Diabate, Toumani
Toumani Diabaté (b. August 10, 1965, Bamako, Mali – d. July 19, 2024, Galle, Mali) was a Malian kora player. In addition to performing the traditional music of Mali, he was involved in cross-cultural collaborations with flamenco, blues, jazz, and other international styles of music.
Toumani was born in Bamako, Mali, into a griot family. His father was known as "the king of kora' and Toumani was the 7th generation of musicians in his family. He started to play kora at the age of five and was considered one of the greatest players of the traditional West African instrument. Toumani recorded his legendary album, Kaira (1988), in only a couple of hours and revolutionized the way of playing the kora, like Jimi Hendrix revolutionized the way of playing the guitar.
Di‘bil
Di‘bil. Nickname of Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i (765-860), a satirical poet. A Shi‘a, who was famous for his poems praising the eighth Imam ‘Ali al-Rida. Di'bil generally attacked the ‘Abbasid caliphs.
Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i see Di‘bil.
Khuza'i, Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al see Di‘bil.
Di‘bil. Nickname of Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i (765-860), a satirical poet. A Shi‘a, who was famous for his poems praising the eighth Imam ‘Ali al-Rida. Di'bil generally attacked the ‘Abbasid caliphs.
Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al-Khuza‘i see Di‘bil.
Khuza'i, Abu ‘Ali Muhammad al see Di‘bil.
Dihlawi
Dihlawi (Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi) (1703-1762). Revolutionary Indian thinker, theologian, and pioneer Persian translator of the Qur’an and hadith. He is considered the founder of Islamic modernism.
Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi see Dihlawi
Dihlawi (Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi) (1703-1762). Revolutionary Indian thinker, theologian, and pioneer Persian translator of the Qur’an and hadith. He is considered the founder of Islamic modernism.
Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi see Dihlawi
Dihqan
Dihqan. Term which is applied primarily to proprietors of small landholdings in Sasanid and early Islamic Iran. Muslim lexicographers understood it to denote “chiefs, proprietors of land and villages” or more precisely, owners of large estates (day’a) or “enclosed gardens” (kurum). Some were only village headmen or peasant district representatives; others lived on relatively large estates; still others were quite wealthy, lived in the cities, and were often associated with the merchants. This is reflected by Mas’udi, who reported that the dihqans were divided into five subclasses, each distinguished by a particular form of dress.
The dihqans first appeared as a distinct social group during the Sasanid period (226-641). They were not members of the privileged aristocracy (shahrdaran, vaspuhran) but rather the azadhan, free functionaries responsible for some military service, assisting in the assessment and collection of taxes, and mediating between the peasantry and the central government. Some high officials such as the shahrigh (representative of the king in a district) were also chosen from among the dihqans. The dihqans provided the Sasanid monarchs with a useful counterbalance to the power of the provincial nobility. Thus, Khusrau Anushirvan praised the dihqans and used the folklore that all the dihqans were descended from Vehghard, brother of the legendary King Hoshang, to emphasize that the dihqans and the monarchs were “brothers.”
The Arab-Muslim conquest of the Sasanid empire actually enhanced the position of the dihqans in eastern Iran. When some of the Umayyad governors of Khurasan allied themselves with the provincial aristocracy and attempted to humiliate and degrade the dihqans, the latter threw their support to anti-Umayyad movements in the region and were instrumental in winning rural support for the Abbasid revolutionary coalition (c. 747-750). The dihqans remained politically important until the eleventh century and also helped achieve the synthesis of Islamic and Iranian cultural traditions represented by Firdausi’s Shahnama. They were gradually supplanted by the class of holders of iqta (“fief”). Today, the term is often used for a common peasant or rustic character.
Dihqan. Term which is applied primarily to proprietors of small landholdings in Sasanid and early Islamic Iran. Muslim lexicographers understood it to denote “chiefs, proprietors of land and villages” or more precisely, owners of large estates (day’a) or “enclosed gardens” (kurum). Some were only village headmen or peasant district representatives; others lived on relatively large estates; still others were quite wealthy, lived in the cities, and were often associated with the merchants. This is reflected by Mas’udi, who reported that the dihqans were divided into five subclasses, each distinguished by a particular form of dress.
The dihqans first appeared as a distinct social group during the Sasanid period (226-641). They were not members of the privileged aristocracy (shahrdaran, vaspuhran) but rather the azadhan, free functionaries responsible for some military service, assisting in the assessment and collection of taxes, and mediating between the peasantry and the central government. Some high officials such as the shahrigh (representative of the king in a district) were also chosen from among the dihqans. The dihqans provided the Sasanid monarchs with a useful counterbalance to the power of the provincial nobility. Thus, Khusrau Anushirvan praised the dihqans and used the folklore that all the dihqans were descended from Vehghard, brother of the legendary King Hoshang, to emphasize that the dihqans and the monarchs were “brothers.”
The Arab-Muslim conquest of the Sasanid empire actually enhanced the position of the dihqans in eastern Iran. When some of the Umayyad governors of Khurasan allied themselves with the provincial aristocracy and attempted to humiliate and degrade the dihqans, the latter threw their support to anti-Umayyad movements in the region and were instrumental in winning rural support for the Abbasid revolutionary coalition (c. 747-750). The dihqans remained politically important until the eleventh century and also helped achieve the synthesis of Islamic and Iranian cultural traditions represented by Firdausi’s Shahnama. They were gradually supplanted by the class of holders of iqta (“fief”). Today, the term is often used for a common peasant or rustic character.
Dimashqi
Shams al-Din al-Ansari al-Dimashqi or simply al-Dimashqi (1256–1327) was a medieval Arab geographer, completing his main work in 1300. Born in Damascus — as his name "Dimashqi" implies—he mostly wrote of his native land, the Greater Syria (Bilad ash-Sham), upon the complete withdrawal of the Crusaders. He became a contemporary of the Mamluk sultan Baibars, the general who led the Muslims in war against the Crusaders. His work is of value in connection with the Crusader Chronicles. He died while in Safad, in 1327.
Al-Dimashqi (1325) gives very detailed accounts of each island in the Malay archipelago, its population, flora, fauna and customs. He mentions "the country of Champa ... is inhabited by Muslims and idolaters. The Islam came there during the time of Caliph Uthman ... and Ali, many Muslims who were expelled by the Umayyads and by Al-Hajjaj, fled there, and since then a majority of the Cham have embraced Islam."
Of their rivals the Khmer, Al-Dimashqi (1325) mentions they inhabit the island of Komor (Khmer), also called Malay Island, a land of many towns and cities, rich-dense forests with huge, tall trees, and white elephants; they supplemented their income from the trade routes not only by exporting ivory and aloe, but also by engaging in piracy and raiding on Muslim and Chinese shipping.
Dinawari
Dinawari (Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari) (Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari) (828-896). Arab scholar of Iranian origin. Among other works, he wrote a well-known history [Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")] from a Persian point of view.
Ābu Ḥanīfah Āḥmad ibn Dawūd Dīnawarī was a Persian polymath excelling as much in astronomy, agriculture, botany and metallurgy and as he did in geography, mathematics and history. He was born in Dinawar, (halfway between Hamadan and Kermanshah in western Iran). He studied astronomy, mathematics and mechanics in Isfahan and philology and poetry in Kufa and Basra. He died on July 24, 896 at Dinawar. His most renowned contribution is Book of Plants, for which he is considered the founder of Arabic botany. He is also considered among the very first writers to discuss the ancestry of the Kurds. He wrote a book about this subject called Ansâb al-Akrâd (Ancestry of the Kurds).
Dinawari's Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History") has been edited and published numerous times, but has not been translated into a Western language.
On the other hand, al-Dinawari is considered the founder of Arabic botany for his Kitab al-Nabat (Book of Plants), which consisted of six volumes. Only the third and fifth volumes have survived, though the sixth volume has partly been reconstructed based on citations from later works. In the surviving portions of his works, 637 plants are described. He also discusses plant evolution from its birth to its death, describing the phases of plant growth and the production of flowers and fruit.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the applications of Islamic astronomy and meteorology to agriculture. It describes the astronomical and meteorological character of the sky, the planets and constellations, the sun and moon, the lunar phases indicating seasons and rain, the anwa (heavenly bodies of rain), and atmospheric phenomena such as winds, thunder, lightning, snow, floods, valleys, rivers, lakes, wells and other sources of water.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the Earth sciences in the context of agriculture. He considers the Earth, stone and sands, and describes different types of ground, indicating which types are more convenient for plants and the qualities and properties of good ground.
The works al-Dinawari include:
In mathematics and the natural sciences:
1. Kitâb al-jabr wa'l-muqâbila ("Book of Algebra")
2. Kitâb al-nabât ("Book of Plants")
3. Kitâb al-kusuf ("Book of Solar Eclipses")
4. Kitâb al-radd alâ rasad al-Isfahâni ("Refutation of al-Isfahani's Astronomical Observations")
5. Kitâb al-hisâb ("Book of Arithmetics")
6. Bahth fi hisâb al-Hind ("Analysis of Indian Arithmetics")
7. Kitâb al-jam' wa'l-tafriq ("Book of Arithmetics")
8. Kitab al-qibla wa'l-ziwal ("Book of Astral Orientations")
9. Kitâb al-anwâ' ("Book of Weather")
10. Islâh al-mantiq ("Improvement upon Logic")
In the social sciences and humanities:
1. Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")
2. Kitâb al-kabir ("Grand Book" in history of sciences)
3. Kitâb al-fisâha ("Book of Rhetorics")
4. Kitâb al-buldân ("Book of Geography")
5. Kitâb al-shi'r wa'l-shu'arâ ("Book of Poetry and Poets")
6. Ansâb al-Akrâd ("Ancestry of the Kurds").
Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari see Dinawari
Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari see Dinawari
Dinawari (Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari) (Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari) (828-896). Arab scholar of Iranian origin. Among other works, he wrote a well-known history [Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")] from a Persian point of view.
Ābu Ḥanīfah Āḥmad ibn Dawūd Dīnawarī was a Persian polymath excelling as much in astronomy, agriculture, botany and metallurgy and as he did in geography, mathematics and history. He was born in Dinawar, (halfway between Hamadan and Kermanshah in western Iran). He studied astronomy, mathematics and mechanics in Isfahan and philology and poetry in Kufa and Basra. He died on July 24, 896 at Dinawar. His most renowned contribution is Book of Plants, for which he is considered the founder of Arabic botany. He is also considered among the very first writers to discuss the ancestry of the Kurds. He wrote a book about this subject called Ansâb al-Akrâd (Ancestry of the Kurds).
Dinawari's Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History") has been edited and published numerous times, but has not been translated into a Western language.
On the other hand, al-Dinawari is considered the founder of Arabic botany for his Kitab al-Nabat (Book of Plants), which consisted of six volumes. Only the third and fifth volumes have survived, though the sixth volume has partly been reconstructed based on citations from later works. In the surviving portions of his works, 637 plants are described. He also discusses plant evolution from its birth to its death, describing the phases of plant growth and the production of flowers and fruit.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the applications of Islamic astronomy and meteorology to agriculture. It describes the astronomical and meteorological character of the sky, the planets and constellations, the sun and moon, the lunar phases indicating seasons and rain, the anwa (heavenly bodies of rain), and atmospheric phenomena such as winds, thunder, lightning, snow, floods, valleys, rivers, lakes, wells and other sources of water.
Parts of al-Dinawari's Book of Plants deals with the Earth sciences in the context of agriculture. He considers the Earth, stone and sands, and describes different types of ground, indicating which types are more convenient for plants and the qualities and properties of good ground.
The works al-Dinawari include:
In mathematics and the natural sciences:
1. Kitâb al-jabr wa'l-muqâbila ("Book of Algebra")
2. Kitâb al-nabât ("Book of Plants")
3. Kitâb al-kusuf ("Book of Solar Eclipses")
4. Kitâb al-radd alâ rasad al-Isfahâni ("Refutation of al-Isfahani's Astronomical Observations")
5. Kitâb al-hisâb ("Book of Arithmetics")
6. Bahth fi hisâb al-Hind ("Analysis of Indian Arithmetics")
7. Kitâb al-jam' wa'l-tafriq ("Book of Arithmetics")
8. Kitab al-qibla wa'l-ziwal ("Book of Astral Orientations")
9. Kitâb al-anwâ' ("Book of Weather")
10. Islâh al-mantiq ("Improvement upon Logic")
In the social sciences and humanities:
1. Akhbâr al-tiwâl ("General History")
2. Kitâb al-kabir ("Grand Book" in history of sciences)
3. Kitâb al-fisâha ("Book of Rhetorics")
4. Kitâb al-buldân ("Book of Geography")
5. Kitâb al-shi'r wa'l-shu'arâ ("Book of Poetry and Poets")
6. Ansâb al-Akrâd ("Ancestry of the Kurds").
Abu Hanifa al-Dinawari see Dinawari
Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Dawud Dinawari see Dinawari
Dinet
Dinet (Alphonse Dinet) (1861-1929). French author and a painter of Asian subjects. He assumed the name Nacir Ed Dine (Nasir al-Din) when he became a convert to Islam.
Alphonse Dinet see Dinet
Nacir Ed Dine see Dinet
Dine, Nacir Ed see Dinet
Nasir al-Din see Dinet
Din, Nasir al- see Dinet
Dinet (Alphonse Dinet) (1861-1929). French author and a painter of Asian subjects. He assumed the name Nacir Ed Dine (Nasir al-Din) when he became a convert to Islam.
Alphonse Dinet see Dinet
Nacir Ed Dine see Dinet
Dine, Nacir Ed see Dinet
Nasir al-Din see Dinet
Din, Nasir al- see Dinet
Diola
Diola. The major ethnic group in the Lower Casamance region of southwestern Senegal. The Diola comprise several subgroups which are distinguished from one another by linguistic and cultural variations. The isolation of these subgroups is reflected in the fact that, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Diola had no single word to identify themselves. From the late fifteenth century, the term “Floups” or “Felupes” was used by European travelers to refer to them. The term “Diola,” apparently of Wolof origin came into common usage during the mid-1800s. Some nineteenth century sources spell the term, Yola. The Senegalese government has adopted the simplified spelling, Jola.
Islam attracted its first Diola converts during the 1890s. The early Muslims were men who had traveled to the Gambia to trade rubber and palm produce. Within a few years, several northwestern Diola communities, which maintained the closest commercial contact with the Manding, were predominantly Muslim. Also, beginning in the 1890s, the establishment of French colonial administration over the Diola fostered increased communications between local populations and the outside world. Dyula (Manding) traders, some of whom served as marabouts, began to circulate through the region. In addition, about 1900, the Mauritanian marabout Sharif Mahfuz established himself among the Diola. All of these factors fostered conversion.
During the 1920s, roads were constructed throughout the Lower Casamance, encouraging continued urban migration. The resulting partial integration into colonial society stimulated the rapid spread of Islam.
Floups see Diola.
Felupes see Diola.
Yola see Diola.
Jola see Diola.
Diola. The major ethnic group in the Lower Casamance region of southwestern Senegal. The Diola comprise several subgroups which are distinguished from one another by linguistic and cultural variations. The isolation of these subgroups is reflected in the fact that, until the mid-nineteenth century, the Diola had no single word to identify themselves. From the late fifteenth century, the term “Floups” or “Felupes” was used by European travelers to refer to them. The term “Diola,” apparently of Wolof origin came into common usage during the mid-1800s. Some nineteenth century sources spell the term, Yola. The Senegalese government has adopted the simplified spelling, Jola.
Islam attracted its first Diola converts during the 1890s. The early Muslims were men who had traveled to the Gambia to trade rubber and palm produce. Within a few years, several northwestern Diola communities, which maintained the closest commercial contact with the Manding, were predominantly Muslim. Also, beginning in the 1890s, the establishment of French colonial administration over the Diola fostered increased communications between local populations and the outside world. Dyula (Manding) traders, some of whom served as marabouts, began to circulate through the region. In addition, about 1900, the Mauritanian marabout Sharif Mahfuz established himself among the Diola. All of these factors fostered conversion.
During the 1920s, roads were constructed throughout the Lower Casamance, encouraging continued urban migration. The resulting partial integration into colonial society stimulated the rapid spread of Islam.
Floups see Diola.
Felupes see Diola.
Yola see Diola.
Jola see Diola.
Diouf
Diouf (Abdou Diouf) (Wolof: Abdu Juuf) (b. September 7, 1935). Prime minister of Senegal (r.1970-1981) who became president in 1981. Diouf was born in Louga and educated at the Lycee Faidherbe in Saint Louis and at the University of Dakar. In 1960, he received a law degree from the University of Paris. Upon his return, he held increasingly important government positions, and became known as President Leopold Sedar Senghor’s protégé. In 1964, Diouf was named secretary-general to the presidency. In 1970, Senghor revived the post of prime minister -- previously abolished when the incumbent Mamadou Dia had challenged Senghor’s authority -- and named Diouf to the position. Diouf was viewed by many as the embodiment of Senghor’s attempt to establish a technocratically oriented administration.
In 1981, Senghor, approaching his seventy-fifth year, stepped down from the presidency in favor of Diouf. The latter immediately lifted many of his mentor’s restrictions on political opposition parties. In the same year, Diouf responded to a plea from Gambian president Dauda Jawara for assistance against an apparently successful coup. Senegal’s intervention restored Jawara, and shortly afterward the two countries agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia, which stressed military cooperation.
In 1983, Diouf was elected president in his own right with 84 percent of the vote, the opposition parties being badly fragmented. He then took steps to replace the old-line politicians with younger men, which created some tension within the government and the party. During Diouf's tenure, Senegal remained closely allied with France, both politically and culturally. In 1985, Diouf was elected head of the OAU (Organization of African Unity).
Abdou Diouf was the second President of Senegal, serving from 1981 to 2000. Diouf is notable both for coming to power by peaceful succession, and leaving willingly after losing the 2000 presidential election to Abdoulaye Wade. He also became the Secretary-General of La Francophonie in 2003.
Diouf was born in Louga, Senegal, the child of an Hal Pulaar mother and a Serere father. He went to primary and secondary school at the Lycée Faidherbe in Saint-Louis, and studied law at Dakar University and then at the Sorbonne, Paris. Diouf graduated in 1959.
After graduation, Diouf returned to Senegal, where in September 1960 he was appointed Director of International Technical Cooperation. In November 1960 he became assistant of the Secretary-General of the Government, and in June 1961 he became Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense. In 1961 he joined the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, UPS), which later became the Socialist Party of Senegal. In December 1961 he became Governor of the Sine-Saloum Region, serving in that position until December 1962, when he became Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1963 he was moved to the position of Director of the Cabinet of President Léopold Senghor, where he remained until December 1965. In January 1964 he became Secretary-General of the Presidency, serving in that post until March 1968, when he became Minister of Planning and Industry. He remained in the latter position until February 1970, when he was named Prime Minister.
In 1970, Senghor reinstated the post of prime minister, giving it to Diouf, his protégé. Senghor trusted Diouf, Diouf had administrative experience, and also no independent power base of his own. This was important, for Senghor's last prime minister had used the position to launch a coup d’état. On January 1, 1981, Senghor resigned in favor of Diouf, who became president of Senegal.
Diouf continued the political liberalization Senghor had begun by holding elections in 1983. He allowed fourteen opposition parties to run, instead of the four Senghor had allowed. The practical effect of this was to fragment the opposition, and Diouf won with 83.5 percent of the vote.
In 1985, opposing parties tried to form a coalition. It was broken up on the grounds that coalitions were forbidden by the constitution. Also in 1985, Abdoulaye Wade, Diouf's main political opponent, was temporarily arrested for unlawful demonstration.
In February, 1988, elections were held again. Diouf won 72.3 percent of the vote to Wade's 25.8 percent, and opposing parties alleged electoral fraud. Disturbances followed, and Diouf declared a state of emergency, detaining Wade again until May of that year.
Under Diouf, Senegal agreed to form a confederation called Senegambia with neighboring Gambia on December 12, 1981. This union took place on February 1, 1982. In April 1989, the Mauritania-Senegal Border War developed, leading to an outbreak of ethnic violence and the severing of diplomatic relations with Mauritania. As the region destabilized, Senegambia was dissolved.
In 1986, Diouf began an anti-AIDS program in Senegal, before the virus was able to take off in earnest. He used the media and schools to promote safe-sex messages, and required prostitutes to be registered. He also encouraged civic organizations and both Christian and Muslim religious leaders to raise awareness about AIDS. The result was that while AIDS was decimating much of Africa, the infection rate for Senegal stayed below 2 per cent.
Diouf was re-elected in February 1993 with 58% of the vote to a 7-year term. Presidential term lengths had been extended by two years in 1991. In the first round of the 2000 elections, on February 27, he took 41.3% of the vote against 30.1% for the long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, but in the second round on March 19 he received only 41.5% against 58.5% for Wade. Diouf conceded defeat and left office on April 1.
From this electoral defeat came one of Diouf's greatest contributions to African peace, for he gracefully surrendered power to Abdoulaye Wade, his long-time rival. When Diouf left office Wade said he should receive a Nobel Peace Prize for leaving without violence.
Both during and after his presidency, Diouf was active in international organizations. He was elected President of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 1985 to 1986. Soon after his election, he made a personal plea to François Mitterrand, the President of France, resulting in France speaking strongly for sanctions against South Africa. In 1992, he was re-elected President of the OAU again for another year-long term.
After leaving office as President of Senegal, he was unanimously elected as Secretary-General of La Francophonie at that organization's Ninth Summit on October 20, 2002 in Beirut, following the withdrawal of the only other candidate, Henri Lopes of the Republic of the Congo. Diouf took office as Secretary-General on January 1, 2003. He was re-elected as Secretary-General for another four years at the organization's summit in Bucharest in September 2006.
Abdou Diouf see Diouf
Wolof Abdu Juuf see Diouf
Juuf, Wolof Abdu see Diouf
Diouf (Abdou Diouf) (Wolof: Abdu Juuf) (b. September 7, 1935). Prime minister of Senegal (r.1970-1981) who became president in 1981. Diouf was born in Louga and educated at the Lycee Faidherbe in Saint Louis and at the University of Dakar. In 1960, he received a law degree from the University of Paris. Upon his return, he held increasingly important government positions, and became known as President Leopold Sedar Senghor’s protégé. In 1964, Diouf was named secretary-general to the presidency. In 1970, Senghor revived the post of prime minister -- previously abolished when the incumbent Mamadou Dia had challenged Senghor’s authority -- and named Diouf to the position. Diouf was viewed by many as the embodiment of Senghor’s attempt to establish a technocratically oriented administration.
In 1981, Senghor, approaching his seventy-fifth year, stepped down from the presidency in favor of Diouf. The latter immediately lifted many of his mentor’s restrictions on political opposition parties. In the same year, Diouf responded to a plea from Gambian president Dauda Jawara for assistance against an apparently successful coup. Senegal’s intervention restored Jawara, and shortly afterward the two countries agreed to form the Confederation of Senegambia, which stressed military cooperation.
In 1983, Diouf was elected president in his own right with 84 percent of the vote, the opposition parties being badly fragmented. He then took steps to replace the old-line politicians with younger men, which created some tension within the government and the party. During Diouf's tenure, Senegal remained closely allied with France, both politically and culturally. In 1985, Diouf was elected head of the OAU (Organization of African Unity).
Abdou Diouf was the second President of Senegal, serving from 1981 to 2000. Diouf is notable both for coming to power by peaceful succession, and leaving willingly after losing the 2000 presidential election to Abdoulaye Wade. He also became the Secretary-General of La Francophonie in 2003.
Diouf was born in Louga, Senegal, the child of an Hal Pulaar mother and a Serere father. He went to primary and secondary school at the Lycée Faidherbe in Saint-Louis, and studied law at Dakar University and then at the Sorbonne, Paris. Diouf graduated in 1959.
After graduation, Diouf returned to Senegal, where in September 1960 he was appointed Director of International Technical Cooperation. In November 1960 he became assistant of the Secretary-General of the Government, and in June 1961 he became Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense. In 1961 he joined the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, UPS), which later became the Socialist Party of Senegal. In December 1961 he became Governor of the Sine-Saloum Region, serving in that position until December 1962, when he became Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In May 1963 he was moved to the position of Director of the Cabinet of President Léopold Senghor, where he remained until December 1965. In January 1964 he became Secretary-General of the Presidency, serving in that post until March 1968, when he became Minister of Planning and Industry. He remained in the latter position until February 1970, when he was named Prime Minister.
In 1970, Senghor reinstated the post of prime minister, giving it to Diouf, his protégé. Senghor trusted Diouf, Diouf had administrative experience, and also no independent power base of his own. This was important, for Senghor's last prime minister had used the position to launch a coup d’état. On January 1, 1981, Senghor resigned in favor of Diouf, who became president of Senegal.
Diouf continued the political liberalization Senghor had begun by holding elections in 1983. He allowed fourteen opposition parties to run, instead of the four Senghor had allowed. The practical effect of this was to fragment the opposition, and Diouf won with 83.5 percent of the vote.
In 1985, opposing parties tried to form a coalition. It was broken up on the grounds that coalitions were forbidden by the constitution. Also in 1985, Abdoulaye Wade, Diouf's main political opponent, was temporarily arrested for unlawful demonstration.
In February, 1988, elections were held again. Diouf won 72.3 percent of the vote to Wade's 25.8 percent, and opposing parties alleged electoral fraud. Disturbances followed, and Diouf declared a state of emergency, detaining Wade again until May of that year.
Under Diouf, Senegal agreed to form a confederation called Senegambia with neighboring Gambia on December 12, 1981. This union took place on February 1, 1982. In April 1989, the Mauritania-Senegal Border War developed, leading to an outbreak of ethnic violence and the severing of diplomatic relations with Mauritania. As the region destabilized, Senegambia was dissolved.
In 1986, Diouf began an anti-AIDS program in Senegal, before the virus was able to take off in earnest. He used the media and schools to promote safe-sex messages, and required prostitutes to be registered. He also encouraged civic organizations and both Christian and Muslim religious leaders to raise awareness about AIDS. The result was that while AIDS was decimating much of Africa, the infection rate for Senegal stayed below 2 per cent.
Diouf was re-elected in February 1993 with 58% of the vote to a 7-year term. Presidential term lengths had been extended by two years in 1991. In the first round of the 2000 elections, on February 27, he took 41.3% of the vote against 30.1% for the long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, but in the second round on March 19 he received only 41.5% against 58.5% for Wade. Diouf conceded defeat and left office on April 1.
From this electoral defeat came one of Diouf's greatest contributions to African peace, for he gracefully surrendered power to Abdoulaye Wade, his long-time rival. When Diouf left office Wade said he should receive a Nobel Peace Prize for leaving without violence.
Both during and after his presidency, Diouf was active in international organizations. He was elected President of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for 1985 to 1986. Soon after his election, he made a personal plea to François Mitterrand, the President of France, resulting in France speaking strongly for sanctions against South Africa. In 1992, he was re-elected President of the OAU again for another year-long term.
After leaving office as President of Senegal, he was unanimously elected as Secretary-General of La Francophonie at that organization's Ninth Summit on October 20, 2002 in Beirut, following the withdrawal of the only other candidate, Henri Lopes of the Republic of the Congo. Diouf took office as Secretary-General on January 1, 2003. He was re-elected as Secretary-General for another four years at the organization's summit in Bucharest in September 2006.
Abdou Diouf see Diouf
Wolof Abdu Juuf see Diouf
Juuf, Wolof Abdu see Diouf
Divehi
Divehi. The Divehi people, or Maldivians, occupy the whole of the Maldive Islands, an archipelago of coral atolls in the Indian Ocean about 400 miles west of Sri Lanka. There are some 1,000 little islands and islets, stretching for 475 miles and grouped into a score of atolls. Most islands have fresh water because rainfall is abundant, and vegetation is lush on islands where enough humus is mixed with the coral sand. Coconut palms predominate. The Divehis are 100 percent Muslim. It is believed that in 1154 a saint from Morocco dispelled an apparition in Male harbor, converted the king and designated him sultan. Thereafter, all his subjects were compelled to accept Islam. The Tarikh, a chronicle in Arabic, records the reigns of 92 sultans (and a few sultanas). Ibn Battuta, the famed Arab traveler and chronicler, appeared in Male in 1343 and stayed for a year and a half as qadi (qazi), as there was no judge there trained in Islamic law.
The Portuguese ruled the Maldives for fifteen years in the mid-sixteenth century but were overthrown by a hero, Muhammad Takurufan, whose epic deeds as narrated today show the antipathy of the Divehis to outsiders and to Christians in particular. The British signed an agreement to “protect” the Maldives in 1887, but did not administer it internally and left no colonial stamp. They withdrew in 1965, and in 1968 a republic was proclaimed and the sultanate abolished. The government today, however, is still highly centralized.
Maldivians see Divehi.
Divehi. The Divehi people, or Maldivians, occupy the whole of the Maldive Islands, an archipelago of coral atolls in the Indian Ocean about 400 miles west of Sri Lanka. There are some 1,000 little islands and islets, stretching for 475 miles and grouped into a score of atolls. Most islands have fresh water because rainfall is abundant, and vegetation is lush on islands where enough humus is mixed with the coral sand. Coconut palms predominate. The Divehis are 100 percent Muslim. It is believed that in 1154 a saint from Morocco dispelled an apparition in Male harbor, converted the king and designated him sultan. Thereafter, all his subjects were compelled to accept Islam. The Tarikh, a chronicle in Arabic, records the reigns of 92 sultans (and a few sultanas). Ibn Battuta, the famed Arab traveler and chronicler, appeared in Male in 1343 and stayed for a year and a half as qadi (qazi), as there was no judge there trained in Islamic law.
The Portuguese ruled the Maldives for fifteen years in the mid-sixteenth century but were overthrown by a hero, Muhammad Takurufan, whose epic deeds as narrated today show the antipathy of the Divehis to outsiders and to Christians in particular. The British signed an agreement to “protect” the Maldives in 1887, but did not administer it internally and left no colonial stamp. They withdrew in 1965, and in 1968 a republic was proclaimed and the sultanate abolished. The government today, however, is still highly centralized.
Maldivians see Divehi.
Dongxiang
Dongxiang. Three Muslim ethnic groups live in the villages and towns along the rivers flowing out of the Qilian and other mountains in north central China. The largest is the Dongxiang (the others, the Bonans and Salars), most of whom live in the Dongxiang Autonomous County in Gansu Province. This county, established in 1950, is in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture and borders on the Tao River in the east, the Daxia River in the west and the Huang (Yellow) River in the north. Smaller groups form compact communities in Hezheng County and Linxia City, both also in Gansu Province. Still smaller groups live in the provincial capital of Lanzhou and are scattered throughout Dingxi District as well as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Before 1950, the Dongxiang were known as Dongxiang Hui or Mongolian Huihui, but the Dongxiang referred to themselves simply by what is now their official designation. The word is Chinese and means “the eastern village,” that is, a village located east of Linxia, the nearest major city. Some foreign observers have called the Dongxiang “Santa,” but in its present usage this word refers only to a Dongxiang who is a practicing Muslim, and it is thus strictly a religious term.
Historical records reveal that when, in 1226, Jenghiz Khan attacked the Tangut state of Xixia for a second time, the Hezhou area became an important staging area where a military farm (tunitan) was established. During Monghe’s reign Hezhou was used as a major strongpoint in the campaign against the Tibetans. After Kublai Khan conquered the Tangzang area of northern Tibet, he established in Hezhou three different kinds of offices. The incumbent of one of these, Ananda, one of Kublai’s many grandsons, adopted Islam during Timur’s reign (1295-1307), and most of his troops followed suit.
Another theory sees the Dongxiang as part of the Chagatai khanate, which flourished during the Yuan period in what is now Chinese (Xinjiang) and Soviet Central Asia. There they converted to Islam but were promptly discriminated against by other Mongols who resisted conversion. To avoid further friction, the Islamized Mongols moved eastward by way of Xingxingxia. When they reached Zhenfan (today’s Minqin County in Gansu) they split into two routes. One group crossed the Helan Mountains and went to Hetao, where their descendants are today Muslim Mongols of the Alashan Left Banner in Inner Mongolia. The other group turned south, crossed the Huang River and settled in the Hezhou area.
A third notion, held by only a few persons, claims that the Dongxiang were originally Hui living in the present Dongxiang area who over the centuries mingled with Han and Mongols. Judging by linguistic and other evidence, this theory is probably incorrect. There is a general consensus that the main stock of the original Dongxiang was Mongol, not Hui. Later, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, these Mongols began to intermarry with Hui, Han and Tibetans living in the area.
Dongxiang Hui see Dongxiang.
Mongolian Huihui see Dongxiang.
“the eastern village” see Dongxiang.
Santa see Dongxiang.
Dongxiang. Three Muslim ethnic groups live in the villages and towns along the rivers flowing out of the Qilian and other mountains in north central China. The largest is the Dongxiang (the others, the Bonans and Salars), most of whom live in the Dongxiang Autonomous County in Gansu Province. This county, established in 1950, is in Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture and borders on the Tao River in the east, the Daxia River in the west and the Huang (Yellow) River in the north. Smaller groups form compact communities in Hezheng County and Linxia City, both also in Gansu Province. Still smaller groups live in the provincial capital of Lanzhou and are scattered throughout Dingxi District as well as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Before 1950, the Dongxiang were known as Dongxiang Hui or Mongolian Huihui, but the Dongxiang referred to themselves simply by what is now their official designation. The word is Chinese and means “the eastern village,” that is, a village located east of Linxia, the nearest major city. Some foreign observers have called the Dongxiang “Santa,” but in its present usage this word refers only to a Dongxiang who is a practicing Muslim, and it is thus strictly a religious term.
Historical records reveal that when, in 1226, Jenghiz Khan attacked the Tangut state of Xixia for a second time, the Hezhou area became an important staging area where a military farm (tunitan) was established. During Monghe’s reign Hezhou was used as a major strongpoint in the campaign against the Tibetans. After Kublai Khan conquered the Tangzang area of northern Tibet, he established in Hezhou three different kinds of offices. The incumbent of one of these, Ananda, one of Kublai’s many grandsons, adopted Islam during Timur’s reign (1295-1307), and most of his troops followed suit.
Another theory sees the Dongxiang as part of the Chagatai khanate, which flourished during the Yuan period in what is now Chinese (Xinjiang) and Soviet Central Asia. There they converted to Islam but were promptly discriminated against by other Mongols who resisted conversion. To avoid further friction, the Islamized Mongols moved eastward by way of Xingxingxia. When they reached Zhenfan (today’s Minqin County in Gansu) they split into two routes. One group crossed the Helan Mountains and went to Hetao, where their descendants are today Muslim Mongols of the Alashan Left Banner in Inner Mongolia. The other group turned south, crossed the Huang River and settled in the Hezhou area.
A third notion, held by only a few persons, claims that the Dongxiang were originally Hui living in the present Dongxiang area who over the centuries mingled with Han and Mongols. Judging by linguistic and other evidence, this theory is probably incorrect. There is a general consensus that the main stock of the original Dongxiang was Mongol, not Hui. Later, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, these Mongols began to intermarry with Hui, Han and Tibetans living in the area.
Dongxiang Hui see Dongxiang.
Mongolian Huihui see Dongxiang.
“the eastern village” see Dongxiang.
Santa see Dongxiang.
Druze
Druze (in Arabic, Duruz; in singular form, Durzi). The secret religion, practiced by some Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, was founded by Shaykh Darazi, who preached that the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim was the last of a series of emanations from God. The Druze are, thus, an esoteric Isma‘ili sect dating from the eleventh century of the Christian calendar.
The Druze are a Syrian people professing a faith derived from the Isma'iliyya sect of Shi’ism. The name comes from Muhammad al-Darazi (d. 1019), a non-Arab leader of the movement, which originated in the last years of the reign of al-Hakim, Caliph of the Fatimid dynasty of Egypt (996-1021).
The Druze religion was first established in Cairo around 1017. It is believed that it soon spread to many regions in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
In the Isma'ili religious hierarchy, al-Hakim was regarded as the infallible Imam and was also an absolute monarch, exercising spiritual supremacy as possessor of the “active intellect,” transmitted by the divine will through a divinely ordained family. Al-Hakim, an eccentric ruler in the exercise of his authority as both temporal and spiritual head of the Isma'ilis, seems to have wished to be regarded as an incarnation of divinity. Out of the resulting confusion over his claims, which greatly weakened the Fatimid establishment, the Druze movement arose in 1017.
Hamza ibn 'Ali, a Persian, was responsible for establishing al-Hakim’s standing among the Druze as the embodiment of the ultimate One who created the first cosmic principle, the intellect. The Hakim cult in this sense became the worship of the One alone, manifested in al-Hakim. From this belief comes the appellation muwahhidun (“unitarians”), which the Druze applied to themselves. Hamza’s teaching was founded on extremist Ismailism in its descriptions of the spiritual hierarchy which embodies cosmic principles. According to Hamza, there were five great cosmic ranks, each embodied in a human leader: the intellect, which was Hamza; the universal soul, Isma'il ibn Muhammad al-Tamimi; the word, Muhammad ibn Wahb al-Qurashi; the preceder, Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; and the follower, Baha’ al-Din al-Muqtana. Below these were a number of missionaries and preachers embodying cosmic effort, and subordinate to them were the ordinary believers. In opposition to these cosmic ranks were a series of false ones, also created by the One, al-Hakim, and these embodied the evil side of the cosmos. The latter will be abandoned by al-Hakim in the Last Days, when the messianic culmination of the era will be marked by the establishment of the worship of the One, revealed in al-Hakim.
The Druze await the return of both al-Hakim and Hamza, who are believed to be in “occultation,” like that of the Imamite twelfth imam. During the occultation of Hamza, al-Muqtana became the link between Hamza and his followers, and it was under him that Druze orthodoxy was established.
In 1033, al-Muqtana also went into occultation, a state corresponding to the “complete” occultation of the Imamites. From then on the Druze became a closed community, keeping their religious doctrines secret. Those who know the system are known as “the wise;” the others in the community are the “ignorant”. The wise alone take part in the religious services on Thursday evening, although the ignorant may be admitted to the least secret of these services.
In 1516, the Druze came under Turkish pressure as the Levant was conquered by the Ottomans. The Druze offered strong opposition to the Ottomans and kept a higher level of independence than their neighbors. Under the Jumblat, the Druze would cause trouble for the Ottomans until the beginning of the twentieth century.
In 1918, the Druze participated in the army of Faisal, thereby breaking a principle of non-participation outside their own community.
On March 4, 1921, the Druze were granted autonomy in the region of Jabal al-Duruz, from the the League of Nations.
In 1925, the Druze revolted, as Druze leaders protested against the liberalization of the society as promoted by the French governor of Jabal al-Duruz. The revolt ended with the arrest of the Druze leaders, and their being exiled to Palmyra.
By 1927, the Druze revolt was over, and the French began a political program that was intended to keep the Druze away from Arab nationalism, and hence dependent upon the safety offered by the French.
Today, the Druze live primarily in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, often in mountainous regions. There are also important Druze communities abroad, including in Europe and the United States.
While the Druze are not regarded as Muslims by other Muslims, they regard themselves as Muslims as well as carriers of the core of Muslim faith. The origin of the Druze is to a large extent from a group of Shi'a, the Isma'ilis, but they have diverged much, and the Qur’an does not seem to be a part of their religious exercises. Nevertheless, the Druze do call themselves muwahhidun – “monotheists.”
The theology of Druze religion is called hikma and its main theme is that God incarnated himself in the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, who disappeared in 1021. While most Muslims believe he died in 1021, the Druze disagree and believe that al-Hakim is awaiting to return to the world in order to bring a new golden age to true believers.
The Druze believe in one God and claim that the qualities of God cannot be understood or defined by humans. Al-Hakim is worshipped in Druze religion, he is called “Our Lord” and his cruelties and eccentricities are all interpreted symbolically.
However, while God incarnated himself in al-Hakim in his unity, other aspects of God can be incarnated in other human beings. These aspects are represented with five superior ministers. Under the ministers one finds three other groups: functionaries, preachers, and heads of communities. The knowledge of this hierarchical system is the highest knowledge in the Druze religion.
Frequently, one hears about a calf in Druze religion. It is believed that the calf is a central symbol which represents the negative forces in the world.
The moral system of Druze religion consists of seven principles:
Love of truth
Taking care of one another
Renouncing all other religions
Avoiding the demon (the calf?) and all wrongdoers
Accepting divine unity in humanity
Accepting all of al-Hakim’s acts
Acting in total accord with al-Hakim’s will
Central in the Druze world system is the belief in reincarnation, where all souls are reborn as humans, good as well as bad. Good people have a more fortunate rebirth than bad people. Behind this system is the belief that man cannot reach perfection and unite with God. Hell and heaven in this world view differ from most other Southwest Asian religions, and bear clear resemblances with Gnostic philosophy and religion, as heaven is only spiritual, where man stops being man and is saved from more rebirths. Hell is just as spiritual and is the distance from, and the longing to, unity with God which goes on in life time after life time for the bad.
The Druze star symbolizes the five wise superior ministers, each with his quality. Green is for “the mind,” ‘al-‘akl, which is necessary for understanding the truth. Red is for “the soul,” ‘an-nafs. Yellow is for “the word,” ‘al-kalima, which is the purest form of expression of the truth. Blue, ‘as-sabik, is for the mental power of the will. White, ‘al-tali, is the realization of Blue, where its power has been materialized in the world of matter.
The hikma is only known to an elite of religiously trained men, the uqqal. Most Druze know only parts of their religion’s theology, and they are referred to as juhhal, “ignorants.” One out of 50 members of the uqqal, reach as high as perfection, and are called ‘ajawid, “noble,” and work as the real leaders of the Druze religion.
The uqqal take care of the religion for the juhhal, and they alone attend the religious meetings taking place at the night between Thursday and Friday, in ordinary buildings in the outskirts of Druze villages. For the Druze, the center of religious activities is located in the mountainous region called Jabalu Duruz in Syria.
The juhhal perform few of the typical Muslim rituals. Prayer is not performed in mosques, fast is not performed during the Muslim month of Ramadan, and there are no obligations for performing the hajj, -- the Muslim pilgrimage.
The Druze follow a life style of isolation where no conversion is allowed, neither out of, nor into, the religion. When the Druze live among people of other religions, they try to blend in, in order to protect their religion and their own safety. They can pray as Muslims, or as Christians, depending on where they are.
This flexible assimilation is apparently changing in modern times, where more security has allowed Druze to be more open about their religious belonging.
The Druze have been reported to practice polygamy. However, there is no evidence of such a practice among Druze today.
The Druze abstain from wine and tobacco. There are clear prohibitions against any practice that could involve profanity of the religion.
The Druze have a strong community feeling, where they identify themselves as related even across borders of countries.
There are sources suggesting that the Druze were a people of their own even before conversion to the faith of al-Hakim. Unsubstantiated theories point in the direction of the Druze being descendants of Persian colonists, while another theory says they are descendants of Christians from the time of the Crusades. The latter is not very likely, due to the fact that the first Crusade came about 80 years after al-Hakim’s disappearance.
Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid persecution, the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.
Duruz see Druze
Durzi see Druze
Druze (in Arabic, Duruz; in singular form, Durzi). The secret religion, practiced by some Arabs in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, was founded by Shaykh Darazi, who preached that the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim was the last of a series of emanations from God. The Druze are, thus, an esoteric Isma‘ili sect dating from the eleventh century of the Christian calendar.
The Druze are a Syrian people professing a faith derived from the Isma'iliyya sect of Shi’ism. The name comes from Muhammad al-Darazi (d. 1019), a non-Arab leader of the movement, which originated in the last years of the reign of al-Hakim, Caliph of the Fatimid dynasty of Egypt (996-1021).
The Druze religion was first established in Cairo around 1017. It is believed that it soon spread to many regions in Southwest Asia and North Africa.
In the Isma'ili religious hierarchy, al-Hakim was regarded as the infallible Imam and was also an absolute monarch, exercising spiritual supremacy as possessor of the “active intellect,” transmitted by the divine will through a divinely ordained family. Al-Hakim, an eccentric ruler in the exercise of his authority as both temporal and spiritual head of the Isma'ilis, seems to have wished to be regarded as an incarnation of divinity. Out of the resulting confusion over his claims, which greatly weakened the Fatimid establishment, the Druze movement arose in 1017.
Hamza ibn 'Ali, a Persian, was responsible for establishing al-Hakim’s standing among the Druze as the embodiment of the ultimate One who created the first cosmic principle, the intellect. The Hakim cult in this sense became the worship of the One alone, manifested in al-Hakim. From this belief comes the appellation muwahhidun (“unitarians”), which the Druze applied to themselves. Hamza’s teaching was founded on extremist Ismailism in its descriptions of the spiritual hierarchy which embodies cosmic principles. According to Hamza, there were five great cosmic ranks, each embodied in a human leader: the intellect, which was Hamza; the universal soul, Isma'il ibn Muhammad al-Tamimi; the word, Muhammad ibn Wahb al-Qurashi; the preceder, Salama ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab; and the follower, Baha’ al-Din al-Muqtana. Below these were a number of missionaries and preachers embodying cosmic effort, and subordinate to them were the ordinary believers. In opposition to these cosmic ranks were a series of false ones, also created by the One, al-Hakim, and these embodied the evil side of the cosmos. The latter will be abandoned by al-Hakim in the Last Days, when the messianic culmination of the era will be marked by the establishment of the worship of the One, revealed in al-Hakim.
The Druze await the return of both al-Hakim and Hamza, who are believed to be in “occultation,” like that of the Imamite twelfth imam. During the occultation of Hamza, al-Muqtana became the link between Hamza and his followers, and it was under him that Druze orthodoxy was established.
In 1033, al-Muqtana also went into occultation, a state corresponding to the “complete” occultation of the Imamites. From then on the Druze became a closed community, keeping their religious doctrines secret. Those who know the system are known as “the wise;” the others in the community are the “ignorant”. The wise alone take part in the religious services on Thursday evening, although the ignorant may be admitted to the least secret of these services.
In 1516, the Druze came under Turkish pressure as the Levant was conquered by the Ottomans. The Druze offered strong opposition to the Ottomans and kept a higher level of independence than their neighbors. Under the Jumblat, the Druze would cause trouble for the Ottomans until the beginning of the twentieth century.
In 1918, the Druze participated in the army of Faisal, thereby breaking a principle of non-participation outside their own community.
On March 4, 1921, the Druze were granted autonomy in the region of Jabal al-Duruz, from the the League of Nations.
In 1925, the Druze revolted, as Druze leaders protested against the liberalization of the society as promoted by the French governor of Jabal al-Duruz. The revolt ended with the arrest of the Druze leaders, and their being exiled to Palmyra.
By 1927, the Druze revolt was over, and the French began a political program that was intended to keep the Druze away from Arab nationalism, and hence dependent upon the safety offered by the French.
Today, the Druze live primarily in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, often in mountainous regions. There are also important Druze communities abroad, including in Europe and the United States.
While the Druze are not regarded as Muslims by other Muslims, they regard themselves as Muslims as well as carriers of the core of Muslim faith. The origin of the Druze is to a large extent from a group of Shi'a, the Isma'ilis, but they have diverged much, and the Qur’an does not seem to be a part of their religious exercises. Nevertheless, the Druze do call themselves muwahhidun – “monotheists.”
The theology of Druze religion is called hikma and its main theme is that God incarnated himself in the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim, who disappeared in 1021. While most Muslims believe he died in 1021, the Druze disagree and believe that al-Hakim is awaiting to return to the world in order to bring a new golden age to true believers.
The Druze believe in one God and claim that the qualities of God cannot be understood or defined by humans. Al-Hakim is worshipped in Druze religion, he is called “Our Lord” and his cruelties and eccentricities are all interpreted symbolically.
However, while God incarnated himself in al-Hakim in his unity, other aspects of God can be incarnated in other human beings. These aspects are represented with five superior ministers. Under the ministers one finds three other groups: functionaries, preachers, and heads of communities. The knowledge of this hierarchical system is the highest knowledge in the Druze religion.
Frequently, one hears about a calf in Druze religion. It is believed that the calf is a central symbol which represents the negative forces in the world.
The moral system of Druze religion consists of seven principles:
Love of truth
Taking care of one another
Renouncing all other religions
Avoiding the demon (the calf?) and all wrongdoers
Accepting divine unity in humanity
Accepting all of al-Hakim’s acts
Acting in total accord with al-Hakim’s will
Central in the Druze world system is the belief in reincarnation, where all souls are reborn as humans, good as well as bad. Good people have a more fortunate rebirth than bad people. Behind this system is the belief that man cannot reach perfection and unite with God. Hell and heaven in this world view differ from most other Southwest Asian religions, and bear clear resemblances with Gnostic philosophy and religion, as heaven is only spiritual, where man stops being man and is saved from more rebirths. Hell is just as spiritual and is the distance from, and the longing to, unity with God which goes on in life time after life time for the bad.
The Druze star symbolizes the five wise superior ministers, each with his quality. Green is for “the mind,” ‘al-‘akl, which is necessary for understanding the truth. Red is for “the soul,” ‘an-nafs. Yellow is for “the word,” ‘al-kalima, which is the purest form of expression of the truth. Blue, ‘as-sabik, is for the mental power of the will. White, ‘al-tali, is the realization of Blue, where its power has been materialized in the world of matter.
The hikma is only known to an elite of religiously trained men, the uqqal. Most Druze know only parts of their religion’s theology, and they are referred to as juhhal, “ignorants.” One out of 50 members of the uqqal, reach as high as perfection, and are called ‘ajawid, “noble,” and work as the real leaders of the Druze religion.
The uqqal take care of the religion for the juhhal, and they alone attend the religious meetings taking place at the night between Thursday and Friday, in ordinary buildings in the outskirts of Druze villages. For the Druze, the center of religious activities is located in the mountainous region called Jabalu Duruz in Syria.
The juhhal perform few of the typical Muslim rituals. Prayer is not performed in mosques, fast is not performed during the Muslim month of Ramadan, and there are no obligations for performing the hajj, -- the Muslim pilgrimage.
The Druze follow a life style of isolation where no conversion is allowed, neither out of, nor into, the religion. When the Druze live among people of other religions, they try to blend in, in order to protect their religion and their own safety. They can pray as Muslims, or as Christians, depending on where they are.
This flexible assimilation is apparently changing in modern times, where more security has allowed Druze to be more open about their religious belonging.
The Druze have been reported to practice polygamy. However, there is no evidence of such a practice among Druze today.
The Druze abstain from wine and tobacco. There are clear prohibitions against any practice that could involve profanity of the religion.
The Druze have a strong community feeling, where they identify themselves as related even across borders of countries.
There are sources suggesting that the Druze were a people of their own even before conversion to the faith of al-Hakim. Unsubstantiated theories point in the direction of the Druze being descendants of Persian colonists, while another theory says they are descendants of Christians from the time of the Crusades. The latter is not very likely, due to the fact that the first Crusade came about 80 years after al-Hakim’s disappearance.
Despite their practice of blending with dominant groups in order to avoid persecution, the Druze have had a history of brave resistance to occupying powers, and they have at times enjoyed more freedom than most other groups living in the Levant.
Duruz see Druze
Durzi see Druze
Dunama
Dunama (d. 1820). Ruler of the Kanuri state of Bornu (in Niger and Nigeria) (r.1808-1809 and 1813-1820). Dunama ultimately yielded power to al-Kanemi, thereby ending effective rule of the thousand year old Sefawa dynasty. Dunama succeeded his father, Ahmad Alimi, in 1808 when the latter, old and blind, abdicated in the face of devastating attacks by the Fula Islamic revolutionaries of ‘Uthman dan Fodio. The abdication factionalized the Bornu court, already beset with external problems. Dumana, desperate for a victory against the Fula, solicited the help of al-Kanemi, an Islamic scholar and warrior living nearby who had recently defeated the Fula in battle. Their combined forces overcame the Fula and liberated the Bornu capital. Dunama lavishly rewarded al-Kanemi, who returned home.
In 1809, Dunama recalled al-Kanemi to help ward off new Fula attacks. This time al-Kanemi was awarded a large land grant in gratitude. Dunama’s reliance on al-Kanemi, his inability to defeat the Fula, and the unusual circumstance of his accession caused the members of his court to depose him in favor of his uncle, Muhammad Ngileruma (c. 1809). But Muhammad did not get on well with al-Kanemi, who joined forces with Dunama’s supporters to depose Muhammad and reinstate Dunama in 1813.
However, while Dunama was king, al-Kanemi was actually the most powerful man in Bornu. Dunama found himself having to rely increasingly on al-Kanemi to ward off the Fula. The two had been friends, but al-Kanemi posed a threat to the dynasty. Dunama conceived a plan whereby he would invite Burgomanda, ruler of Baghirmi, to invade Bornu. Dunama and al-Kanemi’s forces would respond, and the Burgomanda and Dunama would turn on al-Kanemi. But al-Kanemi learned of the plan and repositioned his troops, causing Burgomanda mistakenly to attack his ally. Dunama was killed in the battle in 1820. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Ibrahim, who was by then only the titular ruler of Bornu.
Dunama (d. 1820). Ruler of the Kanuri state of Bornu (in Niger and Nigeria) (r.1808-1809 and 1813-1820). Dunama ultimately yielded power to al-Kanemi, thereby ending effective rule of the thousand year old Sefawa dynasty. Dunama succeeded his father, Ahmad Alimi, in 1808 when the latter, old and blind, abdicated in the face of devastating attacks by the Fula Islamic revolutionaries of ‘Uthman dan Fodio. The abdication factionalized the Bornu court, already beset with external problems. Dumana, desperate for a victory against the Fula, solicited the help of al-Kanemi, an Islamic scholar and warrior living nearby who had recently defeated the Fula in battle. Their combined forces overcame the Fula and liberated the Bornu capital. Dunama lavishly rewarded al-Kanemi, who returned home.
In 1809, Dunama recalled al-Kanemi to help ward off new Fula attacks. This time al-Kanemi was awarded a large land grant in gratitude. Dunama’s reliance on al-Kanemi, his inability to defeat the Fula, and the unusual circumstance of his accession caused the members of his court to depose him in favor of his uncle, Muhammad Ngileruma (c. 1809). But Muhammad did not get on well with al-Kanemi, who joined forces with Dunama’s supporters to depose Muhammad and reinstate Dunama in 1813.
However, while Dunama was king, al-Kanemi was actually the most powerful man in Bornu. Dunama found himself having to rely increasingly on al-Kanemi to ward off the Fula. The two had been friends, but al-Kanemi posed a threat to the dynasty. Dunama conceived a plan whereby he would invite Burgomanda, ruler of Baghirmi, to invade Bornu. Dunama and al-Kanemi’s forces would respond, and the Burgomanda and Dunama would turn on al-Kanemi. But al-Kanemi learned of the plan and repositioned his troops, causing Burgomanda mistakenly to attack his ally. Dunama was killed in the battle in 1820. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Ibrahim, who was by then only the titular ruler of Bornu.
Dunama Dibbalemi
Dunama Dibbalemi (Dunama Dabbalemi) (d. c. 1259). Ruler of the Kanuri Empire of Kanem during its apogee (r. c. 1221-1259). Dunama Dibbalemi succeeded his father, and according to Arabic and local sources greatly augmented the empire when he captured the important oasis of Tragham, nearly 1300 kilometers from the capital. He performed this feat with his extensive use of cavalry, which included 41,000 horses. Military commanders “ probably his sons “ administered the conquered territories, but later broke away to establish their own states. He was also troubled by a major war with the Bulala people, a nomadic group. Dunama violated a traditional religious prohibition by opening a sacred talisman which symbolized all the power of the old religion. He may have been attempting to precipitate a conflict between Islamic and traditional factions, or, according to another interpretation, between his Sefawa dynasty and all other factions, in order to establish Sefawa superiority. Arabic sources such as al-Maqrizi attest to Dunama’s preference for Islam. He is said to have conducted jihad and other Islamic good works. It was probably Dunama who established mosque colleges in Cairo for Kanuri students. The conflict which he initiated continued for many years after his death and nearly caused the overthrow of the Sefawa dynasty. His son and successor, Kadai, was assassinated and civil war broke out at the beginning of the fourteenth century.
A fervent Muslim, Dibbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to Mecca. In particular the historian Ibn Khaldun, who remembers him as "King of Kanem and Lord of Bornu", reports a Kanem embassy in 1257 to Tunisia. During his reign, he declared jihad against the surrounding tribes and initiated an extended period of conquest, allegedly coming to have under his command a cavalry 40,000 strong. After consolidating the territory around Lake Chad, the Fezzan region (in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended westward to Kano (in present-day Nigeria), eastward to Ouaddaï, and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Through his wars he captured many slaves that he sold to the northern kingdoms, thus enriching his country.
Dibbalemi is also credited with destroying the mune, a mysterious object believed to possess unknown powers, possibly a symbol of divine kingship. It was probably destroyed to cancel an important symbol of pre-Muslim beliefs, and to prove his determination in contrasting what he saw as the lax faith of his predecessors. The action generated some reprobation, as it is reported that the destruction opened a period of hardship for the kingdom.
Dibbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dibbalemi was able to suppress this tendency, but it was to erupt after his death, provoking the loss of most of Dibbalemi's conquests.
Dunama Dabbalemi see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dabbalemi, Dunama see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dunama Dibbalemi (Dunama Dabbalemi) (d. c. 1259). Ruler of the Kanuri Empire of Kanem during its apogee (r. c. 1221-1259). Dunama Dibbalemi succeeded his father, and according to Arabic and local sources greatly augmented the empire when he captured the important oasis of Tragham, nearly 1300 kilometers from the capital. He performed this feat with his extensive use of cavalry, which included 41,000 horses. Military commanders “ probably his sons “ administered the conquered territories, but later broke away to establish their own states. He was also troubled by a major war with the Bulala people, a nomadic group. Dunama violated a traditional religious prohibition by opening a sacred talisman which symbolized all the power of the old religion. He may have been attempting to precipitate a conflict between Islamic and traditional factions, or, according to another interpretation, between his Sefawa dynasty and all other factions, in order to establish Sefawa superiority. Arabic sources such as al-Maqrizi attest to Dunama’s preference for Islam. He is said to have conducted jihad and other Islamic good works. It was probably Dunama who established mosque colleges in Cairo for Kanuri students. The conflict which he initiated continued for many years after his death and nearly caused the overthrow of the Sefawa dynasty. His son and successor, Kadai, was assassinated and civil war broke out at the beginning of the fourteenth century.
A fervent Muslim, Dibbalemi initiated diplomatic exchanges with sultans in North Africa and apparently arranged for the establishment of a special hostel in Cairo to facilitate pilgrimages to Mecca. In particular the historian Ibn Khaldun, who remembers him as "King of Kanem and Lord of Bornu", reports a Kanem embassy in 1257 to Tunisia. During his reign, he declared jihad against the surrounding tribes and initiated an extended period of conquest, allegedly coming to have under his command a cavalry 40,000 strong. After consolidating the territory around Lake Chad, the Fezzan region (in present-day Libya) fell under Kanem's authority, and the empire's influence extended westward to Kano (in present-day Nigeria), eastward to Ouaddaï, and southward to the Adamawa grasslands (in present-day Cameroon). Through his wars he captured many slaves that he sold to the northern kingdoms, thus enriching his country.
Dibbalemi is also credited with destroying the mune, a mysterious object believed to possess unknown powers, possibly a symbol of divine kingship. It was probably destroyed to cancel an important symbol of pre-Muslim beliefs, and to prove his determination in contrasting what he saw as the lax faith of his predecessors. The action generated some reprobation, as it is reported that the destruction opened a period of hardship for the kingdom.
Dibbalemi devised a system to reward military commanders with authority over the people they conquered. This system, however, tempted military officers to pass their positions to their sons, thus transforming the office from one based on achievement and loyalty to the mai into one based on hereditary nobility. Dibbalemi was able to suppress this tendency, but it was to erupt after his death, provoking the loss of most of Dibbalemi's conquests.
Dunama Dabbalemi see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dabbalemi, Dunama see Dunama Dibbalemi
Dungans
Dungans. Small Chinese Muslim population in Russia. They have lived there for about 100 years. The Dungans originally lived mainly in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces in northwest China, although some also came from Xinjiang in the far west near the Russian border. The question of their precise origin has never been settled satisfactorily. According to various Western, Chinese, Dungan, and Russian scholars, the ancestors of the Chinese speaking Muslims of China could have come from one or two or a mixture of several of the following groups: Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Manchus, Turks, Tanguts, Kitans, Uygurs or Tibetans.
The Dungans migrated to Central Asia in two movements. The first movement was the gradual emigration from the Ili River valley in Xinjiang, where they had been settled by Emperor Zianlong in the eighteenth century. In this movement, there were two major migrations: that of 1867, after an outburst of racial conflict between Dungans and the Taranchi (Turks); and that of 1881, when part of the Ili River valley was returned by Russia to the Chinese government. The second movement was the headlong flight in 1877 of those who had supported the autonomous state of Kashgaria.
Dungans. Small Chinese Muslim population in Russia. They have lived there for about 100 years. The Dungans originally lived mainly in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces in northwest China, although some also came from Xinjiang in the far west near the Russian border. The question of their precise origin has never been settled satisfactorily. According to various Western, Chinese, Dungan, and Russian scholars, the ancestors of the Chinese speaking Muslims of China could have come from one or two or a mixture of several of the following groups: Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Manchus, Turks, Tanguts, Kitans, Uygurs or Tibetans.
The Dungans migrated to Central Asia in two movements. The first movement was the gradual emigration from the Ili River valley in Xinjiang, where they had been settled by Emperor Zianlong in the eighteenth century. In this movement, there were two major migrations: that of 1867, after an outburst of racial conflict between Dungans and the Taranchi (Turks); and that of 1881, when part of the Ili River valley was returned by Russia to the Chinese government. The second movement was the headlong flight in 1877 of those who had supported the autonomous state of Kashgaria.
Durani, Maryam
Maryam Durani (b. 1987). An Afghan activist and women's advocate. In 2012, she received the International Women of Courage Award.
Maryam Durani is the daughter of Haji Mohammad Eisa Durani, and she is a member of the Durrani tribe. She graduated from the Payam Noor and American University of Afghanistan. She earned a degree in Law and Political Science and business. Despite the area's extremely conservative view toward women, Durani served as a leader, role model, and advocate for women in Kandahar. First elected as a Kandahar Provincial Council Member in 2005 at the age of 21 and for a second term in 2009, Durani served as one of only four women on the Council and brought women's concerns and a woman's perspective to the activities and discussions of the Council.
As a young, emerging leader in southern Afghanistan, Durani's courage and dedication to the women of Afghanistan were embedded in the fabric of her daily life. Durani founded and served as the director of an association focused on empowerment of women, and she managed Merman Radio, a radio station in Kandahar City focused on women's issues. She was an outspoken advocate for the peace and rights of women and girls in Afghan society, as well as for basic civil rights for all Afghan citizens, and she was determined to change the culture and perception of women's roles in Afghanistan.
Durani understood and accepted the risks of being a visible woman in such powerful and meaningful roles and received strong support from her immediate and extended family who also faced these dangers. She was injured in an attempted assassination with a bomb that nearly took her life. The position she holds in the Kandahar Provincial Government was for a woman, extremely unusual, given the conservative values in southern Afghanistan, which continued to be influenced by Taliban views. Durani defied stereotypes and cultural norms and became a strong role model for women who wanted to change their circumstances, both for themselves and for their families. Durani used her position to foster justice, peace, human rights, and overall basic freedoms for Kandahari women.
In Afghanistan, Durani dedicated her life to educating those on the fringes of society and to pursuing equality for women and universal human rights. She believed that the greatest investment that could be made in Afghanistan's future was in its teachers, and that investing in their professional development would ensure that they have access to knowledge and information that would stimulate their own learning. This, in turn, will contribute to the critical task of providing a high-quality education to the youth of Afghanistan. Durani believed that to promote peace in Afghanistan, there must be expanded equal access to quality community-based education, as well as support programs that increase girls' and boys' attendance at school. Durani served in different positions, Durani was Kandahar people's representative in the provincial council, and director of a nonprofit women development organization registered in Afghanistan in 2004 seeking to improve women conditions in war-torn Kandahar province.
Durani became the founder and the owner of Merman Radio of Kandahar which was established in 2010 to address gender inequalities in Kandahar province and bring women's voices to the forefront. Merman Radio empowered Kandahar's youth, especially women and media professionals to explore sensitive issues of gender, human rights, good governance, rule of law, in addition to economic, and social issues.
In 2013, Durani founded the Kandahar women's advocacy network, Kandahar Women's Network, an advocacy platform which functioned for women's empowerment. Kandahar Women's Network had 25 women led organizations as its members.
In March 2012, Durani received the United States Secretary of State's International Women of Courage Award. In the same year, Time Magazine chose Durani as one of "The 100 Most Influential People in the World" According to Time Magazine, "As the owner and operator of a radio station (Merman Radio) that focuses on women's issues and as a member of the Kandahar provincial council, Durani stands up for the region's women with remarkable bravery."
In July 2013, Durani was selected as one of 30 young activists by the National Endowment for Democracy. In May 2014, Durani received the Roosevelt Four Freedoms Award in Middelburg, Netherlands. In November 2015, Durani received the International Peace Generation Award. And, in December 2015, Durani received the Simorgh International Peace Prize which was awarded on Human Rights Day (December 10, 2015) in the context of the Human Rights Week.
In 2021, with the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, Maryam Durani was forced to go into hiding for fear of losing her life because of her activism. After an excruciating ordeal, Durani was able to escape Afghanistan and relocate to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where her new work centered on helping the growing community of Afghan refugees.
Durayd
Durayd (Durayd ibn al-Simma) (c.530-630). Ancient Arabic poet and one of the most powerful Bedouin opponents of the Prophet.
Durayd ibn al-Simma see Durayd
Durayd (Durayd ibn al-Simma) (c.530-630). Ancient Arabic poet and one of the most powerful Bedouin opponents of the Prophet.
Durayd ibn al-Simma see Durayd
Duri
Duri (‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri) (b. 1919). Iraqi educator and Arabist social historian. Born in Baghdad, he was educated there and at London University. He taught history at the Higher Teachers’ College and the Faculty of Arts, was translation and publications director at the ministry of education, and was dean of Arts and then rector of Baghdad University, ending his working career as professor of history at the University of Jordan in Amman. Al-Duri’s publications include two studies on the political and financial history of the Meso-‘Abbasid era, a study of the economic history of Mesopotamia in the tenth century, a study on the origins of Arab historiography, and studies on the history of the Arab nationalism, anti-Arab nationalisms (shu‘ubiyah) and Arab Socialism.
In addition to his valuable studies on Iraqi history, al-Duri has contributed significantly in the field of the socioeconomic history of the Arab world. His suggestion that the emergence of an “Arab Nation,” although closely tied to the unity of language, was in many ways molded by a unified, or at least similar, socioeconomic historical pattern, is particularly pioneering. As do most influential Arab nationalists, al-Duri regards language as the major factor in forming an Arab identity, thus making Arabism a cultural, rather than an ethnic or regional or religious, matter. Like many Arab nationalists and some cultural Islamists, he tends to subsume Islam into Arabism: Islam unified the Arabs, giving them an intellectual and ideological basis by means of which they formed a state. Through the latter they were to spread Islam even further afield, to the extent that to non-Arabs Islam and Arabism became virtually indistinguishable.
Unlike the most influential Arabist, Abu Khaldun Sati‘ al-Husri, who refused to consider economic interests among the main components in forming a nation, al-Duri always had implied that one of the bases of the Arab nation was the emergence of one path in the development of the Arab economy. For example, historically there has been a unified Islamic position toward the ownership (mainly public) of national resources such as land, water, and minerals and a comprehensive system of taxation and tribute with similar features, coinciding with distinct urban development, some improvement of agriculture, and great expansion in trade. This pattern gradually led to the emergence of a semi-feudal system of a distinct bureaucratic nature (iqta‘ ‘askari) and the state’s crucial role in the economic affairs of the society.
Al-Duri emphasized the social and economic processes through which the various peoples conquered by the Arabian Muslims were arabized in language and culture (as the conquerors
and the conquered mingled in various activities in town and country) and how, following the consequent decline in tribalism, one nation, which he defined as an Arab (rather than an Islamic) nation, then emerged. He paid special attention to the “popular classes” and to various social movements (for example, al-‘ammah, al-‘ayyarun, al-futuwah) often overlooked in conventional historical studies.
Al-Duri saw the re-emergence of Arabist ideas in the nineteenth century as an attempt to revive an earlier cultural heritage that had been abused by non-Arab rulers. The emphasis on Arabic (the language and the culture) as a nationalist link “had its roots in the Arab heritage and historical conscience, and was not being developed as part of the Arabs’ self-consciousness vis-à-vis the West,” and increasingly expressed in a more comprehensive (Pan-)Arabist fashion. Unlike some other authors, al-Duri contends that there is no observable influence or frequent reference to Western national theories in Arabic writings on the subject. Arabist concepts on nationalism are, he believes, authentic but still incomplete: they have not reached the level of forming “a general theory of Arab nationalism”; they have not linked their idea of the Arab nation to any distinct concept of the state; nor have they clarified the groups or classes that “embody the Arabist idea” and, hence, the socioeconomic orientation that the Arabist movement is bound to follow.
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri see Duri
Al-Duri saw the re-emergence of Arabist ideas in the nineteenth century as an attempt to revive an earlier cultural heritage that had been abused by non-Arab rulers. The emphasis on Arabic (the language and the culture) as a nationalist link “had its roots in the Arab heritage and historical conscience, and was not being developed as part of the Arabs’ self-consciousness vis-à-vis the West,” and increasingly expressed in a more comprehensive (Pan-)Arabist fashion. Unlike some other authors, al-Duri contends that there is no observable influence or frequent reference to Western national theories in Arabic writings on the subject. Arabist concepts on nationalism are, he believes, authentic but still incomplete: they have not reached the level of forming “a general theory of Arab nationalism”; they have not linked their idea of the Arab nation to any distinct concept of the state; nor have they clarified the groups or classes that “embody the Arabist idea” and, hence, the socioeconomic orientation that the Arabist movement is bound to follow.
‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Duri see Duri
Durranis
Durranis. Name carried by an Afghan tribe, known as Abdali, until it was changed by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Durranis became an Afghan dynasty of the shahs of Afghanistan which ruled from 1747 to 1826. Their main capitals were Kandahar, and Kabul from 1772. The Durrani tribe in Afghanistan gained independence under its chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1772), following the murder in 1747 of Nadir Shah of Persia, who had occupied the country. Durrani founded Afghanistan’s most powerful emirate, assuming the title of shah. He then decreed that Durrani would be the new name of the Abdalis. The change from Abdali, a term for a category in the Sufi hierarchy, to Durrani, derived from a word meaning “pearl,” was symbolically significant. The change also allowed for modifications in the genealogical charter. Some Abdali clans were not recognized as Durrani, and some subclans in the Peshawar valley were renamed Bar (“upper”) Durrani.
In 1750, Ahmad Shah conquered Herat. Stable rule was set up by Taimur Shah (1772-1793) before it was endangered by internal power struggles after 1801. In 1816, the Durrani had to defend Herat against the Persians. In 1817, they were divided into two ruling branches in Kabul and Peshawar/Kashmir. Conflicts with the viziers of the Barakzai house marked the start of their decline. After being removed from the throne by the Barakzai in 1826, the last Durrani ruler was finally expelled in 1842.
During the imperial period (1747-1818), Durrani clans were the military backbone of the state. They consolidated their hold on southwestern Afghanistan and acquired property in eastern Afghanistan and northern India. Several previously nomadic clans became settled.
In the post-imperial period, the institutionalization of a standing army gradually weakened the privileged position of the Durranis. Nevertheless, as members of the Durrani Muhammadzai lineage held state power from 1880 to 1978, Durrani clans were able to claim a symbolically superior social status. This was especially important in northern Afghanistan, to which Durrani nomadic clans moved from 1880 onward. Some Durrani clans played an active role against Soviet occupation in their localities during the 1980s, but no Durrani leader of national significance emerged.
Abdali see Durranis.
Durranis. Name carried by an Afghan tribe, known as Abdali, until it was changed by Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Durranis became an Afghan dynasty of the shahs of Afghanistan which ruled from 1747 to 1826. Their main capitals were Kandahar, and Kabul from 1772. The Durrani tribe in Afghanistan gained independence under its chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1772), following the murder in 1747 of Nadir Shah of Persia, who had occupied the country. Durrani founded Afghanistan’s most powerful emirate, assuming the title of shah. He then decreed that Durrani would be the new name of the Abdalis. The change from Abdali, a term for a category in the Sufi hierarchy, to Durrani, derived from a word meaning “pearl,” was symbolically significant. The change also allowed for modifications in the genealogical charter. Some Abdali clans were not recognized as Durrani, and some subclans in the Peshawar valley were renamed Bar (“upper”) Durrani.
In 1750, Ahmad Shah conquered Herat. Stable rule was set up by Taimur Shah (1772-1793) before it was endangered by internal power struggles after 1801. In 1816, the Durrani had to defend Herat against the Persians. In 1817, they were divided into two ruling branches in Kabul and Peshawar/Kashmir. Conflicts with the viziers of the Barakzai house marked the start of their decline. After being removed from the throne by the Barakzai in 1826, the last Durrani ruler was finally expelled in 1842.
During the imperial period (1747-1818), Durrani clans were the military backbone of the state. They consolidated their hold on southwestern Afghanistan and acquired property in eastern Afghanistan and northern India. Several previously nomadic clans became settled.
In the post-imperial period, the institutionalization of a standing army gradually weakened the privileged position of the Durranis. Nevertheless, as members of the Durrani Muhammadzai lineage held state power from 1880 to 1978, Durrani clans were able to claim a symbolically superior social status. This was especially important in northern Afghanistan, to which Durrani nomadic clans moved from 1880 onward. Some Durrani clans played an active role against Soviet occupation in their localities during the 1980s, but no Durrani leader of national significance emerged.
Abdali see Durranis.
Durrizade
Durrizade. Patronymic of a family of Ottoman scholars of the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, five members of which attained the office of Shaykh al-Islam.
Durrizade. Patronymic of a family of Ottoman scholars of the eighteenth through nineteenth centuries, five members of which attained the office of Shaykh al-Islam.
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey (1869-1923). Last Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire. He is known for his legal opinions (in Arabic, fatwa) condemning the Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Durrizade ‘Abd Allah Bey (1869-1923). Last Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire. He is known for his legal opinions (in Arabic, fatwa) condemning the Turkish nationalist movement under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.
Dust Muhammad
Dust Muhammad (Dost Mohammed) (Dost Muhammad) (Dost Mohammad Khan) (December 23, 1793 - June 9, 1863). Founder of Barakzay rule in Afghanistan (r.1826-1863). He took the title of amir in 1835 and made the country into a geographically compact unit.
Dost Mohammad Khan was the son of Sardār Pāyenda Khan (chief of the Barakzai tribe) who was put to death by Zaman Shah Durrani. He was a descendant of Jamal Khan Barakzai who founded the Barakzai dynasty in Afghanistan. He also belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group.
The elder brother of Dost Mohammad (Dust Muhammad), the chief of the Barakzai, Fatteh Khan, took an important part in raising Mahmud Shah Durrani to the sovereignty of Afghanistan in 1800 and in restoring him to the throne in 1809. Mahmud Shah repaid Fatteh Khan's services by having him assassinated in 1818, thus incurring the enmity of his tribe. After a bloody conflict, Mahmud Shah was deprived of all his possessions but Herat, the rest of his dominions being divided among Fatteh Khan's brothers. Of these, Dost Mohammad received Ghazni, to which in 1826 he added Kabul, the richest of the Afghan provinces.
From the commencement of his reign, Dost Mohammad found himself involved in disputes with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, who used the dethroned Sadozai prince, Shuja Shah Durrani, as his instrument. In 1834, Shuja Shah made a last attempt to recover his kingdom. He was defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan under the walls of Kandahar, but Ranjit Singh seized the opportunity to annex Peshawar. The recovery of this fortress became the Afghan amir's great concern.
Rejecting overtures from Russia, Dost Mohammad endeavored to form an alliance with England, and welcomed Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837. Burnes, however, was unable to prevail on the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to respond to the amir's advances. Dost Mohammad was enjoined to abandon the attempt to recover Peshawar, and to place his foreign policy under British guidance. In return, he was only promised protection from Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs. He replied by renewing his relations with Russia, and in 1838 Lord Auckland set the British troops in motion against him.
In March 1839 the British force under Sir Willoughby Cotton advanced through the Bolan Pass, and on April 26 it reached Kandahar. Shah Shuja was proclaimed amir, and entered Kabul on August 7, while Dost Mohammad sought refuge in the wilds of the Hindu Kush. Closely followed by the British, Dost was driven to extremities, and on November 4, 1840 surrendered as a prisoner. He remained in captivity during the British occupation, during the disastrous retreat of the army of occupation in January 1842, and until the recapture of Kabul in the autumn of 1842.
He was then set at liberty, in consequence of the resolve of the British government to abandon the attempt to intervene in the internal politics of Afghanistan. On his return from Hindustan, Dost Mohammad was received in triumph at Kabul, and set himself to re-establish his authority on a firm basis. From 1846 he renewed his policy of hostility to the British and allied himself with the Sikhs. However, after the defeat of his allies at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, he abandoned his designs and led his troops back into Afghanistan. In 1850, he conquered Balkh, and in 1854 he acquired control over the southern Afghan tribes by the capture of Kandahar.
On March 30, 1855 Dost Mohammad reversed his former policy by concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the British government. In 1857 he declared war on Persia in conjunction with the British, and in July a treaty was concluded by which the province of Herat was placed under a Barakzai prince. During the Indian Mutiny, Dost Mohammad refrained from assisting the insurgents. His later years were disturbed by troubles at Herat and in Bokhara. These he resolved for a time, but in 1862 a Persian army, acting in concert with Ahmad Khan, advanced against Kandahar. The old amir called the British to his aid, and, putting himself at the head of his warriors, drove the enemy from his frontiers. On May 26, 1863, Dost Mohammad captured Herat, but on the 9th of June he died suddenly in the midst of victory, after playing a great role in the history of Central Asia for forty years.
Dost Mohammed see Dust Muhammad
Dost Muhammad see Dust Muhammad
Mohammed, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dust see Dust Muhammad
Dost Mohammad Khan see Dust Muhammad
Dust Muhammad (Dost Mohammed) (Dost Muhammad) (Dost Mohammad Khan) (December 23, 1793 - June 9, 1863). Founder of Barakzay rule in Afghanistan (r.1826-1863). He took the title of amir in 1835 and made the country into a geographically compact unit.
Dost Mohammad Khan was the son of Sardār Pāyenda Khan (chief of the Barakzai tribe) who was put to death by Zaman Shah Durrani. He was a descendant of Jamal Khan Barakzai who founded the Barakzai dynasty in Afghanistan. He also belonged to the Pashtun ethnic group.
The elder brother of Dost Mohammad (Dust Muhammad), the chief of the Barakzai, Fatteh Khan, took an important part in raising Mahmud Shah Durrani to the sovereignty of Afghanistan in 1800 and in restoring him to the throne in 1809. Mahmud Shah repaid Fatteh Khan's services by having him assassinated in 1818, thus incurring the enmity of his tribe. After a bloody conflict, Mahmud Shah was deprived of all his possessions but Herat, the rest of his dominions being divided among Fatteh Khan's brothers. Of these, Dost Mohammad received Ghazni, to which in 1826 he added Kabul, the richest of the Afghan provinces.
From the commencement of his reign, Dost Mohammad found himself involved in disputes with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, who used the dethroned Sadozai prince, Shuja Shah Durrani, as his instrument. In 1834, Shuja Shah made a last attempt to recover his kingdom. He was defeated by Dost Mohammad Khan under the walls of Kandahar, but Ranjit Singh seized the opportunity to annex Peshawar. The recovery of this fortress became the Afghan amir's great concern.
Rejecting overtures from Russia, Dost Mohammad endeavored to form an alliance with England, and welcomed Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837. Burnes, however, was unable to prevail on the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to respond to the amir's advances. Dost Mohammad was enjoined to abandon the attempt to recover Peshawar, and to place his foreign policy under British guidance. In return, he was only promised protection from Maharaja Ranjit Singh of the Sikhs. He replied by renewing his relations with Russia, and in 1838 Lord Auckland set the British troops in motion against him.
In March 1839 the British force under Sir Willoughby Cotton advanced through the Bolan Pass, and on April 26 it reached Kandahar. Shah Shuja was proclaimed amir, and entered Kabul on August 7, while Dost Mohammad sought refuge in the wilds of the Hindu Kush. Closely followed by the British, Dost was driven to extremities, and on November 4, 1840 surrendered as a prisoner. He remained in captivity during the British occupation, during the disastrous retreat of the army of occupation in January 1842, and until the recapture of Kabul in the autumn of 1842.
He was then set at liberty, in consequence of the resolve of the British government to abandon the attempt to intervene in the internal politics of Afghanistan. On his return from Hindustan, Dost Mohammad was received in triumph at Kabul, and set himself to re-establish his authority on a firm basis. From 1846 he renewed his policy of hostility to the British and allied himself with the Sikhs. However, after the defeat of his allies at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, he abandoned his designs and led his troops back into Afghanistan. In 1850, he conquered Balkh, and in 1854 he acquired control over the southern Afghan tribes by the capture of Kandahar.
On March 30, 1855 Dost Mohammad reversed his former policy by concluding an offensive and defensive alliance with the British government. In 1857 he declared war on Persia in conjunction with the British, and in July a treaty was concluded by which the province of Herat was placed under a Barakzai prince. During the Indian Mutiny, Dost Mohammad refrained from assisting the insurgents. His later years were disturbed by troubles at Herat and in Bokhara. These he resolved for a time, but in 1862 a Persian army, acting in concert with Ahmad Khan, advanced against Kandahar. The old amir called the British to his aid, and, putting himself at the head of his warriors, drove the enemy from his frontiers. On May 26, 1863, Dost Mohammad captured Herat, but on the 9th of June he died suddenly in the midst of victory, after playing a great role in the history of Central Asia for forty years.
Dost Mohammed see Dust Muhammad
Dost Muhammad see Dust Muhammad
Mohammed, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dost see Dust Muhammad
Muhammad, Dust see Dust Muhammad
Dost Mohammad Khan see Dust Muhammad
Dyula
Dyula (Dioula) (Juula). Ethnic group and language from West Africa (Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). The term Dyula is more commonly used to refer to a group specializing in trade. The term “Dioula” is synonymous with the term “Dyula.”
The Dyula (Dioula or Juula) are a Mande ethnic group inhabiting several West African countries, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
Characterized as a highly successful merchant caste, Dyula migrants began establishing trading communities across the region in the fourteenth century. Since business was often conducted under non-Muslim rulers, the Dyula developed a set of theological principles for Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies. Their unique contribution of long-distance commerce, Islamic scholarship and religious tolerance were significant factors to the peaceful expansion of Islam in West Africa.
The Mandé embraced Islam during the thirteenth century, following introduction to the faith through contact with the Soninké people and North African traders. By the 14th century the Malian empire (c.1230-1600) had reached its apogee, acquiring a considerable reputation for the Islamic practice of its court and the pilgrimages of several emperors who followed the tradition of Lahilatul Kalabi, the first black prince to make hajj to Mecca. It was at this time that Mali began encouraging some of its local merchants to establish colonies close to the gold fields of West Africa. This migrant trading class were known as dyula, the Mandingo word for “merchant” that referred simultaneously to their language (a dialect of Mandinka), commercial vocation, and religious practice.
The Dyula spread throughout the former area of Mandé culture, from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia to the Niger, and from the southern edge of the Sahara to forest zones further south. They established decentralized townships in non-Muslim colonies that were linked to an extensive commercial network, in a trading diaspora. Motivated by business imperatives, they expanded into new markets, founding settlements under the auspices of various local rulers who often permitted self-governance and autonomy. The organization of Dyula trading companies were based on a clan-family structure known as the lu - a working unit consisting of a father, his sons, and other attached males. Members of a given lu dispersed from the savanna to the forest, managed circulation of goods and information, placed orders, and effectively controlled the economic mechanisms of supply and demand.
Over time dyula colonies developed a theological rationale for their relations with non-Muslim ruling classes and subjects in what author Nehemia Levtzion dubbed “accommodationist Islam”. The man credited with formulating this rationale is Sheikh Al-Hajj Salim Suwari, a Soninke cleric from the core Mali area who lived around 1500. He made hajj to Mecca several times and devoted his intellectual career to developing an understanding of the faith that would assist Muslim minorities in “pagan” lands. He drew on North African and Middle Eastern jurists and theologians who had reflected on the situations of Muslims living among non-Muslim majorities, situations that were frequent in the centuries of Islamic expansion.
Sheikh Suwari formulated the obligations of Muslim minorities in West Africa into something known as the Suwarian tradition. It stressed the need for Muslims to coexist peaceably with unbelievers, and so justified a separation of religion and politics. In this understanding Muslims must nurture their own learning and piety and thereby furnish good examples to the non-Muslims around them. They could accept jurisdiction of non-Muslim authorities, as long as they had the necessary protection and conditions to practice the faith. In this teaching Suwari followed a strong predilection in Islamic thought for any government, albeit non-Muslim or tyrannical, as opposed to none. The military jihad was a resort only if the faithful were threatened. Suwari discouraged dawah (missionary), instead contending that Allah would bring non-Muslims to Islam in Allah's own way. It was not a Muslim's responsibility to decide when ignorance should give way to belief. Since their Islamic practice was capable of accommodating traditional cults, Dyula often served as priests, soothsayers and counselors at the courts of animist rulers.
As fellow Muslims, Dyula merchants were also able to assess the valuable trans-Saharan trade network, conducted by North African Arabs and Berbers whom they met at commercial centers across the Sahel. Some important trade goods included gold, millet, slaves, kola nuts from the south and slave beads and cowrie shells from the north (for use as currency). It was under Mali that the great cities of the Niger bend - including Gao and Djenné - prospered, with Timbuktu in particular becoming known across Europe for its great wealth. Important trading centers in southern West Africa developed at the transitional zone between the forest and the savanna; examples include Begho and Bono Manso (in present-day Ghana) and Bondoukou (in present-day Côte d'Ivoire). Western trade routes continued to be important, with Ouadane, Oualata and Chinguetti being the major trade centres in what is now Mauritania.
The development of Dyula trade in Ghana and the adjacent Ivory Coast had important political consequences, and sometimes military implications as well. The Dyula spearheaded Mande penetration of the forested zones in the south by establishing caravan routes and trading posts at strategic locations throughout the region en route to cola producing areas. By the start of the sixteenth century, Dyula merchants were trading as far south as the coast of modern Ghana.
On the forests northern fringes, new states emerged such as Bono and Banda. As the economic value of gold and kola became appreciated, forests south of these states - which had hitherto been little inhabited because of limited agricultural potential - became more thickly populated, and the same principles of political and military mobilization began being applied there. Village communities became tributaries of ruling groups, with some members becoming the clients and slaves needed to support royal households, armies, and trading enterprises. Sometimes these political changes were not to the advantage of the Dyula, who employed Mande warriors to guard their caravans and, if necessary, could call in larger contingents from the Sudanic kingdoms. In the seventeenth century, tensions between the Muslims and the local pagans in Begho erupted into a destructive war which eventually led to the total abandonment of the Banda capital. The local people eventually settled in a number of towns further east, while the Dyula withdrew to the west, to the further side of the Banda hills, where they established the new trading center of Bonduku.
The Dyula presence and changes in the balance of power occasioned political upheavals in other places. Among the paramount Mande political initiatives along trade routes south of Jenne was creation of the Dyula state of Gonja in the early 17th century. This was apparently motivated by a general worsening of the competitive position of Dyula traders, and was occasioned by three factors: (1) a near monopoly control in exporting forest produce achieved by the Akan kingdom of Bono; (2) the rise to power further north of the Dagomba kingdom, which controlled local salt pans; and (3) increased competition following the arrival in the region of rival long-distance traders from Hausaland.
The reaction of the Dyula in the Bono-Banda-Gonja region to these developments was to erect a kingdom of their own in Gonja - the territory northern traders had to cross to reach Akan forestlands. By 1675, Gonja had established a paramount chief called Yagbongwura, to control the kingdom. But Gonja was not a fruitful land in which to try to maintain a centralized government, neither Dagomba power to the north nor Akan power to the south had been finally destroyed, and the new kingdom rapidly declined in strength.
Many of the trading posts established by the Dyula eventually became market villages or cities, such as Kong in today's north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire. It emerged as a commercial center when Malian merchants began trading in the territory which was inhabited by pagan Senufo and other Voltaic groups. The sous-préfecture of Kong, in the area of Kong to Dabakala, is said to be the “origin” area, where dyula traders first settled in the twelfth century. Dyula presence in the Kong area grew rapidly in the seventeenth century as a result of the developing trade between the commercial centers along the Niger banks and the forest region to the south, which was controlled by the Baule chiefdoms and by Ashanti. The Dyula brought their trading skills and connections, and transformed Kong into an international market for the exchange of northern desert goods, such as salt and cloth, and southern forest exports such as cola nuts, gold, and slaves. The city was also a religious center that housed a substantial academic community of Muslim scholars, with palaces and mosques built in the traditional Sudanese style. As Kong grew prosperous, its early rulers – from the Taraweré clan, combined Dyula and Senufo traditions and extended their authority over the surrounding region.
By the eighteenth century, the Dyula had become quite powerful in the area and wished to rid themselves of subordination to Senufo chiefs. This was achieved in an uprising led by Seku Wattara (Ouattara), a Dyula warrior who claimed descent from the Malinke Keita lineage and who had studied the Quran and engaged in commerce before becoming a warrior. By rallying around himself all Dyula in the area, Seku Wattara easily defeated local chiefdoms and set up an independent Dyula state in 1710, the first of its kind in West Africa. He established himself as ruler and, under his authority, the city rose from a small city-state to become the capital of the great Kong Empire holding sway over much of the region. The Dyula of Kong also maintained commercial links with European traders on the Atlantic coast, around the Gulf of Guinea, from whom they easily obtained prized European goods, most notably rifles, gunpowder and textiles. The acquisition of weapons allowed for the creation of an armed militia force that protected trade routes passing through the territories of various minor rulers. In the course of developing his state, Seku Wattara built a strong army composed mostly of defeated pagan groups. The leadership of the army eventually developed into a new warrior class, called sonangi, which was gradually separated from the overall Dyula merchant class.
The Kong Empire started to decline after the death of Seku Wattara. Succession struggles divided the kingdom into two parts, the northern area being controlled by Seku’s brother Famagan who refused to recognize the rule of Seku’s oldest son in the south. Towards the end of the nineteenth century many of Kong’s provinces had formed independent chiefdoms. The city of Kong retained the prestige of an Islamic commercial center, but it was no longer the seat of an important political power. It eventually came under French colonial control in 1898. Despite the fall from glory, the seventeenth century Kong Friday Mosque survived and the city was largely rebuilt in a traditional Sudano-Sahelian architectural style featuring a Qur'anic school.
The Mande conquerors of the nineteenth century frequently utilized trade routes established by the Dyula. Indeed, it was his exploitation of their commercial network that allowed military leader Samory Touré (1830-1900) to rise to a dominant position in the Upper Niger region. A member of a dyula family from Sanankoro in Guinea, Samori conquered and united Dyula states during the 1860s. He gained control over the Milo River Valley in 1871, seized the village of Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power-holder on the upper Niger. By 1883, Samori had successfully brought the local chieftains under his control and officially founded the kingdom of Wasulu.
Having established an empire, he adopted the religious title of Almami in 1884 and recreated the Malian realm. This new state was governed by Samori and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancery and the treasury, administered justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. Unlike some of his contemporary state-builders, Samori was not a religious preacher and Wasulu was not a reformist state as such. Nevertheless, he used Islam to unify the nation, promoting Islamic education and basing his rule on shari’a (Islamic law). However, Samori’s professional army was the essential institution and the real strength behind his empire. He imported horses and weapons and modernized the army along European lines.
Dyula traders had never enjoyed as much prosperity as they did under the almamy. Even though they did not play a central part in the creation of the state, the Dyula supported Samori because he actively encouraged commerce and protected trade routes, thus promoting a free circulation of people and goods. Samori put up the strongest resistance to European colonial penetration in West Africa, fighting both the French and British for seventeen years. Samori’s would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who took Sikasso in 1898, and sent Samori into exile, where he died in 1900.
The Dyula have been predominantly Muslim since the 13th century. Many in rural areas combine Islamic beliefs with certain pre-Islamic animistic traditions, such as the presence of spirits and use of amulets. Dyula communities have a reputation for historically maintaining a high standard of Muslim education. The Dyula family enterprise based on the lu could afford to provide some of its younger men an Islamic education. Thus, an ulema (clerical) class known as karamogo emerged, who were educated in the Quran and commentary (tafsir), hadith (prophetic narrations), and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the Dyula clerical tradition, a student received instruction under a single sheikh for a duration varying from five to thirty years, and earned his living as a part-time farmer working his teacher's lands. After completing his studies, a karamogo obtained a turban and an isnad (teaching license), and either sought further instruction or to start his own school in a remote village. A highly educated karamogo could become a professional imam or qadi (judge).
Dioula see Dyula
Juula see Dyula
trader see Dyula
Wangara see Dyula
Dyula (Dioula) (Juula). Ethnic group and language from West Africa (Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). The term Dyula is more commonly used to refer to a group specializing in trade. The term “Dioula” is synonymous with the term “Dyula.”
The Dyula (Dioula or Juula) are a Mande ethnic group inhabiting several West African countries, including the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.
Characterized as a highly successful merchant caste, Dyula migrants began establishing trading communities across the region in the fourteenth century. Since business was often conducted under non-Muslim rulers, the Dyula developed a set of theological principles for Muslim minorities in non-Muslim societies. Their unique contribution of long-distance commerce, Islamic scholarship and religious tolerance were significant factors to the peaceful expansion of Islam in West Africa.
The Mandé embraced Islam during the thirteenth century, following introduction to the faith through contact with the Soninké people and North African traders. By the 14th century the Malian empire (c.1230-1600) had reached its apogee, acquiring a considerable reputation for the Islamic practice of its court and the pilgrimages of several emperors who followed the tradition of Lahilatul Kalabi, the first black prince to make hajj to Mecca. It was at this time that Mali began encouraging some of its local merchants to establish colonies close to the gold fields of West Africa. This migrant trading class were known as dyula, the Mandingo word for “merchant” that referred simultaneously to their language (a dialect of Mandinka), commercial vocation, and religious practice.
The Dyula spread throughout the former area of Mandé culture, from the Atlantic coast of Senegambia to the Niger, and from the southern edge of the Sahara to forest zones further south. They established decentralized townships in non-Muslim colonies that were linked to an extensive commercial network, in a trading diaspora. Motivated by business imperatives, they expanded into new markets, founding settlements under the auspices of various local rulers who often permitted self-governance and autonomy. The organization of Dyula trading companies were based on a clan-family structure known as the lu - a working unit consisting of a father, his sons, and other attached males. Members of a given lu dispersed from the savanna to the forest, managed circulation of goods and information, placed orders, and effectively controlled the economic mechanisms of supply and demand.
Over time dyula colonies developed a theological rationale for their relations with non-Muslim ruling classes and subjects in what author Nehemia Levtzion dubbed “accommodationist Islam”. The man credited with formulating this rationale is Sheikh Al-Hajj Salim Suwari, a Soninke cleric from the core Mali area who lived around 1500. He made hajj to Mecca several times and devoted his intellectual career to developing an understanding of the faith that would assist Muslim minorities in “pagan” lands. He drew on North African and Middle Eastern jurists and theologians who had reflected on the situations of Muslims living among non-Muslim majorities, situations that were frequent in the centuries of Islamic expansion.
Sheikh Suwari formulated the obligations of Muslim minorities in West Africa into something known as the Suwarian tradition. It stressed the need for Muslims to coexist peaceably with unbelievers, and so justified a separation of religion and politics. In this understanding Muslims must nurture their own learning and piety and thereby furnish good examples to the non-Muslims around them. They could accept jurisdiction of non-Muslim authorities, as long as they had the necessary protection and conditions to practice the faith. In this teaching Suwari followed a strong predilection in Islamic thought for any government, albeit non-Muslim or tyrannical, as opposed to none. The military jihad was a resort only if the faithful were threatened. Suwari discouraged dawah (missionary), instead contending that Allah would bring non-Muslims to Islam in Allah's own way. It was not a Muslim's responsibility to decide when ignorance should give way to belief. Since their Islamic practice was capable of accommodating traditional cults, Dyula often served as priests, soothsayers and counselors at the courts of animist rulers.
As fellow Muslims, Dyula merchants were also able to assess the valuable trans-Saharan trade network, conducted by North African Arabs and Berbers whom they met at commercial centers across the Sahel. Some important trade goods included gold, millet, slaves, kola nuts from the south and slave beads and cowrie shells from the north (for use as currency). It was under Mali that the great cities of the Niger bend - including Gao and Djenné - prospered, with Timbuktu in particular becoming known across Europe for its great wealth. Important trading centers in southern West Africa developed at the transitional zone between the forest and the savanna; examples include Begho and Bono Manso (in present-day Ghana) and Bondoukou (in present-day Côte d'Ivoire). Western trade routes continued to be important, with Ouadane, Oualata and Chinguetti being the major trade centres in what is now Mauritania.
The development of Dyula trade in Ghana and the adjacent Ivory Coast had important political consequences, and sometimes military implications as well. The Dyula spearheaded Mande penetration of the forested zones in the south by establishing caravan routes and trading posts at strategic locations throughout the region en route to cola producing areas. By the start of the sixteenth century, Dyula merchants were trading as far south as the coast of modern Ghana.
On the forests northern fringes, new states emerged such as Bono and Banda. As the economic value of gold and kola became appreciated, forests south of these states - which had hitherto been little inhabited because of limited agricultural potential - became more thickly populated, and the same principles of political and military mobilization began being applied there. Village communities became tributaries of ruling groups, with some members becoming the clients and slaves needed to support royal households, armies, and trading enterprises. Sometimes these political changes were not to the advantage of the Dyula, who employed Mande warriors to guard their caravans and, if necessary, could call in larger contingents from the Sudanic kingdoms. In the seventeenth century, tensions between the Muslims and the local pagans in Begho erupted into a destructive war which eventually led to the total abandonment of the Banda capital. The local people eventually settled in a number of towns further east, while the Dyula withdrew to the west, to the further side of the Banda hills, where they established the new trading center of Bonduku.
The Dyula presence and changes in the balance of power occasioned political upheavals in other places. Among the paramount Mande political initiatives along trade routes south of Jenne was creation of the Dyula state of Gonja in the early 17th century. This was apparently motivated by a general worsening of the competitive position of Dyula traders, and was occasioned by three factors: (1) a near monopoly control in exporting forest produce achieved by the Akan kingdom of Bono; (2) the rise to power further north of the Dagomba kingdom, which controlled local salt pans; and (3) increased competition following the arrival in the region of rival long-distance traders from Hausaland.
The reaction of the Dyula in the Bono-Banda-Gonja region to these developments was to erect a kingdom of their own in Gonja - the territory northern traders had to cross to reach Akan forestlands. By 1675, Gonja had established a paramount chief called Yagbongwura, to control the kingdom. But Gonja was not a fruitful land in which to try to maintain a centralized government, neither Dagomba power to the north nor Akan power to the south had been finally destroyed, and the new kingdom rapidly declined in strength.
Many of the trading posts established by the Dyula eventually became market villages or cities, such as Kong in today's north-eastern Côte d'Ivoire. It emerged as a commercial center when Malian merchants began trading in the territory which was inhabited by pagan Senufo and other Voltaic groups. The sous-préfecture of Kong, in the area of Kong to Dabakala, is said to be the “origin” area, where dyula traders first settled in the twelfth century. Dyula presence in the Kong area grew rapidly in the seventeenth century as a result of the developing trade between the commercial centers along the Niger banks and the forest region to the south, which was controlled by the Baule chiefdoms and by Ashanti. The Dyula brought their trading skills and connections, and transformed Kong into an international market for the exchange of northern desert goods, such as salt and cloth, and southern forest exports such as cola nuts, gold, and slaves. The city was also a religious center that housed a substantial academic community of Muslim scholars, with palaces and mosques built in the traditional Sudanese style. As Kong grew prosperous, its early rulers – from the Taraweré clan, combined Dyula and Senufo traditions and extended their authority over the surrounding region.
By the eighteenth century, the Dyula had become quite powerful in the area and wished to rid themselves of subordination to Senufo chiefs. This was achieved in an uprising led by Seku Wattara (Ouattara), a Dyula warrior who claimed descent from the Malinke Keita lineage and who had studied the Quran and engaged in commerce before becoming a warrior. By rallying around himself all Dyula in the area, Seku Wattara easily defeated local chiefdoms and set up an independent Dyula state in 1710, the first of its kind in West Africa. He established himself as ruler and, under his authority, the city rose from a small city-state to become the capital of the great Kong Empire holding sway over much of the region. The Dyula of Kong also maintained commercial links with European traders on the Atlantic coast, around the Gulf of Guinea, from whom they easily obtained prized European goods, most notably rifles, gunpowder and textiles. The acquisition of weapons allowed for the creation of an armed militia force that protected trade routes passing through the territories of various minor rulers. In the course of developing his state, Seku Wattara built a strong army composed mostly of defeated pagan groups. The leadership of the army eventually developed into a new warrior class, called sonangi, which was gradually separated from the overall Dyula merchant class.
The Kong Empire started to decline after the death of Seku Wattara. Succession struggles divided the kingdom into two parts, the northern area being controlled by Seku’s brother Famagan who refused to recognize the rule of Seku’s oldest son in the south. Towards the end of the nineteenth century many of Kong’s provinces had formed independent chiefdoms. The city of Kong retained the prestige of an Islamic commercial center, but it was no longer the seat of an important political power. It eventually came under French colonial control in 1898. Despite the fall from glory, the seventeenth century Kong Friday Mosque survived and the city was largely rebuilt in a traditional Sudano-Sahelian architectural style featuring a Qur'anic school.
The Mande conquerors of the nineteenth century frequently utilized trade routes established by the Dyula. Indeed, it was his exploitation of their commercial network that allowed military leader Samory Touré (1830-1900) to rise to a dominant position in the Upper Niger region. A member of a dyula family from Sanankoro in Guinea, Samori conquered and united Dyula states during the 1860s. He gained control over the Milo River Valley in 1871, seized the village of Kankan in 1881, and became the principal power-holder on the upper Niger. By 1883, Samori had successfully brought the local chieftains under his control and officially founded the kingdom of Wasulu.
Having established an empire, he adopted the religious title of Almami in 1884 and recreated the Malian realm. This new state was governed by Samori and a council of kinsmen and clients who took on the management of the chancery and the treasury, administered justice, religious affairs, and foreign relations. Unlike some of his contemporary state-builders, Samori was not a religious preacher and Wasulu was not a reformist state as such. Nevertheless, he used Islam to unify the nation, promoting Islamic education and basing his rule on shari’a (Islamic law). However, Samori’s professional army was the essential institution and the real strength behind his empire. He imported horses and weapons and modernized the army along European lines.
Dyula traders had never enjoyed as much prosperity as they did under the almamy. Even though they did not play a central part in the creation of the state, the Dyula supported Samori because he actively encouraged commerce and protected trade routes, thus promoting a free circulation of people and goods. Samori put up the strongest resistance to European colonial penetration in West Africa, fighting both the French and British for seventeen years. Samori’s would-be Muslim empire was undone by the French, who took Sikasso in 1898, and sent Samori into exile, where he died in 1900.
The Dyula have been predominantly Muslim since the 13th century. Many in rural areas combine Islamic beliefs with certain pre-Islamic animistic traditions, such as the presence of spirits and use of amulets. Dyula communities have a reputation for historically maintaining a high standard of Muslim education. The Dyula family enterprise based on the lu could afford to provide some of its younger men an Islamic education. Thus, an ulema (clerical) class known as karamogo emerged, who were educated in the Quran and commentary (tafsir), hadith (prophetic narrations), and the life of the Prophet Muhammad. According to the Dyula clerical tradition, a student received instruction under a single sheikh for a duration varying from five to thirty years, and earned his living as a part-time farmer working his teacher's lands. After completing his studies, a karamogo obtained a turban and an isnad (teaching license), and either sought further instruction or to start his own school in a remote village. A highly educated karamogo could become a professional imam or qadi (judge).
Dioula see Dyula
Juula see Dyula
trader see Dyula
Wangara see Dyula
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