ISLAM
The word "islam" is an Arabic word which literally
means "submission
or total surrender (to God)". A Muslim therefore, is "one who submits to God" while following the teachings of the Qur'an and the Muslim hadith. In European languages, Islam often also
denotes the whole body of Muslim peoples, countries and states, in their
socio-cultural or political as well as their religious sphere. Finally, the word denotes the ideal Muslim
community.
After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, Islam
spread very quickly to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, North Africa, Spain, and, in
the east, to Iraq, Armenia and Iran, as far as Transoxiana and Chinese
Turkestan, all within the seventh century.
Expansion continued to India ,
Indonesia , sub-Saharan West
Africa, East Africa and the Nile
Valley Eastern Europe .
Although most confined to Asia and Africa, Islam was introduced in North
and South America by African slaves and Arab immigrants, while immigrants and transient
workers spread it to Western Europe . Today, Islam is a global religion, embracing
over a billion adherents.
To understand all aspects of Islam, both historical and
contemporary, requires a multi-cultural and interdisciplinary perspective. The various ethnic, linguistic, economic, and
military factors combined with the social, literary, and religious factors have
shaped Islamic culture from its beginnings and made Islamic culture a vibrant,
dynamic force in the world.
In its religious structure, Islam is both ethnic and
confessional. Because it had its
beginnings on the Arabian Peninsula and has
always retained a decisive Arab component, Islam is an ethnic religion,
comparable to Judaism and Hinduism, which also espouse a universal teaching but
channel it through one restricted group of people. The Islamic accent on Arab tribal origins is
comparable to the Jewish emphasis on the twelve tribes of Israel
For Islam, Arabic has become even more sacrosanct in its
canonical form than Hebrew is for Jews or Sanskrit is for Hindus. The elevation of Arabic is due to the fact
that Arabic is the language of the Qur'an
-- the revealed Word of God. The Qur'an is a scriptural text which sets
forth a series of divine revelations given to the Prophet Muhammad through an
angel during the latter part of Muhammad's
life commencing about 610 C.C. until the Prophet's
death in 632 C.C.
Although it might seem obvious that God would choose
Arabic to communicate with an Arab prophet, the choice of Arabic has meaning
for all Muslims, even non-Arabs. The
choice of Arabic has meaning not merely because Arabic words are used in the Qur'an but also because the oral
expression of the Qur'an
in Arabic conveys a uniquely divine revelation which is, quite simply, not amenable
to translation. Because the divinity of
the Quranic revelation is diminished when not read or spoken in Arabic, Muslims
have never sanctioned the translation of the Qur'an into another language. The Qur'an may be "interpreted" or "paraphrased" but the Qur'an can never be authentically
translated.
The "Arabicity
of the Qur'an" remains a core doctrine in Islam. This
doctrine reinforces the ethnic Arab character as being part of the foundation
of Muslim belief and ritual.
Islam is a confessional religion. It is less similar to Judaism or Hinduism
than to Buddhism and Christianity, both of which are universal not only in
doctrine (as are Judaism and Hinduism) but also in missionary outreach. As a missionary faith, Islam encourages
converts because the truth it espouses can theoretically be recognized and
embraced by any perceptive human being.
The creed of Islam -- the shahada -- is as simple as the
Christian affirmation of the Trinity or the Buddhist testimony of the
Triratna. To become a Muslim one has
only to declare in sincerity, "I
testify that there is no god but God, and that Muhammad is the Prophet of God."
The Islamic creed presupposes a cosmology that includes
an invisible as well as a visible world.
The invisible world may be called heaven or hell, just as this world is
called earth, and creatures, whether angels or demons inhabit that world, in
the same way that humans and other animal life populate this world. The cosmology of Islam also postulates that a
purposeful force has created both worlds, that it governs, guides and
ultimately judges them as well. Because
that force (God) is all-powerful rather than competitive with others or
compromised by the existence of others, it (God) is singular not
plural. In effect, the first part of the
Muslim creed -- the "I
testify that there is no god but God..." -- is a rigorous rejection of polytheism in favor of
monotheism. The first part of the Muslim
creed underlies the pivotal Muslim doctrine of divine unity -- the tawhid
-- and has historical antecedents in both Judaism and Christianity.
The transcendent oneness which Islam isolates as the root
motivating force of the universe is only knowable through human mediaries --
through men who have been set apart to fill a special function within their
community in a given generation. These
human mediaries are the prophets, and the second part of the Muslim creed
specifies Muhammad as one of the prophets.
Muhammad is God's
messenger -- the rasul -- to the Arabs, as Moses was to the Jews, Jesus
to the Christians, and Zoroaster to the Zoroastrians. Underlying the cosmology of the Muslim creed,
which, in its first part, is universalist and acknowledged by all monotheistic
faiths, is a concept of prophecy which is particularist. By demanding recognition of Muhammad as God's prophet, the second part of the
Muslim creed becomes unacceptable to non-Muslims.
Although Muhammad denied any divine status for himself,
asserting himself to be more akin to Moses than to Jesus, Muhammad did function
as an anchor tying the monotheism of the Qur'an to Arab tribes and the Arabic
language through his own personal authority as the latest and, in Muslim
doctrine, the last of the prophets.
The limits of Muhammad's
personal authority ultimately became a divisive issue. The majority Sunnis subordinate Muhammad's prophetic role to the content of the
revelation, while the Shi'ites
extol his role as progenitor of a new spiritual autocracy.
The basic Muslim creed is the key to seeing how Islam
functions in both a complementary and adversary relationship to antecedent
monotheistic faiths. Like Christianity,
Islam has a confessional tone. The
message of Islam -- "there
is no god but God" -- is perceived by Muslims as demanding a response from all peoples in all
generations.
Like Judaism, Islam has an indissoluble ethnic
focus. It is a religion centered on the
Arab people, the Arabic language, and, above all, the Arab prophet. None of the teachings of the prophets who
preceded Muhammad are denied. From Adam
and Abraham to Solomon and Jesus, the biblical (and even extra-biblical)
prophets are affirmed, many of their actions and utterances being lauded in the
suras of the Qur'an.
However, since Muhammad is considered to be the last
prophet -- the revelations communicated through Muhammad supersede previous
revelations, even as they mark the culmination of all earlier scriptures. Thus, in Islam, the authority of both Jewish
and Christian scripture is subordinated to the content of Muslim revelation. Accordingly, Jewish and Christian scripture
essentially serve as a theological, not merely a chronological, preamble to
Islam.
The social position of Jews and Christians under Muslim
rule directly mirrored the theological valuation of their scriptural
sources. Historically, in Muslim countries,
Jews and Christians were protected (albeit second class) citizens. Contrary to popular belief, Jews and
Christians were not faced with the choice of conversion to Islam or the sword. This particular practice -- the choice of
conversion or death -- was more confined to Christian countries such as
Catholic Spain
In the abode of Islam -- the dar al-Islam --, Jews
and Christians were accepted as People of the Book. Although Jews and Christians were often
required to pay a steep tax for their rights as citizens, they were permitted
to occupy public buildings, perform age-old liturgies, and continue the religious
education of their young. Jews,
Christians, and Zoroastrians, while considered inferior to Muslims, were
nonetheless deemed superior to polytheists and unbelievers.
The requirements of Muslim belief and ritual underscore
the ambivalent relationship of Islam to its monotheistic forebears. The shahada is the first of five
Pillars of Islam. The shahada leads
naturally into the daily cycle of prayer, since it is assumed that whoever
acknowledges the one God will pray to him, following the example of Muhammad.
The orientation for prayer -- the qiblah -- was
first directed towards Jerusalem Medina around 622 C.C., the qiblah was permanently
shifted towards Mecca
Mecca, and by extension Arabia, has therefore been the
geographic focus for the daily devotional life of Muslims since the inception
of Islam. Its centrality is supported by
a third pillar of Islam -- the canonical pilgrimage -- the hajj.
Unlike ritual prayer -- the salat -- the hajj is
an occasional rather than a daily requirement.
Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon each able-bodied Muslim male to
undertake the arduous and often expensive journey to Mecca
and Medina
Further differentiating Muslims are the other two
pillars, fasting -- sawm --, and alms-giving -- zakat. Each of these disciplines was observed,
and its value acknowledged, by both Jews and Christians before the rise of
Islam. One can even trace early Islamic
tithing practices to Jewish and Christian antecedents. However, the Muslim observance of almsgiving
was linked to the particular needs of Muhammad's
community, even as the period prescribed for fasting during the month of
Ramadan was legitimated with reference to the calling of Muhammad as the last
prophet.
Islam has more in common with Judaism and Christianity
than with any other major religious tradition.
Yet Islam has charted an independent course, one that emphasizes
negligence more than sin as the fundamental human condition and corporate
guidance rather than individual salvation as the prescriptive divine
intent. The most accurate history of
Islam, therefore, concerns the shaping and reshaping of the Muslim community.
Historically, Muslim scholars have a tendency, too
readily emulated by Western scholars, to focus on biography as the essential
element for assessing major trends and locating pivotal moments in Muslim
history. The decisions of major rulers,
the battles of major warriors, or the writings of major thinkers are valuable
points of documentation in describing the historic past of a civilization which
places great stress on temporal achievements and their literary record. However, it is all too easy to assume that biographical
sketches, or dates linked to great men, can fully explain the history of an
entity remote in time and purpose from the Christian or Western experience.
Contrary to widespread belief, the Arabian
peninsula in the late sixth and early seventh centuries of the
Christian Era was not an unsophisticated cultural backwater. The area, at the time, was in contact with
the surrounding Byzantine, Sasanian, and Abyssinian empires. Commerce within and beyond the peninsula
played a decisive role in the structure of urban society and the practice of
religion. Muhammad himself was married
to a rich widow whose business Muhammad successfully managed before his call to
prophesy.
Merchants visiting Mecca
The conflicts of the nomadic tribes of interior Arabia were not simply internecine and localized
feuds. Several decades before Muhammad,
two frontier confederations of South Arabian origin, the Ghasanids and the
Lakhmids, had become vassals or client states in North
Arabia of the Byzantines and Sasanians, respectively. Throughout the sixth century, the
Ghasanids and Lakhmids contended with each other, and this protracted rivalry
formed a bridge between interior Arabia and
the adjacent powers.
The religion of pre-Islamic Arabia
was varied and reflected external influence.
This period, referred to as jahiliyya -- the "Time of Ignorance", stood in stark contrast to the light
that was to be provided by the Quranic revelation that was to follow. Idol worship and animalism marked the
religious disposition of the region, even though sizable Jewish and Christian
communities had been established. Jews,
for instance, had migrated to Arabia at the
beginning of their diaspora. The Jewish
presence in the urban and oasis settlements of Yemen
and the Hejaz is well attested to in the
passages of the Qur'an.
Christians, coming as Nestorian and Monophysite
missionaries, sought a haven in Arabia from
the long arm of Roman Catholic orthodoxy.
In the desolate expanses of the Arabian desert ,
these Christians found a place for themselves and succeeded in converting a
number of tribal confederations such as the Ghasanids and Lakhmids along with
numerous smaller tribes. Symbols of an
active, proselytizing Christian presence such as the solitary Christian hermit
are evident in Arab poetry of the jahiliyya period.
Arabia, then, was clearly a region which was exposed to
monotheism although tribal polytheism tended to predominate. But then came Muhammad.
It was the singular genius of Muhammad to understand the
currents of thought and the social realities of his time. It was the divine inspiration which enabled
Muhammad to create a new religious vehicle which made it possible to mobilize
the disparate Arab factions and interests under the banner of a consistent yet
flexible monotheism. The Great Prophet
was a statesman and administrator with the same zeal, skill, and ultimate
success that he demonstrated as a prophet and charismatic preacher.
***
The rise of Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah
was marked with peril and near failure at every turn. He was orphaned soon after his birth and
adopted into a minor branch of the Quraysh tribe of Mecca
At the age of forty, after many intervals of protracted
meditation in caves near Mecca , Muhammad felt
compelled to proclaim the absolute unity of God and to denounce idolatry,
including the profitable rituals at the Ka'ba
shrine of Mecca
Five years after his first revelation, Muhammad sent some
of his followers to Abyssinia (Ethiopia Medina Medina , Muhammad
gradually gathered a loyal constituency at Medina
By 630, Muhammad was able to return to Mecca Arabian peninsula , largely through
pacts of personal loyalty sworn by tribal leaders to Muhammad.
At the heart of this extraordinary transition from a
tribal to a confessional polity was the dictation, in an intermittent sequence,
of divine revelations to Muhammad which in a compiled form came to be known as
the Qur'an. The Qur'an established day-to-day policies
as well as provided long term ethical, legal, and doctrinal patterns for the
community of Muhammad's
followers.
***
When Muhammad died in 632, he had appointed no one to
succeed him as leader of the Muslim community.
Despite numerous marriages, Muhammad had fathered no son who reached
maturity. Islam might have dissolved
except for the line of able successors -- the caliphs -- who were elected by
Muhammad's
companions -- the Sahaba -- to fill Muhammad's role as the religious and political
leader of the nascent Muslim community (the umma).
Four Meccans, (Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman,
and 'Ali), ruled the umma for the next thirty years. These four patriarchs have become known as
the righteous caliphs -- the rashidun.
During their rule, fraught though it was with tensions, conflicts,
and recurrent acts of violence, even against the caliphs themselves (three of
the four patriarchs were assassinated), Arab armies, fighting under the banner
of Islam, conquered a vast, diverse geographic area extending from North Africa
to the frontier of India United States
east of the Mississippi River . Within forty years after the Prophet's death, Muslim armies had come to
control an area at least as large as the continental United
States minus California
***
A crucial aspect of the initial Islamic expansion was
achieved not only through a series of land assaults by Bedouin tribesmen, but
also through the governmental apparatus of the fallen Sasanian Empire. With the collapse of Sasanian power after the
battle of Nihawand in 642, Muslim Arabs obtained a base of operations in
portions of present day Iran
and Iraq from which they
were able to extend their rule over much of the Middle
East . The emerging profile
of the new Islamic polity was Persian as well as Arab, and the continuous
cross-fertilization of the two traditions -- in society and culture as well as
religion -- was such that many commentators have opted to describe the entire
region from the Nile to the Oxus rivers as Irano-Semitic.
The interaction of the Persian and Arab cultures began
with the initial Muslim conquests when the traditions as well as the
territories of the Sasanian Empire were grafted into dar al-Islam. For instance, tribesmen from several parts of
Arabia migrated northward from the mid-seventh
century of the Christian Era. These
immigrants joined the victorious Arab armies and settled in the former Sasanian
lands. However, the pre-Islamic
inhabitants of these lands, usually known as mawali or clients if they
converted to Islam, often became Arabicized by linking themselves to one of the
Arab tribes. They also learned Arabic
and adopted Arab customs, while suppressing other, non-Arab, values.
Nevertheless, the Arabs did not regard the mawali as
full partners in the Islamic enterprise.
The cleavage between the two mirrored the division in Islam between the
universalist tradition and Arab tribalism and this ethnically based system
persisted throughout the early years (up to about 750 C.C.) of the Muslim
diaspora and, indeed, continues to this day.
It would be natural to assume that in the early period
the Arabs as Muslims would have welcomed the mawali as equal partners in
dar al-Islam. But the Muslims did
not. The Arabs, though Muslims, were
still Arabs, and their re-ranking as Arabs was effected in detail by the second
caliph, 'Umar,
in a divan, or register, which was compiled for determining the
distribution of spoils after each conquest.
By its comprehensive and precise character, 'Umar's
register assured the ascendancy of Arabism in the new Islamic polity. The social, and also the ritual, scale was
hierarchically, centrally Arab.
Moreover, the corporate structure of the Islamic umma remained
dependent on allegiance to the person at its head. 'Umar
made many remarkable decisions that determined the subsequent course of Islamic
history. 'Umar
affirmed the corporate nature of the nascent Muslim community by adding the
title "commander
of the faithful" to the title "successor" adopted by Abu Bakr. 'Umar
also changed the dating system so that years were counted from the date of
Muhammad's
emigration -- the hijra -- from Mecca to Medina
'Umar's personal zeal for modest dress and
strict piety qualified him as an exemplar of the Muslim ideals he wished to
propagate as head of state. He may have
transcended Arab tribalism but he did not disavow it. Instead, 'Umar
tended to recast the nature of Arab loyalties without eliminating them.
***
At 'Umar's death in 644, a group of senior
Companions to the Prophet elected a third Meccan, 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, to be his successor and the
leader of the Muslim community. He
proved a skilled military tactician and a forthright administrator, but he had
two shortcomings, one distinctly Muslim, the other distinctly Arab: (1)
Although a father-in-law to Muhammad, 'Uthman
was from a group of Meccans who were late in accepting Muhammad's prophetic mission; and (2) 'Uthman did not act to avenge the
death of the man accused of the assassination of 'Umar.
After 'Umar
had been assassinated, 'Umar's son took the law into his own hands
by killing the accused, a Persian general.
A group of the Prophet's
companions, including his cousin and son-in-law 'Ali, had demanded revenge
against 'Umar's son, but 'Uthman did not accede to their
request and, thereby, alienated them.
Throughout the twelve years of 'Uthman's
reign, the party of 'Ali grew as a focal point of discontent. Groups within the Arab armies of Iraq and Egypt
***
In 656, 'Uthman
was murdered by Egyptian dissidents. 'Ali
was acknowledged by most Medinans and many Meccans as the next caliph. But 'Ali also had his detractors among whom
was Muhammad's
favorite wife, 'A'isha. 'Ali made Kufa, the provincial capital of lower Iraq Syria
By 657, a large scale encounter between Mu'awiya and the followers of 'Ali took
place at Siffin. 'Ali was on the verge of
defeating Mu'awiya's forces when he was lured into
accepting arbitration. Some of Ali's soldiers, becoming angered at this,
deserted his cause and formed a separatist movement known as the
Kharijites. The results of the
arbitration went against 'Ali, who rejected them and took to the battlefield
again, seeking to pummel Mu'awiya
into acceptance of his caliphate. But Mu'awiya had gained ground among those
Arabs who took sides (many Muslims remained neutral). In 661, before a decisive battle could be
fought, 'Ali was murdered by a Kharijite zealot.
***
In 661, Mu'awiya
reigned as caliph in all the provinces of dar al-Islam. The ascent of Mu'awiya marked the beginning of the
Umayyad dynasty. 'Ali's influence nonetheless persisted and
even increased after his death. The
group which had supported 'Ali and his family in Kufa continued to resent and to
resist Umayyad power, which was based in a rival province, Syria
While the shi'at
al 'Ali
represented the tensions of an intra-Arabic dynastic struggle, it also
extended to the mawali, non-Arab Muslims many of whom resented their
continued exclusion from the top administrative posts of the empire under the
Umayyads. The anti-Umayyad uprising of
al-Mukhtar in Kufa from 685 to 687, for instance, was aided by the
participation of disgruntled mawali, and it was from this time on,
according to Watt, that Shi'ism
was linked with the political grievances and aspirations of non-Arab
Muslims. At the same time, the defeat of 'Ali and his murder by another Muslim became a symbolic event underscoring the
power of Arab factionalism within Islam.
The tension between the role of the caliph as leader of the whole Muslim
community and as a member of a particular tribal or regional group conflicting
with other tribal or regional groups within Islam was never resolved.
Mu'awiya
was probably a much more fair-minded advocate of Islamic unity than subsequent
histories (much of them anti-Umayyad) have suggested. However, Mu'awiya's successor, Yazid was unable to
control the numerous forces which had to be shrewdly balanced to govern the
still expanding dar al-Islam. In
establishing his rule, Yazid had to put down a rebellion by Medinan Muslim
families who had encouraged Husayn, 'Ali's
younger son and Muhammad's
grandson (through 'Ali's
wife, Fatima), to lay claim to the caliphate.
Husayn, with a small band of followers, was killed at Karbala
***
Upon the death of Yazid, there was no worthy successor in
Yazid's
immediate family. It was not until after
a further period of unrest, which included the occupancy of the caliphate by a
non-Umayyad, that a second cousin of Mu'awiya, 'Abd
al-Malik took office.
'Abd
al-Malik is considered by many commentators to be the third most notable and
influential sovereign of the early Muslim umma, ranking behind only 'Umar and Mu'awiya, 'Abd
al-Malik established his rule and that of his successors on the principle of jama'a, or Muslim group solidarity. The principle of jama'a was intended to supplant the Arab
tribal factionalism which had continued to plague Arab Muslim society. However, in attempting to promote jama'a, 'Abd
al-Malik encountered a dilemma which would not be resolved until after the fall
of his own dynasty. The dilemma was that
beyond the ideals expounded in the Qur'an,
the text of which had been fixed from the reign of 'Uthman, there was no adequate basis
for defining and applying Islamic solidarity apart from Arab customs, some of
which presupposed and were even consciously modeled on the age-old Arab tribal
conflicts which jama'a
was meant to replace.
After the reign of 'Abd
al-Malik, there were legal, ascetic, and philosophical movements that exerted
some influence on Muslim thought. None
of them, however, adequately interpreted the nature of Islamic corporate
identity. The creed of Abu Hanifa did
emphasize the importance of knowing God and publicly professing faith in him,
but it was probably not widely accepted before 750 C.C. What had to emerge to provide a genuine basis
for solidarity was a scriptural authority complementary to the Qur'an but more specific in detail,
avowedly Arab in content yet also Islamic in tone.
Toward the end of the Umayyad dynasty in 750 C.C., a
group of pious Muslims emerged who began to develop a core of Muslim thought
which advanced the principle of jama'a. These pious Muslims were known as Qur'an reciters. They were trained to intone the scriptural
core of Islamic faith on ritual, public occasions. They also circulated among themselves reports
about what the Prophet and his companions had said or done that would be relevant
for those attempting to lead a fully pious Islamic life.
The reports that were circulated by the Qur'an reciters soon became a body of
literature that is today known as the hadith. These reports, with their text and
verifiable line of transmitters, became the basis for constructing the biography
of Muhammad. Some of the reports
provided background information for the occasions on which passages in the Qur'an had been revealed to
Muhammad. Others described the Prophet's reaction to skirmishes and battles in
which Muhammad had participated. These
reports -- these hadith -- thus became supplementary to the Qur'an in detail and complementary to
the Qur'an
in authority.
However, the original hadith were not immediately
evaluated, arranged, and compiled as independent books of particular importance
for Islamic jurisprudence -- for fiqh.
The potential of the hadith for defining Muslim corporate and
private modes of conduct was still unrealized.
Extraordinary fluidity in range of material and scope of interpretation
continued to characterize legal, doctrinal, ascetic, and philosophical issues
to the end of the Umayyad period.
***
The second major phase of Islamic history began with the
fall of the Umayyad caliphate in 750 C.C. and the ascendancy of the
Abbasids. This second major phase augured
in a change in the nature of the Islamic community that went far beyond the
mere changing of dynasties.
In 750 C.C., the locus of Islamic power remained in the
cities of the Fertile Crescent . However, while the Umayyad capital had been Damascus in Syria ,
the 'Abbasids
chose a new site near the former Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon
in lower Iraq , and
constructed on the banks of the Tigris a magnificent urban complex which they
named Baghdad
With the shift from Damascus
to Baghdad Baghdad Egypt
(1250-1517) and India
Along with changes to the Islamic community, the 'Abbasid dynasty also wrought changes
to the basic nature of the caliphate. As
the capital and other urban courts became ethnically pluralistic, the authority
of the caliphate tended to be more absolutist, more authoritarian. An ascending hierarchy of functionaries
served at the will of the caliph. In
essence, the caliph ceased to be first among equals, as had previously been the
case, and instead became one above all others.
Under the 'Abbasids,
caliphal succession became an increasingly bitter struggle with the spoils of a
wealthy imperial court going to the winners.
Extravagant patronage became the most obvious demonstration of the
caliph's
authority. Each 'Abbasid tried to exceed his
predecessor in the dazzling splendors -- both architectural and literary --
which he produced in Baghdad
Among those who had been excluded from power under the Umayyads
and who worked diligently for the transition from Umayyad to 'Abbasid rule were the mawali, the
dhimmis and the Shi'ites. The first group -- the mawali -- consisting
of non-Arab Muslims, became less intent on connecting themselves with Arab
tribal names and were publicly accorded fairer treatment under the 'Abbasids. The danger in their new freedom, however, was
illustrated by the Barmakids, a Persian family of Central Asian Buddhist stock,
who rose to the top of the 'Abbasid
bureaucracy under Harun ar-Rashid, only to arouse the jealousy and suspicion of
the caliph. All of the prominent males
of the Barmakids were executed or imprisoned.
The dhimmis were the protected people in the
kingdom. Christians, Jews, Copts, and
Zoroastrians were the principle members of this class. The dhimmis continued to enjoy general
favor under the 'Abbasid
caliphs, in part because their major festivals still reflected the seasonal
fluctuation abandoned in Islam since the lunar calendar was introduced by 'Umar. In the major cities, dhimmis retained
or could acquire positions of leadership; in the villages they tended to be
deprived of leadership roles. Actual
circumstances varied enormously from region to region. The Christian Coptic Church in Egypt , Zoroastrians in Iran , Jews in the commercial centers of the
Maghrib and Andalusia -- all existed
throughout the middle period. Their
existence in disparate places makes it difficult to generalize about the "protected people" of medieval Islam. The status of the dhimmis in Islamic
lands was one of second class citizenship.
Nevertheless, their lives were not devoid of religious freedom or
occupational opportunity. Indeed, it
could be argued that for the Jews, the era of the 'Abbasid caliphs was an era which saw
the flowering of Jewish culture and great advances in Jewish theological
thought.
***
The Shi'ites
were not content with secondary status.
Because they were Muslims and linked to the Prophet's family, the Shi'ites considered themselves the natural
elite of Islamic society. Unable to
realize their objective of political leadership under the early 'Abbasids they became a dissident
community, undeniably legitimate but creedally fragmented. Their common strength was loyalty to the
memory of two dead heroes: the fourth caliph, Ali, and his son Husayn.
In the register of 'Umar,
it was clear that the wives and family of Muhammad were to be accorded special
respect by other Muslims. Even those
Muslims who had opposed 'Ali or were neutral during his struggle with Mu'awiya were inclined to esteem him. 'Ali was related to the Prophet both by blood
and by marriage. Many hadith stressed
the close personal relationship between Ali and Muhammad. Additionally, 'Ali was the father of Husayn,
Muhammad's
ill-fated grandson. (The Prophet's only other grandson, Husayn's older brother, Hasan, was also
murdered, but because he had already compromised himself with the hated Mu'awiya, Hasan's significance for Shi'ites has always been minor in
comparison to that of Husayn.)
From an early date, those who favored 'Ali equated his
death and Husayn's
with the death of early martyrs who had been killed on the battlefield fighting
to defend or to extend the borders of the Islamic empire. These martyrs were entitled to immediate
access to the divine presence, without the waiting interval before Judgment Day
that faced ordinary believers at death.
Special ritual significance was attached to the occasion of 'Ali's death, and even more to the tenth of
Muharram, the anniversary of Husayn's
death, which has become the peak day on the Shi'ite
liturgical calendar, marked especially at the Iraqi pilgrimage sites of Najaf
('Ali's tomb)
and Karbala (Husayn's
shrine) but also at other devotional centers throughout the Islamic world where
there are Shi'ites.
Theologically, 'Ali, together with all his descendants
through Husayn, was reputed to have a special proximity to God, and to be
blessed with a knowledge of God unavailable to others. The consequences of such ascriptive loyalty,
cumulatively nurtured by those lacking in political power but certain of their
right to its exercise, are evident. The
first three successors to Muhammad were impugned or reviled. The worst of the three, of course, was 'Uthman, the Umayyad ruler. He, along with all the Umayyad caliphs, was
roundly condemned. This criticism
applied to the first two patriarchal caliphs, Abu Bakr and 'Umar, because, according to the Shi'ites, they, like 'Uthman, had usurped their role
reserved for 'Ali alone. One might say in
retrospect that the entire line of reasoning applied by 'Ali's followers to the early period of
Islamic history (with consequences for both the middle and the modern periods)
had its genesis in Muhammad's
fateful failure to appoint a successor openly acknowledged by the senior
members of his community, including his relatives.
Politically, the consequences of Shi'ite belief were twofold: (1) perpetual
hostility to all existing forms of government and (2) constant vigilance for a
descendant of 'Ali, who might be advocated as caliph. During the eighth and ninth centuries of the
Christian Era, the Shi'ite
community split into two branches. Both
branches professed absolute loyalty to a succession of imams, inspired
descendants of 'Ali through Husayn.
However, the two groups differed over the number of imams succeeding 'Ali.
The smaller group, the Seveners, stopped the line of
succession at the seventh imam, Isma'il. This smaller group became known as the Isma'iliyya.
The dominant group, the Twelvers, continued the line of imams as far as
the twelfth imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi.
This group became known as the
Imamiyya.
Both the Isma'iliyya
and the Imamiyya, as well as other Shi'ite
sects, held that the last in the line of imams did not die but went into
hiding. All governments, including the
Sunni caliphate, will topple at the apocalyptic moment when, by divine design,
the hidden imam will come out of hiding, reveal his true identity as the Mahdi
or "guided
one", and
restore Islam to its pristine purity.
The political explosiveness of Shi'ite messianism was revealed during the
early 'Abbasid
period. At the accession of the caliph,
Mansur in 754, a group of Shi'ites
backed a relative of Ali's
older son, Hasan, as caliph. The Shi'ites rallied dissident forces on their
candidates behalf in the religious heartland of Arabia, the Hejaz . The Umayyads defeated this coalition, but Shi'ism continued to evolve more and more
fantastic end-of-the-world schemes that reached a kind of mythical completeness
by the end of the ninth century. In the
tenth century, a Sevener Shi'ite
group the Fatimids, succeeded in gaining power in Egypt
The Buyids and Fatimids were only two of numerous
regional dynastic elites that appeared from the mid-tenth century on. Among others were the Arab Hamdanis of Syria , the Umayyad Caliphate of Andalusia
(Muslim Spain Western Iran . Ultimately, the Seljuks were victorious in
this struggle.
The regional dynasties reduced the authority of the 'Abbasid caliph in Baghdad Fertile Crescent . Thus the Crusaders were confronted not by the
Seljuks bu the Ayyubid Egyptians under Saladin and his successors.
***
The major question of the period between 750 and 1500
concerns the influence upon Islam of the vast destruction wrought by the Mongol
hordes beginning in the early thirteenth century and continuing for the next
century and a half. In rapidity and
scope of territorial conquest, the Mongol eruptions resembled the early expansion
of Islam. However, there were two
initial, and finally determinative, differences between the two groups. The Arabs had a universalist ethos which they
sought, however imperfectly, to transplant in conquered lands; the Mongols
reigned through the terror of nomadic tribal power. The Arabs were attracted to city life and
trade; the Mongols, at least at first, hated both. In time, the Mongols did learn to patronize
the arts and sciences in mercantile urban centers. They rebuilt destroyed cities or, as in the
case of Samarkand
***
The genesis of the Islam inherited, transmitted and
elaborated by the Mongols lay in juridical developments of the early 'Abbasid period. The critical, recurrent issue, still unresolved
at the end of the Umayyad dynasty, had been to define the Islamic community --
the umma -- and its solidarity.
Scholars of the eighth and ninth centuries had realized that the
community could only be based on the directives of the Qur'an supplemented by sayings of the
Prophet and then applied to the lives of believers. The system they evolved set forth a tacit as
well as an explicit code of behavior, and it was this code of behavior which
became the law -- the sharia.
Within the framework of the sharia, advocates of
Islamic mysticism and theology later expounded their interpretations of
normative thought, belief, and action. "Without the sharia there is no
Islam," became a
popular dictum.
Islam has sometimes been viewed as a community of people
bound together by their common acceptance of, and adherence to, minute legal
prescriptions. The precepts of Islam had
always been based on Qur'anic
passages and the sunna, or conduct of Muhammad, that was to serve as an
example. However, from the mid-eighth
century on, the precepts of Islam, together with all aspects of the sharia,
were particularized with further reference to the consensus -- the ijma
-- of a particular group of Muslim scholars or the independent decision -- the ijtihad
-- of a single jurist. Scholars,
jurists, and other legal functionaries came to comprise a class known as the 'ulama'.
The 'ulama' were the guardians of the sharia,
but how they applied its provisions depended on the nature of decisions which
had been rendered within the school of law of which they were the custodial
agents.
When a question arose concerning the hadith, the mujtahid
served as the investigating judge, and, on the basis of the inquiry made by
the mujtahid, a subordinate judge -- a faqih -- would weigh the
applicability of the ruling to the ordinary Muslim. The faqih could consult his colleagues
in order to reach a consensus of opinion on the matter, and this opinion became
part of the sharia.
A mufti, or advisory judge, could then deliver to
a petitioner a legal decree on the matter, but it was the qadi, or court
judge, who decided whether or not to assess a penalty for failure to conform to
that part of the sharia. From
early 'Abbasid
times, the qadi was a useful officer of the state, though his politicization
raised a new and persistent problem:
What if the wishes of the caliph or local Muslim ruler clashed with the
most honorable and accurate reading of the law?
The problem of conflict between the law and the wishes of
the ruler was never solved, and the emergence of four overlapping but distinct
schools of law further indicates how the sharia became an extension of
geopolitical interests. The Hanafite
school, originating from Abu Hanifa, became accepted in Turkey , the Fertile Crescent, Afghanistan Fertile
Crescent .
After the endeavors of these pioneering jurists, the hadith
were compiled into numerous books, of which six became especially
authoritative. The efforts of men such
as al-Bukhari and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj reinforced the legacy of the jurists and
made it appear that the sharia, through persistent study, could be fully
learned and comprehensively applied. Hadith
became the key to the sharia. According
to al-Shafi'i, hadith
were necessary to complement but also to interpret the Qur'an, with the result that Sunni
Islam came to rest on a twofold scriptural authority. By the end of the tenth century, the desire
for scriptural legitimization, abetted by the rapid growth of sectarian
movements, regional dynasties, and philosophical speculations, produced a
series of efforts to close the gate of interpretation -- ijtihad -- and
to rely on compliance with time sanctioned models for conduct.
The 'ulama', who generally promoted such
efforts, were themselves subjected to further institutionalization in the
eleventh century when madrasas proliferated as the principal
institutions for Islamic religious education.
The 'ulama' staffed the madrasas. In the madrasas, the 'ulama' taught both new converts and
successive generations of established Muslim families the full array of
traditional Islamic sciences. But the 'ulama' were not disinterested teachers;
they were increasingly manipulated by the military leaders and notables,
whether at caliphal or provincial courts, who founded the madrasas and funded their staffs. It may be deduced that the concept of an
independent Muslim judiciary, to the limited extent that it was ever feasible,
died with the phenomenal, rapid growth of the madrasa network.
Little room was left for the incorporation of local
custom, especially important to Persian and Turkish ethnic groups, who did not
become widely Islamized beyond the major cities until the eleventh and twelfth
centuries. The madrasa curriculum,
with the 'ulama' as its instructors, underscored
Arabization as the bedrock of Islamic identity.
Not only was it necessary for a Muslim to learn the Arabic of the Qur'an and hadith (which varied
considerably from the colloquial Arabic spoken even in the medieval period),
but one had also to identify with the norms of seventh century Arabian society
since, as the context of Muhammad's
thought, belief, and conduct, they were the ideal for every generation and
every segment of Muslim society.
The Shi'ites
did not cooperate with, nor participate in, this system. They belonged to none of the four schools of
law, nor did they accept the Sunni hadith as authoritative compilations
of Muhammad's
dicta. Yet they did develop a parallel
structure of community life and religious education, with their own schools of
law and hadith compendia, and with mullahs, rather than the 'ulama', as instructors.
It was, therefore, Islam as expressed in sharia,
taught in the madrasa, defined by jurists, refined by traditionists, and
promulgated by the 'ulama', which established a pattern of
community consciousness for Sunni Islam that survived up to and beyond the
Mongol incursions. Mongol rulers, in
fact, helped to freeze the form of Sunni Islam which they adopted, for it was
during the fifteenth century, toward the end of the Mongol period, that
dynastic law (which had been applied de facto in some pre-Mongol Islamic
states) became welded to the sharia. Not
only was the law acknowledged to be a final, unchanging code, but it was to be
administered by the exemplary ruler, himself the repository of truth and the
authority of last resort. The 'ulama', despite their scholarly
credentials, served at the ruler's
will and as his functionaries.
Mysticism, theology, and law in Islam were not mutually
exclusive. All three presupposed the sharia;
they differed in how to interpret and apply its precepts to Muslim
society. The task of the theologian was
to justify Islam on two fronts: (1) as the fulfillment of monotheistic faith,
which was initiated by pre-Islamic prophets from Adam through Jesus, and which
culminated in Muhammad, and (2) as the perfect cosmology, ontology,
epistemology, completing but also transcending Platonic and Aristotelian
categories. The collective endeavors of
quasi-rationalists -- the mu'tazila
-- inspired, then provoked, the first Islamic theologians, Ash'ari and al-Maturidi, both of whom
disowned the conclusions of philosophy while using its analytical methods to
bolster their own faith claims. Popular
philosophical movements, such as the Ikhwan al-Safa, enjoyed sporadic success,
while theological discourse itself aroused suspicion among many of the 'ulama'.
Even the acclaim of encyclopedic and incisive Muslim philosophers,
such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd was blunted by the anti-philosophical polemic
which prevailed in madrasa and sharia.
The mystic was not removed from the intricacies of
theology and law. Typically, theological
speculations and juridical pronouncements came from the same person who was
also a practitioner of mystical exercises, or at least sympathetic to an
interiorized definition of Islamic piety.
The usual example of such a multi-disciplinary intellectual and
spiritual giant is al-Ghazzali. The
contributions of al-Ghazzali to the Islamic society of his day may have been
exaggerated for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was his stature as
a bi-lingual (Persian and Arabic) advocate of Sunni Islam in a pluralistic
society embracing non-Arabs as well as Arabs.
Yet al-Ghazzali's
fearless quest for the truth was extraordinary by any canon of human judgment.
Because he stands at a pivotal point in Muslim history,
al-Ghazzali is often credited with initiating two major developments in Islamic
mysticism -- in Sufism. These
developments actually reflect changes in Muslim society rather than the direct
impact of one man, and they have persisted through the Mongol period into the
modern period. One is the elaboration of
theoretical or theosophical Sufism in both prose and verse, dramatized by the
literary legacy of the Andalusian (Spanish Muslim) Ibn 'Arabi and the Anatolian (Turkish
Muslim) Jalal ad-Din Rumi. Another is
the emergence of mystical brotherhoods, known as tariqas or silsilas,
which became vehicles both for personalizing Islam and for incorporating local
customs into Muslim ritual. The
brotherhoods acted as institutional extensions of Sufi theory; their masters,
often called shaikhs, may or may not have introduced Islam into those
regions of the world (such as interior Africa and the Indonesian archipelago)
where many Muslim communities ascribe their origins to itinerant saints, and
yet the role that Sufi charismatic leaders performed in facilitating the
acceptance of Sunni Islam (and the concomitant exclusion or minimalization of
Shi'ite
Islam) is undeniable.
Sufism also provided a spur to literary activities. Even in the case of a major Persian poet such
as Hafiz, who was not affiliated with a hospice or attached to a shaikh, the
imagery of mystical Islam added a heightened tone of ambiguity and allurement
to his verse. Many poets, both Persian
and Arab, from the middle period of Islamic history were directly linked to and
inspired by organized Sufi brotherhoods.
Nor did the Mongol devastations bring to an end the literary
productivity of medieval Muslim poets.
Hafiz, one of the greatest Persian poets, lived during the period of
Mongol hegemony. Jami lived in its
aftermath, as did the foremost Chagatay (Eastern Turkish) lyricist, 'Ali Sher Nawa'i.
Achievements within other intellectual traditions, especially astronomy
and historiography, and the flourishing visual arts all attest to the enduring
vitality of Islamic civilization under the Mongols.
***
From the early sixteenth to the early eighteenth century,
the Muslim world was dominated by three extensive and powerful military
patronage states, all reflecting the peculiarly Mongol marriage of dynastic law
to the sharia. The Ottomans
controlled, in addition to their Anatolian homeland, the Balkans as far as Vienna , most of the Middle East, and the northernmost
stretch of Africa from Egypt
to Algeria Iran and a
portion of neighboring Afghanistan
and Pakistan Afghanistan
and Pakistan
Perhaps one of the most remarkable developments of Islam
took place in sub-Saharan Africa . Muslim loyalties became established there
through a gradual process of cultural penetration that proceeded at different
rates in the west, in central Africa, and along the Indian
Ocean coast. As early as
the eleventh century of the Christian Era, Islam had been represented in west
Africa by foreign Muslim residents.
Gradually it had gained local support, until it succeeded in reforming
indigenous customs at will. Later, in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, strong Muslim states were able to
resist the European colonial powers.
Along the east coast of Africa , Islam
had come to dominate the port cities by as early as the twelfth century. Zanzibar and Mogadishu were initial centers
of influence, and the distinctive Swahili culture developed out of the amalgam
of diverse populations and languages. In
the interior, Muslim societies had been threatened by the Ethiopian Christians,
by turbulent nomads, and, beginning in the fifteenth century, by the
Portuguese. Early Sufi influences were
pervasive. However, subsequently they were modified by the Wahhabiya and by the
development of indigenous cultures. In
modern times the sheer demographic growth of African Islam has been
astounding. Throughout the twentieth
century Islam continued to evolve as a major religious and cultural force in
the savannah belt that extends across the continent between desert and forest.
***
It is impossible to appreciate the character of twentieth
century Islam, in Africa , or elsewhere,
without an awareness of the nature of the three major sixteenth and seventeenth
century empires. Ottomans, Safavids, and
Moguls controlled different geographic areas, represented different
constituencies, and advanced different creedal emphases, but they were all
Muslim and they shared many important features.
Each established a court life of stupefying grandeur, impressive even to
European travelers. Each patronized art,
architecture, literature, miniature painting, and religious institutions on a
lavish scale that was never matched by subsequent Muslim rulers. Each state also weathered political and
religious dissidence within its borders during the period of ascendancy. In the eighteenth century all three began to
decline, though at varying points and with disparate outcomes.
The Ottoman was not only the earliest of the three
empires to emerge (in 1299), it also survived the longest (until 1919). The Ottoman Empire expanded from an obscure
thirteenth century kingdom in northwest Anatolia to embrace by 1500 the
heartland of the former Byzantine Empire and its capital, Istanbul
(Constantinople ). The height of its glory was attained under
Selim the Grim, who ruled from 1512 to 1520, and Suleiman the Magnificent, who
ruled from 1520 to 1566. The armies of
these sultans conquered Egypt ,
Syria , Iraq , the coastlands of North Africa and the Red
Sea, the island
of Rhodes Vienna
The Ottomans were staunch proponents of Sunni Islam even
though theirs was a modified form not fully welcomed by their Arab subjects. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
stiffest internal resistance to Ottoman hegemony came from Arabia . Southwest Yemen asserted its independence
from Istanbul Mecca and Medina ,
while acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty, were beholden to Cairo
rather than to Istanbul Arabia
maintained their independence throughout the Ottoman period and in the middle
of the eighteenth century gave birth to a powerful spiritual movement, which
some have compared in force and influence to the rise of Islam itself. The movement became known as the Wahhabiya,
and the puritanical asceticism of the Wahhabiya became a threat to the Ottoman
sultans especially after the Wahhabis took control of Mecca
and Medina Egypt Arabia
for the next few decades, but they once again erupted in the mid-nineteenth
century and again during the first decades of the twentieth century. From their origins, the Wahhabis were allied
with the Saudi royal house and thus have controlled events in post-Ottoman Arabia .
Though their territories were less extensive than the
Ottomans, the Safavids were a major force in determining the mood and course of
Islam. Not only did the Safavids usher
in one of the peak periods in Persian culture and spur the development of an
almost obsessively bureaucratic state.
They also nurtured the first full-scale Muslim polity that espoused
Twelver Shi'ism --
Imamiyya. There was a curious irony in
this development, which has contemporary parallels. Despite the fact that the imperial government
identified with the Shi'ite
cause (which necessarily meant stifling expressions of Sunni loyalism among
religious functionaries, landed aristocracy, and mystics), its own legitimacy
was thrown into question by the fact that institutional Shi'ism, so long an oppositional movement,
had developed its own authorities apart from any government. The Shi'ite 'ulama' or mullahs claimed that only the
most learned and pious among them were fully qualified to interpret the law as mujtahids,
because they alone were in touch with the Hidden Imam. The Safavid monarch also claimed to be a
spokesman for the Hidden Imam, and during the period of Safavid ascendancy his
claim was upheld, at least publicly.
With the decline of Safavid fortunes in the seventeenth century,
however, the Shi'ite
mullahs reasserted their position that the only qualified interpreter of the
law, who was also a direct recipient of guidance from the Hidden Imam, was some
learned and pious member of their own group, chosen by the entire group to
serve as its spokesman. Safavid Shi'ism, therefore, made an inadvertent but
essential contribution to the contemporary Iranian spirituality by exalting the
Shi'ite
concept of Imam and linking it exclusively to a member of the religious
classes.
The Mogul empire, like the Safavid, was more restricted
in territory and wielded less nearly absolute power than the Ottoman. It did, however, witness a unique blend of
Islamic and indigenous values in the person of the greatest Mogul ruler, Akbar
who reigned from 1556 to 1605. Too often
the syncretistic nature of Akbar's
religious beliefs have been stressed, with resulting lack of attention to his
strength as an administrative genius and persuasive codifier of dynastic
law. In that sense, Akbar is most aptly
compared to the foremost Ottoman sultan, Suleiman, and the great Safavid
monarch, Shah 'Abbas,
who reigned from 1587 to 1629. It is
perhaps because of their creating an enduring legal system that each of these
rulers was revered as an exemplary emperor during his lifetime, and
subsequently, when their empires began to decline, that their reigns were
recalled with greatest nostalgia.
***
The decline of the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mogul empires
and the Muslim world in general began in the eighteenth century. This decline cannot be easily or uniformly
charted. It is easy to say, as many
have, that internal factors, such as prolonged inflation, military
conservatism, and political corruption, made the Ottoman downfall inevitable. The blunt fact is that the Ottomans survived
a long time, despite their repeated confrontations with an assertive and
militarily superior European enemy. The
Ottoman navy was destroyed at Lepanto in 1571 and the Ottoman army was
decimated at Zenta in 1698, resulting in the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Nevertheless, the Ottoman
Empire was still fighting and winning wars well into the
eighteenth century. It was only the
Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja in 1774 which shattered the Ottoman image of
themselves as a vigorous, revitalized, invincible empire.
The downfall of the Moguls and Safavids, like that of the
Ottomans, can be tied to particular historical events. In each case downfall was also the result of
underlying shifts in the worldwide balance of economic and military power. During the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, the industrial age in Western Europe
caused spectacular change in commodity production, communication systems, and
military efficiency. Since European
production depended on a simultaneous and accelerated acquisition of new
customers and sources of raw material, market economies expanded and colonial
empires were launched. Commercial
necessity, more than political aggrandizement, military chauvinism, or
missionary zeal, led to the rapid formation of British, French, Portuguese,
Spanish, Italian, and Dutch empires in remote corners of the world. Many of these marketing regions were
Islamic. The Dutch, for instance, carved
out a sphere of influence in non-Muslim South
Africa , as well as in Indonesia
Second, the rise of Europe
augured a weakening of faith in a bedrock tenet of the Muslim world view, that
history was the continuous, progressive affirmation of the truth of Islam. The Ottoman historian Naima relied on the
social analyses of a fourteenth century North African, Ibn Khaldun, to persuade
his countrymen that history has an ebb and flow, that the temporary reversals
suffered by Ottoman arms would be followed by eventual victory. The eighteenth century North Indian
theologian, Shah Wali Allah, interpreted the external decline of Mogul fortunes
as an incentive, indeed a catalyst, to the internal toughening of the Muslim
spirit both within and beyond India
Third, European colonialism brought a direct
confrontation with another universalist missionary faith. The long history of Islamic interaction with
Christianity dates back to the Prophet Muhammad, encompassing the early period of
Muslim expansion and extending through the Crusades. But in each encounter Islam was
victorious. Beginning in the eighteenth
century, however, the Christian missionaries who circulated through various
parts of the Muslim world in the wake of their commercially minded countrymen
represented a superior civilization and polity.
The enormity of that challenge was unprecedented.
The resurgence of Europe
affected only some elements of traditional Muslim societies, namely, the
literate, economically prosperous, militarily dominant, politically powerful
elite. These elite, though at first
resisting colonialism, later accommodated themselves to it. The bulk of Muslims remained untouched by the
European presence in their homelands.
Until the end of the nineteenth century major changes in the public
sphere were evident only in communications, health care, and education. The twentieth century, however, brought two
further technological changes that have affected all Muslims: the discovery and
production of oil, a resource vital to European industrial growth, and the
development of the airplane and automobile.
Added to these has been the unexpected, rapid population growth, due to
reduced infant mortality rates and increased life expectancy. Perhaps most important of the all the
twentieth century European imports, especially for the fragmenting affect it
has wrought on the Muslim world view, has been nationalism.
Following World War I, there was strong sentiment in
support of the pan-Islamic movement, which had particular appeal to Muslim
constituencies in certain regions, such as North India ,
but which had also a universal urgency because it represented a distinctly
Muslim resistance to nationalism. By the
peace settlement of Versailles and other post-World War I conferences, some
Arab kingdoms, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were granted outright
independence as national entities, while others, ironically comprising the most
sophisticated and culturally advanced Muslim populations of the Middle East
(i.e., Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Iran) were carved into
spheres of influence under the League of Nations mandates. Ostensibly, the British, French and Spanish
mandates were created to protect the rights of the disputing ethnic and
religious groups within their purview, but they also allowed the dominant
European nations to divide the spoils of the Allied victory.
Nationalist movements, some predating World War I, spread
throughout the Muslim world as a protest against the colonial presence. Their leaders were the educated and politically
powerful urban elite, but they also succeeded in mobilizing the masses to
support their cause. Not all were caught
up in the tide of nationalism, however, and a few spiritually perceptive,
fervently anti-colonial Muslims rallied behind the pan-Islamic movement as the
last opportunity to reclaim their own identity under a political structure that
was Islamic rather than Western in both inspiration and form. Their efforts failed. The caliphate, which had been the symbolic
focus of the movement was abolished by the new secular ruler of Turkey
The burr of Zionism, the conflict between rival Muslim
factions, and the constant reminder of Western political, military, and
economic superiority all detracted from the appeal of the pan-Islamic
movement. During the hectic interwar
years, a few Muslim countries gained independence as nation states, while
others continued the bitter struggle, until by the mid-1950s only British
colonies in the Arabian peninsula, together with French and Spanish mandates in
North Africa , remained under the direct
foreign rule.
The long struggle for a pan-Islamic movement which has
occupied much of the twentieth century history of Islamic peoples not only in
the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia . However, the pan-Islamic movement is based on
a self-contradictory premise. Islam,
from its origin, has been a religious polity.
A Muslim, unlike a Jew or a Christian, cannot readily separate his
spiritual from his national identity. As
the sharia makes clear, in tone as well as content, the basic vocabulary
of Islamic life is at once religious and political. The mosque and the state are not separable --
they are complementary expressions of the same, single reality. Islam applies to all spheres of life, both
secular and religious.
Thus, nationalism, even Muslim nationalism, will continue
to elicit tensions and pose paradoxes that will continue to riddle Muslim
public behavior and private faith.
It would be wrong to underestimate the resilience of Islam. Amid staggering perplexities, there persist
genuine aspirations for a confident, progressive worldwide Muslim community,
one which would uphold the traditions of the past while adapting to forces of
change. The future of Islam may well lie
not with national political leaders but with the local custodians of the sharia,
the 'ulama'.
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