza). After his mother's death, when Arafat was four years old, Arafat shuttled back and forth among relatives in Cairo, Gaza, and Jerusalem throughout his childhood. In 1947, during the wars with the Jews, Arafat fought on the side of the grand mufti of Jerusalem. He fled after the establishment of the nation of Israel in 1948, settling in Cairo. He later studied engineering in Cairo (at the University of Cairo), and also trained as a fedayeen (commando).
In 1952, Arafat joined the Muslim Brotherhood and the Union of Palestinian Students, of which he became president. In 1956, he participated in the Suez campaign as a member of the Egyptian Army.
In 1956, Arafat founded the commando group known as al-Fatah ("the Conquest") and for the next few years, while working as an engineer with a construction firm in Kuwait, repeatedly led fedayeen raids deep into Israeli territory. As the leader of al-Fatah, Arafat launched a series of high-profile acts of anti-Israel terrorism. According to Middle East experts, it was Arafat who was the mastermind behind the kidnapping that resulted in the deaths of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany.
In 1964, Arafat linked al-Fatah with similar groups in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1967, Israel defeated Arab countries in a war and occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, lands where many Palestinians had lived since 1948. The Palestinians had moved into these regions after Israel officially came into being and was immediately attacked by surrounding Arab countries.
Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank after 1967 further inflamed Arab-Israeli tensions, causing Palestinian nationalism to become more radical. After the war, al-Fatah and guerrilla groups gained control of the PLO, which Arab leaders had established to represent the Palestinians. In 1969, Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO, which he controlled for the rest of his life.
After becoming the leader of the PLO, Arafat worked on bringing the PLO from an ideology of Pan-Arabism to Palestinian nationalism. After the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian Arabs in 1974, Arafat worked ceaselessly, and with some success, to win the organization international recognition. At the same time, Arafat made a strong effort to shed his terrorist image for that of the moderate statesman.
Arafat's self-reinvention from guerrilla fighter to statesman began in 1974, when he became the first person to address the United Nations as a leader of a liberation movement rather than a United Nations member state. After his appearance before the General Assembly, the United Nations recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1982, the PLO was forced to move from Lebanon, the site of the organization's headquarters, after Israel attacked the country. The headquarters of the PLO were re-located to Borj Cedria in the Gulf of Tunis, Tunisia.
On November 15, 1988, the State of Palestine was proclaimed at a meeting in Algiers, Algeria. Subsequently, in 1989, Arafat was elected president of the State of Palestine by the Central Council of the Palestine National Council.
In 1991, United States led talks began in Madrid, but were unproductive.
In 1993, the Oslo Agreement (the Oslo Accords) brought the peace process significantly forward. The basis for the prospective peace was to be a “land for peace” principle. Based upon this agreement, Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist. By signing the Oslo Agreement, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin established a framework and timetable for the Middle East peace process. The process included the gradual transfer of control of parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, which Arafat headed. That year, both men shared the Nobel Peace Prize along with Israeli leader Shimon Peres.
In May 1994, Israeli forces withdrew from the town of Jericho in order to relinquish control to the Palestinians. In July of 1994, Arafat returned to Palestine.
On January 20, 1996, Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in public elections with 88% of the vote.
In the year 2000, Arafat turned down a peace proposal from the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, which would have given Palestine control over more than 90% of the territory of the West Bank. This peace proposal was the biggest compromise Israel had ever offered.
Later that year, Palestine entered a situation of civil unrest, where Palestinians threw stones at soldiers, who retaliated with bullets. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed.
In December 2000, reports of new negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were announced.
In 2001, the dialogue between Israel and Palestine disintegrated following numerous terrorist attacks from Palestinian groups on Israeli civilians followed by Israeli attacks on Palestinian militants, their leaders and many Palestinian civilians. By Christmas, Arafat had been stripped of much of his power by Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and had been placed under virtual house arrest.
Arafat’s international profile changed during his more than 40 year career. During the 1960s, he was looked upon as leader and conductor of several terrorist attacks into Israel. In the 1970s, the international society came to regard him as being a politician without country, but still associated with the activities performed in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Arafat started to gain more important support in the West, mainly because of increasingly questionable Israeli military actions (e.g., attacks in Lebanon, massacres in Sabra and Chatila).
In the 1990s, Arafat came to be considered a pragmatic moderate, and by many foreign observers as a wiser politician than his Israeli opponents.
By 2001, Arafat’s position had weakened, as well as his popularity. There were several reasons for this. Other more radical groups became far more active as well as representative of public opinion. Israeli actions against the Palestinian infrastructure, like the police, made it virtually impossible for Arafat to exercise much power, hence creating an image of him as weak and ineffective among his own supporters. There were also indications that Arafat himself was sympathetic with certain radical groups, and gave said groups sufficient room for their uprising -- their intifada -- and their terrorist attacks on Israeli soil.
Arafat’s rule over the small territories that had been given autonomy was not very successful. There were many violations of human rights and economic growth was stunted. Much of this was ascribed to Arafat, who was accused of being too weak to prevent corruption and nepotism amongst the new leadership of Palestine.
During the same period, Israel made it more difficult for Palestinians living in occupied territories who worked in Israel to keep their positions. The result was that living conditions became worse for most of the Palestinians.
Ultimately, Arafat's legacy is ambiguous at best. He died without achieving any of the goals he had championed at various times in his life -- the destruction of Israel; then peace with Israel, which he backed after 1988; and an independent Palestinian nation with Jerusalem as its capital. He did, however, succeed in forging a nationalist movement among Palestinians, and he placed his people and their situation at the absolute center of world politics.
Yasir Arafat see Arafat, Yasir
Yassir Arafat see Arafat, Yasir
Arafat, Yasir (Yasir Arafat) (Yassir Arafat) (August 24, 1929-November 11, 2004). Palestinian Arab nationalist who became the President of Palestine.
Mohammed Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini, popularly known as Yasser Arafat or by his kunya Abu Ammar, was a Palestinian leader. He was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, President of the Palestinian National Authority, and leader of the Fatah political party, which he founded in 1959. Arafat spent much of his life fighting against Israel in the name of Palestinian self-determination. Originally opposed to Israel's existence, he modified his position in 1988 when he accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242.
Born in Jerusalem (other sources say Cairo, Egypt or Gaza). After his mother's death, when Arafat was four years old, Arafat shuttled back and forth among relatives in Cairo, Gaza, and Jerusalem throughout his childhood. In 1947, during the wars with the Jews, Arafat fought on the side of the grand mufti of Jerusalem. He fled after the establishment of the nation of Israel in 1948, settling in Cairo. He later studied engineering in Cairo (at the University of Cairo), and also trained as a fedayeen (commando).
In 1952, Arafat joined the Muslim Brotherhood and the Union of Palestinian Students, of which he became president. In 1956, he participated in the Suez campaign as a member of the Egyptian Army.
In 1956, Arafat founded the commando group known as al-Fatah ("the Conquest") and for the next few years, while working as an engineer with a construction firm in Kuwait, repeatedly led fedayeen raids deep into Israeli territory. As the leader of al-Fatah, Arafat launched a series of high-profile acts of anti-Israel terrorism. According to Middle East experts, it was Arafat who was the mastermind behind the kidnapping that resulted in the deaths of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany.
In 1964, Arafat linked al-Fatah with similar groups in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1967, Israel defeated Arab countries in a war and occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, lands where many Palestinians had lived since 1948. The Palestinians had moved into these regions after Israel officially came into being and was immediately attacked by surrounding Arab countries.
Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank after 1967 further inflamed Arab-Israeli tensions, causing Palestinian nationalism to become more radical. After the war, al-Fatah and guerrilla groups gained control of the PLO, which Arab leaders had established to represent the Palestinians. In 1969, Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO, which he controlled for the rest of his life.
After becoming the leader of the PLO, Arafat worked on bringing the PLO from an ideology of Pan-Arabism to Palestinian nationalism. After the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian Arabs in 1974, Arafat worked ceaselessly, and with some success, to win the organization international recognition. At the same time, Arafat made a strong effort to shed his terrorist image for that of the moderate statesman.
Arafat's self-reinvention from guerrilla fighter to statesman began in 1974, when he became the first person to address the United Nations as a leader of a liberation movement rather than a United Nations member state. After his appearance before the General Assembly, the United Nations recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.
In 1982, the PLO was forced to move from Lebanon, the site of the organization's headquarters, after Israel attacked the country. The headquarters of the PLO were re-located to Borj Cedria in the Gulf of Tunis, Tunisia.
On November 15, 1988, the State of Palestine was proclaimed at a meeting in Algiers, Algeria. Subsequently, in 1989, Arafat was elected president of the State of Palestine by the Central Council of the Palestine National Council.
In 1991, United States led talks began in Madrid, but were unproductive.
In 1993, the Oslo Agreement (the Oslo Accords) brought the peace process significantly forward. The basis for the prospective peace was to be a “land for peace” principle. Based upon this agreement, Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist. By signing the Oslo Agreement, Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin established a framework and timetable for the Middle East peace process. The process included the gradual transfer of control of parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, which Arafat headed. That year, both men shared the Nobel Peace Prize along with Israeli leader Shimon Peres.
In May 1994, Israeli forces withdrew from the town of Jericho in order to relinquish control to the Palestinians. In July of 1994, Arafat returned to Palestine.
On January 20, 1996, Arafat was elected president of the Palestinian Authority in public elections with 88% of the vote.
In the year 2000, Arafat turned down a peace proposal from the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak, which would have given Palestine control over more than 90% of the territory of the West Bank. This peace proposal was the biggest compromise Israel had ever offered.
Later that year, Palestine entered a situation of civil unrest, where Palestinians threw stones at soldiers, who retaliated with bullets. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed.
In December 2000, reports of new negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were announced.
In 2001, the dialogue between Israel and Palestine disintegrated following numerous terrorist attacks from Palestinian groups on Israeli civilians followed by Israeli attacks on Palestinian militants, their leaders and many Palestinian civilians. By Christmas, Arafat had been stripped of much of his power by Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and had been placed under virtual house arrest.
Arafat’s international profile changed during his more than 40 year career. During the 1960s, he was looked upon as leader and conductor of several terrorist attacks into Israel. In the 1970s, the international society came to regard him as being a politician without country, but still associated with the activities performed in the 1960s. In the 1980s, Arafat started to gain more important support in the West, mainly because of increasingly questionable Israeli military actions (e.g., attacks in Lebanon, massacres in Sabra and Chatila).
In the 1990s, Arafat came to be considered a pragmatic moderate, and by many foreign observers as a wiser politician than his Israeli opponents.
By 2001, Arafat’s position had weakened, as well as his popularity. There were several reasons for this. Other more radical groups became far more active as well as representative of public opinion. Israeli actions against the Palestinian infrastructure, like the police, made it virtually impossible for Arafat to exercise much power, hence creating an image of him as weak and ineffective among his own supporters. There were also indications that Arafat himself was sympathetic with certain radical groups, and gave said groups sufficient room for their uprising -- their intifada -- and their terrorist attacks on Israeli soil.
Arafat’s rule over the small territories that had been given autonomy was not very successful. There were many violations of human rights and economic growth was stunted. Much of this was ascribed to Arafat, who was accused of being too weak to prevent corruption and nepotism amongst the new leadership of Palestine.
During the same period, Israel made it more difficult for Palestinians living in occupied territories who worked in Israel to keep their positions. The result was that living conditions became worse for most of the Palestinians.
Ultimately, Arafat's legacy is ambiguous at best. He died without achieving any of the goals he had championed at various times in his life -- the destruction of Israel; then peace with Israel, which he backed after 1988; and an independent Palestinian nation with Jerusalem as its capital. He did, however, succeed in forging a nationalist movement among Palestinians, and he placed his people and their situation at the absolute center of world politics.
Yasir Arafat see Arafat, Yasir
Yassir Arafat see Arafat, Yasir
Argobba
Argobba. Muslim people of Ethiopia. The cryptic Argobba, a Muslim people in Ethiopia are divided into two groups (the Northern and the Southern). They pose some of the major historical and ethnological problems remaining among Ethiopia’s Semitic speaking peoples. Questions exist as to the very survival of the Argobba language, and no ethnography of the group has ever been carried out.
There are three explanations for Argobba distribution. The first is that, in accord with the origin tradition of a migration of the Beni Umayya from Arabia, a very early Argobba presence, around 750, was established in Ethiopia, probably in the northern region. A further development of this possibility would allow for a continuous population of Argobba, encompassing the present locations and intermediate points. There is evidence that the Argobba were more widespread than at present.
A second explanation connects the migration of the Argobba to their southern range with the fortunes of the sultanates which developed in the northern area. This hypothesis has strong circumstantial evidence in its favor, particularly if one connects the Argobba to the Walashima’ dynasty. In 1277, Wali Asma’ began the conquest of the Muslim state of Shawa, completing his task in 1285 and establishing ‘Ifat as the dominant state of the region. ‘Ifat itself was conquered by the armies of Christian Ethiopian kings Dawit I and Yeshaq in 1415, and the Walashima’ were driven towards the Red Sea, finally establishing Adal, which was to become the most powerful of this succession of Muslim polities. This explanation of the origin of the Southern Argobba notes that the capital of Adal was near the site of Harar and the present Argobba villages. Although there is no direct evidence, this hypothesis suggests that the Southern Argobba accompanied the Walashima’ leaders on their flight from ‘Ifat in the early 1400s. There is evidence to suggest that the Northern Argobba were the remaining population of ‘Ifat after the conquest.
The third hypothesis for explaining the links between the Northern and Southern Argobba suggests relatively recent migration to the Harar region. Two major events in Ethiopian history affected the Adal kingdom. In 1529 Imam Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi of Adal mounted a jihad from Harar which swept throughout highland Ethiopia, where the Imam is still remembered with trepidation as Ahmed Gragn, “the left-handed.” He was finally killed in 1549 by the Portuguese troops of Christopher de Gama, who had come to aid the Ethiopian king. In reaction to the jihad, the Christian Ethiopians counterattacked, crushing the Adal kingdom. At this point, Adal retreated to an oasis in the Danakil desert, leaving the city of Harar as the last remnant of the once powerful Muslim principalities of Ethiopia. Immediately following the collapse of the jihad, a major population movement took place which permanently altered the demographic and political balance of Ethiopia. This was the expansion of the Oromo from their homelands in southwestern Ethiopia northward until they occupied most of the Rift region, thus surrounding the Northern Argobba villages, and eastward until they isolated the city of Harar and occupied the environs of the Southern Argobba. The present Argobba villages in this region are, for the most part, situated on hilltops. The inhabitants explain that the sites were chosen to defend against the Oromo invaders.
The Argobba are a Muslim people group that is spread out through isolated village networks and towns in the northeast and east of Ethiopia. The Argobba have typically been astute traders and merchants, and have adjusted to the economic trends in their area. These factors have led to the decline of the Argobba language.
Argobba communities can be found in the Afar, Amhara, and Oromia Regions, in and along the Rift Valley. They include Yimlawo, Gusa, Shonke, Berehet, Khayr Amba, Melkajillo, Metehara, Shewa Robit, and the surrounding rural villages.
In some places the Argobba language has homogenized with Amharic. In other places the people have shifted to neighboring languages for economic reasons. At this time there are only a few areas left where the Argobba are not at least bilingual in Amharic, Oromiffa or Afar. All of these languages have a literature that can be used to serve the Argobba, even though their current literacy rate in any language is low; the Argobba reportedly do not like to send their children to school because they will be influenced by the non-Muslim world. This is the same reason that the Argobba do not go to court.
Argobba. Muslim people of Ethiopia. The cryptic Argobba, a Muslim people in Ethiopia are divided into two groups (the Northern and the Southern). They pose some of the major historical and ethnological problems remaining among Ethiopia’s Semitic speaking peoples. Questions exist as to the very survival of the Argobba language, and no ethnography of the group has ever been carried out.
There are three explanations for Argobba distribution. The first is that, in accord with the origin tradition of a migration of the Beni Umayya from Arabia, a very early Argobba presence, around 750, was established in Ethiopia, probably in the northern region. A further development of this possibility would allow for a continuous population of Argobba, encompassing the present locations and intermediate points. There is evidence that the Argobba were more widespread than at present.
A second explanation connects the migration of the Argobba to their southern range with the fortunes of the sultanates which developed in the northern area. This hypothesis has strong circumstantial evidence in its favor, particularly if one connects the Argobba to the Walashima’ dynasty. In 1277, Wali Asma’ began the conquest of the Muslim state of Shawa, completing his task in 1285 and establishing ‘Ifat as the dominant state of the region. ‘Ifat itself was conquered by the armies of Christian Ethiopian kings Dawit I and Yeshaq in 1415, and the Walashima’ were driven towards the Red Sea, finally establishing Adal, which was to become the most powerful of this succession of Muslim polities. This explanation of the origin of the Southern Argobba notes that the capital of Adal was near the site of Harar and the present Argobba villages. Although there is no direct evidence, this hypothesis suggests that the Southern Argobba accompanied the Walashima’ leaders on their flight from ‘Ifat in the early 1400s. There is evidence to suggest that the Northern Argobba were the remaining population of ‘Ifat after the conquest.
The third hypothesis for explaining the links between the Northern and Southern Argobba suggests relatively recent migration to the Harar region. Two major events in Ethiopian history affected the Adal kingdom. In 1529 Imam Ahmed Ibrahim al-Ghazi of Adal mounted a jihad from Harar which swept throughout highland Ethiopia, where the Imam is still remembered with trepidation as Ahmed Gragn, “the left-handed.” He was finally killed in 1549 by the Portuguese troops of Christopher de Gama, who had come to aid the Ethiopian king. In reaction to the jihad, the Christian Ethiopians counterattacked, crushing the Adal kingdom. At this point, Adal retreated to an oasis in the Danakil desert, leaving the city of Harar as the last remnant of the once powerful Muslim principalities of Ethiopia. Immediately following the collapse of the jihad, a major population movement took place which permanently altered the demographic and political balance of Ethiopia. This was the expansion of the Oromo from their homelands in southwestern Ethiopia northward until they occupied most of the Rift region, thus surrounding the Northern Argobba villages, and eastward until they isolated the city of Harar and occupied the environs of the Southern Argobba. The present Argobba villages in this region are, for the most part, situated on hilltops. The inhabitants explain that the sites were chosen to defend against the Oromo invaders.
The Argobba are a Muslim people group that is spread out through isolated village networks and towns in the northeast and east of Ethiopia. The Argobba have typically been astute traders and merchants, and have adjusted to the economic trends in their area. These factors have led to the decline of the Argobba language.
Argobba communities can be found in the Afar, Amhara, and Oromia Regions, in and along the Rift Valley. They include Yimlawo, Gusa, Shonke, Berehet, Khayr Amba, Melkajillo, Metehara, Shewa Robit, and the surrounding rural villages.
In some places the Argobba language has homogenized with Amharic. In other places the people have shifted to neighboring languages for economic reasons. At this time there are only a few areas left where the Argobba are not at least bilingual in Amharic, Oromiffa or Afar. All of these languages have a literature that can be used to serve the Argobba, even though their current literacy rate in any language is low; the Argobba reportedly do not like to send their children to school because they will be influenced by the non-Muslim world. This is the same reason that the Argobba do not go to court.
‘Arif, 'Abd al-Salam
‘Arif, 'Abd al-Salam. See 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif.
‘Arif, 'Abd al-Salam. See 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif.
‘Arif, Mirza Abu ’l-Qasim
‘Arif, Mirza Abu ’l-Qasim. See Mirza Abu ’l-Qasim ‘Arif.
‘Arif, Mirza Abu ’l-Qasim. See Mirza Abu ’l-Qasim ‘Arif.
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